Category: General Law

4

The Six Stages of Scandal

This is a classic that I bring out once every couple of years to describe the political crisis du jour. Now it’s Donald Trump’s turn.

Stage 1:  That’s ridiculous.  It can’t possibly be true.

Stage 2:  It’s not true.

Stage 3:  You can’t prove it’s true.

Stage 4:  Why are you trying to prove it’s true?

Stage 5:  It’s disgusting that you proved it’s true.

Stage 6:  What’s the big deal anyway?

0

Vanderbilt Law Review, Volume 70, Number 4

The Vanderbilt Law Review is pleased to announce the publication of our May 2017 issue:

ARTICLES

Neil S. Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation in the Federal Courts System, 70 Vand. L. Rev. 1183 (2017)

Kiel Brennan-Marquez, “Plausible Cause”: Explanatory Standards in the Age of Powerful Machines, 70 Vand. L. Rev. 1249 (2017)

Morgan Ricks, Organizational Law as Commitment Device, 70 Vand. L. Rev. 1303 (2017)

 

NOTES

Loren D. Goodman, For What It’s Worth: The Role of Race- and Gender-Based Data in Civil Damages Awards, 70 Vand. L. Rev. 1353 (2017)

Carly A. Myers, Police Violence Against People with Mental Disabilities: The Immutable Duty Under the ADA to Reasonably Accommodate During Arrest, 70 Vand. L. Rev. 1393 (2017)

1

FAN 151 (First Amendment News) Morgan Weiland Meet Ira Glasser — The First Amendment & the Liberal Dilemma

[F]or those who believe that the Speech Clause has meaning beyond its strategic use, the application of the speech right must have limits. In other words, the outward creep of the speech doctrine’s boundaries need not be tolerated as “freedom for the [speech] that we hate.” — Morgan N. Weiland

I regard [the campaign finance issue] as the biggest liberal blindspot in First Amendment struggles in my entire career at the ACLU. – Ira Glasser 

∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ 

Morgan Weiland

Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant Libertarian Speech Tradition” is the title of a forthcoming article in the Stanford Law Review.

The author is Morgan N. Weiland, an attorney and PhD candidate at Stanford University specializing in speech, press, and technology law and ethics. Next year she will clerk for Ninth Circuit Judge M. Margaret McKeown. Here is how Ms. Weiland begins the abstract to her forthcoming article:

“Though scholars have identified the expanding scope of First Amendment speech doctrine, little attention has been paid to the theoretical transformation happening inside the doctrine that has accompanied its outward creep. Taking up this overlooked perspective, this Article uncovers a new speech theory: the libertarian tradition. This new tradition both is generative of the doctrine’s expansion and risks undermining the First Amendment’s theoretical foundations.”

“This Article excavates the libertarian tradition through an analysis of Supreme Court cases that, beginning in the 1970s, consistently expanded speech protections by striking down limits on commercial speech and corporate political spending. The Court justified this expansion with the rationale of vindicating listeners’ rights in the free flow of information—the corporate benefit was incidental. But by narrowly conceptualizing listeners as individuals whose interests are aligned with corporate speech interests, the Court ended up instrumentalizing listeners’ rights in the service of corporate speech rights. This is the libertarian tradition. Today, the tradition has abandoned listeners’ rights altogether, directly embracing corporate speech rights. . . .”

As Ms. Weiland sees it, the “libertarian tradition” threatens two longstanding free-speech theories:  “the republican and liberal tradition.” Against that conceptual backdrop, she adds:

“First, by reconceptualizing listeners as individuals whose interests are vindicated through deregulation, the libertarian tradition draws from and is hostile to the republican tradition, which emphasizes the rights of the public, figured as listeners. Second, because the libertarian tradition focuses on vindicating corporate speech rights, it strips away the hallmarks of individual autonomy central to the liberal tradition, leaving only a naked speech right against the state, which this article names ‘thin autonomy.’ If the two traditions have value, then the libertarian tradition is problematic.

