Category: General Law

2

Thomas Marshall’s Dilemma

Fantasies never die. The one that comes up more frequently than most is that Vice-President Pence, the members of the Cabinet, and supermajorities in both Houses of Congress are going to somehow invoke the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and remove President Trump from office. There are a million problems with this thought, but let’s focus on just one.

Even when we had a President who was disabled by a stroke at a time when immense political issues were being debated, neither the Vice-President nor the Cabinet (let alone Congress) acted to remove him.  I’m talking, of course, about Woodrow Wilson. Granted, President Wilson’s colleagues did not have the benefit of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment or any helpful precedents, but still their collective response to Wilson’s illness was passive to the point of denial.

Vice-President Thomas Marshall (a Hoosier, I might add) took the position that he would assume the Presidency only if a joint resolution of Congress, Mrs. Wilson, and Wilson’s doctor all agreed that Wilson was unfit to serve.  This was an impossibly high burden that was probably designed to avoid that outcome. Lots of people in Washington knew that Wilson could not think things through clearly, but virtually nobody said that publicly. If not then, why now?

2

Is Justice Story Overrated?

This is a question that I am asking myself as I begin researching the life of Bushrod Washington. The typical story about the Marshall Court is that Marshall and Story towered above everyone else. Part of Justice Story’s reputation rests on his voluminous scholarly writings, most notably his 1833 treatise on constitutional law.  But if you look at his judicial opinions, the record is quite mixed.

Aside from Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, it’s hard to think of a great Supreme Court opinion by Story. By contrast, I can think of two that were terrible (Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Swift v. Tyson). As a circuit Justice, Story did write some important decisions (such as the one that essentially created the copyright fair use doctrine), but over 34 years you’d expect more given his importance.

Moreover, I see indications that Justice Story made mistakes that Washington had to clean up.  For instance, Story’s 1821 opinion for the Court in Green v. Biddle was so poor that it led to a rehearing where Washington (in 1823) wrote a new opinion reaching the same result. (Justice Washington was ill when Biddle was decided the first time.) As my research progresses, I’ll flesh this out.

1

Rurality and “Government Retreat”

The New York Times ran a story yesterday, dateline Roseburg, Oregon (population 21,000), headlined “Where Anti-Tax Fervor Means All Government Will Cease.”  This is not exactly breaking “news.”  This story has been around in some form, with varying degrees of urgency, for about five years.  See earlier installments here, here and here.  The gist of it is that many rural counties in the West which rely on federal funding streams (e.g., PILT, Secure Rural Schools and Community Self Determination Act monies, covered by stories herehere and here), have seen those monies taper off and in some cases dry up.

I want to be clear before going further that the federal funding streams these counties rely on are not giveaways, at least by my assessment.  They are intended to replace, in some small measure, tax dollars the counties cannot generate because property taxes cannot be levied on federal lands, which comprise vast portions of the West.  (The existence of such extensive public lands is also associated with other controversies, of course; read more here and here).  The existence of public lands may also have an impact on other ways local governments might choose to plump up their public coffers (read more here and here), and the existence of these lands limits the ways in which locals can earn a living, as in the timber industry or in ranching.

As a result of these funding cuts, many nonmetropolitan counties–those least likely to have other funding sources (taxes on robust business enterprises, for example)–are  cutting critical services.  Most news reports to date have focused on cuts to law enforcement, which has cultivated some “informal justice”/citizens “militias” type activity.  But this NYTimes story focuses on cuts to other services.  Highlighted in the story and illustrated by a photo is the fact that Douglas County–at 5,134 square miles, more than 2.5 times the size of Delaware and nearly as large as Connecticut–is about to close the last of the 11 library branches it previously boasted.  The one in Roseburg, the county seat, will be the last to go.  Kirk Johnson, NY Times reporter based out west, reports that Douglas County residents recently voted down a ballot measure that “would have added about $6/month to the tax bill on a median-priced home,” a measure that would have saved the libraries from crisis and closure.

