Category: Jurisprudence

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A Lament of Many Judges

“This is one of those cases which too frequently occur, in which the court is called upon to interpret legislative expressions of doubtful import, without a clue to ascertain, with precision, what was the real intention of the framers of the law. After the closest examination of the point on which the controversy hangs, we can truly say, that our mind rather inclines to the opinion which we shall deliver, than that we feel a full confidence in its correctness.”

Goodwin v. United States (1811) (Washington, J., Circuit Justice).

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“THE JUDGE: 26 Machiavellian Lessons” coming this Fall

Ronald Collins & David Skover, The Judge: 26 Machiavellian Lessons (Oxford University Press, October 3, 2017).

The Judge is in a league of its own. For all the countless books and articles written on the politics of judging, no work has ever taken that point seriously, at least not the way the authors do. The Judge breaks into the world of judicial decision-making with bold strides and throws down a provocative conceptual gauntlet. The authors’ thesis is at once shocking and sobering. By cutting to the quick of the matter with Machiavellian acumen and fervor, they level a powerful pox on the houses of liberals and conservatives alike. Combining a sophisticated knowledge of the Supreme Court with a resourceful understanding of Machiavelli’s Prince, Collins and Skover’s The Judge is certain to redefine the entire “law is politics” debate. It will spark needed controversy in the short run and prompt informed thought in the long run. The light from this book is also likely to cast a long shadow for decades to come.

David M. O’Brien, Leone Reaves & George W. Spicer Professor of Politics, Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics, University of Virginia & Author of Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American Politics (Norton, 10th ed.)

∇ ∇ ∇ ∇    ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇

This inspired tract is Machiavellian in a profound sense. If, as Rousseau and Spinoza alleged, Machiavelli wrote The Prince to expose the true ways of power, Collins and Skover perform a similar service: The Judge ingeniously delineates how the pursuit of power lurks within the rarefied realm of appellate judging. Moreover, it delves even deeper: its Machiavellian examination of our judicial history illuminates how John Marshall established an autonomous realm of authority (a state as it were) for the judiciary. In so doing, the great Chief Justice is revealed to be of that most rarefied breed, a true modern “prince,” a state-maker in black robes. This unique work is astute and compelling; it is also carefully executed and buttressed by impressive scholarship. In any variety of instructive ways, The Judge will challenge political theorists, legal scholars, and judges alike.

Alissa Ardito, Ph.D., J.D. & author of Machiavelli and the Modern State (Cambridge University Press)

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Looking back on Bridges v. California (1941) — Some random thoughts inspired by Floyd Abrams’ new book

The Bridges opinion was “a judicial Declaration of Independence for the First Amendment, freeing it from English law.” — Benno C. Schmidt

Harry Bridges

One sign of a good book is its ability to engage readers, to pique curiosity, and to urge one to return anew to something largely known but mostly forgotten. By that measure, Floyd Abrams’ latest book (The Soul of the First Amendment) is a valuable book.

In reading this so-called “modest essay” — Abrams tags it “ruminations about certain aspects of American constitutional law” — I was drawn back to a Bridges v. California (1941), the contentpt of court case involving the militant Harry Bridges, the then conservative Los Angeles Times, and their unrestrained comments on a then pending case.

Abrams devotes the better part of a concise chapter to this First Amendment majority opinion authored by Justice Hugo Black. The Court divided 5-4 with Justice Felix Frankfurter registering a stinging dissent.

Bridges is “a seminal but too-little recalled First Amendment case” writes Abrams.  I agree. Many con-law casebooks do not even cite the case anymore.

After reading the Bridges chapter, which is rich with important observations and comments, I went back and did some research on the case. Here is what I found — several revealing facts nearly lost to time.

Justice Douglas Edmonds

The Importance of a Forgotten State-Court Dissent: Does the name Douglas Lyman Edmonds (1887-1962) ring a bell? There is no reason it should except for the fact that he authored a powerful lone dissent when the California Supreme Court ruled on the  case in 1939.

