Tagged: technology

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University of Toronto Law Journal Vol. 68, No. supplement 1

 

Special Issue: Artificial Intelligence, Technology, and the Law

University of Toronto Law JournalVolume 68, No. S1 

Articles: 

Introduction: Artificial intelligence, technology, and the lawSimon Stern

Law as computation in the era of artificial legal intelligence: Speaking law to the power of statisticsMireille Hildebrandt

Warming up to inscrutability: How technology could challenge our concept of lawBrian Sheppard 

Prediction, persuasion, and the jurisprudence of behaviourism – Frank PasqualeGlyn Cashwel

Transformative legal technology and the rule of law – Paul Gowder

How artificial intelligence will affect the practice of lawBenjamin AlarieAnthony NiblettAlbert H Yoon

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FAN 173.1 (First Amendment News) ROBOTICA EROTICA — Robotic Strippers Dance in Las Vegas

To suggest that the state can regulate robot dancers because they may stir erotic feelings is to say that the government may control the imagination. — Robert Corn-Revere

Dateline Pornotopia. The very thought of it would have made Doctor Freud blush, this new pleasure-principle frontier. As for Anthony Comstock, he would be in moral shock. What about Aldous Huxley? He would have said, “This is something right out of my Brave New World.” And most assuredly Professor Fred Schauer would view such eroticized acts as well beyond the First Amendment pale of protection. Then there is The Death of Discourse (1996), which predicted that the new technologies would serve the libido of future generations.

Well, make of it what you will, but it is nonetheless now a fact: Robotic strippers have come to Las Vegas at the 50th Consumer Electronics Show. Side-by-side with real dancers, the robotic strippers gyrate with erotic pulsation.  (Video here).

MANDEL NGAN/AFP/Getty Images

As reported by Kurt Wagner of CNBC: “The Sapphire Gentleman’s Club, a strip club right off Vegas’s main drag, paid to showcase the robots as a way to drum up interest from press and customers. . . . The robots were as advertised: They gyrated on a stripper pole to music from 50 Cent and Pharrell, with dollar bills scattered on the stage and the floor. A half-dozen human dancers, most of whom were dressed in tight, shiny robot costumes, repeatedly took pics in front of their metallic colleagues.”

Giles Walker (Islington Tribune)

Inventor: “They’re the work,” adds Wagner, “of an artist named Giles Walker, a 50-year-old Brit who describes himself as a scrap metal artist with a passion for building animatronic robots. One of his other projects, The Last Supper, features 13 robots interacting around a table.”

“Walker says he got the idea for pole-dancing robots more than seven years ago, when he noticed the rise of CCTV cameras being used as a way to surveil people in Britain for safety purposes, what he called ‘mechanical peeping Toms.’ He was inspired by the idea of voyeurism, or watching others for pleasure, and decided to try and turn the cameras into something sexy on their own.”

So, are these robots art? Well, they could be.  Again, consider Corn-Revere’s reply to this question: “If stationary sculptures are expressive art that the First Amendment protects – and they are – then moving sculptures can be as well.”

Question: what does this all portend for the future of eroticized expression and the First Amendment? For openers, consider Collins & Skover, Robotica: Speech Rights & Artifical Intelligence (Cambridge University Press, June 2018) —  Robotica Erotica may be the sequel.  Stay tuned!

Robot Lady (credit: Salon)

Nude Dancing: Assuming that erotic robotic dancing is covered under the First Amendment, might a state either ban or regulate such dancing? Recall in this regard the line of First Amendment cases ranging from Schad v. Mount Ephraim (1981) to Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. (1991) to City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. (1986) to Erie v. Pap’s A.M. (2000).

See also, David Hudson, “Nude Dancing,” First Amendment Online Library (“Nude dancing is a form of expressive conduct that when restricted, requires First Amendment review. However, the Supreme Court has upheld restrictions on totally nude dancing based on the secondary effects doctrine. Thus, in many cities and counties, dancers must don a modicum of clothing, arguably tempering their erotic messages.”)