I could digress here into a long discussion about how critically important libraries are for all sorts of reasons, not least these days that–in my suburb and many other California locales–they accommodate many homeless people during the day, providing them a lifeline (the Internet) to identifying and getting services.  I know that my family and I use our neighborhood library on a weekly basis, even though I have ready access to a fabulous academic library.  A 2013 story about the particular benefits of libraries in rural communities is here, and broadband is a big part of the story.   A more recent library story out of rural northern California about the power of books in children’s lives is here.

But Johnson makes the point that libraries are not the only thing on the chopping block in Douglas County.  The failed library initiative is like many others in Douglas and neighboring counties (e.g., Curry and Josephine) that voters have rejected in the last decade.  Another very sobering illustration of the southwest Oregon situation is the fact that Curry County has only one full-time employee in the elections division of its clerk’s office and therefore may have difficulty holding an election this fall.  (I’ve documented here and here similar phenomena in my home county in Arkansas, another place heavily reliant on PILT because of the presence of public lands set aside as Ozark National Forest and Buffalo National River).

There is so much I could say about this particular rural trend to shrink government, sometimes to an extreme degree.  But I just want to make a few points in regard to theoretical legal geography regarding how spatiality and law are co-constitutive.   I have argued as a related matter that rural society and rural spatiality are co-constituting, as reflected in a less robust presence of law, legal actors, and other institutions and agents of the state in rural places.  I framed it as “space tames law tames space” in a frustrating feedback loop:  it is expensive for the state to do its work when the area to be governed is vast and when residents emotionally and intellectually resist vesting power (including via tax dollars)  in the state.  I would characterize this feedback loop as disabling, though I understand some rural residents of a more libertarian bent would see it as enabling–enabling the individual, that is, fostering self-sufficiency.

My argument about the relative “lawlessness” of rural and remote places has not been uncontroversial.  Lots of folks see small towns as the epitome of order and law-abiding-ness and have pushed back against my argument.  Yet it seems that my point is very well illustrated by this detail from Johnson’s article, which he offers as an illustration of “government retreat”:

It looks like the house on Hubbard Creek Road in Curry County, where owners went for more than 10 years without paying any property taxes at all because the county assessor’s office couldn’t field enough workers to go out and inspect. The house, nestled in the woods with a tidy blue roof and skylights, dodged more than $8,500 in property taxes that would have gone to support the schools, fire district and sheriff, because government had gotten too small to even ask. So things fall even further, with cuts to agencies that actually bring in revenue prompting further cuts down the line.

So there you have it:  a community envisages itself as not needing law, regulation and the state, so it underfunds government to such an extent that the state can no longer support itself and perform (m)any government functions.  This, in turn, further fuels the imaginary–and reality–of an anemic and unhelpful state.  The state is thus discredited, thereby further undermining the state’s ability to justify the raising of revenue or to do, well, much of anything.

Which came first, the chicken or the egg?  the state’s inability to be effective?  or the perception that it would necessarily be ineffective and a consequent decision not to fund it, thereby rendering it (more?) ineffective, unhelpful, and inefficient?

As for when a community goes too far in its retreat from public institutions…well, the defeat of the library tax crossed that line for some.  Johnson quotes a Douglas County resident, 54-year-old Terry Bean, a construction manager who supported the library tax, though he had opposed other local taxes.  In explaining his position he invoked another concept associated with rural livelihoods:  community.

There is conservative, said Bean, flicking a cigarette butt into the bed of his pickup truck, and then there is community. And people got them confused.

The library, he said, was something a person could use — for computers, if not for books — even if that person didn’t have a dime, and he still respects that.

And that, in turn, brings me back to my earlier point:  doesn’t everyone reap communitarian benefits from the public library?  even the richest of folks who may never darken its doors.

3

Presidential Chats With An FBI Director About Investigations

The Deputy White House Press Secretary is asserting on television that that “legal scholars” are saying that it was not inappropriate for the President and the FBI Director to discuss whether the President was under criminal investigation. These “legal scholars” are not named.  (Indeed, they sound like the “top men” that are researching the Ark of the Covenant).

The Deputy White House Press Secretary’s statement is incorrect.  It was not illegal for the FBI Director and the President to have these conversations standing alone.  But it was inappropriate.

0

Did You Hear the One About the Alaska Legislator Who Said …

We have folks who try to get pregnant in this state so that they can get a free trip to the city, and we have folks who want to carry their baby past the point of being able to have an abortion in this state so that they can have a free trip to Seattle.