  • Edmonds’ dissent drew in part on a 1928 Columbia Law Review article entitled “Contempt by Publication in the United States.” It was written by Walter Nelles (co-founder of the ACLU and co-counsel in Gitlow v. New York and Whitney v. California) and Carol Weiss King (one of Bridges’ lawyers and one of the founders of the National Lawyers Guild).
  • After discussing British constitutional history, Edmonds wrote: “The concept of freedom of the press, stated by Blackstone, is completely foreign both in time and place to the fundamental principles of American institutions. The doctrine that ‘the liberty of the press … consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published’ . . . is a statement of the British law at a time when seditious libel was punishable as a crime; it is not the interpretation of a Constitution. Moreover, that law has been very differently declared in the last one hundred and twenty-five years. (See Chaffee, Freedom of Speech, (1920), 8 et seq.”
  • And then following more extended discussions of federal and state laws (decisional and statutory laws), Edmonds declared: “The notion that contumacious publications have been subject to the summary power from time immemorial has been shown to be historically incorrect. Also, the experience of Pennsylvania and other jurisdictions where immunity of the press has long been maintained conclusively proves that no such power is necessary to maintain either the existence of courts or the respect for them. It is not necessary to the wholesome administration of justice in this state that judicial officers have uncontrolled discretion in passing upon alleged constructive contempts of court.”
  • “The rights of freedom of speech and of the press,” Edmonds added, “have their roots deep in the soil of this nation’s organic law. Five days before the Declaration of Independence was proclaimed, the patriots of Virginia declared in their Constitution ‘that the freedom of the press is the great bulwarks of liberty, and can never be restrained but by despotic governments.’ For more than a century and a half our nation has consistently upheld this right of expression by a free people as a vital principle which the founders of our national and state governments stated in the respective constitutions as necessary to a democracy.”
  • He closed his dissent with these words: “When free speech is fettered, liberty is a meaningless word.”

More, much more, can be said about this remarkable dissent, but that is a task for another day.

A.L. Wirin

The Importance of the Counsel in the Case: Turning back the pages of history reminds us that two rather important ACLU lawyers represented Bridges in the U.S. Supreme Court:

  • Osmond K. Fraenkel argued the case. Earlier, he represented the defendants in the Sacco-Vanzetti case and was one of the attorneys for Scottsboro boys. Fraenkel argued 26 cases  in the Supreme Court.  He was the lead counsel for the petitioners in  De Jonge v. OregonKunz v. New York and Schneider v. New Jersey. [Roger K. Newman, ed., The Yale Biographical Dictionary of American Law (2009), p. 200]
  • A. L. Wirin was with Fraenkel on the Bridges brief. Wirin was the first full‐time lawyer for the ACLU and served as chief counsel of the ACLU of Southern California for four decades. As Sam Walker noted: Wirin “particularly distinguished himself during the Japanese-American internment when he and the ACLU affiliate sought an aggressive challenge to the government’s catastrophic program.” Wirin was counsel for the petitioner in Korematsu v. United States

Here is an excerpt from the Fraenkel-Wirin brief, a passage that apparently got the attention of Justice Black when he authored his majority opinion:

“The ‘Inherent Tendency’ and ‘Reasonable Tendency’ rule applied by the California Courts to publications pertaining to issues pending in the courts are too vague and indefinite… They offend due process of law and deprive the petitioner of freedom of speech and freedom of the press… Only the application of the ‘clear and present danger’ or the ‘actual obstruction’ principle to publications alleged to be in contempt of court will reconcile the independence of the judiciary with freedom of the press.”

The Importance of Fate: The Bridges case was first argued on Friday October 18th and on Monday October 21st of 1940. At the time of the conference, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes found it to be an easy case. In conference he was straightforward: “The facts here transcend the limits of reasonable discussion and I think [the lower court] should be affirmed.” (Roger K. Newman, Hugo Black: A Biography (1994), p. 290).  With that he assigned the majority opinion to Justice Frankfurter with Black, Reed and Douglas in dissent.  But then Fate changed things.

Anthony Lewis

As Anthony Lewis noted, on February 1, 1941, Justice James McReynolds retired.  “That left a five-to-three majority for affirmance.” And then Justice Frank Murphy jumped ship and joined with the dissenters.  That left the vote at four-to-four.  “At the end of the term,” Lewis added, “Chief Justice Hughes retired, leaving only three votes to affirm the contempt convictions.” [Anthony Lewis, “Justice Black and the First Amendment,” in Tony Freyer, Justice Hugo Black and Modern America (1990), pp. 237-252.]

And then two new members joined the Court: Justices James Byrnes and Robert Jackson.  Byrnes voted to affirm, Jackson to reverse. The result: a new majority with Black writing for the Court and Frankfurter dissenting.

The Importance of the Date: The 5-4 ruling in Bridges v. California came down on December 8, 1941 — the day after the attack on Pearl Harbor. That was also the day when President Roosevelt spoke to Congress at noon to request a declaration of war from the House.

Meanwhile, at the Court there was great division. On the one hand, Justice Black declared that “[h]istory affords no support for the contention” that speech could be abridged merely because it was directed at a judge sitting in a case. On the other hand, Justice Frankfurter was adamant that “[o]ur whole history repels the view [that a] newspaper to attempt to overawe a judge in a matter immediately pending before him.”

While war was afoot in the nation, freedom was being debated in the nation’s highest Court.

