Category: History of Law

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FAN 165.2 (First Amendment News) Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten court documents now posted on First Amendment Library

Judge Learned Hand’s order granting the temporary injunction against the postmaster and ordering the magazine transmitted through the mails “without delay” was dated July 26, two days after the decision became known. During that brief period, the company pulled back the copies sent to the Post Office so the edition could be delivered by alternate means. On the same day the order was issued, U.S. Attorney Francis G. Caffey filed an Assignment of Error listing grounds on which he would rely in his appeal from Hand’s decree. In all, there were seven alleged errors, although essentially all of them went directly to the bottom line: Hand was wrong in finding for the magazine under every provision of the Espionage Act raised by government and wrong in granting the injunction.   — Eric Easton, Defending the Masses (Jan. 2018) 

* * * *

‘Tis the year of The Masses. This year marks the 100th anniversary of Judge Learned Hand’s seminal free-speech opinion in Masses Publishing Co. v. PattenAs previously reported here, two major events have been organized to celebrate the occasion.

New York Univeristy School of Law and the Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law at Arizona State University are hosting an all-day conference in New York on October 20th.

Gilbert E. Roe (lawyer for The Masses)

 Not long thereafter, on November 6th, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in association with The First Amendment Salons, the Floyd Abrams Institute for Freedom of Expression at Yale Law School, and the Media Law Committee of the New York State Bar Association, will host a “reargument” of the appeal in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten. Floyd Abrams will appear on behalf of Postmaster Patten and Kathleen M. Sullivan will appear on behalf of Masses Publishing Co. The case will be argued before a panel of three judges:

  • Circuit Judge Reena Raggi,
  • Circuit Judge Pierre N. Leval, and
  • Circuit Judge Robert D. Sack

Original court documents posted for first time

In light of all of the above, the folks over at the First Amendment Library (led by Jackie Farmer) have uploaded 18 never before posted documents relating to the appeal in The Masses case. Among other things, this compilation includes the complaint, various affidavits filed in the case, transcript of the record, the order staying Judge Hand’s injunction, and much more.

Adriana Mark, head of research and education for the Second Circuit Library, unearthed these documents for the First Amendment Library. The librarians at the Gallagher Library of the University of Washington School of Law also provided additional research.

As the editor of the Library, I wrote the Introduction to the collection of The Masses documents.

Professor Eric Easton, author of Defending the Masses: A Progressive Lawyer’s Battles for Free Speech University of Wisconsin Press (Jan. 2018), kindly agreed to allow us to post a chapter from his forthcoming book, this to provide additional context for the documents posted.

            Judge Hand’s signature in Masses case

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Other Finds in the Bushrod Washington Journal

In addition to the Justice’s notes on Corfield, here are some other notable items in the journal that I found that is held by the Chicago History Museum.

  1. Part of Washington’s draft opinion in Biddle v. Green, a controversial debtor/creditor case that he wrote for the Supreme Court to supersede an earlier opinion by Story.
  2. His notes on Ogden v. Saunders, a Supreme Court case on bankruptcy law from which John Marshall dissented.
  3. His draft opinion in Le Tigre, a circuit case on salvage.
  4. Some observations on the defects in the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793. (I’ll say more about this after I do further research.)
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FAN 156 (First Amendment News) Special Post: The Espionage Act at the 100 Year Mark: Commentaries by Bambauer, Chemerinsky, Stone & Vladeck

There are citizens of the United States . . . born under other flags but welcomed under our generous naturalization laws to the full freedom and opportunity of America, who have poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life; who have sought to bring the authority and good name of our Government into contempt, to destroy our industries wherever they thought it effective for their vindictive purposes to strike at them, and to debase our politics to the uses of foreign intrigue. . . . 

I urge you to enact . . . laws at the earliest possible moment and feel that in doing so I am urging you to do nothing less than save the honor and self-respect of the nation. Such creatures of passion, disloyalty, and anarchy must be crushed out. — Woodrow WilsonState of the Union Address, December 7, 1915

[T]he newspaper or individual who criticizes or points out defects in policies . . . with the honest purpose of promoting remedial action and warning against danger is not a public enemy. — Editorial, New York Times,  April 13, 1917

Today marks the 100th anniversary of the Espionage Act of 1917 (18 U.S. Code Chapter 37). In light of that, I have collected some background materials about the Act followed by several original comentaries on it, which follow the introductory materials below.

Origins

  • Assistant Attorney General Charles Warren drafts a bill “for suppressing or punishing disloyal and hostile acts and utterances.”
  • Bill introduced in the House as H.R. 291
  • Bill passes in the House on May 4, 1917 (261–109)
  • Bill passes the Senate on May 14, 1917 (80–8)
  • President Woodrow Wilson signs bill into law on June 15, 1917.

August 1917 cover of Masses Magazine

First Amendment Online Library Timeline of Espionage Act & Related Acts

 The Masses cases:

  • Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.Dist.N.Y., 1917) (per Hand, J.)
  • ruling re stay of appealed order, 245 F. 102 (per Hough, J., 1917), and
  • Circuit Court ruling reversing District Court,  246 F. 24 (2nd Cir., 1917) (per Rogers, J. for the majority  with Ward, J. concurring)

FAN 148, Coming this fall: NYU Law to host conference to commemorate centennial anniversary of Hand’s Masses decision

Controversial Provisions of the Act: “The Espionage Act put into law a penalty of up to 20 years imprisonment for anyone convicted of interfering with military recruitment. The law also presented the penalty of levying fines of up to $10,000 for those convicted. The law also gave additional powers to the post office. Specifically, the law allowed the Postmaster General to confiscate any mail that might be deemed seditious or treasonable.” (source: This Day in History)

Domestic Issues of Concern: “There were quite a number of concerns the Wilson administration had about certain groups that were in opposition to the war. Public criticism of the war was definitely a major concern of the government. Since a significant number of troops would be needed to carry out the war effort, a draft was imposed. Among the concerns the government had was the notion that constant criticism would make recruitment and even conscription difficult.” (source: This Day in History)

Enforcement: “Enforced largely by A. Mitchell Palmer, the United States attorney general under President Woodrow Wilson, the Espionage Act essentially made it a crime for any person to convey information intended to interfere with the U.S. armed forces prosecution of the war effort or to promote the success of the country’s enemies. Anyone found guilty of such acts would be subject to a fine of $10,000 and a prison sentence of 20 years.” (Source: Totally History)

See also David Greene, As the Espionage Act Turns 100, We Condemn Threats Against Wikileaks, Electronic Frontier Foundation, June 14, 2017

Historical Resources

→ Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 Harvard Law Review 932 (1919)

Karl N. Llewellyn, Free Speech in Time of Peace, 29 Yale Law Journal 337 (1920) (student comment)

Walter Nelles, In the Wake of the Espionage Act, The Nation (December 15, 1920)

Masthead from Masses magazine

Commentaries by Derik Bambauer, Erwin Chemerinsky, Geoffrey Stone & Stepehen Vladeck 

Backwards and Forwards

by Derek E. Bambauer

Many thanks to Ron Collins for the invitation to reflect on the centennial of the Espionage Act!

