Category: Education

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What’s Buffett’s Secret to Great Writing?

symposium-coverWe all write more than ever today, but do we communicate well?  As one group, corporate directors, pondered how to communicate effectively to shareholders, they  turned to the gold standard.  They wondered, what most distinguishes Warren Buffett’s annual missive to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders, and asked me, as a student of these writings for two decades, for the answer.

Clarity, wit and rationality are hallmarks to emulate, I said, along with how Buffett personally pens lengthy sections to read more as literary essays than corporate communications.

But, far more important, these attractive qualities are products of a deeper distinction with greatest value. Every Buffett communiqué has a particular motivation: to attract shareholders and colleagues—including sellers of businesses—who endorse his unique philosophy. Tenets include fundamental business analysis, old-fashioned valuation methods, and a long time horizon.

A recurring motif of Buffett’s writing is the classic rhetorical practice of disagreement. Buffett recites conventional wisdom along with multiple reasons why it is inaccurate or incomplete. He then differentiates Berkshire with themes like autonomy, permanence, and trust.

In a new article I wrote at the request of the National Association of Corporate Directors (available free here), I parse recent examples to show that Buffett’s dispatches often work on several levels simultaneously. Think of circles on a dartboard, with the bull’s-eye as Berkshire’s distinctive practices, which Buffett relentlessly explains. Surrounding that core explication, in concentric circles, Buffett lauds specific Berkshire businesses or personnel, contrasts their industry or competitors, and opines on related public policy debates.

By arguing in this artful manner, Buffett hones Berkshire’s corporate culture while answering rivals and critics alike. Leaving an unmistakable effect on the conglomerate’s millions of owners, managers, and employees, Buffett’s essays are a model of tone-at-the-top governance.

Buffett’s essays are rich with history, putting current debates in broad context, and steeped in statistics, anchoring argument in data. Buffett contrasts and compares; jokes and quips; and prefers to praise by name but criticize by category. Even when confronting critics, Buffett’s essays avoid sounding defensive.

Above all, the work expresses who Warren is—a confident, astute and joyous capitalist. Yale University writing professor William Zinsser says that “Motivation is at the heart of writing.” Buffett loves Berkshire, his curated life’s work defined by unusual shareholders, adroit managers, and idiosyncratic principles. Munger has commented: “Warren’s whole ego is poured into Berkshire.”

More than the elements of style, such motivation is a gold standard worth aspiring to.

Download the full article free here.

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In 1996, based on a law review symposium they led together, Warren Buffett chose Lawrence Cunningham to compile his famous shareholder letters into the book, The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for Corporate America, now in its 4th edition and sold worldwide in a dozen languages.

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FAN 118 (First Amendment News) University of Cape Town Disinvites Flemming Rose — Floyd Abrams Dissents

Note: Below is a heretofore unpublished letter from Floyd Abrams. It follows another one recently posted on this blog by Professor Nadine Strossen. Vice-Chancellor Max Price, to whom both letters were primarily directed, was invited to reply. (Links have been added for reference purposes.) 

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July 24, 2016

Dear Vice-Chancellor Price:

I am a practicing lawyer in the United States who has devoted the better part of my professional career to defending freedom of expression. I am also a Visiting Lecturer at the Yale Law School, have written two books and many articles about freedom of expression around the world, and have spoken about the topic in a number of nations including, by way of example, India, Japan, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Great Britain and—of particular relevance—South Africa. I was one of a number of foreign scholars who participated in advising the drafters of the South African Constitution. I have spoken about issues relating to freedom of expression in Johannesburg, Cape Town and Pretoria. I have read your statement about the decision of University of Cape Town to withdraw the invitation to Flemming Rose to deliver this year’s  TB Davie Memorial Lecture. I take the liberty of writing this letter to you because your decision is not only of consequence to your university and to your country but to democratic nations and universities in them throughout the world.

Floyd Abrams

I would like to make two brief observations at the outset.

The first is that I am not writing to you to urge you to adopt or to apply American standards in deciding who may be invited. As your statement correctly observed, the framers of your Constitution quite deliberately adopted a general right of free expression subject to certain specific limitations relating to propaganda for war, incitement of imminent violence, and “advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.”

