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The Great University Chicago Trio (Kalven, Rosenfield & Ming) & Their Defense of Lenny Bruce

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Behold People v. Lenny Bruce.  And note his three lawyers who handled the appeal of his obscenity conviction for his performance at the famed Gate of Horn nightclub in Chicago (December 1962):

Harry Kalven & Maurice Rosenfield

Harry Kalven & Maurice Rosenfield

Professor Kalven, the famed First Amendment scholar, had long been critical of the Court’s ruling in Roth v. United States (1957) and its progeny. He aired those reservations in his seminal 1960 Supreme Court Review article titled “The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity.” Thus his interest in People v. Bruce; it presented itself as a test case to reexamine Roth.

William R. Ming, Jr. (credit: U. Chi. archives)

William R. Ming, Jr. (credit: U. Chi. archives)

To help Kalven move from the theoretical to the practical, Kalven collaborated with Maurice Rosenfield and William Ming — two friends, highly reputable lawyers, and colleagues from their University of Chicago Law School days.

Rosenfield, who once co-authored an article with Kalven, was a partner in the law firm of Devoe, Shadur, Mikva, and Plotkin. He had represented Hugh Hefner in the mid-1950s and into the 1960s, and had likewise filed an amicus brief in Roth on behalf of the Authors League of America (Abe Fortas was also on that brief).

Ming was the first African American professor at the University of Chicago Law School. He had been one of Thurgood Marshall’s advisors and worked with Marshall on the Brown v. Board brief (his name was listed between Jack Greenberg and Constance Baker Motley).

There is, to be sure, more to the story, much more.* Suffice it to say that in the end, the trio prevailed when the Illinois Supreme Court ruled in Bruce’s favor.

* See Ronald Collins & David Skover, The Trials of Lenny Bruce (2002), pp. 175-182.

For more on the Chicago connection, see “Laughter & the First Amendment,” Chicago Humanities Festival (Geoffrey Stone, Ron Collins, Judge Diane Wood & Judge William Bauer — introduced by Burt Joseph) (Geof stone was at his comedic best).

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We kill comedians don’t we? — The Lenny Bruce Story

We drove him into poverty and bankruptcy and then murdered him. We all knew what we were doing. We used the law to kill him. — Vincent Cuccia (one of Bruce’s NY prosecutors)

He died before his death. It was apparent that Wednesday (February 9) in 1966 when Lenny Bruce spoke at the Associated Students Speakers’ Program at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). He rambled; he misspoke; he struggled; and, yes, he bombed. Pathetic. That’s one word. Sad. That’s another. Predictable. Yet another word.

In less than six months he would be officially dead. Who could not see it coming?

Lenny Bruce, left (credit: Getty Images)

Lenny Bruce, left (credit: Getty Images)

Bruce was broke, bankrupt, out of work, out of luck, friendless, divorced, depressed, and junked up. It was so bad that shortly before he died he tried to hit up his parole officer for $10. Worse still, he was a criminal—a year or so earlier he had been convicted and sentenced in New York for an “obscene” bit he did at the Cafe au Go Go.

They hunted him in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York. It took its toll: the busts, the prosecutions, the trials, the appeals, and the alienation. And all this for his comedy. He was so taken with his legal plight that he largely abandoned comedy. Besides, by the time he spoke at UCLA no club would hire him. He was a sick and sad comedian, a man waiting to be fitted for a hangman’s noose.

The days of his outrageous humor—“obscene,” “blasphemous,” “sick”—were over. His great comic bits that once pierced the boils of hypocrisy were past tense. He was obsessed with the law; he had a childlike faith in it; and he long thought it would save him. By the time he found himself at UCLA surrounded by students—by that pinpoint in time—he came to a terrifying realization: it was over. Hence, when he spoke of the law, it was like listening to a man with an uncontrollable mental tic—a flick of the head, a fast-and-fleeting flash of an idea, and all capped off with a lunatic’s chuckle.

That day at UCLA much of the laughter was feigned. Or it was an uneasy laughter, an awkward gesture of sympathy. How could it be otherwise? The great Lenny Bruce—the TV and record star, the club star, the well-paid star, and the star of the hip generation—had been reduced to rubble. No wonder he babbled as he tried to speak of free-speech freedom; no surprise that he blathered on as he attempted to discuss the importance of courts and the rule of law; and no wonder it all went south when he sought to make sense of his life at the intersection of despair and destitution.