The Importance of Four Unpublished Sentences: In a draft of his original dissent, Justice Black penned the following words, which never appeared in his majority opinion:

 First in the catalogue of human liberties essential to the life and growth of a government of, for, and by the people are those liberties written into the First Amendment to our Constitution. They are the pillars upon which popular government rests and without which a government of free men cannot survive. History persuades me that the moving forces which brought about the creation of the safeguards contained in the other sections of our Bill of Rights sprang from a resolute determination to place the liberties defined in the First Amendment in an area wholly safe and secure against any invasion — even by government. [Howard Ball, Hugo L. Black: A Cold Steel Warrior (1996), p. 191]

And then there was this line: Narrow abridgments have a way of broadening themselves[Newman, supra, at p. 290, n. *]

Hugo Black (1937: credit: Harris & Ewing)

The Importance of the Bridges TestJustice Black harbored no fondness for Holmes’ clear-and-present danger test. Still, in Bridges he did give it a judicial nod of sorts, but then pointed beyond it:

What finally emerges from the ‘clear and present danger’ cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished. Those cases do not purport to mark the furthermost constitutional boundaries of protected expression, nor do we here. They do no more than recognize a minimum compulsion of the Bill of Rights. For the First Amendment does not speak equivocally. It prohibits any law ‘abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.’ It must be taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-loving society, will allow.

The Importance of  Three PrecedentsAs Anthony Lewis saw it, Bridges was part of a trilogy of First Amendment cases that changed the conceptual landscape of American free-speech law. The other two cases were Near v. Minnesota and New York Times Co. v. SullivanHere is how Lewis put it:

  • What Near did for our law of prior restraints from English tradition, and Bridges for our law of contempt, the 1964 decision in . . . Sullivan did for libel.

What is also key to these three rulings, and what also links them together, is that unlike earlier First Amendment cases that “focused on the harm speech could do,” Near, Bridges and Sullivan focused instead on “the good it could do.”

  • “Chief Justice Hughes found affirmative reasons for a free press.”
  • “Justice Brennan spoke of our ‘profound commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.'”
  • And then there was Justice Black: “No purpose in ratifying the Bill of Rights was clearer than that of securing for the people of the United States much greater freedom of religion, expression, assembly, and petition than the people of Great Britain had ever enjoyed.”

* * * * *

Justice Louis Brandeis

As Frankfurter told it, Justice Brandeis allegedly agreed with him and disfavored Black’s view in Bridges: “Black and Co.,” he had Brandeis saying, “have gone mad on free speech.” [H.N. Hirsch, The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter (1981), p. 158] Professor Hirsch noted that it was not “possible to verify this story.” [Id. at 240, n. 115].

True or not, one thing was certain: “Bridges cut deeply into Frankfurter’s sense of well-being.” [Id. at p. 158] And perhaps that explains FF’s need to find a purported ally in Brandeis.

Lewes was understandably skeptical: “I should not leave unquestioned any assumption that Justice Brandeis would in the end have disagreed with the Black view in Bridges if he had still been on the Court. No doubt fair trial was an important value for him, and he might well have been reluctant to limit the power of judges to punish comments threatening that fairness. But it is also true that Brandeis considered freedom of speech a positive good, and he made the case for that belief with compelling eloquence.” [Lewes, supra, at p. 245]

The battle between Black and Frankfurter continued for decades thereafter. Ultimately, however, the spirit of Brandeis’ free-speech jurisprudence pointed more towards Black’s expansive views than towards Frankfurter’s cramped ones. Perhaps that explains why Mr. Abrams began his book with an epigraph quote from Justice Black:

The very reason for the First Amendment is to make the people of the country free to think, speak, write and worship as they wish, not as the Government commands.  

And to think that much of that heroic spirit traced back to Bridges . .  . first in Justice Edmonds’s dissent, then in the work done by Fraenkel  and Wirin, followed by the Black dissent that became a majority opinion, and ultimately capped by Tony Lewis’s revealing explanation of it all.

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FAN 148 (First Amendment News) Coming this fall: NYU Law to host conference to commemorate centennial anniversary of Hand’s Masses decision

Judge Learned Hand (credit: NY Rev. of Books)

Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department’s (“Defendant” or “LVMPD”) violations of Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to freedom of expression, as well as his due process rights in terminating his employment based on an unconstitutionally vague social media policy.

This year marks the centennial anniversary of Judge Learned Hand’s seminal opinion in Masses Publishing Company v. Patten (S.D., NY, 1917).  Among others, New York Universally Law School is hosting a major program to commemorate the occasion. Below is a draft of the agenda and the participants scheduled to participate in the upcoming symposium.