I want to argue that the Espionage Act is not only problematic on its own terms, but that it has paved the way for a newer set of worrisome statutes and dubious cases. These newer measures, like the Act itself, respond to an exaggerated sense of danger from internal and external threats. Courts and lawmakers alike have largely engaged in ahistorical analysis: they have failed to learn the lessons from the past. They underrated the perceived risk of subversive political speech in wartime in the early twentieth century, and they fail to question whether terrorism is a sufficiently existential threat today to warrant impingements on speech. I conclude that there are two possible responses, neither particularly promising.

To give the problems with the Espionage Act and its progency some currency, consider the current fight against the terror group ISIS in the Middle East. ISIS has taken a surprising amount of territory, and has become infamous for its horrific treatment of captives. There have been domestic attacks by individuals or small groups who claimed an association with or allegiance to ISIS. However, while these attacks are horrifying, even significant terror attacks are not existential threats to the United States.

But the perceived threat from ISIS has generated a disproportionate response, and one that frequently targets speech. For example, the assistant attorney general for national security said that people who are “proliferating ISIS social media” could be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. 2339A (the material support statute). His contention was that disseminating ISIS’s point of view counts as providing “technical expertise” to a terrorist group. In 2012, the government successfully prosecuted Tarek Mehanna as a terrorist, in part because he translated al Qaeda writings and videos into English. The First Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming his conviction, called terrorism the “modern-day equivalent of the bubonic plague” and an “existential threat” – an embarrassing example of hyberbole. And the Supreme Court has failed to rein in restrictions on speech justified as necessary for the war on terror. In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to the material support statute, highlighting the fact that completely independent political advocacy is not covered by the law’s prohibitions. (The challenge, of course, is determining when someone is “completely independent.”)

The material support statute is also problematic in that it defers decisions about what content should be criminalized to the executive branch. The State Department is empowered to determine which entities constitute terrorist groups. Coordinated political advocacy with groups on the list is a crime; advocacy for violent but not listed groups is safe. One person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter. There’s also the risk of one-way advocacy: if terrorist group calls for people to advocate on its behalf, and someone does so, does that count as coordination? And, of course, the Justice Department has charged Edward Snowden under the Espionage Act itself, and continues to investigate whether to prosecute WikiLeaks and Julian Assange under it.

These efforts seem similar to prosecutions in the early twentieth century under the Espionage Act that ultimately elucidated the weak form of the “clear and present danger” test. For example, Charles Schenck was convicted for distributing pamphlets for American Socialist Party that read “Assert your rights – do not submit to intimidation” – hardly stuff to stir the blood. The Socialist Eugene Debs was convicted for giving a speech titled “Socialism is the Answer.” And Jacob Abrams was an anarchist convicted for his criticism of the U.S. decision to defend Russia against the Bolsheviks.

There were similar trends during the Cold War. The Communist Eugene Dennis received his conviction for knowingly advocating the overthrow of the U.S. government by force. The Supreme Court called the Communist Party a “permanently organized, well-funded, semi-secret organization.” These cases demonstrate at least two parallels to current events. The first is a conception of political (largely foreign) enemies as an existential threat. The second is that the magnitude of this threat justifies restrictions on political speech and advocacy that would ordinarily be at the heart of First Amendment protection.

I can see two tentative responses to these problems, one pessimistic and one mildly optimistic.

The pessimistic channels Geoffrey Stone: we must accept as inevitable that there will be limits on political advocacy, especially in wartime, even if that war is a long twilight struggle rather than a declared conflict. This has the interesting side effect of making First Amendment less exceptional – there turns out to be an implicit balancing test even with “core” political speech. It might also be a useful descriptive exercise to examine the pendulum swing of First Amendment liberties – is it temporal in nature, or does it relate primarily to subject matter?

The optimistic idea is to draw upon the historical parallels elaborated above: neither socialists nor Communists proved an existential threat to U.S. politics and institutions, despite the heated fears of the moment. This requires more work on our collective part: we have to hold the government to its burden when it seeks to restrict speech, first by questioning the characterization of information as a threat, and second by carefully policing the line between conduct and speech when regulations are proposed or promulgated. That will require political courage – always in short supply – and legal analysis grounded in history.

The Espionage Act ought to teach us that these are vital assets in our self-governance, but it’s not clear we have yet learned the lesson.

A Loaded Gun

By Erwin Chemerinsky

The Espionage Act of 1917 is a loaded gun waiting for the federal government to use it to punish speech. Indeed, throughout its history, it has been used to punish speech that should be deemed constitutionally protected. I especially worry that the Obama administration has set a precedent for the Trump administration, which has shown great hostility to the press. Since the enactment of the Espionage Act of 1917, twelve prosecutions have been brought under it for disclosures of information and nine of those were during the Obama administration.

The Espionage Act, by its very terms, is directed at restricting speech. The law makes it a crime to convey information with the intent to interfere with the operation of the armed forces or to promote the success of its enemies. The Act also makes it a federal crime to convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States or to promote the success of its enemies when the United States is at war, to cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States, or to willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States. Yet another provision gives the Postmaster General the authority to impound or to refuse to mail publications that he determined to be in violation of its prohibitions.

The Act has been used to punish speech. Most famously, it was used to punish speech during World War I that the First Amendment never should have allowed to be punished. In Schenck v. United States, the Court considered the conviction of two individuals – Charles Schenck and Elizabeth Baer – who were prosecuted for circulating a leaflet arguing that the draft violated the Thirteenth Amendment as a form of involuntary servitude. The leaflet was titled, “Long Live the Constitution of the United States.”   It said, ‘‘Do not submit to intimidation,’’ and ‘‘Assert Your Rights,’’ but did not expressly urge violation of any law; it advocated repealing the draft law and encouraged people to write to their representatives in Congress to do so.

There was not any evidence that their leaflet had any effect in causing a single person to resist the draft. Nonetheless, they were prosecuted and convicted and sentenced to jail for violating the 1917 Act. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, upheld their convictions and sentences; he dismissed as irrelevant that the leaflet had no effect.

A week after Schenck was announced, the Court upheld convictions under the 1917 Act in two other cases, Frohwerk v. United States and Debs v. United States.   Jacob Frohwerk was the publisher of a German language newspaper, Missouri Staats-Zeitung. He was prosecuted for a dozen articles published between June and December 1917. Again, the speech was the antithesis of shouting fire in a crowded theater or that which would pose a clear and present danger.   Without doubt, any court today would regard it as expression protected by the very core of the First Amendment. It took the jury only three minutes of deliberation to convict Frohwerk of violating the 1917 Espionage Act and the judge sentenced him to 10 years in prison for his writings. The Supreme Court affirmed.

Albert Burleson was appointed Postmaster General by Woodrow Wilson

In Debs v. United States, the Court affirmed the conviction of Socialist Party leader Eugene Debs who had been sentenced to jail for ten years for violating the 1917 Act. Debs was a national political figure, having run for President in 1900, 1904, 1908, and 1912. Debs was convicted for a speech that was primarily advocacy of socialism, but it included some mild criticism of the draft. At one point in a long speech, Debs remarked that he had to be ‘‘prudent’’ and not say all that he thought, but that ‘‘you need to know that you are fit for something better than slavery and cannon fodder.’’ For this mild statement Debs was convicted of attempting to incite disloyalty in the military and obstruct the draft. Again, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Moreover, during World War I, the Postmaster used the authority under the statute to seize magazines and newspapers. Albert Burleson, a reactionary racist from Texas who despised labor unions and the people who supported them, began a campaign to root out magazines and newspapers that promoted socialist or radical causes.

