Category: Psychology and Behavior

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On Donald Trump, J.D. Vance, and the white working class

Thanks for the opportunity to guest blog here at Concurring Opinions. Though I am a law professor on a law faculty, I plan to spend much of the time and space afforded by this blogging invitation to write more about politics and culture than about “law” in a narrow sense. Indeed, a great deal of my scholarship over the past decade has drawn heavily on politics and culture, and I’ve even had the opportunity to engage in some political punditry post-Election 2016.  I plan to write some posts about rurality, yes, but I’m also going to write a series of posts about low-income, low-education whites, a population with which we as a nation have a newfound fascination following the election of Donald Trump, who drew considerable support from this demographic segment. I hope readers will provide some feedback on these musings, as I am engaged in ongoing, more substantial writing about this population as a critical race project, exploring what is at the particular intersection of white skin privilege with socioeconomic disadvantage and distress.

I’m going to begin with some musings on J.D. Vance’s Hillbilly Elegy: A Memoir of a Family and Culture in Crisis (HarperCollins 2016), a book that has been widely reviewed—and nearly as universally praised—since its publication early last summer. If you think you’ve read all you need to know (or all you can stand!) about this bestseller, bear with me.  I’m not going to join the resounding chorus of praise you’ve you already consumed regarding Hillbilly Elegy.  Further, what I find interesting about the book is less its content than the elite, coastal reaction to it. (Yes, fellow law professors, when I say “elite,” I’m talking about us, you and me, along with the media and other privileged institutions of the narrating classes/interest public.)

Let me preface my comments by outing myself as a class migrant and a hillbilly. Vance grew up in Appalachia; I grew up in the Arkansas Ozarks, both high and/or persistent poverty white regions. I’m a first generation college graduate (and, as a law graduate, a first generation professional), and I’m not sure if Vance also is, given that his mother was a nurse.  Nevertheless, we’ve both migrated from being low-income, low-status whites to being higher status whites, largely by virtue of access to and consumption of a great deal of higher education.

Shortly after Hillbilly Elegy was published, one of my former law professors asked me, only partly tongue in cheek, if I had written the book—then quickly added, maybe “you should have written it.” (This makes for an interesting reminder that I was apparently not class passing very effectively back in law school). You get the idea: my own life story shares many similarities with Vance’s (though I’m two decades older, and upward mobility for po’ folk has declined over the 20 years that separate me from J.D.), sans the elite law degree (my J.D. is from the University of Arkansas, Vance’s from Yale).  This latter distinction may be quite significant in any number of regards, and I hope to return to that point in a subsequent post.

While I have reflected on my own class migration in some law review articles (here and here), I did not reach for the brass ring of a popular press book contract. So, alas, J.D. Vance is a millionaire, best-selling author who appears regularly on television as everyone’s  favorite “white trash ‘splainer” and I continue to toil away in the obscurity of my Ivory Tower.  All of this means, among other things, that if you think I’m too hard on Hillbilly Elegy, you can write it off as sour grapes.

Let me begin, though, by telling you what I liked about Hillbilly Elegy. First and foremost, before I started reading it, I loved the fact that someone had written a book about this milieu—my people, too, I assumed—and that the media outlets I consume (mostly liberal, all elite) were paying attention to it. I sent lots of affirming Tweets, cheering on the new book.  Second, once I finally started reading the book, I found that the memoir parts (as opposed to the social science blurbs and policy suggestions) of the book rang authentic, so much so that I found myself both laughing and crying at the tales of Mamaw and Papaw. I, too, grew up in a family of straight-talking folks who often expressed themselves in colorful language, delivered at high volume, sometimes with guns. Many of the vignettes resonated strongly with me based on my own hillbilly upbringing.