My point? What people saw that day at UCLA was a Lenny Bruce freak show. But the show, as they say, had to go on . . . and go on it did.

Death changed everything; it would bring Lenny back to life with everlasting applause. It was ironic: death was his best publicity agent. But why?

Because . . .

(Credit: UPI)

(Credit: UPI)

Dead Lenny was no longer a threat to anyone.

Dead Lenny could no longer offend the sensibilities of the righteous.

Dead Lenny was compliant.

That, at least, was the censorial hope. But there was more:

Dead, Lenny the man became Lenny the myth.

Dead, Lenny the uninhibited comedian became a cultural hero.

Dead, Lenny the unruly social commentator became packaged product, and

Dead, Lenny the once bankrupt comic became a cash cow for others

* * * *

It’s true: We feared Lenny alive / yet we love Lenny the dead hero.

Odd the way we turn the First Amendment into a death wish. It is to take a guarantee meant for the living and cram it into a coffin. The result: The censor’s past will likely repeat itself when the next Lenny Bruce comes onto a new life stage.

It is oft repeated: Lenny Bruce is the patron saint of comedians. There is truth there. After all, Lenny Bruce was the last comedian prosecuted and tried for word crimes in a comedy club. He paid the dues, and comedians were the everlasting beneficiaries. Hail Lenny; hail St. Lenny! Okay. But think of it: we canonize a (Jewish) comedian?

“I don’t want to end up like [Lenny Bruce], but I want to be like him.”—Margaret Cho

Which brings me to this question: Why should it be so? Why must we demand dead Lennys? Why not alive Lennys?

Why not celebrate the First Amendment by protecting speech that offends us, repels us, and even unsettles us? Is that asking too much? Perhaps. But that is what the First Amendment asks of us. No joke!

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The Bill of Rights and the Cold War

I’ve been hard at work on my Bill of Rights book (three chapters to go), which explains my recent absence here.  I’ll have more posts coming up shortly, but I did want to mention one part of my ongoing research.

The final chapter of the book is about the Bill of Rights and the Cold War. In a symbolic sense, that connection can be seen in the fact that the original Declaration of Independence, Constitution, and an original parchment of the proposal from the First Congress that became our Bill of Rights were all descend each night into a vault that was designed to survive a nuclear bomb. More interesting, though, is that the party platforms that invoked the Bill of Rights after the Second World War almost always did so in the context of fighting communism.  For instance:

The 1956 GOP Platform: “We hold that the major world issue today is whether Government shall be the servant or the master of men. We hold that the Bill of Rights is the sacred foundation of personal liberty. That men are created equal needs no affirmation, but they must have equality of opportunity and protection of their civil rights under the law.”

The 1960 Democratic Platform: “With democratic values threatened today by Communist tyranny, we reaffirm our dedication to the Bill of Rights. Freedom and civil liberties, far from being incompatible with security, are vital to our national strength.”

I’ll have some more on this as the chapter gets written.

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The Second Amendment: Constructing Racial and Gender Hierarchy

As posts two and three suggest, social justice feminist (SJF) methods illuminate aspects of the Second Amendment’s history that the Court ignored but are essential to understand fully its social meaning.

At ratification, the right to keep and bear arms helped construct notions of citizenship, race, and gender.  Reconstruction challenged those ideas, but failed to dismantle them in the face of hate group terrorism.  Indeed, hostilities such as the Hamburg Massacre illustrate that the right to keep and bear arms was integral to reinforcing white hegemonic masculinity.

SJF shows that the Second Amendment does more than just support patriarchal norms of defending family, home, and hearth. It is a bulwark for the citizen-self, which has been raced and gendered from the founding.  The right to keep and bear arms has served as both a gatekeeper to and symbol of gaining that status.

What does this mean for today?  In the article upon which these posts are drawn, “Guns, Sex, and Race,” I argue that, by ignoring the racial and gender history of the Second Amendment, the Court protected and reinforced intersecting race- and gender-based oppressions as they relate to gun ownership and use.

Consider Stand Your Ground (SYG) laws.  In 31 states, such statutes allow people to use deadly force for self-defense purposes in home or in public with no duty to retreat.  Many of those jurisdictions provide immunity to persons asserting SYG.  The American Bar Association  reported on significant racial disparities it found in surveying these laws last year:  for example, a white shooter of a black victim is 350 times more likely to found justified than a white shooter of a white victim.  The ABA also reported that similar fact patterns yielded drastically different outcomes.