A Decision for the Ages

A Symposium Marking the Centenary of Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten

Date:     Friday, October 20, 2017

Host:     New York University School of Law

I.       Historical and Cultural Background – 9:00-10:30

A.     The Artistic and Cultural Scene in 1917 as reflected in The Masses magazine: Amy Adler (NYU)

B.     The Political Situation and The Espionage Act of 1917: Geoffrey Stone (Chicago)

C.     The State of Free Speech Doctrine in 1917: David Rabban (Texas)

II.     The Masses case: Dramatis Personae and Decision – 10:45-12:15

A.     Learned Hand’s Jurisprudence: Ed Purcell (NYLS)

B.     The Role of Gilbert Roe, the Masses attorney: Eric Easton (Baltimore)

C.     The Decision: Vincent Blasi (Columbia)

D.     The Decision: Richard Posner (Chicago) (via videoconference)

Lunch – 12:30-1:30

III.    Aftermath of the Masses decision – 1:45-3:15

A.     Hand’s influence on Holmes and the Abrams dissent: Thomas Healy (Seton Hall)

B.     Hand’s influence on free speech theory and justifications: Mark Graber (Maryland)

C.     Hand’s subsequent free speech decisions: Paul Bender (ASU) (via videoconference)

IV.   A Debate: The Influence of Masses on Modern First Amendment Doctrine 3:30-5:00

A debate/discussion about the extent to which the Masses test has been incorporated into Brandenburg and other modern cases: Burt Neuborne (NYU); James Weinstein (ASU); Martha Field (Harvard)

Walking tour or Reception – 5:15-6:15

DinnerLocation TBD

President Lee Bollinger

In progress: Book to commemorate centennial anniversary of Schenck opinion 

Columbia’s Lee Bollinger and Chicago’s Geoffrey Stone are reuniting to edit another First Amendment-related book. Following their 2002 work entitled Eternally Vigilant: Free Speech in the Modern Era the forthcoming work is timed to coincide with the hundredth anniversary of Schenck v. United States (1919).

As in the prior volume, Bollinger and Stone will begin and end the book with a dialogue between themselves. The authors scheduled to be in the new volume, which will be published by Oxford University Press, include:

  • Floyd Abrams
  • Emily Bell
  • Mona Bicket
  • Vince Blasi
  • Sarah Cleveland
  • Heather Gerken
  • Tom Ginsburg
  • Jameel Jaffer
  • Larry Lessig
  • Catherine MacKinnon
  • Robert Post
  • Albie Sachs
  • Fred Schauer
  • David Strauss
  • Cass Sunstein
  • Laura Weinrig

Owen Fiss on Harry Kalven Read More

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Symposium on Carol Sanger’s “About Abortion”: Introduction & Commentaries

What follows is an online symposium concerning Professor Carol Sanger’s latest book, About Abortion: Terminating Pregnancy in Twenty-First-Century America (Harvard University Press 2017) (table of contents here). Links to the Introduction and Commentaries are set out below.

Related

Professor Carol Sanger

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Introduction to About Abortion Symposium

We are delighted to introduce Professor Carol Sanger and the participants in our online symposium on About Abortion: Terminating Pregnancy in Twenty-First-Century America (Harvard University Press 2017).

Professor Sanger, in her inimitable style, updates us on the state of the abortion debate in the age of Trump.  She explains how the experiences of women who have abortions have disappeared into the shadows while those who would outlaw it control the public discourse.  She explores the explosion of hostile legislation in state legislatures, as the new laws “treat abortion not as an acceptable medical decision—let alone a right—but as something disreputable, immoral, and chosen by mistake.”  Sanger’s book captures the reasons why the discourse has changed, and how abortion, which has always been a contentious issue, drives its emotional force from its connection to underlying debates about sex, religion, gender, politics, and identity.  She nonetheless seeks to reclaim women’s perspectives on the practice of abortion.   She argues that as women become more willing to talk about their experiences, “women’s decisions about whether or not to become mothers will be treated more like those of other adults making significant personal choices.”  In short, she seeks to normalize the topic of abortion.

The book covers original material that Sanger has assembled documenting the legal infrastructure for abortion decision-making.  She presents the experiences of vulnerable teens, forced to appear before hostile judges in an effort to secure permission to proceed without parental consent.  Courts deem many of the teens too immature to make such decisions on their own, but not apparently too immature to become mothers against their will.  She also describes the women required to undergo involuntary ultrasounds, the debate about whether the women are allowed to look away, and the insidiousness of this alleged effort to “help” women make the abortion decision.