Third, I thought Vance provided an occasional insight into his people, who seem closely akin to “my people.”  For example, Vance talked about their attitudes toward Obama, noting, among other things, that “[h]is accent—clean, perfect, neutral—is foreign; his credentials are so impressive they’re frightening…he conducts himself with the confidence that comes from knowing that the modern American meritocracy was meant for him.” With this passage Vance contrasts the knowledge in his Ohio community—a realization that hit at about the time “Obama came on the scene”—that “the modern American meritocracy was not built for them.” (p. 191).  Ah, yes, meritocracy, shmeritocracy.  Guinier refers to The Tyranny of Meritocracy, a title that speaks volumes.  “Meritocracy” has actually come to be for only a select few, and they are not by and large the children of Appalachia and the Ozarks.  Read more here.

My read is that Vance is opining that the disaffection of the white working class is not so much about race as the mainstream media seem to have concluded. It is more about a growing sense that working class whites’ prospects are declining, and this has happened more dramatically as elites have come to dominate both the Democratic and Republican parties.  I also give Vance credit for calling our attention to white working class distrust of the mainstream media—even before the election made it an undeniable force. Indeed, Vance notes–months before the election of 2016–the significance among hillbillies of Alex Jones and others who perpetuate what we now call “fake news.” (p. 192)

Yet contrary to many reviewers’ opinions, I did not find Hillbilly Elegy especially well written—even acknowledging that it would take extraordinary skill to write about a life permeated by such sensitive and stigmatized matters, e.g., domestic violence, drug abuse, gun toting grandmothers. Nevertheless, a much stronger memoir of a low-income, dysfunctional white family and the author’s escape from it is Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Rick Bragg’s All Over But the Shoutin’ (1998). A much more compassionate depiction and far more incisive commentary about this milieu can be found in Joe Bageant’s Deer Hunting with Jesus: Dispatches from America’s Class War (2007). Among tales of class migration, Alfred Lubrano’s Limbo: Blue-Collar Roots, White-Collar Dreams (2005) is superb. I don’t recall those books garnering nearly as much media attention as Hillbilly Elegy, but that may be because the one thing Vance got most “right” was his timing.

So why have so many reviewers been complimentary of Vance’s writing? I have two theories. First, reviewers may be surprised that anyone who grew up with so much childhood and adolescent trauma—in Appalachia no less—is capable of writing a solid sentence, let alone a solid paragraph.  (Yes, I’m suggesting a best selling memoir should require more than that).  Alternatively, reviewers may give any graduate of Yale Law School a free pass—that is, Vance may enjoy a presumption that he is a good writer because he earned a law degree at Yale. Vance does in the book’s latter chapters acknowledge the extraordinariness of his elite education and the doors it opens (chapters 12-13).

Hillbilly Elegy is also made less readable by Vance’s distracting practice of peppering policy prescriptions (e.g., food stamps (SNAP) are bad because poor white folks abuse them (p. 139); unregulated payday lending is good because it gives poor folks choices (p. 185)) awkwardly amidst his first-person narrative. Sometimes these are accompanied by social science or other evidence to bolster a point, or to explain the psychology of a phenomenon he has experienced by virtue of his traumatic upbringing. Sarah Jones, writing in the New Republic, called the book mostly “a list of myths about welfare queens repackaged as a primer on the white working class.” (Indeed, I recently published an essay arguing that our nation increasingly views these two populations similarly, showing no more sympathy (or empathy) for poor whites than for poor blacks.) Even more problematic, to my mind, is Vance’s use of those myths to advance a regressive policy agenda.

In my next post, I’ll return with a more substantive critique of Hillbilly Elegy–and, implicitly, a commentary on the book’s fans.

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Frontal Lobe or A Softer Take on The Twenty-Fifth Amendment and Mental Illness

Gerard makes a good point about the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, but there may a related idea that helps (and shows the limits of the Amendment). Perhaps the President, as with many folks as we age, has a front lobe problem. These ideas apply to many more than the President.