The subsequent use of the Espionage Act reinforces reasons for great concern. It is the statute used to prosecute Daniel Ellsberg and Chelsea Manning. It is a law that can be used to punish those who provide information to the press and to those who disseminate information. The Act is so broadly written that there is no way to know the speech that it has chilled over the years. I have great fears of how it might be used in the next four years with a President who has shown such great hostility to the press.

When Can a Government Employee Leak Classified Information?

by Geoffrey R. Stone

The Espionage Act of 1917, as amended over the years, forbids government employees to disclose classified information to any person who is not authorized to have access to it. For this reason, most prosecutions of government leakers of classified information have relied upon the Espionage Act. The Act recognizes no defense for government employees who leak such information. This is one of Edward Snowden’s justifications for refusing to return to the United States to face prosecution. He maintains that the absence of a defense that would exonerate government leakers of classified information whose acts do more good than harm is unjust. As we look to the future, a central question is whether the Espionage Act should be amended to recognize such a defense.

Edward Snowden (credit: The Guardian)

At first blush, there is obvious logic in Snowden’s position. After all, if someone does more good than harm, shouldn’t they be free to do the good? Moreover, this seems especially sensible in the context of classified information, because the test for classification is whether the disclosure of the information might “reasonably be expected to harm the national security.” There is no balancing at all of good versus harm. The standard does not take into account the possible benefits of the leak and it does not require that the harm be likely, imminent, or grave.

Moreover, the government quite predictably tends to over-classify information. The simple rule is: Better be safe than sorry. In addition, we know from experience that public officials have on occasion abused the classification system in order to hide from public scrutiny their own misjudgments, incompetence, and venality.

In light of these concerns, it might seem logical to amend the Espionage Act to permit a government employee legally to disclose classified information whenever she can demonstrate that the benefit of the disclosure outweighed the actual harm to the national security. Why shouldn’t Edward Snowden have such a defense, if he can prove the case? After all, granting such a high level of deference to the government in these situations significantly overprotects government secrecy at the expense of both official accountability and informed public debate. Even worse, in some situations the leaker might disclose the existence of programs that are themselves unlawful. In that case, how can it possibly be right to make it a crime for the government employee to disclose the information to the public?

The government’s response to all this is fairly straightforward. First, except in extraordinary circumstances like self-defense, we don’t give individuals a right to break the law because, in the circumstances, committing the crime might do more good than harm. For example, if X steals someone’s purse because he needs money to feed his children, he could easily argue that his theft did more good than harm, but that is not a defense. One could, of course, multiply that hypothetical endlessly.

Second, there are more than a million government employees and private contractors who have access to classified information. The government will argue that it would be reckless in the extreme to permit each of those individuals to think that it is permissible for them to disclose classified information whenever they conclude that the good would outweigh the harm. Even if in some instances they might be right, often they will be wrong – especially because individual government employees and contractors are rarely in a position to understand how the information they plan to disclose might damage the national security. Thus, the government will argue, the only sensible thing to do is to take that option away from these employees. Finally, the government will point out that in order to prove in court that a leak caused substantial damage it would often have to reveal even more classified information, often including sources and methods, which would make such inquiries especially problematic.

So, what’s to be done? It seems unlikely that the Supreme Court will recognize a First Amendment right of government employees to leak classified information. The implementation of a constitutional rule that permits leaks would just be too messy for the Court to impose or to implement. As a legislative matter, though, it would make sense to create some internal mechanism through which these employees can raise their concerns, especially if they believe the programs at issue to be unlawful. To-date, though, there seems to be little interest in such an option. Another possibility, of course, is simply to tighten up the standards and procedures for classification. No one doubts that we currently live in a world of gross over-classification.

Are there cases one can imagine in which even under existing law it would seem implausible to punish a leaker? Suppose an FBI agent learns from a classified document that at the direction of the Russian government the FBI assassinated the president? I rather suspect that if she leaked that information, assuming it is accurate, she would not go to jail.

It’s (Long-Past) Time to Modernize the Espionage Act

by Stephen Vladeck 

For a law that turns 100 today, and that’s only been materially amended once in a century, the Espionage Act has sure enjoyed a popular resurgence of late. President Barack Obama used it to prosecute more leakers than all previous Presidents put together. Critics of Secretary Hillary Clinton’s unauthorized use of a private e-mail server sought desperately to make the (legally unconvincing but politically damaging) argument that she had violated the statute. And when former FBI Director Jim Comey revealed just last week that he had been responsible for leaking a memo memorializing a conversation he had with President Trump, commentators quickly gravitated toward the Act as proof that, if any laws were broken as part of Comey’s termination, it was the old chestnut herself through Comey’s transgression.

U.S. Army Intelligence WW I Poster Warned Americans About German Spies.

What all of these recent stories have in common is the absence of actual “espionage”— the conduct that motivated Congress to enact the law in the first place. The Act was written on the eve of the United States’s entry into World War I, and, as importantly, before the emergence of either the modern terminology for national security classification or the Supreme Court’s modern First Amendment and vagueness jurisprudence. But because Congress has resisted decades of calls to revisit it, it remains on the books mostly as initially enacted—a statute aimed at German spies. Its clunky and capacious language paints with the same brush three distinct offenses:

  1. classic espionage,
  2. leaking, and
  3. the retention or redistribution of national defense information by third parties.

Part of why it’s so problematic that the Espionage Act treats these three very different sins as the same crime is because of its outdated (and outmoded) language. We now have a sophisticated series of Executive Orders that define and regulate the scope of “classified” national security information, and that have, unlike the Espionage Act, regularly been updated to respond to changes in technologies and threat vectors. One would think it is those provisos, and not a century-old statute, that better reflect the true contemporary scope of “information relating to the national defense.”

And, along with classification, we also now have a far-more-sophisticated understanding of the problem of over-classification—and why it’s so problematic that courts have refused to recognize “improper classification” as a defense to an Espionage Act prosecution. Thus, the more information that has become classified, the easier it has become to violate the Espionage Act through conduct that bears increasingly less resemblance to spying.

Finally, we also now have First Amendment jurisprudence that recognizes at least some circumstances (albeit virtually none thus far involving national security information) in which the disclosure of certain previously confidential material might be of such surpassing public concern as to be protected by the First Amendment even when it might otherwise be unlawful. But the 100-year-old verbiage of the Espionage Act doesn’t account for any of these developments. That may be why, 37 years ago (before it qualified for Medicare), the Act was decried by Anthony Lapham, then the General Counsel of the CIA, as the “the worst of both worlds.” As he then explained to Congress:

On the one hand the laws stand idle and are not enforced at least in part because their meaning is so obscure, and on the other hand it is likely that the very obscurity of these laws serves to deter perfectly legitimate expression and debate by persons who must be as unsure of their liabilities as I am unsure of their obligations.

Modernizing the Espionage Act won’t be easy. But 100 years in, it’s long past time for Congress to do so.