Throughout, Sanger connects these practices to law, medicine, the organization of intimate relationships, the shape of a woman’s life, and national identity.  She takes pains to present  the objections to abortion accurately even as she also counters the depiction of decisions to end pregnancies as “selfish” or casual decisions to put women’s interests ahead of their children.  She distinguishes between abortion privacy, a form of nondisclosure based on a woman’s desire to control personal information, and abortion secrecy, a woman’s defense against the many harms of disclosure.   She captures women’s varied views, whether they treat abortion as unthinkable or as a measure necessary to allow them to become “good” mothers in circumstances of their choosing.

Indeed, Sanger’s original treatment of abortion includes a chapter on the views of men.  She asks not what decisions men would make about abortion; instead, she explores how they in fact decide whether to become fathers when they are faced with the choice of what to do with their frozen embryos.  The men in such circumstances express concern over the potential child’s future welfare, distress over an ongoing relationship with the other parent, an unwillingness to consider adoption as an acceptable alternative; in short, they express the same concerns that women do about whether to proceed with a pregnancy.  Yet, the right to life forces, while they often champion the rights of frozen embryos,  do not subject the men’s decisions  to the same intrusion and vilification they reserve for women.  Sanger speculates that if the same law that governs decisions about frozen embryos applied to women’s reproductive decisions, it “would not look quite the same as it does now, with assumptions of incompetence, layers of second-guessing, and invasive counseling.”

About Abortion adds to our understanding of the abortion debate.  It confronts the dishonesty and distortions that characterizes much of the public debate.  It acknowledges the way the issue is deeply intertwined with fundamental questions about the organization of society.  It advocates bringing the experiences of those who have chosen abortion out the shadows, and it succeeds in providing a richer foundation for public consideration of the issue.

About Abortion is an important book that has already received wide attention, including a New Yorker review that coincides with our consideration of it here.  http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/04/03/why-its-become-so-hard-to-get-an-abortion.

For this Concurring Opinions book symposium, we have invited an all-star cast of thinkers who have a variety  of different perspectives on abortion:  Helen Alvare, Caitlin  Borgmann, Khiara Bridges, David Cohen, Leslie Griffin, Linda McClain, David Pozen, Lisa Pruitt, and Rachel Rebouche.

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FAC 6 (First Amendment Conversations) The Law & Politics of Money: A Q & A with Richard Hasen – Part I

Professor Richard Hasen

Professor Richard Hasen

Richard Hasen is the Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science at the University of California at Irvine. I am pleased to do FAC Q&A interview with him in connection with his new book:

Two of Professor Hasen’s previous books in this same area of study are:

  1. The Voting Wars: From Florida 2000 to the Next Election Meltdown (Yale University Press, 2013), and
  2. The Supreme Court and Election Law: Judging Equality from Baker v. Carr to Bush v. Gore (NYU Press 2003).

{99A7FD02-1A3C-40A1-888E-748696B03D3B}Img400He has been writing in this field for over two decades (see 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1311 (1993)). Today, Professor Hasen is one of as the nation’s leading authorities on election law and is the publisher of the much-noticed and highly regarded Election Law Blog. He is also the co-author of a leading election law casebook, author of a book on statutory interpretation, and author of numerous scholarly articles, including a review essay published in the Harvard Law Review.

* * * * 

Collins: Thank you Rick for agreeing to do this interview and congratulations on the publication of your latest book, which is getting quite a lot of favorable attention, including a four-part video interview on SCOTUSblog.

Hasen: Ron, let me thank you for the opportunity to answer your questions and engage in this dialogue. It is too rare these days for there to be serious discussion on these contentious First Amendment issues. Even among academics, much of what we read on blogs etc. is little more than talking points.

NB: A hyperlinked list of previous FAC interviews can be found at the end of this Q&A.

____________________

Can the System be Fixed? / Need it Be?

UnknownCollins: Four years ago you wrote: “Fixing Washington’s money problems may have to await widespread scandal, and fixing its broader problems likely will have to await a societal shift that alleviates the partisanship currently gripping national politics.” Do you still hold to that?

Hasen: I do stand by this statement. Even though many voters—Democrats, Republicans, and independents—believe that the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC was wrong, and that more reasonable campaign finance laws are necessary, there is now a deep partisan divide on this issue among elites in Washington. More than ever, this is seen as a Democratic/Republican issue. As I argue in Plutocrats United, the John McCains of the Republican Party have gone silent on this issue, and the Mitch McConnells, who used to argue for no limits and full and instant disclosure, now argue even against effective disclosure.

I do expect that we will see continued attempts to improve campaign finance laws on the state and local levels, especially in those places with voter initiatives (which can bypass self-interested legislatures). Some of these laws may raise constitutional questions, which could lead a new progressive Supreme Court (if one arrives) to reconsider the First Amendment balancing in the campaign finance arena.

