Category: Supreme Court

6

Felix Frankfurter

In teaching con law this semester, I was struck by something that crosses my mind every so often. Felix Frankfurter was obviously an influential teacher, scholar, political advisor, and judge.  He was also a fearless advocate for liberal causes in situations such as the Sacco and Vanzetti case.

At the risk of incurring the wrath of Harvard, though, he was a terrible writer.  I wince every time I have to read one of his opinions.  They’re often meandering, filled with irrelevant commentary, and hard to understand.  His academic prose, unfortunately, isn’t any better.  (His colleague Robert H. Jackson blows him away in this respect.)

Indeed, I’d be hard pressed to name a single Frankfurter opinion that is influential today.

5

Justice Arthur Goldberg

In some recent research, I’ve been struck by the high quality of Justice Arthur Goldberg’s opinions during his three years on the Court (from 1962-1965).  In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States and Griswold v. Connecticut, for example, he wrote separate opinions that were more insightful than what the Court produced. His memo in Harper v. Board of Elections was much better than Justice Douglas’ opinion.  And he was the first Justice to raise constitutional questions about the death penalty.  (Justice Breyer was Goldberg’s clerk; so was Alan Dershowitz).

Unfortunately, Justice Goldberg allowed himself to be talked into resigning to become our Ambassador to the UN.  Lyndon Johnson, who was famous for his ability to persuade, wanted to put Abe Fortas on the Court and convinced Goldberg that the path to the White House rested with success at the UN.  (Writing that line just reinforces how absurd LBJ’s pitch was.) He also made some sort of empty promise to put Goldberg back on the Court if that didn’t work out.

Justice Goldberg resigned from the Court when he was just 57.  He lived until 1990, which suggests that under normal circumstances he would have served on the Court for more than two decades.  It’s fair to say that he’s probably the last Justice who will leave the bench to take another government post.

6

A Few Preliminary Thoughts on Snyder v. Phelps

This morning the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751, holding that a military funeral protest by the Fred Phelps’ Westboro Baptist Church was protected by the First Amendment, and did not give rise to civil liability under the state law torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), invasion of privacy, or civil conspiracy.  The case has generated a lot of media attention, in part because it offered a chance to see whether the Roberts Court would continue its trend of retaining or expanding strong First Amendment protections.  (In United States v. Stevens 130 S.Ct. 1577 (2010), which I blogged about here last year, the Court claimed fidelity to the existing structures of First Amendment law, even though it seems to have expanded corporate speech protections in Citizens United 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010), and cut back on incitement doctrine in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705 (2010)).  Snyder v. Phelps is also notable because the defendant, Fred Phelps, is possibly the most unappealing First Amendment claimant that has made it to the Supreme Court.  In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court upheld the funeral protest, essentially holding that speech on matters of public concern made peaceably in a public space receives protection even if it causes significant psychological and emotional harm.  As the Chief Justice concluded:

Speech is powerful.  It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict great pain.  On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker.   As a Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to  ensure that we do not stifle public debate.  That choice requires that we shield Westboro from tort liability for its picketing in this case.

There is a lot to say about this important decision, but a few preliminary observations struck me as especially interesting.  First, the holding in the case seems to be correct, at least as a matter of fidelity to existing First Amendment precedent.  In Falwell v. Flynt, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), the Court held that IIED suits by public figures had to satisfy the protective actual malice standard of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), continuing the trend of First Amendment cases protecting speech on matters of public concern even if they caused emotional injury.  Some observers thought that Snyder was a chance for the Court to halt the trend, since Snyder, the plaintiff in this case, was merely the father of an ordinary soldier killed while serving in Iraq and not a public figure.  What’s interesting about today’s opinion is that the Court sidestepped this question entirely, holding that the nature of the speech was a matter of public concern and thus protected.  The Court held that the Church’s rather distasteful message – that God hates America and is punishing it for its tolerance of homosexuality, particularly in the armed forces – was principally a commentary on public affairs rather than a private act of harassment against the Snyder family.  Again, this is consistent with the broad theme of modern First Amendment law that speech on matters of public concern (especially politics) is entitled to very strong protection, and cannot be regulated or made the subject of civil liability even when (like this speech) it is both offensive to many and causes significant harm.