This insight cuts against the widespread belief that to protect speech we must be willing to countenance nearly any application of the right, even—and perhaps especially—if it goes against our most deeply held beliefs. That view is a myth; the speech right must have limits.”

 Related 

Weiland on Press Clause & Shield Legislation 

“Weiland’s scholarship and policy work has also focused on the press clause and journalism. She is researching the doctrinal development of the press clause, a paper that was supported by Stanford’s Constitutional Law Center and presented at the Communication Department’s Rebele Symposium in April 2015.”

“Related to this research, Weiland has engaged extensively with the federal shield bill debate. She has spoken about the bill and its potential impact on journalism at AEJMC’s 2014 conference. Free Press, in a report titled “Acts of Journalism: Defining Press Freedom in the Digital Age,” notes that “[j]ournalism and First Amendment scholar Morgan Weiland has argued that lawmakers should simply drop the definition of ‘covered persons’ in both the House and Senate bills and rely instead on the House definition of journalism.” She advanced these arguments while working as a legal intern at the Electronic Frontier Foundation in 2013, where she critiqued and helped to change the legislation. Her work on congressional shield legislation is also featured in the Stanford Lawyer.” [Source here]

Podcast: Interview with former ACLU Executive Director Ira Glasser

[F]or me the First Amendment and all those always was a strategic argument. I regarded the First Amendment, not as a highfalutin doctrine of principle, but as an insurance policy, and that’s what it was meant to be. . . .Ira Glasser 

Ira Glasser

Over at FIRE’s So to Speak podcast series Nico Perrino interviews one the ACLU’s giants, Ira Glasser (transcript here).

In this wide-ranging and spirited interview, the liberal Glasser speaks about everything from

  • his teaching math at Queens and Sarah Lawrence Colleges,
  • to the people who inspired him (e.g., Murray Kempton, I.F. Stone and Max Lerner),
  • to his admiration for Jackie Robinson,
  • to his early days in 1967 at the NYCLU with Aryeh Neier (Glasser is not a lawyer),
  • to his understanding of  how real political change comes about,
  • to his presence at March on Washington in 1963 when he was 25 (“I’d never seen anything like that in my life before, or since”)
  • to his activism during the Nixon years
  • to his views on the ACLU’s involvement in the Skokie case (“It was a surprise to us that it got so controversial”)
  • to his historical discussion of Buckley v. Valeo and how of campaign-finace laws were tapped to go after liberals,
  • to his views on progressives’ call to amend the First Amendment in order to overrule Citizens United (“You are handing your enemies the tools to suppress you!”)
  • to his reply to Perrino’s last question: “What are you most proud of?” — Glasser: “There are two answers: One answer is substantive, and one answer is organizational . . . .” [You’ll have to listen to the podcast or read the transcript to hear the rest of Glasser’s answer.]

Related 

[B]ack in 1972, the ACLU, which by the way is . . . a corporation, was prevented from taking out an ad in The New York Times criticizing then-President Nixon for his opposition to school busing for integration, and had to go to court to vindicate its right to free speech. Ira Glasser (2011)

From Stanford Law Review Online: Judge Neil M. Gorsuch on Free Expression Read More

2

The Inner Workings of the Marshall Court

A big part of my Bushrod Washington research will be on the Marshall Court. Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Washington served together for twenty-eight years. They were once described by Justice Johnson (in a letter to Jefferson) as “one judge.” For the most part, this has been taken to mean that Washington basically just silently followed the Chief’s lead.

Of course, there is another way of interpreting this “one judge” description. Perhaps they were more like partners. This would throw Washington’s role on the Court into a different light, since the great Marshall opinions (for example, Marbury or M’Culloch) would look more like joint efforts. We now know that Justice Brennan exerted a considerable influence on the Warren Court even though his name was not always on the opinions. (Justice Van Devanter did something similar for the Taft Court.) We lack, though, a clear written record of what went on behind-the-scenes in the Marshall Court, though I’ll try to find more.  Some of that was due to the unusual living arrangements of that Court (they all shared the same boarding house and table) which meant that many of their debates were oral and probably interspersed with toasts.