Collins: Does money translate to political power and advantage? Consider this news item (2-22-06) from the New York Times: “When Jeb Bush formally entered the presidential campaign in June, there was already more money behind him than every other Republican candidate combined. When he suspended his campaign on Saturday night in South Carolina, Mr. Bush had burned through the vast majority of that cash without winning a single state.” What do you make of this?

Hasen: I begin my book by urging progressives to reject facile campaign finance arguments such as “all politicians are corrupt” or money buys elections. A little while ago, I had a prebuttal to the Jeb Bush point in the Washington Post which pointed out that Money Can’t Buy Jeb Bush the White House, But It Still Skews Politics. I argued there:

“But this overly simplistic analysis misses the key role of money in contemporary American politics. In spite of the rhetoric of some campaign reformers, money doesn’t buy elections. Instead, it increases the odds of electoral victory and of getting one’s way on policies, tax breaks and government contracts. And the presidential race is the place we are least likely to see money’s effects. Looking to Congress and the states, though, we can see that the era of big money unleashed by the Supreme Court is hurtling us toward a plutocracy in which the people with the greatest economic power can wield great political power through campaign donations and lobbying….”

“And yet a single donor’s influence in presidential contests is tempered by other factors. With billions of dollars sloshing around on all sides, so much free media attention (especially to outlandish candidacies like Trump’s) and widespread public interest, mega-donors are only one part of a larger picture.”

“Money can matter more to the outcomes of congressional and state races because of relative scale. Millions of dollars spent in these contests can swamp the competition and help swing close elections, especially by influencing low-information voters. Merely the threat of such spending gets the attention of candidates, who worry about the next super PAC to line up against them.”

And there is more at stake here as I pointed out in my Washington Post piece:

“Even more significant, big money skews public policy in the direction of the wealthiest donors. In Illinois, a handful of the super-rich, including hedge-fund billionaire Kenneth C. Griffin, played a key role in getting Republican Bruce Rauner elected governor with an agenda to slash government spending, impose term limits and weaken employee unions. Hedge funds have used campaign to block a potential bankruptcy declaration by Puerto Rico that could help its people but hurt bondholders’ interests.”

“We’re supposed to be in a post-earmark era, yet Congress’s recent must-pass omnibus bill to fund the government was full of special interest deals backed by big spenders. The New York Times reported that “as congressional leaders were hastily braiding together a tax and spending bill of more than 2,000 pages, lobbyists swooped in to add 54 words that temporarily preserved a loophole sought by the hotel, restaurant and gambling industries, along with billionaire Wall Street investors, that allowed them to put real estate in trusts and avoid taxes.” Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid supported the language, and the company of one of Reid’s top donors admitted to being among those “involved in the discussions with congressional staff members.”

The Crisis of Liberalism Divided

Collins: As you well know, the campaign finance controversy has divided the liberal civil liberties community. In that regard, I understand that your aim in Plutocrats “is to start a dialogue among progressives.” Even if that dialogue might point to some common ground “among progressives,” there are still conservative Americans. What, if anything, is there in Plutocrats United for conservatives?

Hasen: There is a conservative case for campaign finance reform. I would point readers to Richard Painter’s new book, Taxation Only with Representation (2016). Painter was President George W. Bush’s ethics czar. My book has a different purpose: it is to talk among progressives and moderates about what the real problems of money in politics are and how to fix them. I say that the main problem is a system in which we allow ever increasing economic inequality to be translated into political inequalities, which distort our elections and politics. I then advocate conducting the First Amendment balance by considering not only anti-corruption arguments, but also political equality arguments, on the government interests side.

(credit: AP Photo-- J. Scott Applewhite)

(credit: AP Photo– J. Scott Applewhite)

Collins: The death of Justice Antonin Scalia has placed the entire nomination and confirmation process in bold ideological relief – and you have commented on the that very point. Mindful of that, Vice President Joseph Biden has suggested that the President nominate a “centrist.” In that regard,

  1. would you consider someone like Justice Potter Stewart or Justice Lewis Powell to be such a “centrist,”
  2. and would you support such a nomination as a compromise of sorts?

Hasen:

  1. It is hard to evaluate how the equivalent of a Justice Stewart or Powell would decide things today. The fact is that on the current Supreme Court all of the conservatives have been appointed by Republican presidents and all the liberals by Democratic ones. It is not that these Justices are deciding cases to help their party. It is that they are chosen because of how they would be likely to vote given their jurisprudential commitments on issues each of the parties cares about the most. This is not how things were even a few years ago. So what would we mean by a “centrist” today? Some conservatives consider Justice Kennedy a centrist (or a vacillator). On election-related issues, Justice Kennedy was in the majority in both Citizens United and the 2013 Shelby County v. Holder case, striking down a key portion of the Voting Rights Act. So he is no centrist on issues I care about.
  2. No, I see the Supreme Court today as essentially a political institution and the battle over confirmation essentially a political one. Why should the Left include a compromise candidate, especially when there is no reason to believe the Right would do so? The compromise I support would be to eliminate life tenure, and to move to 18-year non-renewable terms. This would ensure orderly turnover and that over time the Court reflects more of the public’s views on these issues. It is an idea supported by strong conservatives such as the Federalist Society’s Steven Calabresi.
Professor Lawrence Lessig