The second aspect of this case that’s notable is what it says about tort liability and free speech.  Dan Solove and I have argued (here) that torts are most threatening to the First Amendment when they allow the state to control the content of public debate.  Snyder is certainly consistent with that theory, and it seems to all but rule out liability for IIED when the speech at issue is about a matter of public concern.  The Court also ruled that the invasion of privacy (intrusion upon seclusion) claim for funeral disruption violated the First Amendment because the speech was protected, and the captive audience doctrine did not save Snyder’s claim.  The invasion of privacy claim is odd, because it seems that the district court in this case mis-applied Maryland law.  Although the intrusion upon seclusion tort would be violated (and probably could to impose liability constitutionally) if a protestor disrupted a funeral by entering a church or menacing a gravesite, those facts weren’t present here.  (In fact, the concurrence by Judge Shedd at the Fourth Circuit level made exactly this point, but the point wasn’t preserved on appeal).  So in reality, the invasion of privacy claim boils down to something like “you hurt my feelings when you picketed the funeral from a public place”; in other words, a classic IIED claim.

There are thus lots of questions about the relationship between tort liability and free speech that the Court refused to decide and remain open.  For instance, the Court tells us that speech on “matters of public concern” is protected, which it defines as “a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public.”  But it doesn’t define private speech, so we don’t really know how broad the “public speech” category is.  Presumably, because the Court uses a kind of “enquiring minds want to know” standard, it’s a rather broad category, but it’s hard to be sure from this opinion.  The Court does hint in a couple of places that personally directed harassment, speech to a small number of people, and the publication of someone else’s sex tape would be “private speech” and more readily amenable to regulation based on their content.  In addition, the Court refused to rule on a second IIED claim, one arising from a post on the Church’s website that described the funeral protest in detail.  The court noted only that “an Internet posting may raise distinct issues in this context,” and declined to rule on the question.  This allows the possibility that the Court could create a separate category of cyber-harassment, though given the overall tenor of the opinion, I think this possibility is unlikely to occur in practice.  It is interesting to see the Court treading warily in the Internet speech context, however.

The third notable aspect of this case is Justice Alito’s dissent.  Last year in Stevens, he dissented from the Court’s protection of animal cruelty videos, apparently on the ground that certain images are so horrible that society can regulate them.  Today, he also seemed outraged by the emotionally harmful nature of the Church’s protest, and would have allowed the state to regulate the protest by holding that the tort actions weren’t protected by the First Amendment.  Alito seems willing to approve a per se rule that funerals call for special sensitivity and special protection against “emotional assaults.”  But reading this opinion together with his Stevens dissent, it appears that Justice Alito is the most willing member of the current Court to allow regulation of speech based upon its morally objectionable nature or its emotionally harmful content.  It will be interesting to see how he rules the next time the Court hears a hate speech case, if only to test his fidelity to this principle.  If his vote in that future case is consistent with his vote today, Justice Alito may be the best friend of anyone who seeks a broader protection against hate speech and other words that wound.

Finally, although the case is something of a victory for orthodox free speech theory, there is one note of concern for free speech advocates, which is the opinion’s toleration of “free speech zone” theory.  The opinion notes with approval that the funeral protest took place from a free speech zone from behind a protective fence, and notes at the end that even though Phelps’ speech was protected, it would certainly be amenable to possibly aggressive time, place, and manner restriction.  If, as Tim Zick suggests in his excellent recent book Speech Out of Doors, spatial tactics have become the new frontier of free speech protection, Snyder v. Phelps possibly moves us even further in that direction, for all of its protection of the funeral protest at issue.  So the real message to states from Snyder v. Phelps might be not that lots of speech is protected, but as a blueprint for ways to regulate lots of speech in the future.