Lawyers still have a romantic notion that John Marshall did everything himself. Indeed, I get the sense that some of Marshall’s biographers (notably Beveridge) talked Washington down to talk Marshall up. The Chief Justice certainly did a lot by modern standards, but most of the decisions were unanimous because the other Justices had significant input into the result. Washington (before Story’s arrival) was probably the leading force in this respect, and even afterwards he was probably formidable. Can I take this from a hypothesis to proof? We’ll see.

 

5

Our Unconstitutional Reapportionment Process

I thought I would post the Introduction of the paper that I’m now writing. I’ve taken out the footnotes to make this short enough for a long post, though I’m happy to share those if asked. Hopefully the draft will be complete by August.

Determining how many members each state is entitled to in the House of Representatives is among the most routine constitutional tasks. Every ten years, a census is conducted under the auspices of the Commerce Department. When the census is complete, the Department enters the state and national population information into a mathematical formula that was fixed by Congress in 1941, and the formula generates a representative total for each state. These state tallies are sent to the President and are certified by him without any congressional action or any exercise of administrative discretion. Though the counting method in the census and the allocation formula for representatives were the subject of unsuccessful court cases in the 1990s, the ministerial nature of the modern reapportionment process is taken almost entirely for granted.

This Article argues instead that the current mechanical system for redistributing congressional representatives violates Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section Two provides that if the right to vote in federal or many state elections is “denied” or “in any way abridged” by a state for a broad class of presumptively eligible voters, then that state’s delegation in the House of Representatives shall be reduced in proportion to the amount of disenfranchisement. Consistent with this requirement, the first census taken after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified tried to ascertain the number of people who fell within Section Two’s definition. The resulting data was then forwarded to Congress and was discussed in floor debates as part of the reapportionment legislation enacted in 1871.

Under present law, by contrast, the Commerce Department is barred from considering Section Two in assessing how many representatives each state should get. While the census can ask Americans about their voting eligibility and behavior, the formula that Congress created to delegate its reapportionment authority does not include a Section Two variable. The current state regulations of voting rights may not require the imposition of any representation penalty, but the imposition of such a penalty cannot be precluded no matter what the facts are. It is axiomatic that Congress cannot erase a constitutional requirement through ordinary legislation, but that is exactly what the reapportionment statutes do given that Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment says a representation penalty is mandatory if the suffrage rights of a sufficient percentage of the relevant population within a state are “in any way abridged.”

My claim that the reapportionment law in place since World War II is unconstitutional may seem unbelievable, but that reaction might fade after learning that the same point was made in the civil rights era. In the early 1960s, there was growing interest in Congress’s failure to enforce Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment against the flagrant exclusion of African-Americans in the South. Indeed, there was a specific demand from the 1963 March on Washington led by Martin Luther King Jr. for the “[e]nforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment—reducing Congressional representation of states where citizens are disfranchised.” As part of this brief renaissance, a handful of scholars observed that the automatic system of ascertaining that representation violated Section Two and litigation was filed in the District of Columbia seeking a declaratory judgment that would invalidate the reapportionment statutes. Following the enactment of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, however, academic interest in the Section Two issue evaporated and the litigation was dismissed on prudential grounds pending “appraisal of the effectiveness of the new Voting Rights Act.”

Though the Voting Rights Act and its subsequent amendments did not fix the constitutional flaw in the reapportionment process, the Supreme Court’s 2013 holding in Shelby County v. Holder that the Act’s preclearance requirement cannot be applied to the jurisdictions that were designated by Congress makes that flaw more visible. After decades of neglect, it is time to treat Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect. Congress must revise the reapportionment statutes and at least permit the Commerce Department to take Section Two into account. If Congress takes no action, then a state with standing to contest the result of the next reapportionment should raise a Section Two objection and the Supreme Court should hold the reapportionment void.