One might think, at first blush, that this is a bad joke.  Yet this quote actually did fall from the lips of Alaska state representative David Eastman of Wasilla (Anchorage suburb, of Sarah Palin fame) last week, in conversation with the Associated Press.  Eastman subsequently made similar comments to other media outlets.  Bear with me as I bracket Eastman’s impeachment of women’s character, returning to it below.

Like me, you are probably wondering about this “free trip” thing, given that the Hyde Amendment prohibits the use of federal funding for abortions.  Turns out, according to the AP story, that the “Alaska Supreme Court has held that the state must fund medically necessary abortions if it funds medically necessary services for others with financial needs.”  Mighty progressive, if you ask me, not least because many women in Alaska must travel vast distances to reach an abortion provider, given the size of the state.  And this can be mighty expensive and involve multiple plane journeys, even within Alaska.  (Bear in mind that the villages around Bethel and the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta are among many Alaska places not accessible by road.) Ditto for those who must travel for other medical services, which the Alaska court has wisely recognized.

Indeed, speaking of distance, the dust-up created by Mr. Eastman reminds me of one of the most knuckle-headed things I’ve ever seen a judge say about the “undue burden” standard under Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992):

A woman in Alaska, for example, could be required to travel 800 miles to get to an abortion clinic merely because she lives in one place and the nearest abortion clinic is on the other side of the state. But that certainly doesn’t constitute anything even approaching an undue burden.

The judge who wrote this was Dee Benson (now a senior district judge), and the case was Utah Women’s Clinic v. Leavitt, 844 F. Supp. 1482 (D. Utah 1994) (discussed here).  Why the Utah judge thought it appropriate or necessary to use an example from Alaska rather than Utah is unclear.  I suppose he was looking for the most extreme example of distance he could find–to then make the point that such travel would still not trigger a constitutional problem.  Given that Alaska is the largest state in terms of land area, Judge Benson necessarily turned to “The Last Frontier” to illustrate his point.

Interesting in light of this point is the fact that the second largest state in the union, Texas, became the subject of the latest round of litigation over abortion restrictions, culminating in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.  Of course, distance ultimately loomed very large in relation to the Court’s assessment of the undue burden standard there because women would have been challenged to travel as far as 550 miles each way (from El Paso to San Antonio) to reach an abortion provider had the Court not struck down Texas H.B. 2.  Read more here and here.  Distance as an undue burden is also a reminder of my recent exchange with Prof. Carol Sanger of  Columbia Law  on this blog regarding  the significance of spatiality/geography/rurality as it relates to abortion access.

But let me return now to the issue most directly implicated by Eastman’s comments,  which is less about the burden of distance (and therefore the “situation of women”)–which the state of Alaska has pragmatically taken care of, at least in part–and more about the character of women.  The AP story, by Becky Bohrer, includes not only helpful background for us on abortion availability in Alaska and, for late-term abortions, in Seattle, she also fills us in on the furor Eastman’s comments have generated:

In a speech on the House floor Friday, Democratic Rep. Neal Foster of Nome said Eastman’s comments were unacceptable and said he hoped Eastman would apologize.

“It shocks the conscience to think that a female in a village would want to endure the physical and the emotional pain of getting an abortion just so that they could get a free trip to Anchorage,” Foster said.

Most of the women who live in villages that Foster represents are Alaska Native and feel Eastman’s comments were directed toward them, Foster said. Many Alaska communities are not connected to a road system and smaller communities often have limited health services that necessitate travel to larger communities for care.

Two other “rural lawmakers,” demanded a public apology from Eastman, and Rep. Geran Tarr of Anchorage said she might “seek a motion to censure Eastman,” calling his comments “deeply offensive, racist in nature, and misogynistic.”

It is encouraging to see other legislators standing up for Alaska Natives and other rural populations.  And it also brings me back to the really outrageous part of what Eastman said–that women might purposefully get pregnant so that they can have a day out on the town, a freebie trip to the bright lights to get an abortion … and then tie on some shopping or a fancy meal, maybe even a jaunt up the Space Needle. This outrageous suggestion ties perfectly into Sanger’s over-arching point in About Abortion:  Terminating Pregnancy in the 21st Century:  women take abortion seriously–and we should presume they can make good decisions about it for themselves.  We should certainly not presume–as Eastman suggests–that they will get pregnant willy-nilly to “earn” a frolic in the city.  Insulting, misogynist and racist, indeed.