Sex Toys?: Are such erotic bots akin to “sex toys” such that they might not qualify for any First Amendment protection? Consider Noah Feldman, Courts playing with the constitutionality of sex toys, Chicago Tribune, August 4, 2016 (“There’s no constitutional right to sex toys — yet. That’s according to a federal appeals court, which declined to strike down a Georgia city’s ordinance that prohibits selling sexual aids. But the three-judge panel invited the full court to rehear the case and strike down the law, stating that it was “sympathetic” to the claim but constrained by precedent. Eventually, the right to sex toys is likely to be accepted in all jurisdictions, as it already is in some. The basis will be the right to sexual intimacy recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in the landmark 2003 case Lawrence v. Texas. And that raises a question about the evolving nature of constitutional rights: How did we get here? How does a decision framed around the autonomous right of two people to create an intimate sexual relationship come to cover access to toys? And should it?”) See Flanigan’s Enterprises v. City of Sandy Springs Georgia (11th Cir., en banc, Aug. 24, 2017).

Related

Meet “Harmony” – the sex robot with a Scottish accent (considerably more “appealing” than her Las Vegas mechanical counterparts) (YouTube video here)

→ Aurora Snow, Sex Robots Are Here, and They’re Incredibly Lifelike. But Are They Dangerous?, The Daily Beast, July 22, 2017

→ Eric Lieberman, Sex Robots Are Here And Could Change Society Forever, The Libertarian Republic, July 17, 2017

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Computable Contracts Explained – Part 1

Computable Contracts Explained – Part 1

I had the occasion to teach “Computable Contracts” to the Stanford Class on Legal Informatics recently.  Although I have written about computable contracts here, I thought I’d explain the concept in a more accessible form.

I. Overview: What is a Computable Contract?

What is a Computable Contract?   In brief, a computable contract is a contract that a computer can “understand.” In some instances, computable contracting enables a computer to automatically assess whether the terms of a contract have been met.

How can computers understand contracts?  Here is the short answer (a more in-depth explanation appears below).  First, the concept of a computer “understanding” a contract is largely a metaphor.   The computer is not understanding the contract at the same deep conceptual or symbolic level as a literate person, but in a more limited sense.  Contracting parties express their contract in the language of computers – data – which allows the computer to reliably identify the contract components and subjects.  The parties also provide the computer with a series of rules that allow the computer to react in a sensible way that is consistent with the underlying meaning of the contractual promises.

Aren’t contracts complex, abstract, and executed in environments of legal and factual uncertainty?  Some are, but some aren’t. The short answer here is that the contracts that are made computable don’t involve the abstract, difficult or relatively uncertain legal topics that tend to occupy lawyers.  Rather (for the moment at least), computers are typically given contract terms and conditions with relatively well-defined subjects and determinable criteria that tend not to involve significant legal or factual uncertainty in the average case.

For this reason, there are limits to computable contracts: only small subsets of contracting scenarios can be made computable.  However, it turns out that these contexts are economically significant. Not all contracts can be made computable, but importantly, some can.

Importance of Computable Contracts 

There are a few reasons to pay attention to computable contracts.   For one, they have been quietly appearing in many industries, from finance to e-commerce.  Over the past 10 years, for instance, many modern contracts to purchase financial instruments (e.g. equities or derivatives) have transformed from traditional contracts, to electronic, “data-oriented” computable contracts.   Were you to examine a typical contract to purchase a standardized financial instrument these days, you would find that it looked more like a computer database record (i.e. computer data), and less like lawyerly writing in a Microsoft Word document.

Computable contracts also have new properties that traditional, English-language, paper contracts do not have.  I will describe this in more depth in the next post, but in short, computable contracts can serve as inputs to other computer systems.  These other systems can take computable contracts and do useful analysis not readily done with traditional contracts. For instance, a risk management system at a financial firm can take computable contracts as direct inputs for analysis, because, unlike traditional English contracts, computable contracts are data objects themselves.

II. Computable Contracts in More Detail

Having had a brief overview of computable contracts, the next few parts will discuss computable contracts in more detail.

A. What is a Computable Contract?

To understand computable contracts, it is helpful to start with a simple definition of a contract generally. 