There is some evidence that our frontal lobe decays as we age; when that happens executive control goes down and we are less able to manage many things. This abstract for the paper Aging, Executive Functioning, and Social Control says it all rather well

Aging is associated with atrophy of the frontal lobes of the brain, which are the seat of executive functions. Because successful social functioning often requires executive control, aging can lead to unintended social changes via deficits in executive control. In this article I review evidence that, due to losses in executive control, aging leads to increased prejudice and social inappropriateness and, under certain circumstances, increased depression and problem gambling. I then discuss theory and research suggesting possible interventions that might ameliorate unwanted social changes brought about by executive decline.

Yes. The part of our brain that is “the seat of executive functions, which include tasks such as planning and controlling thought and behavior” decay with age. This change can lead to “poor executive functioning, including reduced ability to inhibit irrelevant or unwanted thoughts.” How does this play out? It seems a variety of things can happen.

Prejudice: “Automatic or unintentional stereotypic thoughts appear to be common in most people (Devine, 1989), and it might be that older adults have greater difficulty inhibiting these stereotypic thoughts despite their efforts to avoid being prejudiced. Thus, older adults might also be more prejudiced than younger adults because they can no longer inhibit their unintentionally activated stereotypes.”

Inhibition and Social Inappropriateness: “findings suggest a dissociation between knowledge of social rules and the ability to follow them that is consistent with other types of frontal lobe damage.”

Inhibition and Depression: As I read the paper, the results are not settled except that “age-related inhibitory deficits might also contribute to late-onset depression by impairing control of excessive rumination (a tendency to focus on one’s problems without engaging in active problem solving,
which exacerbates and prolongs depression).” The paper is clear that the key issue is “those older adults who rely on inhibitory control to stop themselves from ruminating (either chronically or when confronted by negative life events) are likely to develop problems with rumination if they have poor executive control.”

Inhibition and Gambling: Again not conclusive: “Analogous to the case with late-onset depression, poor inhibitory ability is unlikely to lead to gambling problems in all or even most older adults. Rather inhibitory deficits might lead to gambling problems only among those who struggle with their
impulse to gamble. That is, people who gamble and who are impulsive by nature might be at risk for developing gambling problems as they age, due to losses in the ability to restrain their urge to gamble.”

SOLUTIONS: Apparently we are able to exercise and control earlier in the day rather than later.

Another paper notes the limits of the above findings, and both call for longitudinal studies to understand how things change as we age.

Nonetheless, although arm-chair psychology has problems, the list above seems to map rather well to President Trump’s behaviors. None of that excuses them. Unlike our parents, or us as we age, the President’s statements, orders, and actions have consequences that affect hundreds of millions, if not, billions of people. If the above is useful or interesting, I expect someone could and will track the President’s habits and look at time of day. As Gerard noted, it is unlikely these traits will rise to incapacity. And yet, as with our elders and us as we age, at some point, someone gets to run tests and see whether everything is working well. Again for the Office of the President whether we want such tests seems to be answered as no. Both or any party is not to be trusted with such a tool. But that is a problem for another time.

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UCLA Law Review Vol. 64, Discourse