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FAN 152 (First Amendment News) Gilbert Roe — Free Speech Lawyer is Subject of Forthcoming Book

Breaking News from the New York Times

“. . . Mr. Comey had been in the Oval Office that day with other senior national security officials for a terrorism threat briefing. When the meeting ended, Mr. Trump told those present — including Mr. Pence and Attorney General Jeff Sessions — to leave the room except for Mr. Comey.”

“Alone in the Oval Office, Mr. Trump began the discussion by condemning leaks to the news media, saying that Mr. Comey should consider putting reporters in prison for publishing classified information, according to one of Mr. Comey’s associates.”

_______________________

Do not be bluffed on this subject of free speech. Remember that the first amendment of the Constitution stands.  I would say it with greater emphasis if I were a member of the forces of the [Wilson] Administration; for I want to say that if any administration in this country wants to seek trouble, it will find it along the line of denying the constitutional rights of free speech and free press. — Gilbert Roe (1917)

Indeed, [Gilbert] Roe provided the most trenchant and prescient of all criticisms of the Espionage bill by stressing the dangers of the intent requirement. — David Rabban

Gilbert Roe

By and large, First Amendment law is Supreme Court centric. That is, we equate the law, logic and history of freedom of speech with the names of Justices — Holmes, Brandeis, Black, Douglas, Brennan, Scalia, and Roberts. The lawyers behind the cases are all-too-frequently ignored . . . save, perhaps, for Floyd Abrams. But if one looks around the black robes and then turns the clock back, one name, among others, surfaces — Gilbert Roe (1864-1929).

Among other things, Gilbert Roe was the lawyer for the Free Speech League. He  knew and once worked with Louis Brandeis before the latter became a Justice. In 1917 Roe represented Max Eastman, the petitioner in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten (1917, per Hand., J.). Mr. Roe also argued the case on appeal to the Second Circuit (246 F. 24), which reversed Judge Hand’s opinion.

Before the Masses case Roe was Eastman’s lawyer in a criminal libel case. See People v. Eastman, 89 Misc. 596, 152 N.Y.S. 314 (N.Y., 1915). Before that Roe was the attorney for the petitioner in Fox v. State of Washington (1915). And in April of 1917, he testified before Congress against the Espionage Act.

In his amicus brief in Debs v. United States (1919) Roe, along with the attorney for the petitioner, challenged the Blackstonian interpretation of freedom of expression.

Once this Court says that public discussion of the measures of government can be punished because of any intent which a jury may find caused the discussion, or because of any result which a jury may think will follow such discussion, then the free speech and free press of the Constitution is destroyed. — Gilbert Roe, amicus brief in Debs v. United States (1919)

 Statement of Gilbert Roe, representing the Free Speech League, House Committee on the Judiciary (65th Congress), April 12, 1917 (re proposed bill “To Punish Acts of Interferference with the Foreign Relations, the Neutrality, and the Foreign Commerce of the United States”).

Gilbert Roe & Robert La Follett (credit: Wisconsin Historical Society)

Related

Gilbert Roe died in 1929.

* * * *

Beyond what Professor David Rabban wrote in his seminal Free Speech in its Forgotten Years (1999) and Mark Graber in his Transforming Free Speech (1991), this January Gilbert Roe will be the object of a full-length biography by Professor Eric B. Easton.

The book, to be published by the University of Wisconsin Press, is titled Defending the Masses: A Progressive Lawyer’s Battles for Free SpeechHere is the abstract:

“Free speech and freedom of the press were often suppressed amid the social turbulence of the Progressive Era and World War I. As muckrakers, feminists, pacifists, anarchists, socialists, and communists were arrested or censored for their outspoken views, many of them turned to a Manhattan lawyer named Gilbert Roe to keep them in business and out of jail.”

“Roe was the principal trial lawyer of the Free Speech League—a precursor of the American Civil Liberties Union. His cases involved such activists as Emma Goldman, Lincoln Steffens, Margaret Sanger, Max Eastman, Upton Sinclair, John Reed, and Eugene Debs, as well as the socialist magazine The Masses and the New York City Teachers Union. A friend of Wisconsin’s progressive senator Robert La Follette since their law partnership as young men, Roe defended ‘Fighting Bob’ when the Senate tried to expel him for opposing America’s entry into World War I.”

“In articulating and upholding Americans’ fundamental right to free expression against charges of obscenity, libel, espionage, sedition, or conspiracy during turbulent times, Roe was rarely successful in the courts. But his battles illuminate the evolution of free speech doctrine and practice in an era when it was under heavy assault. His greatest victory, including the 1917 decision by Judge Learned Hand in The Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, is still influential today.”

Prof. Eric Easton

How the book came about: “I was looking to write something about Masses Publ. Co. v. Patten, but couldn’t find an approach that hadn’t already been done . . . and done well.  I decided to look at the human side of the case. Again, I found Hand and Eastman well covered (and Patten not terribly interesting).  But Roe seemed like a possibility, although I didn’t know who he was. Brief mentions of him in books I had read (Rabban, Graber) hadn’t really registered with me.

“I wrote to the University of Wisconsin Law Library, among others, to see if they might have some of Roe’s papers, and a librarian there sent me a Westlaw printout of Roe’s published cases (something I could have done myself, but didn’t). My interest was really piqued when I saw some familiar names as parties. When I read the cases, I knew I had something, and plunged into his papers (with La Follette’s in the Library of Congress) and his wife’s (at the Wisconsin Historical Society).”

“What followed was the most enjoyable scholarly experience of my career:  a new discovery nearly every day, a fascinating cast of characters, and a true unsung hero in the evolution of American freedom of speech.  I only hope I have done him justice.” [Source: e-mail to RKLC]

Professor Easton will present a paper at the October Masses conference at New York University Law School. His paper is entitled: “The Role of Gilbert Roe, the Masses attorney.”

Cert. Petition filed in Right to Assembly Protest Case Read More

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Why Write About Bushrod Washington?

Before I unleash the barrage of details about Justice Washington, I want to explain the themes that are motivating me to write this book.

  1. I’ve never written about the Founders. A biography of Washington is a fresh way of doing that for a few reasons. First, there will have to be a lot of George Washington in this book. Second, Washington was a delegate at the Virginia ratifying convention in 1788. Third, he knew and corresponded with all the usual suspects (Jefferson, Madison, Lafayette, to name just three).
  2. I’ve never written about the Marshall Court.  This book will, of course, talk a lot about that.
  3. I’ve never written about slavery from the perspective of a slaveowner. This is a more complex point that I will need to wrestle with for some time. Washington’s relationship with slavery was tortured.  He may have fathered a child with a slave. He was the first president of the American Colonization Society, which supported gradual abolition and deportation to Africa. He ruled in favor of slaves from the bench and carried out George Washington’s wishes to free his slaves. On the other hand, he later brought slaves back to Mount Vernon and sold some in a way that broke up families. Even worse, he defended this conduct is a particularly nasty way.
  4. I’ve never really written about Corfield v. Coryell and the Fourteenth Amendment. In my Bingham book, I noted that Bingham was not a big fan of Washington’s opinion defining the privileges and immunities of national citizenship. Many other members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, though, were very keen about the opinion, and I need to grapple with that.
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Looking back on Bridges v. California (1941) — Some random thoughts inspired by Floyd Abrams’ new book

The Bridges opinion was “a judicial Declaration of Independence for the First Amendment, freeing it from English law.” — Benno C. Schmidt

Harry Bridges

One sign of a good book is its ability to engage readers, to pique curiosity, and to urge one to return anew to something largely known but mostly forgotten. By that measure, Floyd Abrams’ latest book (The Soul of the First Amendment) is a valuable book.