The cases of George Zimmerman and Marissa Alexander, Florida residents who sought refuge under SYG, are useful examples.  As is well known, Zimmerman shot and killed unarmed teenager Trayvon Martin in February 2102.  Police used their discretion not to arrest Zimmerman at the scene because he claimed he had acted in self-defense.  A jury ultimately acquitted him of second degree murder based on instructions that included SYG language.

The same year, Marissa Alexander, an African American woman, was sentenced to 20 years for firing a warning shot in the air out of fear of imminent abuse from her partner, who walked away unharmed.  The court denied Ms. Alexander’s attempt to assert SYG, which an appeals court affirmed.  As Catherine Carpenter has explained, SYG provides no relief for women such as Ms. Alexander defending themselves against battering cohabitants because both parties have an equal right to be the residence.

Race and gender combined powerfully in these cases.  With respect to Zimmerman’s encounter with Martin, they intersected to construct the teen as being a menace, even though he was armed with nothing more than Skittles and iced tea.  For Alexander’s efforts against an abusive partner, on the other hand, patriarchal norms protected the functional or titular head of the household, even when he was posed a real threat to his cohabitant.

Heller and McDonald suggest that the Court’s vision of Second Amendment promotes autonomy and individual rights.  However, as SJF methods demonstrate, by ignoring essential parts of the provision’s text and history, the Court has merely reinforced race- and gender-based barriers.

SJF reveals that the Second Amendment is an issue of concern for feminist legal scholars and advocates. In our efforts to dismantle the intersecting structural barriers confronting too many in our society, gun regulation should be on the agenda.

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Feminist Legal Theorizing about the Second Amendment: (Re)constructing Black Citizens

The previous post in this series explored more deeply the text and context of the Second Amendment that the Supreme Court elided in Heller v. District of Columbia.  I argued that the right to keep and bear arms played a role in constructing “citizen” as white and male.  As I continue to draw upon my forthcoming article, “Guns, Race, and Sex,” this post next examines the Reconstruction era, when Congress repudiated that definition.

The Court examined this period in McDonald v. Chicago, when it held that that Second Amendment applies to the states.  Confining its reading of the narrative to instances in which whites sought to keep guns out of the hands from freed slaves, the majority reasoned that arming the former enslaved was essential to their self-defense, thus supporting the individual right first articulated in Heller.  But, social justice feminism reveals that the McDonald history was superficial and incomplete.

Consider this piece of lost history.

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Feminist Legal Theorizing about the Second Amendment: What Heller Missed

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In my previous post, I suggested that it’s long past time for a feminist analysis of the right to keep and bear arms.  Drawing on my forthcoming article, “Guns, Race, and Sex,” this part follows the Court’s lead in Heller v. McDonald by examining the ratification history of the Second Amendment.

In Heller, the Court split the provision’s text into two parts.  The majority decided that the second (“operative”) clause, supported by the first (“prefatory”) clause, equaled an individual right to possess and carry weapons for self-defense purposes–not limited to militia service.  But closer examination of the Amendment’s terms and the context surrounding its ratification suggests structural purposes extending the individual use of firearms.

Based on their experience dealing with a distant and detached sovereign, among other things, the framers were deeply troubled by the prospect of a standing army.  To them, professional soldiers would be loyal to and help empower central government.  At the same time, they recognized the need for national security.  As a result, the Second Amendment reference to the militia reflects a compromise among the framers to provide for defense, but doing so in a way that would not jeopardize state sovereignty.  Put differently, it’s another check on federal power.  Framers believed that the state’s citizens—local men—would be the best guarantors of peace.  Those men were “the people” the Amendment references, which further suggests that this phrase has structural significance.

Read More

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Feminist Legal Theorizing about the Second Amendment: Gun Violence is a Women’s Issue

Thanks so much, Naomi, for inviting me to blog this month.  It’s really an honor and pleasure to participate in the lively discussion on this forum.

Starting today, concealed weapons will be allowed on college campuses in Texas.  Ironically, this new law goes into effect on the solemn anniversary of the state’s largest mass shooting at none other than its flagship institution, the University of Texas.

More guns.  Just what we need.

After all, there haven’t been enough headlines about Black lives lost at the hands of police, or stunning murders of white police officers as they protected Black Lives Matter protesters.

Please forgive my sarcasm. I’m frustrated.  Before this year is out, I’m sure there will be more tragic slayings, more outpourings of grief and recrimination, but still no movement toward sensible reform of gun laws.