Part I explores the history of congressional reapportionment and describes the contemporary process. Part II discusses Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, how that provision was applied when Congress conducted the first reapportionment after ratification, and the short-lived revival of interest in Section Two’s role in that process during the 1960s. Part III explains why the current reapportionment framework is at odds with Section Two and why a judicial declaration to that effect is proper.

0

The “Shock and Awe” Response to Hillbilly Elegy: Pondering the Role of Race

In my prior posts about Hillbilly Elegy (here and here), I’ve noted some reasons for my struggle to understand the overwhelmingly positive response to J.D. Vance’s 2016 memoir.  Actually, positive is too general a descriptor.  There is often what I call a “shock and awe” character to the response, a “there are actually people like Vance and his family out there in America” response.  Who knew?  And who knew male seahorses gestate the offspring?  Who knew the Okavango River flows inland?  Who knew the Dutch are the tallest people in the world, excepting some small African tribes?  But I digress …

It’s not clear if this initial incredulity regards (1) the white socioeconomic disadvantage and dysfunction from whence Vance comes or (2) his meteoric rise from Appalachia to Yale Law School and on to Peter Thiel’s Mithril Capital.  I’ve already opined on why we should not be surprised by the former, so in this post I’ll say more about the latter.

First, however, to illustrate just how over the top the media response to Hillbilly Elegy has been, let me quote a few reviews.  Bloomberg identified the book as “the most popular choice for best book of 2016.”  Ok, well, popularity doesn’t necessarily equate to quality, but the venerable New York Times, my own media polestar, called the book a “a compassionate, discerning sociological analysis of the white underclass.”  I’ve already explained why I don’t see it as discerning.  As for compassionate?  Maybe in the vein of Bush’s “compassionate conservatism,” but that doesn’t seem to be a thing any more–if ever it was.  I assume that The Economist reviewer would agree with me on the (lack of) compassion point because he concludes that Vance is a “conservative in the oldest and best sense.”  It’s perhaps not surprising, then, that this reviewer opines that “you will not read a more important book this year.”  In short, the reviewer falls hook, line and sinker for Vance’s tough love, personal responsibility prescription, calling it a “bracing tonic.”

One reason I am surprised by the glowing reviews (especially among left-leaning outlets) and the “millions sold” is that I would not have expected 21C Americans–particularly among the chattering classes (and I know a shocking number of law professors who have read this book)–to be so interested in a story of white class migration.  I thought Horatio Alger characters were a creature of history, that American dream, up-by-your-bootstraps narratives were yesterday’s news.  Didn’t our attraction to such delusional thinking fade once we discovered/identified/named white privilege?

In the world in which I live and work, white privilege is often referenced as if a magic bullet, a miraculous cure-all that permits people with white skin to achieve any and all that their hearts desire.  I often hear phrases like “white people’s problems” and “you’re white, you’ll be alright” tossed about casually.  At a minimum, whiteness greases the proverbial skids on the road to success, though we often treat it as much more potent than that.

Broadly speaking, the academy is highly attuned to structural racism and bias based on race/ethnicity–and appropriately so, in my opinion.  Peggy McIntosh tells us that the invisible knapsack of white privilege means that whites “can be pretty sure of renting or purchasing housing in an area which [they] can afford and in which [they] would want to live.”  (“[W]hich they can afford” is a rather important qualifier, no?)  Bernie Sanders told us during the 2016 primary:

When you’re white, you don’t know what it’s like to be living in a ghetto.  You don’t know what it’s like to be poor.

But this isn’t accurate, and surely–somewhere in the deep recesses of our memories and minds–we are aware of this inaccuracy, this failure to see or acknowledge white poverty.  Yet it seems to have taken Hillbilly Elegy‘s publication to surface that reality, however opaquely.  Still, how many of you have made the connection between what (I hope) you know about the existence of white poverty and the economic landscape depicted in this bestseller?