The second is that I am not writing to suggest that the cancellation by a university of an invitation to speak made to a  prominent  public figure is unique to South Africa. Quite the opposite is true. In the United States, a number of invitations have been made and then withdrawn by universities to prominent individuals including a former Secretary of State and the current head of the International Monetary Fund after protests were feared if the speaker was permitted to offer her views. Indeed, it is precisely because of my strong belief that the decisions of those American universities—and there are many of them– were so shameful and so contrary to basic principles of academic freedom that I take the liberty of writing to you.

UnknownAt the outset, nothing in the South African Constitution lends any support to your decision. Nothing that Mr. Rose has ever said can possibly be said to constitute propaganda for war. He has never urged violence against anyone or sought to incite it. Your statement observes that “Mr. Rose is regarded by many around the world as … someone whose statements . . . possibly amount to hate speech.”. I appreciate and honor your unwillingness to say that you credit any such an insupportable charge. But if you are unwilling to do so—and there is no basis for doing so—you can hardly rely on the notion of incitement as a basis for cancelling the invitation. I note in that respect that even the clause of the South African Constitution that limits free speech protection to advocacy of racial hatred or the like does so only when the speech at issue “constitutes incitement to cause harm”.

Writing from afar, I cannot comment specifically on your expressed concern about the security risks of permitting Mr. Rose to appear except to say that your nation, as mine, has experienced security risks in the past and when aware of them has been able to protect speakers and listeners alike. The security question is not whether it can be provided; it is whether freedom of speech on your campus is so important that it is worth doing so, with all its risks. Your Academic Freedom Committee obviously thought it was. From any perspective that honors academic freedom, that is a necessary conclusion.

Dr. Max Price

Dr. Max Price

The same is true of your stated concern that inviting Mr. Rose may have the perverse effect of limiting rather than vindicating academic freedom since he “represents a provocatively—potentially violently—divisive view.” Of course, Mr. Rose himself offers provocative views. I am sure that is why he was invited. But he hardly “represents” a “potentially violently” view about anything. The risk of violence is at all not from him but from those who simply do not accept core notions of freedom of expression and academic freedom. To yield to those who cannot abide freedom of expression that they find abhorrent is to abjectly surrender to them.

There remains the first basis articulated by you for rescinding the invitation to Mr. Rose—concern about provoking conflict on campus. It is, I am well aware, awfully easy for people thousands of miles away from your campus and whose views you have not sought, to presume to advise you that even if there is a risk of conflict on your campus that follows or accompanies a speech by Mr. Rose, it is one worth accepting. Who needs, you may well ask, such second-guessers? All I can say is that those of us who weigh in on the issue from abroad do so because we care about your country, are impressed by its Constitution, and are often in awe of your Supreme Court and its liberty-protecting rulings. We also offer our views because the decision to disinvite by your great institution is one that will be viewed carefully by academic institutions around the world as they decide how to respond in similar circumstances.

The very first TB Davie Memorial Lecture was delivered by Chief Justice Centlivres, the Chancellor of your university, on May 6, 1959. He then summarized what he characterized as Professor’s Davie’s “articles of faith” as follows: “The first was that a university is primarily a centre of learning, the second that a university flourishes only in an atmosphere of absolute intellectual freedom, and the third, that the pre-eminent virtue of university life is intellectual integrity,.” Guided by those precepts, it is difficult to understand or accept the cancellation of Mr. Rose’s appearance.

Respectfully submitted,

Floyd Abrams

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News Update: Michael Cardo, UCT: A tale of two lecturers, PoliticsWeb, July 25, 2016 (“This coming weekend, the University of Cape Town will host Hamza Tzortzis, a highly controversial lecturer who propagates a radical version of Islam. His visit to the campus follows hot on the heels of an executive decision to bar Danish journalist Flemming Rose from delivering the 2016 TB Davie Memorial Lecture on academic freedom.”) 