In reading this so-called “modest essay” — Abrams tags it “ruminations about certain aspects of American constitutional law” — I was drawn back to a Bridges v. California (1941), the contentpt of court case involving the militant Harry Bridges, the then conservative Los Angeles Times, and their unrestrained comments on a then pending case.

Abrams devotes the better part of a concise chapter to this First Amendment majority opinion authored by Justice Hugo Black. The Court divided 5-4 with Justice Felix Frankfurter registering a stinging dissent.

Bridges is “a seminal but too-little recalled First Amendment case” writes Abrams.  I agree. Many con-law casebooks do not even cite the case anymore.

After reading the Bridges chapter, which is rich with important observations and comments, I went back and did some research on the case. Here is what I found — several revealing facts nearly lost to time.

Justice Douglas Edmonds

The Importance of a Forgotten State-Court Dissent: Does the name Douglas Lyman Edmonds (1887-1962) ring a bell? There is no reason it should except for the fact that he authored a powerful lone dissent when the California Supreme Court ruled on the  case in 1939.

  • Edmonds’ dissent drew in part on a 1928 Columbia Law Review article entitled “Contempt by Publication in the United States.” It was written by Walter Nelles (co-founder of the ACLU and co-counsel in Gitlow v. New York and Whitney v. California) and Carol Weiss King (one of Bridges’ lawyers and one of the founders of the National Lawyers Guild).
  • After discussing British constitutional history, Edmonds wrote: “The concept of freedom of the press, stated by Blackstone, is completely foreign both in time and place to the fundamental principles of American institutions. The doctrine that ‘the liberty of the press … consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published’ . . . is a statement of the British law at a time when seditious libel was punishable as a crime; it is not the interpretation of a Constitution. Moreover, that law has been very differently declared in the last one hundred and twenty-five years. (See Chaffee, Freedom of Speech, (1920), 8 et seq.”
  • And then following more extended discussions of federal and state laws (decisional and statutory laws), Edmonds declared: “The notion that contumacious publications have been subject to the summary power from time immemorial has been shown to be historically incorrect. Also, the experience of Pennsylvania and other jurisdictions where immunity of the press has long been maintained conclusively proves that no such power is necessary to maintain either the existence of courts or the respect for them. It is not necessary to the wholesome administration of justice in this state that judicial officers have uncontrolled discretion in passing upon alleged constructive contempts of court.”
  • “The rights of freedom of speech and of the press,” Edmonds added, “have their roots deep in the soil of this nation’s organic law. Five days before the Declaration of Independence was proclaimed, the patriots of Virginia declared in their Constitution ‘that the freedom of the press is the great bulwarks of liberty, and can never be restrained but by despotic governments.’ For more than a century and a half our nation has consistently upheld this right of expression by a free people as a vital principle which the founders of our national and state governments stated in the respective constitutions as necessary to a democracy.”
  • He closed his dissent with these words: “When free speech is fettered, liberty is a meaningless word.”

More, much more, can be said about this remarkable dissent, but that is a task for another day.

A.L. Wirin

The Importance of the Counsel in the Case: Turning back the pages of history reminds us that two rather important ACLU lawyers represented Bridges in the U.S. Supreme Court:

  • Osmond K. Fraenkel argued the case. Earlier, he represented the defendants in the Sacco-Vanzetti case and was one of the attorneys for Scottsboro boys. Fraenkel argued 26 cases  in the Supreme Court.  He was the lead counsel for the petitioners in  De Jonge v. OregonKunz v. New York and Schneider v. New Jersey. [Roger K. Newman, ed., The Yale Biographical Dictionary of American Law (2009), p. 200]
  • A. L. Wirin was with Fraenkel on the Bridges brief. Wirin was the first full‐time lawyer for the ACLU and served as chief counsel of the ACLU of Southern California for four decades. As Sam Walker noted: Wirin “particularly distinguished himself during the Japanese-American internment when he and the ACLU affiliate sought an aggressive challenge to the government’s catastrophic program.” Wirin was counsel for the petitioner in Korematsu v. United States

Here is an excerpt from the Fraenkel-Wirin brief, a passage that apparently got the attention of Justice Black when he authored his majority opinion:

“The ‘Inherent Tendency’ and ‘Reasonable Tendency’ rule applied by the California Courts to publications pertaining to issues pending in the courts are too vague and indefinite… They offend due process of law and deprive the petitioner of freedom of speech and freedom of the press… Only the application of the ‘clear and present danger’ or the ‘actual obstruction’ principle to publications alleged to be in contempt of court will reconcile the independence of the judiciary with freedom of the press.”

The Importance of Fate: The Bridges case was first argued on Friday October 18th and on Monday October 21st of 1940. At the time of the conference, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes found it to be an easy case. In conference he was straightforward: “The facts here transcend the limits of reasonable discussion and I think [the lower court] should be affirmed.” (Roger K. Newman, Hugo Black: A Biography (1994), p. 290).  With that he assigned the majority opinion to Justice Frankfurter with Black, Reed and Douglas in dissent.  But then Fate changed things.

Anthony Lewis

As Anthony Lewis noted, on February 1, 1941, Justice James McReynolds retired.  “That left a five-to-three majority for affirmance.” And then Justice Frank Murphy jumped ship and joined with the dissenters.  That left the vote at four-to-four.  “At the end of the term,” Lewis added, “Chief Justice Hughes retired, leaving only three votes to affirm the contempt convictions.” [Anthony Lewis, “Justice Black and the First Amendment,” in Tony Freyer, Justice Hugo Black and Modern America (1990), pp. 237-252.]

And then two new members joined the Court: Justices James Byrnes and Robert Jackson.  Byrnes voted to affirm, Jackson to reverse. The result: a new majority with Black writing for the Court and Frankfurter dissenting.

The Importance of the Date: The 5-4 ruling in Bridges v. California came down on December 8, 1941 — the day after the attack on Pearl Harbor. That was also the day when President Roosevelt spoke to Congress at noon to request a declaration of war from the House.

Meanwhile, at the Court there was great division. On the one hand, Justice Black declared that “[h]istory affords no support for the contention” that speech could be abridged merely because it was directed at a judge sitting in a case. On the other hand, Justice Frankfurter was adamant that “[o]ur whole history repels the view [that a] newspaper to attempt to overawe a judge in a matter immediately pending before him.”

While war was afoot in the nation, freedom was being debated in the nation’s highest Court.