A majority of those experiencing poverty self-identify as white.  Yet like the academy, the media very often conflate our racism problem with our poverty/inequality problem.  See here and here.  The suggestion is often that black people are poor because they’re black, and of course there’s truth to that.  Trina Jones expresses the phenomenon eloquently:

Somehow . . . race and class become mutually reinforcing. Blacks are poor because they are Black and Blackness gets constructed as poor. That is, poverty becomes a constitutive element of Blackness. Blacks are not only lazy [and] intellectually and morally inferior, they are also poor.

So if we have conflated blackness with dependency, have we conflated whiteness with affluence, well-being, and independence/agency?  Arguably, yes.  And if we have done that, where does that leave low-income, low-education whites?  (This is a H/YUUUGE topic, of which I barely scratch the surface in this post).  If they slump or find themselves downwardly mobile or otherwise fail, we look away, ignoring or “forgetting” them (consider the headlines here and here).  If, like Vance, they ultimately succeed–if they become like “us”–we often discount that success by attributing it to their white privilege.

Given that tendency, isn’t it interesting that we’re so captivated by Vance’s story?  (Further illustrating that intrigue, did you know the movie rights to Hillbilly Elegy have been purchased and Ron Howard will be involved in making the film.  I can’t help wonder/worry what combination of “Beverly Hillbillies,” “Dukes of Hazard,” “Honey Boo Boo” “Duck Dynasty” “Deliverance” and ???? will get depicted.  Plus, who’s going to play J.D.?  Sorry, digressing again).

Furthermore, would we feel the same about Hillbilly Elegy if Vance were our colleague?  (Btw, even friends and acquaintances who liked the book are telling me they are tired of seeing and hearing Vance on CNN; guessing it’s a good thing I don’t watch TV.)  What would it be like to have Vance on your law faculty?  Would that just be too awkward given how different he is from “us”?  What if he showed up, fresh out of Ohio State, as our law student?  (that’s a topic for a future post).  Maybe we relish Vance’s story, his success as a token and at a distance, but we can probably imagine what it would feel like to have him around in the flesh, too close for comfort.  We know he wouldn’t really fit in.  And maybe part of the reason legal academics (of all people) and other elites seem to savor the story is that Yale Law School is the ultimate icing on the educational cake.  Maybe we are attached to that “up by the bootstraps” narrative after all.  Maybe Vance affirms our desire to be engaged in–and to be the products of–a meritocratic enterprise.

And that brings me to another “race” question:  Would the Black/African American equivalent of Hillbilly Elegy have spent so many weeks on the New York Times bestseller list?   Or could/would such a hypothetical book–in an era when the Obamas’ autobiographies have been valued much more highly than prior U.S. presidents–leave Hillbilly Elegy in the dust?  Maybe so.  In fact, we may already have our answer to that question in Dreams from my Father:  A Story of Race and Inheritance.   

Oh, and for the record, I love that book.  Really love it, as reflected in some of my ponderings about it in 2009.  Barack Obama is not only a much finer writer than Vance, I found his reflections more thoughtful, mature, nuanced (and maybe he had a better editor because I don’t recall him going on and on and on).  But I admit that familiarity breeds contempt, and Obama told me a story and introduced me to a world I didn’t already know.  Sadly, I can’t say the same about Vance.

0

“THE JUDGE: 26 Machiavellian Lessons” coming this Fall

Ronald Collins & David Skover, The Judge: 26 Machiavellian Lessons (Oxford University Press, October 3, 2017).