And, amidst the din, there is little to nothing coming from feminist legal circles.

Two summers ago, Nation commentator Dani McClain argued that “the murder of Black youth is a reproductive justice issue.”  Her call to action came to mind when I saw the “Mothers of the Movement” during the Democratic National Convention.  The mother of Jordan Davis, who was shot for playing his music too loud, openly hoped for a time when membership in this “club of heartbroken mothers” would shrink.

I had been puzzling over this issue for a while, struck by the no-regulation-no-time stance of the National Rifle Association.  In the context of reproductive justice, many have argued with success that the state’s interest in potential life trumps women’s fundamental interest in bodily integrity (thankfully, with Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, the Court finally has drawn a line over which states cannot cross).  Imagine if potential gun buyers had to jump through the same hoops as women seeking abortions. As district court judge Myron Thompson stated in Planned Parenthood v. Strange, the legislature would have “a heck of a lot of explaining” to do.

Hypotheticals aside, it doesn’t take much digging to see the gendered and raced aspects of gun violence.  An August 2015 survey by the Ms. Foundation for Women showed that violence is a top concern for women.  Firearms figure prominently in the domestic violence context.  According to the Pew Research Center, gun owners are predominantly male and white—they are 82 % of firearm owners.

So, in the next three blog posts, I accept McClain’s challenge and apply a feminist analysis to the issue of guns in the nation.  Given the medium, the exploration will be brief; but, I discuss it more fully in a forthcoming article upon which my posts are drawn, “Guns, Sex, and Race:  The Second Amendment through a Feminist Lens,” which will be published in the Tennessee Law Review.

The feminist lens that I’m using is one that is intersectional and rooted in feminist legal practice:  social justice feminism (SJF). SJF emerged from practitioners responding to the calls from women of color and other marginalized women to recalibrate the women’s movement with a focus on their needs.  As my colleague Kristin Kalsem and I have explained, SJF is about uncovering and dismantling social and political structures that support patriarchy, while “recognizing and addressing multiple oppressions.” SJF methodologies focus on historical context, structural inequities, intersecting oppressions and underserved populations.  In so doing, they reveal issues liberal feminism might fail to recognize as having gender implications.

SJF’s historical method looks to the past in order identify the roots of structural inequalities and dismantle them.  In this sense, SJF follows in the footsteps of feminist and critical race theory in seeking to uncover lost histories, elevate the experiences of marginalized people, and reveal how traditional historical narratives mask and perpetuate subordination.

In the posts that follow, I will apply this methodology to the Court’s decisions in Heller v. District of Columbia and McDonald v. Chicago, cases that relied heavily on a so-called originalist telling of history.  However, SJF reveals the context omitted by the majorities in both cases—one that helped lay the foundation for a race-and gender-based social hierarchy.

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Guest Blogger – Verna Williams

Verna Williams, Law professor

Verna Williams

I am delighted to introduce Professor Verna Williams as a guest blogger for the month of August.  Professor Williams joined the University of Cincinnati College of Law in 2001 after  many years of practice in the areas of civil and women’s rights.  She co-directs the University’s joint-degree program in Law and Women’s Studies and the Center for Race, Gender, and Social Justice.  Professor Williams teaches in the areas of  critical race theory, family law, gender discrimination, and constitutional law. In 2004 and 2011, she received the Goldman Prize for Teaching Excellence.

Prior to joining the faculty, Professor Williams practiced law in the private and public sectors. She was Vice President and Director of Educational Opportunities at the National Women’s Law Center, where she focused on issues of gender equity in education. During her time at the Center, Professor Williams was lead counsel and successfully argued before the United States Supreme Court Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, which established that educational institutions have a duty to respond to and address complaints of student-to-student sexual harassment. She also practiced at the Department of Justice and at Sidley Austin LLP. Professor Williams began her legal career clerking for the Honorable David S. Nelson, U.S. District Judge for the District of Massachusetts.

Her forthcoming publications include

  • The Patriarchy Prescription: Cure or Containment Strategy? forthcoming, ___ Georgetown J. of Modern Critical Race Perspectives (2016)
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FAN 118.1 (First Amendment News) Seasoned SCOTUS Appellate Lawyer Files Cert. Petition in “Public Official” Defamation Case

Here is what Tony Mauro once said of him: “Few lawyers — including the nine lawyers who wear robes to work — know the Supreme Court’s docket as well as” he does. “He is generally regarded,” observed Georgetown Law Professor Steven Goldblatt,  “as one of the best [Supreme Court lawyers] in the country.”