A contract (roughly speaking) is a promise to do something in the future, usually according to some specified terms or conditions, with legal consequences if the promise is not performed.   For example, “I promise to sell you 100 shares of Apple stock for $400 per share on January 10, 2015.”

computable contract is a contract that has been deliberately expressed by the contracting parties in such a way that a computer can:

1) understand what the contract is about;

2) determine whether or not the contract’s promises have been complied with (in some cases).

How can a computer “understand” a contract, and how can compliance with legal obligations be “computed” electronically?

To comprehend this, it is crucial to first appreciate the particular problems that computable contracts were developed to address.

Read More

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Stanford Law Review Online: Software Speech

Stanford Law Review

The Stanford Law Review Online has just published a Note by Andrew Tutt entitled Software Speech. Tutt argues that current approaches to determining when software or speech generated by software can be protected by the First Amendment are incorrect:

When is software speech for purposes of the First Amendment? This issue has taken on new life amid recent accusations that Google used its search rankings to harm its competitors. This spring, Eugene Volokh coauthored a white paper explaining why Google’s search results are fully protected speech that lies beyond the reach of the antitrust laws. The paper sparked a firestorm of controversy, and in a matter of weeks, dozens of scholars, lawyers, and technologists had joined the debate. The most interesting aspect of the positions on both sides—whether contending that Google search results are or are not speech—is how both get First Amendment doctrine only half right.

He concludes:

By stopping short of calling software “speech,” entirely and unequivocally, the Court would acknowledge the many ways in which software is still an evolving cultural phenomenon unlike others that have come before it. In discarding tests for whether software is speech on the basis of its literal resemblance either to storytelling (Brown) or information dissemination (Sorrell), the Court would strike a careful balance between the legitimate need to regulate software, on the one hand, and the need to protect ideas and viewpoints from manipulation and suppression, on the other.

Read the full article, Software Speech at the Stanford Law Review Online.

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Stanford Law Review Online: How the War on Drugs Distorts Privacy Law

Stanford Law Review

The Stanford Law Review Online has just published an Essay by Jane Yakowitz Bambauer entitled How the War on Drugs Distorts Privacy Law. Professor Yakowitz analyzes the opportunity the Supreme Court has to rewrite certain privacy standards in Florida v. Jardines:

The U.S. Supreme Court will soon determine whether a trained narcotics dog’s sniff at the front door of a home constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. The case, Florida v. Jardines, has privacy scholars abuzz because it presents two possible shifts in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. First, the Court might expand the physical spaces rationale from Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in United States v. Jones. A favorable outcome for Mr. Jardines could reinforce that the home is a formidable privacy fortress, protecting all information from government detection unless that information is visible to the human eye.

Alternatively, and more sensibly, the Court may choose to revisit its previous dog sniff cases, United States v. Place and Illinois v. Caballes. This precedent has shielded dog sniffs from constitutional scrutiny by finding that sniffs of luggage and a car, respectively, did not constitute searches. Their logic is straightforward: since a sniff “discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item,” a search incident to a dog’s alert cannot offend reasonable expectations of privacy. Of course, the logical flaw is equally obvious: police dogs often alert when drugs are not present, resulting in unnecessary suspicionless searches.

She concludes:

Jardines offers the Court an opportunity to carefully assess a mode of policing that subjects all constituents to the burdens of investigation and punishment, not just the “suspicious.” Today, drug-sniffing dogs are unique law enforcement tools that can be used without either individualized suspicion or a “special needs” checkpoint. Given their haphazard deployment and erratic performance, police dogs deserve the skepticism many scholars and courts have expressed. But the wrong reasoning in Jardines could fix indefinitely an assumption that police technologies and civil liberties are always at odds. This would be unfortunate. New technologies have the potential to be what dogs never were—accurate and fair. Explosive detecting systems may eventually meet the standards for this test, and DNA-matching and pattern-based data mining offer more than mere hypothetical promise. Responsible use of these emerging techniques requires more transparency and even application than police departments are accustomed to, but decrease in law enforcement discretion is its own achievement. With luck, the Court will find a search in Jardines while avoiding a rule that reflexively hampers the use of new technologies.

Read the full article, How the War on Drugs Distorts Privacy Law by Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, at the Stanford Law Review Online.