The Judge is in a league of its own. For all the countless books and articles written on the politics of judging, no work has ever taken that point seriously, at least not the way the authors do. The Judge breaks into the world of judicial decision-making with bold strides and throws down a provocative conceptual gauntlet. The authors’ thesis is at once shocking and sobering. By cutting to the quick of the matter with Machiavellian acumen and fervor, they level a powerful pox on the houses of liberals and conservatives alike. Combining a sophisticated knowledge of the Supreme Court with a resourceful understanding of Machiavelli’s Prince, Collins and Skover’s The Judge is certain to redefine the entire “law is politics” debate. It will spark needed controversy in the short run and prompt informed thought in the long run. The light from this book is also likely to cast a long shadow for decades to come.

David M. O’Brien, Leone Reaves & George W. Spicer Professor of Politics, Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics, University of Virginia & Author of Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American Politics (Norton, 10th ed.)

∇ ∇ ∇ ∇    ∇ ∇ ∇ ∇

This inspired tract is Machiavellian in a profound sense. If, as Rousseau and Spinoza alleged, Machiavelli wrote The Prince to expose the true ways of power, Collins and Skover perform a similar service: The Judge ingeniously delineates how the pursuit of power lurks within the rarefied realm of appellate judging. Moreover, it delves even deeper: its Machiavellian examination of our judicial history illuminates how John Marshall established an autonomous realm of authority (a state as it were) for the judiciary. In so doing, the great Chief Justice is revealed to be of that most rarefied breed, a true modern “prince,” a state-maker in black robes. This unique work is astute and compelling; it is also carefully executed and buttressed by impressive scholarship. In any variety of instructive ways, The Judge will challenge political theorists, legal scholars, and judges alike.

Alissa Ardito, Ph.D., J.D. & author of Machiavelli and the Modern State (Cambridge University Press)

0

Inaugural Junior Faculty Forum for Law and Stem

I thought some readers would be interested in a new Junior Faculty Forum.  The details are below:

The Northwestern, Penn, and Stanford Law Schools are pleased to announce the creation of a new Junior Faculty Forum dedicated to interdisciplinary scholarship focusing on the intersection of Law and Science-Technology-Engineering-Mathematics (STEM).

The forum will be held each fall, rotating among Northwestern, Penn, and Stanford. The inaugural forum will be held at Penn Law in Philadelphia on October 6-7, 2017. The forum is currently seeking submissions from junior faculty interested in presenting papers at the forum. The deadline for submissions is Friday, June 9.

Twelve to twenty young scholars will be chosen on a blind basis from among those submitting papers to present. One or more senior scholars, not necessarily from Northwestern, Penn, and Stanford, will comment on each paper. The audience will include the participating junior faculty, faculty from the host institutions, and invited guests.

The goal is to promote interdisciplinary research exploring how developments in STEM are affecting law and vice versa. Preference will be given to papers with the strong interdisciplinary approaches integrating these two areas of study.

The Forum invites submissions on any topic related to the intersection of law and any STEM field. Potential topics include (but are not limited to):

  •   Artificial intelligence
  •   Assisted reproduction
  •   Autonomous vehicles
  •   Bitcoin and other blockchain technologies
  •   Computational law
  •   Customized medicine
  •   Epigenetics
  •   Genomics: Human and Non-Human
  •   Machine learning and predictive analytics
  •   Nanotechnology
  •   Neuroscience
  •   Online security and privacy
  •   Regulation of online platforms
  •   Robotics
  •   Smart contracting and automated analysis of legal texts
  •   Stem cell research
  •   Synthetic biology

A jury of accomplished scholars with expertise in the particular topic will select the papers to be presented. Suggestions of possible commentators are also welcome.  There is no publication commitment, nor is previously published work eligible for presentation. Northwestern, Penn, and Stanford will pay presenters’ and commentators’ travel expenses, though international flights may be only partially reimbursed.