Roy T. Englert, Jr.

Roy T. Englert, Jr.

His name: Roy T. Englert, Jr. That name is known among those seasoned few in the Supreme Court Bar. He has argued 21 cases before the Court, including United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (1989), a Freedom of Information Act case concerning privacy exemption. He won, this while he was Assistant to the Solicitor General.

Later, when he was at Mayer, Brown & Platt, he filed an amicus brief in United States v. Eichman (1990) (First Amendment challenge to Flag Protection Act of 1989)), this on behalf of Senator Joesph Biden, Jr. and in support of the Petitioner. There is, of course, more, much more.

One of Mr. Englert’s latest cert. filings is in Armstrong v. Thompson, submitted earlier this month. The issue in the case is whether all (or nearly all) law enforcement officers are “public officials” under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964). Here is how his cert. petition opens:

“This case presents a recurring First Amendment question: whether a garden-variety law enforcement officer, with little or no role in setting public policy, must establish ‘actual malice’ to recover for harm caused by tortious statements. A number of Circuits and state courts of last resort—where many issues relating to the First Amendment and defamation are decided—have held that every law enforcement officer is a ‘public official’ under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. Accordingly, those courts, including the court below, require each and every law enforcement officer to show ‘actual malice’ before recovering for any tort carried out through speech. In this case, despite an otherwise-error-free trial resulting in a jury verdict establishing that respondent had committed an established common-law tort, the court of appeals joined those courts and reversed on federal constitutional grounds after determining that Armstrong was a public official and that he had failed to prove ‘actual malice.'”

 Later, he argues that the “Court has . . . never determined how far down the government ranks the ‘actual malice’ standard applies. It has, however, unequivocally stated that not every public employee is a ‘public official.’ Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 119 n.8 (1979). And it has made clear that the category ought to be limited to ‘those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.’ Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966); accord Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (equating ‘public official’ with someone who has “accepted public office’).”

Furthermore, Mr. Englert maintains that a “number of state courts have taken heed and held that low-ranking law enforcement officers are not public officials for purposes of the First Amendment. Kiesau v. Bantz (Iowa 2004); McCusker v. Valley News (N.H. 1981); Tucker v. Kilgore (Ky. 1964). Nevertheless, until 2013, there was an ‘overwhelming and entirely one-sided’ consensus among federal courts of appeals (as well as a number of other state courts) that ‘police officers are public officials for defamation purposes’—regardless of rank or role—because ‘there is a strong societal interest in protecting expression that criticizes law enforcement officers.’ Young, 734 F.3d at 553-54 (Moore, J. dissenting). In 2013, the Sixth Circuit stated (albeit in dicta) that courts holding the ‘consensus’ view ‘have misinterpreted federal law on the issue.’ Id. at 549 (opinion of the court). . . .”

“Certain state courts,” he notes, “have developed their own idiosyncratic, fact-based inquiries into whether police officers are public officials. . . .”

“Finally, there are courts that have (correctly) determined that there is nothing talismanic about the designation of ‘law enforcement.’ These courts have applied to ‘law enforcement’ employees the same rule that they would to any other government employee.” . . . . “

In light ion the above, Mr. Englert urged the Justices to “establish a clear rule that low-level law officers are not ‘public officials.'”

Other counsel for the Petitioner are: Lanora C. Pettit and Peter B. Siegal.

The time for filing on a response is on or before September 6, 2016.

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FAN 118 (First Amendment News) University of Cape Town Disinvites Flemming Rose — Floyd Abrams Dissents

Note: Below is a heretofore unpublished letter from Floyd Abrams. It follows another one recently posted on this blog by Professor Nadine Strossen. Vice-Chancellor Max Price, to whom both letters were primarily directed, was invited to reply. (Links have been added for reference purposes.) 

* * * *

July 24, 2016

Dear Vice-Chancellor Price:

I am a practicing lawyer in the United States who has devoted the better part of my professional career to defending freedom of expression. I am also a Visiting Lecturer at the Yale Law School, have written two books and many articles about freedom of expression around the world, and have spoken about the topic in a number of nations including, by way of example, India, Japan, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Great Britain and—of particular relevance—South Africa. I was one of a number of foreign scholars who participated in advising the drafters of the South African Constitution. I have spoken about issues relating to freedom of expression in Johannesburg, Cape Town and Pretoria. I have read your statement about the decision of University of Cape Town to withdraw the invitation to Flemming Rose to deliver this year’s  TB Davie Memorial Lecture. I take the liberty of writing this letter to you because your decision is not only of consequence to your university and to your country but to democratic nations and universities in them throughout the world.