0

UCLA Law Review Vol. 58, Issue 3 (February 2011)

Volume 58, Issue 3 (February 2011)


Articles

Good Faith and Law Evasion Samuel W. Buell 611
Making Sovereigns Indispensable: Pimentel and the Evolution of Rule 19 Katherine Florey 667
The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences Jennifer L. Mnookin et al. 725
Commentary on The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences Joseph P. Bono 781
Commentary on The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences Judge Nancy Gertner 789
Commentary on The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences Pierre Margot 795


Comments

What’s Your Position? Amending the Bankruptcy Disclosure Rules to Keep Pace With Financial Innovation Samuel M. Kidder 803
Defendant Class Actions and Patent Infringement Litigation Matthew K. K. Sumida 843


8

Pop Quiz on Contracts and Arbitration

This is a pop quiz, suitable for any lawyer plus students and teachers of contracts and arbitration–and anyone interested in the immense power and discretion of the United States Supreme Court. The facts are:

Buyer and Seller sign a contract for the sale of goods. It says “any disputes arising under the contract shall be submitted to arbitration.” To finance its business, Seller transfers the contract to Bank, saying Seller “assigns the contract” to Bank. Buyer pays Bank the purchase price and later finds the goods defective. It files a claim in arbitration against Bank, which Bank resists.

Who wins the dispute over arbitration, Bank or Buyer, under: (a) New York contract law, (b) general contract law applicable in many states, as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, and (c) federal arbitration law?

(a) Under New York contract law, Bank wins.  Bank is not bound to the arbitration clause because, under century-old New York contract law applicable to assignments, assignees assume only such duties as they expressly accept.  The language of assignment, “assigns the contract,” does not manifest that Bank intended to accept any duties, including any duty to arbitrate.

(b) Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Buyer wins.  It has long stated the presumption opposite that of New York: ambiguous contractual expressions of assignment, such as “assigns the contract,” are deemed both an assignment of rights and an assumption of duties. (A caveat applies to land sale contracts, which nods to the New York law presumption requiring express assumption of duties.)

(c) Under federal arbitration law, Read More

3

The Supreme Court Justices at the Bar of Politics

I had the pleasure of reading Noah Feldman’s Scorpions this past weekend. It’s an entertaining book, and does a great job relating the judicial and political machinations of Justices Black, Douglas, Frankfurter, and Jackson. The judicial machinations are familiar, but I suspect that for many readers the  extent of the Justices’ direct and ongoing involvement in politics–and not only through their rulings–will come as a bit of a surprise, especially given the widespread hand-wringing about how today’s Court is “political.” However justified that hand-wringing may be, I doubt I’m alone in thinking it unimaginable that any of the current or recently retired Justices would use a seat on the Court as a stepping stone to some other political position. That said, I’m not entirely sure why.

Read More

2

A Dozen SCOTUS Anti-Contract Arbitration Rules

As noted in a recent post, since the 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court in dozens of decisions has decided that the country has a national policy favoring arbitration over litigation. It discerns that policy from a 1925 statute that expresses no such national policy.

The Court’s injection of federal power into territory long the prerogative of the states has been heavily criticized for many years, especially by Prof. Schwartz.  Scholars debate the legitimacy of its jurisprudence from the perspectives of statutory interpretation, federalism, and the relative fairness or efficacy of arbitration compared to litigation.

Less attention has been given to contract law issues in the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence. True, some scholars (like Prof. Ware and Prof. Rau) identify doctrinal infirmities or puzzles in the Court’s cases. Some, especially Prof. Ware, have noted how the Court’s talk of the contractual basis of arbitration is sometimes at odds with the jurisprudence it lays down. But this contribution to the literature compared to other aspects seems both more muted and less comprehensive.

As noted in the linked post, the Court routinely announces things like “arbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion.” (Volt 1989, Rehnquist.)   But the body of rules it has established demonstrates a greater degree of federal judicial coercion than traditional consensual freedom manifest in the common law of contacts.

I’ve identified a dozen examples—general and specific—of occasions when the Court’s federal arbitration jurisprudence is at odds with the common law of contracts. The discrepancies include overt commitments the Court has made to the federal policy; covert values the Court has injected into its policy; and more narrow but surprising misstatements of the common law of contracts. Read More

2

The Supreme Court’s Social Control Disguised as Freedom

Look at the contracts governing your cell phone service, credit card, home loan, and many other consumer items, and even your employment agreement: a large percentage will include a boilerplate clause saying you are bound to arbitrate any disputes that may arise, waiving any day in court.   Look at many business contracts and you’ll see the same thing.

Thanks to forty years of expansionist U.S. Supreme Court precedents, those clauses will be taken literally and enforced, as a matter of federal law.   That’s so even if basic principles of state contract law would otherwise invalidate the contract and the clause.  