4

The Six Stages of Scandal

This is a classic that I bring out once every couple of years to describe the political crisis du jour. Now it’s Donald Trump’s turn.

Stage 1:  That’s ridiculous.  It can’t possibly be true.

Stage 2:  It’s not true.

Stage 3:  You can’t prove it’s true.

Stage 4:  Why are you trying to prove it’s true?

Stage 5:  It’s disgusting that you proved it’s true.

Stage 6:  What’s the big deal anyway?

0

Vanderbilt Law Review, Volume 70, Number 4

The Vanderbilt Law Review is pleased to announce the publication of our May 2017 issue:

ARTICLES

Neil S. Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation in the Federal Courts System, 70 Vand. L. Rev. 1183 (2017)

Kiel Brennan-Marquez, “Plausible Cause”: Explanatory Standards in the Age of Powerful Machines, 70 Vand. L. Rev. 1249 (2017)

Morgan Ricks, Organizational Law as Commitment Device, 70 Vand. L. Rev. 1303 (2017)

 

NOTES

Loren D. Goodman, For What It’s Worth: The Role of Race- and Gender-Based Data in Civil Damages Awards, 70 Vand. L. Rev. 1353 (2017)

Carly A. Myers, Police Violence Against People with Mental Disabilities: The Immutable Duty Under the ADA to Reasonably Accommodate During Arrest, 70 Vand. L. Rev. 1393 (2017)

1

FAN 151 (First Amendment News) Morgan Weiland Meet Ira Glasser — The First Amendment & the Liberal Dilemma

[F]or those who believe that the Speech Clause has meaning beyond its strategic use, the application of the speech right must have limits. In other words, the outward creep of the speech doctrine’s boundaries need not be tolerated as “freedom for the [speech] that we hate.” — Morgan N. Weiland

I regard [the campaign finance issue] as the biggest liberal blindspot in First Amendment struggles in my entire career at the ACLU. – Ira Glasser 

∇ ∇ ∇ ∇ 

Morgan Weiland

Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant Libertarian Speech Tradition” is the title of a forthcoming article in the Stanford Law Review.

The author is Morgan N. Weiland, an attorney and PhD candidate at Stanford University specializing in speech, press, and technology law and ethics. Next year she will clerk for Ninth Circuit Judge M. Margaret McKeown. Here is how Ms. Weiland begins the abstract to her forthcoming article:

“Though scholars have identified the expanding scope of First Amendment speech doctrine, little attention has been paid to the theoretical transformation happening inside the doctrine that has accompanied its outward creep. Taking up this overlooked perspective, this Article uncovers a new speech theory: the libertarian tradition. This new tradition both is generative of the doctrine’s expansion and risks undermining the First Amendment’s theoretical foundations.”

“This Article excavates the libertarian tradition through an analysis of Supreme Court cases that, beginning in the 1970s, consistently expanded speech protections by striking down limits on commercial speech and corporate political spending. The Court justified this expansion with the rationale of vindicating listeners’ rights in the free flow of information—the corporate benefit was incidental. But by narrowly conceptualizing listeners as individuals whose interests are aligned with corporate speech interests, the Court ended up instrumentalizing listeners’ rights in the service of corporate speech rights. This is the libertarian tradition. Today, the tradition has abandoned listeners’ rights altogether, directly embracing corporate speech rights. . . .”

As Ms. Weiland sees it, the “libertarian tradition” threatens two longstanding free-speech theories:  “the republican and liberal tradition.” Against that conceptual backdrop, she adds:

“First, by reconceptualizing listeners as individuals whose interests are vindicated through deregulation, the libertarian tradition draws from and is hostile to the republican tradition, which emphasizes the rights of the public, figured as listeners. Second, because the libertarian tradition focuses on vindicating corporate speech rights, it strips away the hallmarks of individual autonomy central to the liberal tradition, leaving only a naked speech right against the state, which this article names ‘thin autonomy.’ If the two traditions have value, then the libertarian tradition is problematic.