Floyd Abrams

I would like to make two brief observations at the outset.

The first is that I am not writing to you to urge you to adopt or to apply American standards in deciding who may be invited. As your statement correctly observed, the framers of your Constitution quite deliberately adopted a general right of free expression subject to certain specific limitations relating to propaganda for war, incitement of imminent violence, and “advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.”

The second is that I am not writing to suggest that the cancellation by a university of an invitation to speak made to a  prominent  public figure is unique to South Africa. Quite the opposite is true. In the United States, a number of invitations have been made and then withdrawn by universities to prominent individuals including a former Secretary of State and the current head of the International Monetary Fund after protests were feared if the speaker was permitted to offer her views. Indeed, it is precisely because of my strong belief that the decisions of those American universities—and there are many of them– were so shameful and so contrary to basic principles of academic freedom that I take the liberty of writing to you.

UnknownAt the outset, nothing in the South African Constitution lends any support to your decision. Nothing that Mr. Rose has ever said can possibly be said to constitute propaganda for war. He has never urged violence against anyone or sought to incite it. Your statement observes that “Mr. Rose is regarded by many around the world as … someone whose statements . . . possibly amount to hate speech.”. I appreciate and honor your unwillingness to say that you credit any such an insupportable charge. But if you are unwilling to do so—and there is no basis for doing so—you can hardly rely on the notion of incitement as a basis for cancelling the invitation. I note in that respect that even the clause of the South African Constitution that limits free speech protection to advocacy of racial hatred or the like does so only when the speech at issue “constitutes incitement to cause harm”.

Writing from afar, I cannot comment specifically on your expressed concern about the security risks of permitting Mr. Rose to appear except to say that your nation, as mine, has experienced security risks in the past and when aware of them has been able to protect speakers and listeners alike. The security question is not whether it can be provided; it is whether freedom of speech on your campus is so important that it is worth doing so, with all its risks. Your Academic Freedom Committee obviously thought it was. From any perspective that honors academic freedom, that is a necessary conclusion.

Dr. Max Price

Dr. Max Price

The same is true of your stated concern that inviting Mr. Rose may have the perverse effect of limiting rather than vindicating academic freedom since he “represents a provocatively—potentially violently—divisive view.” Of course, Mr. Rose himself offers provocative views. I am sure that is why he was invited. But he hardly “represents” a “potentially violently” view about anything. The risk of violence is at all not from him but from those who simply do not accept core notions of freedom of expression and academic freedom. To yield to those who cannot abide freedom of expression that they find abhorrent is to abjectly surrender to them.

There remains the first basis articulated by you for rescinding the invitation to Mr. Rose—concern about provoking conflict on campus. It is, I am well aware, awfully easy for people thousands of miles away from your campus and whose views you have not sought, to presume to advise you that even if there is a risk of conflict on your campus that follows or accompanies a speech by Mr. Rose, it is one worth accepting. Who needs, you may well ask, such second-guessers? All I can say is that those of us who weigh in on the issue from abroad do so because we care about your country, are impressed by its Constitution, and are often in awe of your Supreme Court and its liberty-protecting rulings. We also offer our views because the decision to disinvite by your great institution is one that will be viewed carefully by academic institutions around the world as they decide how to respond in similar circumstances.

The very first TB Davie Memorial Lecture was delivered by Chief Justice Centlivres, the Chancellor of your university, on May 6, 1959. He then summarized what he characterized as Professor’s Davie’s “articles of faith” as follows: “The first was that a university is primarily a centre of learning, the second that a university flourishes only in an atmosphere of absolute intellectual freedom, and the third, that the pre-eminent virtue of university life is intellectual integrity,.” Guided by those precepts, it is difficult to understand or accept the cancellation of Mr. Rose’s appearance.

Respectfully submitted,

Floyd Abrams

_______________________________________________________

News Update: Michael Cardo, UCT: A tale of two lecturers, PoliticsWeb, July 25, 2016 (“This coming weekend, the University of Cape Town will host Hamza Tzortzis, a highly controversial lecturer who propagates a radical version of Islam. His visit to the campus follows hot on the heels of an executive decision to bar Danish journalist Flemming Rose from delivering the 2016 TB Davie Memorial Lecture on academic freedom.”)