The Importance of Four Unpublished Sentences: In a draft of his original dissent, Justice Black penned the following words, which never appeared in his majority opinion:

 First in the catalogue of human liberties essential to the life and growth of a government of, for, and by the people are those liberties written into the First Amendment to our Constitution. They are the pillars upon which popular government rests and without which a government of free men cannot survive. History persuades me that the moving forces which brought about the creation of the safeguards contained in the other sections of our Bill of Rights sprang from a resolute determination to place the liberties defined in the First Amendment in an area wholly safe and secure against any invasion — even by government. [Howard Ball, Hugo L. Black: A Cold Steel Warrior (1996), p. 191]

And then there was this line: Narrow abridgments have a way of broadening themselves[Newman, supra, at p. 290, n. *]

Hugo Black (1937: credit: Harris & Ewing)

The Importance of the Bridges TestJustice Black harbored no fondness for Holmes’ clear-and-present danger test. Still, in Bridges he did give it a judicial nod of sorts, but then pointed beyond it:

What finally emerges from the ‘clear and present danger’ cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished. Those cases do not purport to mark the furthermost constitutional boundaries of protected expression, nor do we here. They do no more than recognize a minimum compulsion of the Bill of Rights. For the First Amendment does not speak equivocally. It prohibits any law ‘abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.’ It must be taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-loving society, will allow.

The Importance of  Three PrecedentsAs Anthony Lewis saw it, Bridges was part of a trilogy of First Amendment cases that changed the conceptual landscape of American free-speech law. The other two cases were Near v. Minnesota and New York Times Co. v. SullivanHere is how Lewis put it:

  • What Near did for our law of prior restraints from English tradition, and Bridges for our law of contempt, the 1964 decision in . . . Sullivan did for libel.

What is also key to these three rulings, and what also links them together, is that unlike earlier First Amendment cases that “focused on the harm speech could do,” Near, Bridges and Sullivan focused instead on “the good it could do.”

  • “Chief Justice Hughes found affirmative reasons for a free press.”
  • “Justice Brennan spoke of our ‘profound commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.'”
  • And then there was Justice Black: “No purpose in ratifying the Bill of Rights was clearer than that of securing for the people of the United States much greater freedom of religion, expression, assembly, and petition than the people of Great Britain had ever enjoyed.”

* * * * *

Justice Louis Brandeis

As Frankfurter told it, Justice Brandeis allegedly agreed with him and disfavored Black’s view in Bridges: “Black and Co.,” he had Brandeis saying, “have gone mad on free speech.” [H.N. Hirsch, The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter (1981), p. 158] Professor Hirsch noted that it was not “possible to verify this story.” [Id. at 240, n. 115].

True or not, one thing was certain: “Bridges cut deeply into Frankfurter’s sense of well-being.” [Id. at p. 158] And perhaps that explains FF’s need to find a purported ally in Brandeis.

Lewes was understandably skeptical: “I should not leave unquestioned any assumption that Justice Brandeis would in the end have disagreed with the Black view in Bridges if he had still been on the Court. No doubt fair trial was an important value for him, and he might well have been reluctant to limit the power of judges to punish comments threatening that fairness. But it is also true that Brandeis considered freedom of speech a positive good, and he made the case for that belief with compelling eloquence.” [Lewes, supra, at p. 245]

The battle between Black and Frankfurter continued for decades thereafter. Ultimately, however, the spirit of Brandeis’ free-speech jurisprudence pointed more towards Black’s expansive views than towards Frankfurter’s cramped ones. Perhaps that explains why Mr. Abrams began his book with an epigraph quote from Justice Black:

The very reason for the First Amendment is to make the people of the country free to think, speak, write and worship as they wish, not as the Government commands.  

And to think that much of that heroic spirit traced back to Bridges . .  . first in Justice Edmonds’s dissent, then in the work done by Fraenkel  and Wirin, followed by the Black dissent that became a majority opinion, and ultimately capped by Tony Lewis’s revealing explanation of it all.

1

FAN 149 (First Amendment News) On hate speech: Will Howard Dean publicly debate Eugene Volokh?

Suggestion: Howard Dean should debate Eugene Volokh at the Newseum, or at the National Constitutional Center, and/or on air — say, on CNN’s The Lead with Jake Tapper or Fox’s Tucker Carlson Tonight or on MSNBC’s Morning Joe or elsewhere. Here is why I suggest this.  

Howard Dean

The Berkeley controversy began with a back-and-forth over cancelling and then postponing Ann Coulter’s speech at the very campus known for launching its own free-speech movement.

Then Ms. Coulter ratcheted it up a bit more with this tweet: “I’m speaking at Berkeley on April 27th, as I was invited to do and have a contract to do.”

Most recently, a First Amendment lawsuit was filed as this controversy continues to prompt ideological posturing.

Earlier, and on a related from, Steven Greenhouse weighed in with a tweet: “Free Speech Defenders Don’t Forget: Ann Coulter once said: My only regret w/ Timothy McVeigh is he did not go to the New York Times building.”

Now onto the reason why I suggest a Dean-Volokh on-air debate.

Apparently, Greenhouse’s tweet got Howard Dean’s juices flowing, so he took to Twitter:

Not to let such an assertion pass uncontested, Professor Eugene Volokh added this to the mix:

“This leads me to repeat what I’ve said before: There is no hate speech exception to the First Amendment. Hateful ideas (whatever exactly that might mean) are just as protected under the First Amendment as other ideas. One is as free to condemn, for instance, Islam — or Muslims, or Jews, or blacks, or whites, or illegal immigrants, or native-born citizens — as one is to condemn capitalism or socialism or Democrats or Republicans. As the Supreme Court noted in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (2010), the First Amendment’s tradition of ‘protect[ing] the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate’ ‘ includes the right to express even ‘discriminatory’ viewpoints. (The quote comes from the four liberal justices, plus Justice Anthony Kennedy, but the four more conservative justices would have entirely agreed with this, though also extended it to university-recognized student groups’ freedom to exclude members, and not just their freedom to express their thoughts.)”

Professor Eugene Volokh (credit: UCLA Magazine)

“To be sure, there are some kinds of speech that are unprotected by the First Amendment. But those narrow exceptions have nothing to do with “hate speech” in any conventionally used sense of the term. For instance, there is an exception for “fighting words” — face-to-face personal insults addressed to a specific person, of the sort that are likely to start an immediate fight. But this exception isn’t limited to racial or religious insults, nor does it cover all racially or religiously offensive statements. Indeed, when the City of St. Paul tried to specifically punish bigoted fighting words, the Supreme Court held that this selective prohibition was unconstitutional (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992)), even though a broad ban on all fighting words would indeed be permissible. . . . ”

And then this:

To which Volokh replied: , No, Gov. Dean, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire does not recognize a ‘hate speech’ exception, The Volokh Conspiracy, Aril 22, 2017. Here are a few excerpts:

“I’m pleased to say that I have read Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942), which is usually cited as recognizing a ‘fighting words’ exception to the First Amendment — personally addressed face-to-face insults that are likely to start an imminent fight are not constitutionally protected. But that has little to do with ‘hate speech’ as most people tend to use the phrase: (1) Such personal insults are constitutionally unprotected entirely without regard to whether they are bigoted. (2) Bigoted expressions of opinion that don’t involve such personally addressed face-to-face insults are constitutionally protected. (3) Indeed, statutes that target only bigoted ‘fighting words’ for special punishments are constitutionally unprotected, even if they are limited to such personally addressed face-to-face insults, see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992).”