QUALIFICATIONS: To be eligible, an author must be teaching at a U.S. university in a tenured or tenure-track position and must have been teaching at either of those ranks for no more than seven years. American citizens or permanent residents teaching abroad are also eligible to submit provided that they have held a faculty position or the equivalent, including positions comparable to junior faculty positions in research institutions, for no more than seven years and that they earned their last degree after 2007.  Jointly authored submissions are accepted so long as the presenting coauthor is individually eligible to participate in the Forum and none of the other coauthors has taught in a tenured or tenure-track position for more than seven years. Given the novelty of this Forum, the organizers reserve the right to accept submissions in exceptional cases that fall outside the strict eligibility criteria. Papers that will be published prior to the meeting in October 6-7, 2017, are not eligible. Authors may submit more than one paper.

PAPER SUBMISSION PROCEDURE: Electronic submissions should be sent to CTIC with the subject line “Law-STEM Junior Faculty Forum.” The deadline for submission is Friday, June 9, 2017. Please remove all references to the author(s) in the paper. Please include in the text of the email a cover note listing your name, the title of your paper, and the general topic under which your paper falls. Any questions about the submission procedure should be directed both to Professor Christopher Yoo and the email account for the Forum conference coordinator at ctic@law.upenn.edu.

FURTHER INFORMATION: Inquiries concerning the Forum should be sent to David Schwartz at the Northwestern University School of Law, Christopher Yoo at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, or Mark Lemley at the Stanford Law School.

4

Direct Taxes and the Border Adjustment Tax

Former Solicitor General Ted Olson has an op-ed in The Washington Post arguing that a border-adjustment tax would be subject to the state apportionment requirement of the Constitution’s Direct Tax Clause. I see no prospect that a border-adjustment tax will be enacted, but if one is I think that Olson’s argument is without merit.

Let’s start with a point that is missing from the op-ed. The term “direct taxes” in the Constitution is largely a euphemism for “taxes on slaves.” Supporters of slavery in the Constitutional Convention faced a dilemma–suppose Congress were to tax slaves at a very high rate? Would that not give Congress the power (in practice) to abolish slavery? The solution was to say that direct taxes had to be apportioned among the states, which meant that even states with no slaves would have to pay a slave tax.  This was a strong disincentive for such a tax, which was never enacted.

When the Supreme Court first interpreted the Direct Tax Clause in 1795, Justice Patterson (who was a member of the Convention) explained this point in his separate opinion. The import of this history is that the Court never (despite many invitations) applied the Direct Tax Clause from 1795 to 1895. (To the extent that Congress did, it was only for taxes on land.)  In 1895, the Court deviated from this deferential posture and held that the income tax was a direct tax, but that was overruled by the Sixteenth Amendment. Since then, no other tax has been deemed direct.

In the face of this original understanding and overwhelming precedent, Olson musters very little in response. He simply tries to define a border-adjustment tax as direct from first principles. Maybe if given the chance he could say more (an op-ed is, after all, a very limited forum), but I doubt it.

3

FAN 150 (First Amendment News) Trend Ends: ACLU’s 2017 Action Plan Stands “Up for Free Speech”

Throughout our history, the ACLU has stood up for freedom of speech and the right to dissent.  From providing know-your-rights materials, to sending trained legal officers to protests, to bringing critical lawsuits defending free speech, the ACLU is on the ground across the country ensuring that people’s voices can be heard. — 2017 Workplan

After a two year hiatus, the American Civil Liberties Union has reaffirmed its long-standing commitment to free-speech rights, this in its 2017 workplan. The group’s latest workplan contains a section on safeguarding free-speech rights. The 2017 “ACLU Strategy for Defending the Constitution” includes a segment entitled “Standing Up for Free Speech and Protestor Rights.” This portion of the work plan was part of an eight-page mailer sent out to ACLU members. The 2016 and 2015 workplans, by contrast, omitted any mention of protecting First Amendment free-expression rights.

“From Standing Rock to the Women’s March, from airport protests of the Muslim ban to Black Lives Matter marches across the country,” the workplan states, “we are experiencing historic levels of protest.  The whole point of lifting up your voice is making sure your elected officials hear you.”