This insight cuts against the widespread belief that to protect speech we must be willing to countenance nearly any application of the right, even—and perhaps especially—if it goes against our most deeply held beliefs. That view is a myth; the speech right must have limits.”

 Related 

Weiland on Press Clause & Shield Legislation 

“Weiland’s scholarship and policy work has also focused on the press clause and journalism. She is researching the doctrinal development of the press clause, a paper that was supported by Stanford’s Constitutional Law Center and presented at the Communication Department’s Rebele Symposium in April 2015.”

“Related to this research, Weiland has engaged extensively with the federal shield bill debate. She has spoken about the bill and its potential impact on journalism at AEJMC’s 2014 conference. Free Press, in a report titled “Acts of Journalism: Defining Press Freedom in the Digital Age,” notes that “[j]ournalism and First Amendment scholar Morgan Weiland has argued that lawmakers should simply drop the definition of ‘covered persons’ in both the House and Senate bills and rely instead on the House definition of journalism.” She advanced these arguments while working as a legal intern at the Electronic Frontier Foundation in 2013, where she critiqued and helped to change the legislation. Her work on congressional shield legislation is also featured in the Stanford Lawyer.” [Source here]

Podcast: Interview with former ACLU Executive Director Ira Glasser

[F]or me the First Amendment and all those always was a strategic argument. I regarded the First Amendment, not as a highfalutin doctrine of principle, but as an insurance policy, and that’s what it was meant to be. . . .Ira Glasser 

Ira Glasser

Over at FIRE’s So to Speak podcast series Nico Perrino interviews one the ACLU’s giants, Ira Glasser (transcript here).

In this wide-ranging and spirited interview, the liberal Glasser speaks about everything from

  • his teaching math at Queens and Sarah Lawrence Colleges,
  • to the people who inspired him (e.g., Murray Kempton, I.F. Stone and Max Lerner),
  • to his admiration for Jackie Robinson,
  • to his early days in 1967 at the NYCLU with Aryeh Neier (Glasser is not a lawyer),
  • to his understanding of  how real political change comes about,
  • to his presence at March on Washington in 1963 when he was 25 (“I’d never seen anything like that in my life before, or since”)
  • to his activism during the Nixon years
  • to his views on the ACLU’s involvement in the Skokie case (“It was a surprise to us that it got so controversial”)
  • to his historical discussion of Buckley v. Valeo and how of campaign-finace laws were tapped to go after liberals,
  • to his views on progressives’ call to amend the First Amendment in order to overrule Citizens United (“You are handing your enemies the tools to suppress you!”)
  • to his reply to Perrino’s last question: “What are you most proud of?” — Glasser: “There are two answers: One answer is substantive, and one answer is organizational . . . .” [You’ll have to listen to the podcast or read the transcript to hear the rest of Glasser’s answer.]

Related 

[B]ack in 1972, the ACLU, which by the way is . . . a corporation, was prevented from taking out an ad in The New York Times criticizing then-President Nixon for his opposition to school busing for integration, and had to go to court to vindicate its right to free speech. Ira Glasser (2011)

From Stanford Law Review Online: Judge Neil M. Gorsuch on Free Expression Read More

2

The Inner Workings of the Marshall Court

A big part of my Bushrod Washington research will be on the Marshall Court. Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Washington served together for twenty-eight years. They were once described by Justice Johnson (in a letter to Jefferson) as “one judge.” For the most part, this has been taken to mean that Washington basically just silently followed the Chief’s lead.

Of course, there is another way of interpreting this “one judge” description. Perhaps they were more like partners. This would throw Washington’s role on the Court into a different light, since the great Marshall opinions (for example, Marbury or M’Culloch) would look more like joint efforts. We now know that Justice Brennan exerted a considerable influence on the Warren Court even though his name was not always on the opinions. (Justice Van Devanter did something similar for the Taft Court.) We lack, though, a clear written record of what went on behind-the-scenes in the Marshall Court, though I’ll try to find more.  Some of that was due to the unusual living arrangements of that Court (they all shared the same boarding house and table) which meant that many of their debates were oral and probably interspersed with toasts.