Volume 64, Discourse

Citizens Coerced: A Legislative Fix for Workplace Political Intimidation Post-Citizens United Alexander Hertel-Fernandez & Paul Secunda 2
Lessons From Social Science for Kennedy’s Doctrinal Inquiry in Fisher v. University of Texas II Liliana M. Garces 18
Why Race Matters in Physics Class Rachel D. Godsil 40
The Indignities of Color Blindness Elise C. Boddie 64
The Misuse of Asian Americans in the Affirmative Action Debate Nancy Leong 90
How Workable Are Class-Based and Race-Neutral Alternatives at Leading American Universities? William C. Kidder 100
Mismatch and Science Desistance: Failed Arguments Against Affirmative Action Richard Lempert 136
Privileged or Mismatched: The Lose-Lose Position of African Americans in the Affirmative Action Debate Devon W. Carbado, Kate M. Turetsky, Valerie Purdie-Vaughns 174
The Right to Record Images of Police in Public Places: Should Intent, Viewpoint, or Journalistic Status Determine First Amendment Protection? Clay Calvert 230
A Worthy Object of Passion Seana Valentine Shiffrin 254
Foreword – Imagining the Legal Landscape: Technology and the Law in 2030 Jennifer L. Mnookin & Richard M. Re i
Imagining Perfect Surveillance
Richard M. Re 264
Selective Procreation in Public and Private Law Dov Fox 294
Giving Up On Cybersecurity Kristen E. Eichensehr 320
DNA in the Criminal Justice System: A Congressional Research Service Report* (*From the Future) Erin Murphy 340
Utopia?: A Technologically Determined World of Frictionless Transactions, Optimized Production, and Maximal Happiness Brett Frischmann and Evan Selinger 372
The CRISPR Revolution: What Editing Human DNA Reveals About the Patent System’s DNA Robin Feldman 392
Virtual Violence Jaclyn Seelagy 412
Glass Half Empty Jane R. Bambauer 434
Social Control of Technological Risks: The Dilemma of Knowledge and Control in Practice, and Ways to Surmount It Edward A. Parson 464
Two Fables Christopher Kelty 488
Policing Police Robots Elizabeth E. Joh 516
Environmental Law, Big Data, and the Torrent of Singularities William Boyd 544
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Child Safety, Part III

How might tort law respond, if at all, to the preferences of parents and the general population to invest about twice as much in child safety as adult safety? (see this post for a summary of the data, and this post for a discussion of whether those preferences are normatively defensible).

Here’s my take, which you can read more about here:

Because the studies that I’m drawing from concern the allocation of safety-related resources, they have their most direct implications when we view tort law as (at least partially) a means to make people safer by deterring risky behavior. Those studies create two main implications, one for levels of care and one for damages.

Under a deterrence rationale, the standard of care in tort law reflects what we want potential tortfeasors to invest in accident prevention. The investment patterns from my first post in this series suggest that, at least as a prima facie matter, people want potential tortfeasors to invest twice as many resources in preventing accidents when children are the primary potential victims, even when both children and adults are equally vulnerable.  And if my second post in this series is right, we have reasons to respect those preferences. So when children are among the foreseeable class of victims, courts should require a heightened level of care. Although courts appear to respond to a child’s increased vulnerability to harms—they blindly run out into the street to reach ice cream trucks, for example—I have not found evidence that courts have picked up on the extra value that we appear to place on child safety. I’ve also looked at practitioner treatises, and so far I cannot find any mention that courts or juries are more likely to find a defendant negligent if the victim was a child. So, as a prima facie matter, there are reasons to question whether judges and juries are applying a sufficiently stringent level of care in cases involving children.

To motivate potential tortfeasors to take a heightened level of care for children, damages for child victims should be about twice as high as damages for adult victims. Currently, tort damages tend to exhibit child discounts or mild child premiums. This should not be a surprise. We ask juries to set damages in particular ways that constrain their discretion. For wrongful death, we generally ask them to set damages by looking at the economic contributions that the decedent would have made to her relatives. This puts a very small value on dead children, and results in child discounts even after we add non-economic damages. For permanent injuries, some back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that juries tend to award children 20-25 percent more than adults. This is approximately what we would expect if juries were awarding damages based on the number of years that a victim will have to live with her injuries, and then discounting those future yearly payouts to arrive at a single lump sum.   But that child premium is significantly lower than the 2 to 1 ratio that a deterrence-oriented tort system might strive for. So, as a prima facie matter, there are reasons to question whether damages for child victims are high enough to generate the amount of deterrence that people appear to desire.

Of course, there is much more to say.

A fuller deterrence analysis would require examining a host of additional factors, such as whether regulatory agencies or market forces or the threat of criminal liability already provide extra protection for children, whether risk compensation or substitution effects operate differently for the adult and child populations, the differences between contractual settings like medical malpractice and stranger cases, how to handle “hidden-child” cases (which would be partially analogous to thin-skull cases), etc. I invite readers to offer their thoughts on these issues. But as a first cut, there are reasons to think that tort law does not offer the desired mix of protection for adults and children.