Then on MSNBC, Mr. Dean countered: “Okay, several things to think about. One, the United States has the most far-reaching protections on speech of any country in the world. Two, it’s not absolute. Three, there are three Supreme Court cases you ned to know about. One, the most recent, is a John Roberts opinion that said that the Phelps people . . . had the right to picket horrible offensive [things] with signs [at] military funerals. Two, in 2002, . . . the Supreme Court . . . said that cross-buring was illegal because it could incite violence. And three, [the] Chaplinsky case in 1942 said speech was not permitted if it included fighting words that were likely to incite violence. So, this is not a clear-cut [case] . . . . Ann Coulter has used wrods that you cannot use on television to describe Jews, Blacks, gays, Muslims and Hispanics — I think there is a case to be made that invokes the Chaplinsky decision, which is fighting words, likely to incite violence. And I think Berkeley is with its rights to make the decision that it puts there campus in danger if they have her there.”

“I’ll be the first to admit, it’s a close call, it’s a close call,” he added.

*  * * *  *  *

↑→ For a refutation, see Jim Geraghty, Howard Dean’s First AmendmentNational Review, April 24, 2017

Related: Marc Randazza, Dear Berkeley: Even Ann Coulter deserves free speech, CNN, April 24, 2017

Did anti-Trump protestors violate his First Amendment rights?

(credit: Politico)

This from Politico’s Kenneth Vogel: “President Donald Trump’s lawyers argued in a Thursday court filing that protesters “have no right” to “express dissenting views” at his campaign rallies because such protests infringed on his First Amendment rights.The filing comes in a case brought by three protesters who allege they were roughed up and ejected from a March 2016 Trump campaign rally in Louisville, Kentucky, by Trump supporters who were incited by the then-candidate’s calls from the stage to ‘get ’em out of here!’ Lawyers for Trump’s campaign have argued that his calls to remove the protesters were protected by the First Amendment. But the federal district court judge hearing the case issued a ruling late last month questioning that argument, as well as the claim that Trump didn’t intend for his supporters to use force.”

“Of course, protesters have their own First Amendment right to express dissenting views, but they have no right to do so as part of the campaign rally of the political candidates they oppose,” Trump’s lawyers told Newsweek.

 Defendants’ motion to certify an interlocutory appeal in Nwanguma et al v. Donald Trump, President of the United States (Dist. Ct.,, W.D., KY, 2017).

 R. Kent Westberry is counsel for Donald Trump, both as President and individually.

“The Trump Defendants request that the Court certify the following issues:

  1. Whether the First Amendment protects Mr. Trump’s campaign speech as a matter of law, or whether the speech falls within the narrow category of expression that can be subject to censorship for ‘inciting a riot’
  2. Whether the First Amendment precludes holding a speaker liable for negligently causing others to engage in violence.”

Susan Seager, a noted media lawyer,  commented on the claims made by President Trump’s lawyer:

President Trump makes an argument already rejected by the court.  The court ruled that the anti-Trump protesters did have a right to attend the rally since they obtained tickets and were allowed to enter by organizers.  The court said they were not trespassers. Once inside, the protesters did have a First Amendment right to peacefully protest. Organizers had the right to eject them, but not violently.

 Related: Noah Feldman, Trump Lawyers Get Creative With First Amendment, BloombergView, April 24, 2017

Justice Department targets Assange . . . & other leakers  Read More

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FAN 148 (First Amendment News) Coming this fall: NYU Law to host conference to commemorate centennial anniversary of Hand’s Masses decision

Judge Learned Hand (credit: NY Rev. of Books)

Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department’s (“Defendant” or “LVMPD”) violations of Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to freedom of expression, as well as his due process rights in terminating his employment based on an unconstitutionally vague social media policy.

This year marks the centennial anniversary of Judge Learned Hand’s seminal opinion in Masses Publishing Company v. Patten (S.D., NY, 1917).  Among others, New York Universally Law School is hosting a major program to commemorate the occasion. Below is a draft of the agenda and the participants scheduled to participate in the upcoming symposium.

A Decision for the Ages

A Symposium Marking the Centenary of Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten

Date:     Friday, October 20, 2017

Host:     New York University School of Law

I.       Historical and Cultural Background – 9:00-10:30

A.     The Artistic and Cultural Scene in 1917 as reflected in The Masses magazine: Amy Adler (NYU)

B.     The Political Situation and The Espionage Act of 1917: Geoffrey Stone (Chicago)

C.     The State of Free Speech Doctrine in 1917: David Rabban (Texas)

II.     The Masses case: Dramatis Personae and Decision – 10:45-12:15

A.     Learned Hand’s Jurisprudence: Ed Purcell (NYLS)

B.     The Role of Gilbert Roe, the Masses attorney: Eric Easton (Baltimore)

C.     The Decision: Vincent Blasi (Columbia)

D.     The Decision: Richard Posner (Chicago) (via videoconference)

Lunch – 12:30-1:30

III.    Aftermath of the Masses decision – 1:45-3:15

A.     Hand’s influence on Holmes and the Abrams dissent: Thomas Healy (Seton Hall)

B.     Hand’s influence on free speech theory and justifications: Mark Graber (Maryland)

C.     Hand’s subsequent free speech decisions: Paul Bender (ASU) (via videoconference)

IV.   A Debate: The Influence of Masses on Modern First Amendment Doctrine 3:30-5:00

A debate/discussion about the extent to which the Masses test has been incorporated into Brandenburg and other modern cases: Burt Neuborne (NYU); James Weinstein (ASU); Martha Field (Harvard)

Walking tour or Reception – 5:15-6:15

DinnerLocation TBD

President Lee Bollinger

In progress: Book to commemorate centennial anniversary of Schenck opinion 

Columbia’s Lee Bollinger and Chicago’s Geoffrey Stone are reuniting to edit another First Amendment-related book. Following their 2002 work entitled Eternally Vigilant: Free Speech in the Modern Era the forthcoming work is timed to coincide with the hundredth anniversary of Schenck v. United States (1919).

As in the prior volume, Bollinger and Stone will begin and end the book with a dialogue between themselves. The authors scheduled to be in the new volume, which will be published by Oxford University Press, include:

  • Floyd Abrams
  • Emily Bell
  • Mona Bicket
  • Vince Blasi
  • Sarah Cleveland
  • Heather Gerken
  • Tom Ginsburg
  • Jameel Jaffer
  • Larry Lessig
  • Catherine MacKinnon
  • Robert Post
  • Albie Sachs
  • Fred Schauer
  • David Strauss
  • Cass Sunstein
  • Laura Weinrig

Owen Fiss on Harry Kalven Read More

2

An Optimist in Pessimistic Times: Chief Judge Katzmann on Civic Education

Chief Judge Katzmann (Charlie Rose program)

One of the keys to the survival of free institutions is . . .  the way citizens do, or do not, participate in the public sphere. — Robert N. Bellah

*  * * 

Civic education is a force than can provide the ties that bind.”