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FAN 117.3 (First Amendment News) University of Cape Town Disinvites Flemming Rose — Nadine Strossen Dissents

In the classic expression of freedom of speech and assembly, UCT’s policy is that our members will enjoy freedom to explore ideas, to express these and to assemble peacefully. The annual TB Davie Memorial Lecture on academic freedom was established by UCT students to commemorate the work of Thomas Benjamin Davie, vice-chancellor of the university from 1948 to 1955 and a defender of the principles of academic freedom. Organised by the Academic Freedom Committee, the lecture is delivered by distinguished speakers who are invited to speak on a theme related to academic and human freedom. 

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Note: Below is a heretofore unpublished letter from Professor Nadine Strossen. This coming Wednesday FAN will post another dissenting letter, this one by Floyd Abrams. Additionally, Vice-Chancellor Max Price, to whom the letter is primarily directed, is invited to reply should he be so inclined. (Links have been added for reference purposes.) 

July 22, 2016

Dear Vice-Chancellor Price, AFC Chair Professor Rousseau, and Professors Hendricks and McClachlan-Daniels:

UnknownAs someone who was honored to deliver the TB Davie Memorial Lecture in 2011, I was inspired by the University of Cape Town’s proud history of defending academic freedom, and its ongoing commitment to doing so, including through this Lecture and the work of the Academic Freedom Committee. I also recall fondly Dr. [Max] Price’s cordial hospitality and  appreciated support for the AFC and the Davie Lecture.

I applaud the AFC’s March 2015 decision to invite Flemming Rose to deliver the 2016 Davie Lecture, and I am heartened by the AFC’s refusal to rescind that invitation despite apparently great pressure to do so from both within and beyond UCT. Having read Mr. Rose’s enlightening book, The Tyranny of Silence, as well as many other publications by and interviews of him, I consider him one of the most principled, courageous exemplars of intellectual freedom and freedom of conscience, including freedom for religious and other beliefs. I was therefore deeply honored to present to him the biennial Friedman Prize for Advancing Liberty, awarded by the Cato Institute, in New York City on May 25, 2016. For your information,  I append below this letter the text of the remarks that I delivered on that occasion.

maxresdefaultOf course, I would neutrally defend Mr. Rose’s right to speak at UCT  — and the UCT community’s right to hear his ideas – even if I strongly objected to his ideas. But he is especially deserving of a forum such as the Davie Lecture because his ideas have been so widely caricatured and misunderstood, and because these ideas are urgently important precisely due to the sensitive nature of the issues they address.

 For the foregoing reasons, I was deeply disheartened to learn recently that UCT had overridden the AFC and breached the commitment to host Mr. Rose to deliver the 2016 Davie Lecture. I was particularly disheartened by the reasons set out for that action in Dr. Price’s recently released letter, dated July 12, 2016.

These are the very same reasons that regularly have been cited to suppress the expression of any view that is politically unpopular at the particular time and place. In the U.S., for example, these were the reasons that too many universities cited for barring civil rights advocates from speaking during the twentieth-century Civil Rights Movement. Likewise, they are the same reasons why too many U.S. universities more recently barred “Black Power” activists from speaking. In a nutshell, the arguments both then and now are that the suppressed ideas could well offend other people, threatening their most cherished personal beliefs and community values, and potentially leading to violent reactions by those who are thus offended.

Professor Nadine Strossen

Professor Nadine Strossen

I have read the persuasive responses that have been issued to Dr. Price’s letter by the 2015 Davie Lecturer, Kenan Malik, and by the Index on Censorship, as well as by the AFC and Flemming Rose himself. I will not repeat the powerful arguments they made.  Rather, I will confine myself to making several additional points.

First, why does UCT succumb to the victim-blaming approach in this context that it would surely eschew in other contexts? To say that Flemming Rose should not advance ideas that others might find provocative and respond to with violence, seems to me the same as arguing that women should not wear certain clothing that others might find provocative and respond to with violence.

Second, Dr. Price’s letter references the limits upon free speech that the South African Constitution sets out, which are also generally accepted in other legal systems.  Yet the letter doesn’t expressly contend – nor could it credibly do so – that anything Flemming Rose has said, or is likely to say, would transgress any of those limits.  Indeed, apparently acknowledging as much, Dr. Price’s letter makes only the tentative, qualified observation that “Mr. Rose is regarded by many around the world as..someone whose statements.possibly amount to hate speech.”