The Court led the country to this position beginning in 1984 by tortured interpretations of a 1920s federal statute making federal law on arbitration paramount. The Court compounded that error in a series of equally contorted later interpretations that nearly foreclose any contract-law objection to such clauses.   The Court has been roundly rebuked for its 1984 decision but, among active Justices, all but Thomas seem agreed that there is no turning back.

The Court’s manipulation of the old statute, whose purpose was to make state law applicable in federal court not the opposite, seemed initially driven by desire to reduce the work load of federal and state courts.  Arbitration was a release valve for overworked courts.   Though many justices–including Black, O’Connor, Rehnquist–found that repugnant on federalism grounds, some libertarian types find it appealing as a way to privatize dispute resolution.

Read More

3

Does the Roberts Court Have a First Amendment Agenda?

Commentators sometimes study the Supreme Court’s certiorari grants over short periods to discern patterns that suggest an agenda. There are different types of agendas. Some Justices may have a substantive agenda to expand, contract, or change the approach to an area of constitutional doctrine or other federal law. A different agenda might be to clarify or further develop an area of law, but not have a particular direction in mind. That is, the goal simply may be clarity.

Sometimes an agenda may be the product of external events, such as the Court’s foray into limits on executive powers growing out of government actions to address terrorist threats after 9/11 (though, as Fred Schauer argues, the Court’s approach to case selection does not always mirror the nation’s governance priorities). At other times, it might occur internally. It would not be wild to suggest that a majority of the Rehnquist Court consciously wanted to alter the landscape of federalism by reviewing several Commerce Clause and state sovereignty cases over the span of just a few terms.

Recently, there is evidence that the Roberts Court has some sort of First Amendment agenda, but it’s not at all clear what that agenda is. Three times in the last two terms, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review a First Amendment case in which the government has argued for a new exception to the presumptive rule against government regulation of speech based on its content. Last term, the Court heard United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1477 (2010), a challenge to a conviction under a federal law prohibiting the knowing creation, sale, or possession of a depiction of animal cruelty for commercial gain. This term, the Court has already heard argument in Snyder v. Phelps, a case arguing for an exception for emotionally harmful protests outside of funerals, and Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchants Association, a case suggesting a possible exception for regulation of the sale of extremely violent video games to minors.

Though this is an oversimplification, it is generally still valid to describe basic First Amendment analysis as establishing a presumption against government regulation based on the content of the speech (content can include viewpoint, subject matter, and arguably other categories). Exceptions to the general presumption exist for government regulation of “fighting words,” obscenity, child pornography, and threats, as well as altered analytical frameworks for fraud in commercial speech, libel against public figures, and incitement to imminent unlawful conduct. There are continual attempts by government to expand or push the edge on these categories of unprotected or less protected speech, but Courts with vastly different ideological compositions typically resist efforts to carve out exceptions.  As observe in the Third Circuit’s opinion in Stevens, it has been over 25 years since the Court has recognized a new categorical exception to the content discrimination rule.

Given that resistance, the Court’s decisions to review Stevens, Snyder, and Entertainment Merchants in such a short time frame are certainly noteworthy. Read More

2

Argument in Class Waiver Case Favors Consumers, States

Power between enterprises and individuals hangs in the balance as the U.S. Supreme Court considers whether organizations can prevent people from banding together to challenge crooked practices that involve stealing small sums from large numbers of people. The judges and lawyers engaged in a riveting oral argument on the hot topic in a case pitting the mighty AT&T against a couple of California citizens. The case also pits the federal government against the states.

At issue are the clauses that companies now routinely include in standard form consumer contracts requiring disputes to be resolved in one-on-one arbitration. People give up the right to mount class claims in arbitration or court. Some unscrupulous companies use this as a way to cheat large numbers of people out of small amounts of money.

Companies following this route benefit from a strict federal law (the Federal Arbitration Act, or FAA) saying states cannot treat arbitration clauses differently than they treat other contracts. Courts nationally have struggled to evaluate whether these clauses pass standard contract tests of unconscionability. Yesterday’s case will determine whether those states are taking the right approach.

The principal theme of questioning probed how the Justices could tell if a state’s judges comply with the FAA’s mandate to treat arbitration clauses like other contracts. The company’s lawyer (Andrew Pincus) said it was simple: look at the general unconscionability doctrine applied to all contracts and compare it to the unconscionability doctrine applied to arbitration clauses.

Read More