We could also ask what civil recourse and corrective justice accounts of tort law might contribute to the discussion. But I will leave that for another day.

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Child Safety, Part I

Parents: Do you invest more in your child’s safety than your own? Less? Roughly the same amount?

I’ve been pondering these questions lately. I have numerous friends who have purchased safer cars once they became parents, or suddenly took an interest in the finest of fine print on warning labels. These anecdotes suggest that we invest more time and money in child safety compared to adult safety.  Interestingly, more rigorous empirical examinations support these anecdotes. Those data suggest that parents invest about twice as much in protecting children as they do in protecting themselves, even when both are facing the same probability of experiencing the same harm. Parents are not alone in this preference. Both parents and nonparents appear to want governments to invest about twice as many resources in protecting children as adults. Here’s some of the data:

Untitled

Readers: Does this ring true?

Stay tuned for what these preferences might mean for tort law…

Why did our subjects sometimes behave like 19th century legal formalists, and other times like realists from the Wisconsin School of relational contract theory?

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Intuitions About Contract Formation

Tess Wilkinson-Ryan and I have a new paper up on SSRN, titled Intuitions About Contract Formation.  In the great Redyip tradition, I thought I’d blog about it. From the abstract:

Legally, much depends on the moment that a negotiation becomes a deal.  Unlike torts or civil procedure or any area of public law, the laws of  promissory exchange only apply to parties who have manifested their assent to be bound. Even so, the moral norms of exchange and promise are quite firmly  entrenched and more broadly applicable than just legal contracts. Norms of promise-keeping and reciprocity, interpersonal courtesy, community reputation—these kinds of intangible goods have real effects on contract behavior. For this reason it is especially surprising that intuitions about formation have gotten so little attention from legal and behavioral scholars. This paper offers five new empirical studies of commonsense approaches to contract formation. The first section of this Article surveys intuitions about what the law of formation is. In a world in which the vast majority of contracts are signed without the advice of counsel, most people have to draw inferences based on their background knowledge and beliefs. It turns out that the colloquial understanding of contract formation is about the formalization of an agreement rather than actual assent.

In the second part of the Article, we tease out the intuitive relationship between formation and obligation. The law of contracts is very clear that  parties’ obligations to one another turn entirely on whether or not they have mutually manifested assent to be bound. And, in fact, we find that behavioral results suggest that legal (or legalistic) formation does enhance commitment to a deal irrespective of its power to impose sanctions; it seems that the law has freestanding normative force. However, we also find that the subjective sense of obligation is not as black or white as the law would predict. Parties are influenced by the natural, informal obligations to one another that build over the course of a transaction, increasing their commitment to the partnership in stages rather than all at once at the moment of formation.

To set the paper up a bit, Tess and I had previously found that when subjects are told they are in legally binding contracts, they lower their guard against exploitation & treat contracting parties like partners.  This raised a question that Intuitions tries to answer:  what are subjects’ naive views about formation?  We show that they differ systematically from the operative doctrinal rules, which creates a window for exploitation — when consumers believe themselves to be in contracts but aren’t. For example, individuals think that payment is contract, not agreement.  In one experiment, for example, we asked:

“Peter is ordering new custom speakers from Audionuts, a mail-order sound system retailer. Peter calls the company and speaks at length to a customer service representative, hashing out the details of his order, which include speakers for his main media unit (TV and stereo system) as well as his portable devices (phone and iPad). Peter and the customer service representative arrive at a final product specification, including a price and delivery date. Peter gives the rep his credit card number, and the charge is immediately posted to his account. Eight days later, Peter receives his speakers in the mail. Inside the box is a piece of paper headed “Terms and Conditions.” The Terms and Conditions sheet includes information about the duration of the warranty (90 days), the dispute resolution process (mandatory arbitration) and the return policy (return within 14 days for full refund for any reason). The Terms and Conditions sheet states at the bottom, “If you do not agree to these terms and conditions, please return the product within 14 days for a full refund.” Peter uses the speakers with no problems for two months.”

graph2

Note: payment & acceptance without return dominate over the oral agreement, or reading terms.  (Other experiments replicate this finding on payment, and expand it to signature.)