Lawyers still have a romantic notion that John Marshall did everything himself. Indeed, I get the sense that some of Marshall’s biographers (notably Beveridge) talked Washington down to talk Marshall up. The Chief Justice certainly did a lot by modern standards, but most of the decisions were unanimous because the other Justices had significant input into the result. Washington (before Story’s arrival) was probably the leading force in this respect, and even afterwards he was probably formidable. Can I take this from a hypothesis to proof? We’ll see.

 

5

Our Unconstitutional Reapportionment Process

I thought I would post the Introduction of the paper that I’m now writing. I’ve taken out the footnotes to make this short enough for a long post, though I’m happy to share those if asked. Hopefully the draft will be complete by August.

Determining how many members each state is entitled to in the House of Representatives is among the most routine constitutional tasks. Every ten years, a census is conducted under the auspices of the Commerce Department. When the census is complete, the Department enters the state and national population information into a mathematical formula that was fixed by Congress in 1941, and the formula generates a representative total for each state. These state tallies are sent to the President and are certified by him without any congressional action or any exercise of administrative discretion. Though the counting method in the census and the allocation formula for representatives were the subject of unsuccessful court cases in the 1990s, the ministerial nature of the modern reapportionment process is taken almost entirely for granted.

This Article argues instead that the current mechanical system for redistributing congressional representatives violates Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section Two provides that if the right to vote in federal or many state elections is “denied” or “in any way abridged” by a state for a broad class of presumptively eligible voters, then that state’s delegation in the House of Representatives shall be reduced in proportion to the amount of disenfranchisement. Consistent with this requirement, the first census taken after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified tried to ascertain the number of people who fell within Section Two’s definition. The resulting data was then forwarded to Congress and was discussed in floor debates as part of the reapportionment legislation enacted in 1871.

Under present law, by contrast, the Commerce Department is barred from considering Section Two in assessing how many representatives each state should get. While the census can ask Americans about their voting eligibility and behavior, the formula that Congress created to delegate its reapportionment authority does not include a Section Two variable. The current state regulations of voting rights may not require the imposition of any representation penalty, but the imposition of such a penalty cannot be precluded no matter what the facts are. It is axiomatic that Congress cannot erase a constitutional requirement through ordinary legislation, but that is exactly what the reapportionment statutes do given that Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment says a representation penalty is mandatory if the suffrage rights of a sufficient percentage of the relevant population within a state are “in any way abridged.”

My claim that the reapportionment law in place since World War II is unconstitutional may seem unbelievable, but that reaction might fade after learning that the same point was made in the civil rights era. In the early 1960s, there was growing interest in Congress’s failure to enforce Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment against the flagrant exclusion of African-Americans in the South. Indeed, there was a specific demand from the 1963 March on Washington led by Martin Luther King Jr. for the “[e]nforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment—reducing Congressional representation of states where citizens are disfranchised.” As part of this brief renaissance, a handful of scholars observed that the automatic system of ascertaining that representation violated Section Two and litigation was filed in the District of Columbia seeking a declaratory judgment that would invalidate the reapportionment statutes. Following the enactment of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, however, academic interest in the Section Two issue evaporated and the litigation was dismissed on prudential grounds pending “appraisal of the effectiveness of the new Voting Rights Act.”

Though the Voting Rights Act and its subsequent amendments did not fix the constitutional flaw in the reapportionment process, the Supreme Court’s 2013 holding in Shelby County v. Holder that the Act’s preclearance requirement cannot be applied to the jurisdictions that were designated by Congress makes that flaw more visible. After decades of neglect, it is time to treat Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect. Congress must revise the reapportionment statutes and at least permit the Commerce Department to take Section Two into account. If Congress takes no action, then a state with standing to contest the result of the next reapportionment should raise a Section Two objection and the Supreme Court should hold the reapportionment void.

Part I explores the history of congressional reapportionment and describes the contemporary process. Part II discusses Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, how that provision was applied when Congress conducted the first reapportionment after ratification, and the short-lived revival of interest in Section Two’s role in that process during the 1960s. Part III explains why the current reapportionment framework is at odds with Section Two and why a judicial declaration to that effect is proper.