Professor Lawrence Lessig

Collins: Professor Lawrence Lessig took issue with you for discounting corruption (see here) as a viable reason for squelching First Amendment rights in the context of campaign financing. He writes: “I have had the pleasure of reading [Professor Hasen’s] . . . Plutocrats United, a book that will certainly mark him as the dean of this field—I think that he has presented us with a false dichotomy. It is not either corruption or equality. It is both. Our current system for funding campaigns is corrupt, but it is corrupt precisely because it violates a certain kind of equality. The violation is not an equality of speech, but an equality of citizenship. . . . We should not, as scholars, be fighting about which flaw our Republic reveals — inequality or corruption. We should be united — let us say, not citizens or plutocrats, but scholars, united—in the view that our Republic is both unequal and corrupt.”

Is Lessig right? Is there some troublesome division in the progressive ranks here? Is this a case of Progressives Disunited?

Hasen: I love the “Progressive Disunited” label! (Isn’t that always true?) I don’t think there is a large gap between Larry and me anymore. We went back and forth on what the problem is with money in politics in law reviews and blog posts, and in the end I think what is left is primarily a semantic difference. There is much value for an activist to labeling reform in anticorruption terms. Larry is an activist and wants to harness voter anger on this issue. I’m not. But in the end, we both think that the problem is that those with the greatest economic power are able to translate that power into political power, by influencing both who is taken seriously as a candidate for election, and by influencing the public policy that our elected officials pursue.

→ This FAN 6 Q&A will continue tomorrow with Part II.←  

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Previous First Amendment Conversations

FAC #1: Larry Tribe on Free Expression

FAC #2Bruce Johnson on Press Access to Prisons

FAC #3Martin Redish on Free Speech, the Roberts Court, & the Liberal Academy

FAC #4Steve Shiffrin, the Dissenter at the First Amendment Table

FAC #5Madison Unplugged: A Candid Q&A with Burt Neuborne about Law, Life & His Latest Book

Other Interviews 

  1. On Legal Scholarship: Questions for Judge Harry T. Edwards (Journal of Legal Education)
  2. The Complete Posner on Posner Series
  3. Unto the Breach: An interview with the all too candid Dean Erwin Chemerinsky
  4. Ask the author: Chief Judge Katzmann on statutory interpretation*
  5. Ask the author: Garrett Epps on clashing visions on the Court*
  6. Ask the author: Three decades of Court watching – a political scientist’s take on the Court*
  7. Ask the authors: Conflict in the Court — an inside look at New York Times v. Sullivan and its progeny*
  8. Ask the author: Floyd Abrams & his fighting faith*
  9. Ask the author: Marcia Coyle on the Roberts Court*
  10. Ask the author: Kathryn Watts on the workings of the Supreme Court*
  11. Ask the author: Alex Wohl on Tom and Ramsey Clark and the Constitution*
  12. Ask the author: Jeffrey Toobin on The Oath*

* Published on SCOTUSblog

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FAN 99 (First Amendment News) Welcome to the Marketplace of Ideologies — Where Ideas go to Die

One of the prerogatives of publishing First Amendment News is that I am free to express an editorial opinion from time to time. Thus the one that follows . . . along with some news items, of course. — RKLC

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One fact has come into bold relief following the death of Justice Antonin Scalia: Ours is a more a marketplace of ideologies than one of ideas. Let me say it again: Ours is a marketplace of ideologies. In this marketplace ideas do not count for much unless they can be tapped to further some political or religious ideology. So, too, facts are of no moment if they conflict with ideology. Even the constitutional process of governing can be put on hold if it cannot be squared with ideology. And the noble pursuit of truth must take a back seat to ideology. In all of this, conservatives and liberals alike push their respective ideologies into the marketplace. We are, after all, at war — a culture war (or a “kulturkampf” as Justice Scalia tagged in in Romer v. Evans).

→ I  D  E  O  L  O  G  Y ← 

Say goodbye to John Milton and his claims in Areopagitica (1644): “And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?”

Farewell to Harold Laski’s hope expressed in Authority in the Modern State (1919): It “is in the clash of ideas that we shall find the means of truth. There is no other safeguard of progress.”

Au revoir to Holmes’s dissent in Abrams: “when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas — that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.”