Anthony Romero, ACLU Executive Director

“The response to these powerful displays of democracy in action? Legislators in at least 15 states have proposed new laws to criminalize and penalize protest activities. Some of these have been dressed up as bills having to do with obstruction or public safety, but at their core they have one intent and effect — and that is to suppress dissent.”

“. . . The ACLU will fight in statehouses against any bill that violates the First Amendment, and for any that become law, we stand ready to go to court.  We’re confident the courts will see these bills for what they are: unlawful infringements of people’s right to speak out.”

“We’ve also seen a troubling trend of companies attempting to squelch the freedom of speech of the people who disagree with their practices.  Take the residents of Uniontown, Alabama for example. When four residents of Uniontown — a poor, predominately black town with a median per capita  income of $8,000 — decided to fight the hazardous coal ash that Georgia-based Green Group Holdings keeps in a landfill in their community, they were sued for defamation by the company to the tune of $30 million.”

“No one should face a multimillion-dollar federal lawsuit just for organizing and speaking out for the health and well-being of their community. The ACLU took up the case and won a critical victory on behalf of the residents of Uniontown when the court dismissed the case. . . .”

Woman Convicted for Laughing During Congressional Hearing

One horselaugh is worth ten thousand syllogisms.” — H.L. Mencken

Ms. Desiree Fairooz

According to Ryan J. Reilly writing in the Huffington Post,  a “U.S. Capitol Police officer . . . decided to arrest an activist because she briefly laughed during Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ confirmation hearing in January . . . . [P]rosecutors persisted this week in pursuing charges against the 61-year-old woman the rookie had taken into custody. . . .”

“Desiree Fairooz, [a librarian and 61-year-old] activist affiliated with the group Code Pink, . . . laughed when Sen. Richard Shelby (R-Ala.) said that Sessions’ record of ‘treating all Americans equally under the law is clear and well-documented.’ Fairooz was seated in the back of the room, and her laugh did not interrupt Shelby’s introductory speech. But, according to the government, the laugh amounted to willful “disorderly and disruptive conduct” intended to “impede, disrupt, and disturb the orderly conduct” of congressional proceedings. The government also charged her with a separate misdemeanor for allegedly parading, demonstrating or picketing within a Capitol, evidently for her actions after she was being escorted from the room. . . .”

**** Ben Mathis-Lilley writing in Slate has just reported that a “jury in Washington has convicted a 61-year-old protester named Desiree Fairooz of disorderly conduct and “parading or demonstrating on Capitol grounds” because she laughed out loud during Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ confirmation hearing. Fairooz could be sentenced to up to a year in prison. . . .”

Press Advisory, CODEPINK Members Stand Trial for Intervening at Jeff Session Confirmation Hearing, May 1, 2017

James Bovard, Arresting someone for laughing may sound funny, but it’s no joke, Washington Post, May 3, 2017 (“It isn’t the first time federal cops have attempted to enforce the difference between licit and illicit laughter, though, and unfortunately, it might not be the last. Laughing got me tossed out of the press box at the Supreme Court in March 1995. I was on assignment for Playboy, covering arguments in a case involving an Arkansas woman who had sold a small amount of illegal drugs to a government informant and was later the target of a no-knock police raid. Then, too, some laughter was okay, and some wasn’t: When then-Chief Justice William Rehnquist mocked one lawyer’s assertion, everyone in the house responded with a polite chuckle.”)

Christopher Mele, Is It a Crime to Laugh at a Congressional Hearing? A Jury Will Decide, New York Times, May 3, 2017 (“Two other activists, Tighe Barry and Lenny Bianchi, dressed as Ku Klux Klan members with white hoods and robes, stood up before the hearing started and were also charged.All three pleaded not guilty to the charges, rejecting a plea deal and demanding a trial. If she is convicted on both charges, Ms. Fairooz said she faces up to 12 months in prison.”)

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