Those are the words of Second Circuit Chief Judge Robert Katzmann, spoken recently on the Charlie Rose program. At a time when partisan politics and ignorance of our constitutional system of government have nearly become our collective default position, Judge Katzmann is busy rallying the cause of the civic-minded citizen. To that end, two years ago he launched “Justice for All: Courts and the Community.” Its Mission:

The federal judiciary is one of the three branches of the national government. It seeks to provide the fair and effective administration of justice for all persons and interests, regardless of race, color, creed, gender, or status. Federal courts and their state court counterparts provide a means for settling disputes peacefully, and help to foster democratic governance, consistent with the Constitution’s goals of “justice” and “domestic tranquility.” Those who founded our government recognized the critical importance of an independent national judiciary with a limited but essential role.

With the active participation of members of the Bar and community organizations working through several committees, its activities include:

  • hosting field trips to the courthouse for schools and community organizations to observe court proceedings and to meet with judges and court staff;
  • holding moot courts and mock trials for students;
  • developing educational resources for teachers about the law and justice system; developing learning centers;
  • creating library labs for students;
  • coordinating Constitution Day/Citizenship Day programs;
  • supporting essay contests;
  • sponsoring adult education programs in such areas as financial literacy;
  • fostering jury service; and
  • developing a speakers bureau whereby judges and members of the Bar visit the schools and community organizations to discuss the work of the courts.

Following in the footsteps of his mentors Senator Daniel P. Moynihan and Judge Frank M. Coffin, Katzmann is doing what he has long espoused: urging moderation counseled by knowledge coupled with a genuine commitment to improving our democracy. Can he succeed? That is the question.

With steadfast energy, the Chief Judge ventures to schools and elsewhere preaching the the Jeffersonian and Madisonian and Hamiltonian gospels of civic engagement . . . and those of Harriet Tubman and Rosa Parks, too.

Duly sensitive to our “red state/ blue state” differences, Judge Katzmann believes in his mission enough to broker this renewed experiment in democracy. Of course, like any experiment, it may fail. But he moves ahead nonetheless; color him an optimist. Again, his words: “Civic education is a force than can provide the ties that bind.”

For more information, go here.

* * See also * * 

1

Stone’s “Sex and the Constitution” — a monumental work

Professor Geoffrey Stone

If you thought Geoffrey Stone’s Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime: From the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on Terrorism (W.W. Norton, 2005) was an incredible book, hold on: the University of Chicago law professor has outdone himself with his latest book — Sex and the Constitution: Sex, Religion, and Law from America’s Origins to the Twenty-First Century (Liveright, March 21, 2017).

I know of what I speak: I’ve read both books (the latest in advance galleys). With a discerning sense of the currents of history combined with a masterful grasp of the undercurrents of law, Stone provides his readers with a wide-lens view of how sex and the law have interacted in the span of time dating back to ancient Athens. At once fascinating and disturbing, this book reveals how law works — both as a suppressor and liberator. Witness, for example, the nightmarish world of Anthony Comstock (1844-1915) in which countless lives were sacrificed on the altar of Victorian values. Contrast that with the emergence of a new day brought about by Lawrence v. Texas (2003), which thanks to the lawyer Paul M. Smith and the jurist Anthony M. Kennedy helped to free us from the shackles of sexual bigotry. It’s all there, and more, is this superbly crafted book.

That “more” includes everything from the rigid righteousness of St. Augustine (who was a lustful sinner before he became a revered saint), to those ever-so-pious Puritans who loved to lash the impure, to the Temperance Movement crowd and their campaign to ferret out lust in books (and in loins, too, by way of “anti-masterbation devices”), to those entrusted with enforcing Comstock morality and who felt it their God-given duty to persecute the likes of Margaret Sanger (the birth-control activist) and Ira Craddock (author of Right Marital Living), to Attorney General Alberto Gonzales who with zealous conviction launched the Obscenity Prosecution Task Force, to the Moral Majority’s Grand Poobah, Jerry Falwell, and his insistence that the government not spend any money to combat AIDS because this “plague” was the “judgment of God,” to all those who so vigorously opposed gay marriage because it threatened the continued viability of traditional marriages. Oh, the price we have paid for those virtues bequeathed to us by St. Augustine!

As one turns the pages of this book, something of the marvelous freedom-affirming spirit of When we Rise leaps from the pages of Sex and the Constitution. Still, this is not a work that takes liberties with facts; rather, it is a needs-to-be told story presented with legal acumen and a sophisticated sense of history. The scholar in Stone presents his case with nuanced precision, while the humanitarian in him presents his narrative with a gripping sensitivity to those subjected to the whip of sexual morality.

Have I overstated the importance of Sex and the Constitution? Have I exaggerated its worth? No, not at all; truth is my defense. If you doubt that, read the book. If you accept that, buy the book. If you disagree with that, challenge the book. But of this there can be no doubt: Sex and the Constitution is destined to be the defining work of its genre for a long, long time to come.

The epigraph quote for the prologue  to Sex and the Constitution is the same one used as the quote for epilogue.  And it is a fine line, one from Justice William Brennan’s opinion in Roth v. United States (1957):

Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life, has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the ages.

And it is also a fitting tribute to the memory of the Justice for whom Geoffrey Stone once clerked.

__________What Others Are Saying ___________

“No one should miss out on Stone’s spectacular tour through more than 2,000 years of sex, religion, culture, and law. A treasure-house of philosophical brilliance and legal and historical insight—not to mention erotic delights!—this masterpiece is the rarest of combinations: a page-turner that is also a magisterial font of erudite wisdom.”

Laurence H. Tribe, Carl M. Loeb University Professor, Harvard University

“A vivid, sweeping, and compellingly readable account of the history of sex, religion, and the law by one of our most prominent legal scholars.  This monumental study illuminates the origins and stakes of some of the most heated contemporary debates in constitutional law.”
George Chauncey, Samuel Knight Professor of History, Yale University

“Few, if any, legal scholars possess the capacious intellect and encyclopedic command of constitutional law and American history to make us see in an entirely new light what is perhaps society’s most commonly discussed subject.  In devoting his unique talents to Sex and the Constitution, Geoffrey Stone has created a volume of lasting significance that quickly will become essential reading for all who want to better understand sweeping cultural transformations that continue to roil society.”
Lee C. Bollinger, President, Columbia University

Sex, which has simultaneously inspired and eluded regulation through the ages, has been the focus of many of our greatest constitutional controversies.  No one is better suited than the always erudite and lucid Geoffrey Stone to provide the panoramic treatment that the subject deserves.  Unless you are the rare person who has no interest in either the Constitution or sex, you will want to read this book.”
David Cole, LegalDirector, American Civil Liberties Union

“This fascinating account of how sexual mores, religion, and law have intersected or—more often—collided throughout American history is really about even more than that. It’s about the role of law in maintaining a civil society in a diverse 21st century America, and a call to the Supreme Court to step up to the challenge.”
Linda Greenhouse, Pulitzer Prize winner & Knight Distinguished Journalist in Residence, Yale Law School

“Magnificent and monumental—a stunning blend of dispassionate analysis and deep moral conviction. Think that the United States was born as a Christian nation? Think again.”
Cass R. Sunstein, Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard     University

“A superb examination of the history of how the law has regulated sexual behavior and sexual expression from the ancient world to today. This is a brilliant book that offers a balanced and nuanced treatment of controversial topics such as obscenity, abortion, and same sex marriage.”
Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean and Raymond Pryke Professor, University of California, Irvine School of Law