And adios to the “marketplace of ideas,” the one coined by Justice William O. Douglas in his concurrence in  United States v. Rumely (1953): “Like the publishers of newspapers, magazines, or books, this publisher bids for the minds of men in the market place of ideas.”

Bunk, all bunk! And why? The answer is because too often we no longer trade in ideas when they conflict with our ideologies; too frequently we no longer concern ourselves with having our thoughts accepted in the competition of the market if those thoughts cannot serve our ideologies; and who, pray tell, gives a Holmesian hoot about truth when it cannot be squared with our ideologies?

Politicians make up facts; they deny truths; they evade tough questions; and they now say anything, no matter how bizarre or hypocritical, to appeal to our ideologies. While Supreme Court Justices are not yet entirely in that league, time and again their rulings in controversial cases cut along ideological lines. In that clash, ideas have value only insofar as they advance this or that ideological end.

So scrap the old Enlightenment ideal; forget the quest for Truth; discard all that Meiklejohnian idealism about free speech and an informed electorate; chuck all that aspirational Brennan-talk about the importance of the “unfettered interchange of ideas” as a way of “bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people”; and dump all that highfalutin free speech theory preached from the pulpits of the legal academy.

Can we speak frankly? Can we talk openly about what we all know privately? Can we bring some realism into the room? If so, perhaps we will stop conflating ideas with ideologies.

Dogmatism is ideology’s calling card. Where ideology reigns supreme, an open mind poses a clear and present danger to its stability. There is no trade in ideas with ideologues, there is only the demand that all opposing views surrender to the preferred creed.

Ideology is akin to groupthink, which is to say it does not involve individual thought. It is more a reaction than a reason, more influenced by opinion than fact, and more beholden to outcomes than premises. An idea is a thought whereas ideology is an orientation. The two are very different. Whereas an idea can be tested, an ideology cannot, if only because its measure is not truth. Ideology cares not about science or logic or history or facts unless they are harnessed in its name. I D E O L O G Y trumps all.

My fear: The idea of our faith in ideas has passed. We have abdicated; we have moved on; today we trade in the marketplace of ideologies — the very place where ideas go to die.

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Brooklyn Law School to Host Yet Another First Amendment Event  Read More

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Journal of Legal Education: Volume 65, # 3, Spring 2016

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From the Editors

By Thomas D. Cobb & Kate O’Neill

Articles

           By Adam Chodorow & Philip Hackney

           By Lynn M. LoPucki

           By Justin McCrary, Joy Milligan, & James Phillips

           By Elaine Campbell

          By John C. Kleefeld & Katelyn Rattray

At the Lectern

           By Beth Hirschfelder Wilensky

Interview

           By Ronald K.L. Collins

Book Reviews

           By Duncan Farthing-Nichol

           By Michael Robertson

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The Tragedy & Lost Legacy of James M. Landis — Book Review by Duncan Farthing-Nichol

The current issue of the Journal of Legal Education has a fascinating book review by Duncan Farthing-Nichol of Justin O’Brien’s The Triumph, Tragedy and Lost Legacy of James M Landis: A Life on Fire (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014, pp. 187, $52.00 (cloth). Here is how the review opens:

Dean James Landis (1889-1964)

Dean James Landis (1889-1964)

In The Triumph, Tragedy and Lost Legacy of James M Landis, Justin O’Brien asks why Harvard Law School has so far neglected to hang its portrait of James M. Landis (11). The library’s walls bow under the weight of history; Harvard’s twentieth-century deans gaze down en masse from the south end. But Landis, dean from 1937 to 1946, is not among them.1 Professor O’Brien traces the omission to Landis’ 1963 conviction for tax avoidance, a crime for which Landis was sentenced to thirty days in jail. The school, according to O’Brien, has let the conviction overshadow Landis’ vital role in shaping law and government. O’Brien reminds readers that Landis wrote and administered the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934—the first serious efforts at federal securities regulation—and, in 1938, developed the most persuasive contemporary theory of government by administrative agency. The University of New South Wales professor also contends that Landis introduced social responsibility to legal education, an achievement that elevated law from a mere technical discipline to a means of seeking justice. Harvard, O’Brien concludes, should hang its Landis portrait.

I agree, but on somewhat different grounds. O’Brien lays a compelling case for Landis’ impact on administrative thought and practice. He moves too quickly, however, in naming Landis a transformative figure in legal education. Landis spoke in ambitious terms: He aimed for a legal education that transcended technique, reflected the rise of public law, and respected the new experts (economists, sociologists, and other specialists). He sought to instill a desire for justice in his students. Yet Landis did relatively little to institutionalize that vision, acting more as a caretaker than a reformer. If Harvard should hang Landis’ portrait, it is for his ideas and his story, rather than his deeds. . . . [read more here]