At the same time, we find that, in the absence of information about law or legal rules, individuals tend to begin to act like partners significantly earlier than the moment where they’ve concluded a deal.  Indeed, a mere offer appears to motivate feelings of reciprocity by the offeree. Why did our subjects sometimes behave like 19th century legal formalists, and other times like realists from the Wisconsin School of relational contract theory? Our tentative conclusion is that subjects themselves draw a distinction between legal and moral obligations. They view their legal obligations as heavily dependent on formal manifestation of assent via signature. But their moral obligations are attendant to both legal formalism and also to more fine-grained moral norms. This is an interesting case in which we see some evidence of a legal context, contract, in which moral norms are not entirely determined by legal norms. But when subjects are told that they are in a contract, in a sense it makes it so.

 

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Neurocriminology: The Monsters are in the Molecules

Is the brain indeed the prime suspect when it comes to horrific crimes? Does our molecular structure or DNA determine our destiny, for the benevolent best or the malovent worst?

Such questions and others are explored in Dr. Adrian Raine’s book titled The Anatomy of Violence: The Biological Roots of Crime (Pantheon, 2013). This mind-opening book by a University of Pennsylvania professor of psychiatry and chairman of the department of criminology is the focus of an online symposium just posted on the Washington Independent Review of Books Gb4yObYARcACwebsite.

To help flesh out some of the instructive and provocative points raised in Dr. Raine’s illuminating book, NYU professor of Clinical Psychiatry Laurence R. Tancredi (who holds MD and JD degrees) and a University of Minnesota law professor Francis Shen (who specializes in neuroscience and the law) wrote commentaries. In the spirit of a free exchange of ideas, Dr. Raine authored a reply. I wrote the foreword to the symposium.

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UCLA Discourse: Trayvon Martin & Implicit Bias

Vol. 61, Discourse

The killing of Trayvon Martin in 2012 and recent verdict in the trial of George Zimmerman has generated intense national debate.  Mr. Zimmerman’s verdict has not ended the discussion, but instead caused of a firestorm of conversation in the national media.

In light of this debate, we offer a 2012 essay published by two UCLA Law alums discussing the concept of implicit bias and its relationship with gun violence.  The essay remains timely event a year after its publication, and can be found here.

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Warren Buffett’s Single Bid Rule

Among the many ways that Warren Buffett is unusual is his approach to the role of price in business acquisition negotiations. Other people commonly haggle over price. Tactics include sellers naming an asking price that is higher than warranted or buyers making a low-ball bid. Some people enjoy the give and take and many believe it is a way to produce value in exchange.

Buffett eschews such exercises as a waste of time. One of Berkshire’s acquisition criteria (in addition to size, proven earnings power, quality management in place and relative simplicity of the business) is having a price. Eschewing the games so many negotiators like to play over ranges of values, Buffett wants a single price at which each side can say yes—or walk away. His bid is his bid; when he gives you a bid, what you have is what most people classify as the “best price,” “final offer,” or “highest bid.”

Buffett has repeatedly statesd this policy, along with the other acquisition criteria, in every Berkshire Hathaway annual report since 1983 (and once in a 1986 ad in the Wall Street Journal). Yet I know many people who are skeptical about whether Buffett and Berkshire actually adhere to this policy—doesn’t he engage in price negotiations in at least some cases, they ask? Aren’t there situations in which the value of an exchange is not discovered other than through the dynamic of negotiations, including about appropriate methodology?

To answer such questions, I examined the 16 Berkshire Hathaway acquisitions over the past two decades that involved public company targets. Unlike private company targets, those companies are required by U.S. federal law to publicly disclose the background of the transaction, including negotiation over all material terms, such as price. Read More