As any survey of the media will reveal, if universities declined to host any speakers whom some people consider to have made statements that “possibly amount to hate speech,” then they would have to ban from campus just about everyone who is addressing any important, contentious, sensitive issue. For example,  in the U.S., many critics recently have denounced “Black Lives Matter” protestors as engaging in hate speech, even blaming such speech for allegedly instigating murders of police officers.

Dr. Max Price

Dr. Max Price

Flemming Rose’s speech clearly is not “advocacy of hatred . . . that constitutes incitement to cause harm,”  which the South African Constitution excludes from free speech protection (as quoted in Dr. Price’s letter). First, there is no basis for concluding that Mr. Rose would say anything that could fairly be considered “advocacy of hatred that is based on.religion.” Moreover, even if someone did engage in such “advocacy,” it would still be protected speech, unless it also “constitutes incitement to cause harm.” To the best of my knowledge,  not even Flemming Rose’s most unfair, harshest critics have charged him with “incitement” – a legal term of art that means intentionally spurring on listeners who are supportive of his views to commit harm against third parties, in a context where his sympathizers are actually likely to do so imminently. And if any such charge has been leveled, it would be patently unjustified.

If South Africa withheld free speech protection for non-inciting statements that merely criticize certain religious beliefs, or actions that are based on certain religious beliefs, then it could not protect many views that have been widely aired around the world:  for example,  criticism of’ discriminatory views and actions concerning LGBTQ individuals that are held by many Christian and other denominations and their adherents.

Third, Dr. Price’s invocation of “the rise in extremist terrorist groups” as somehow allegedly justifying suppression of Flemming Rose’s speech is also part of a general pattern that has been used to suppress a wide range of freedom, all over the world, not only in the recent past, but also historically. Ironically, this was precisely the topic of my 2011 Davie Lecture:  the unjustified violations of academic freedom in the name of fighting “the War on Terror.”

Given that this “War” is likely to remain “The New Normal” worldwide, it will remain an all-too-convenient, but unjustified, rationale for suppressing academic and other freedom.  This danger was recognized by none other than the namesake of the TB Davie Memorial Lecture himself. Let me quote a passage from my Davie Lecture, which quoted Dr. Davie’s pertinent observations.

“In his 1948 Inaugural Address, upon being installed as UCT’s Principal and Vice-Chancellor, Dr. Davie noted that `[r]ecent history has…shown …how easily and almost imperceptibly Universities can be deprived of their freedom.’  In words that are chillingly apt today  [almost seven] decades later, he warned: `Controls and restrictions [that are] imposed and accepted under conditions of war are only too meekly submitted to, even when the conditions necessitating their imposition have disappeared.'”

Fourth, I would like to add to the critiques that have already been made of Dr. Price’s argument that proceeding with Flemming Rose’s lecture “might retard rather than advance academic freedom.”  This reminds me of the much-maligned statement by a U.S. military official during the Vietnam War, that “we had to destroy the village in order to save it.”

It is also the same argument that the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously rejected in the landmark 1997 case of Reno v. ACLU, in which the Court for the first time upheld freedom of speech for the then-new medium of online expression. The U.S. government had argued that individuals might avoid an uncensored Internet “because of the risk of exposing themselves or their children to harmful material,” and therefore that censorship could have a net positive impact on free speech. The Court resoundingly repudiated this Through-the-Looking-Glass argument for the same reason that it is unpersuasive in the current context:

“We find this argument singularly unpersuasive…[I]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it. The interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship.”

Fifth and finally, I am troubled by the ongoing threat to academic freedom that Dr. Price’s letter signals. On the one hand, he  asserts that UCT “hope[s] never again to have to interfere with an invitation to deliver a lecture on academic freedom.” On the other hand, though, he later endorses  “a considered version of academic freedom that is avowedly sensitive to the concurrent rights to dignity and freedom from harm.” In other words, it is only his version – or UCT’s “official” version – of academic freedom that will be honored, not that of the AFC, or the viewpoint-neutral version that would be consistent with the South African Constitution and UCT’s own proud traditions, as exemplified by TB Davie.

In light of the positive experience that I was so honored to enjoy as a prior Davie Lecturer -the same positive experience that Kenan Malik described in his response to Dr. Price’s letter – and in the constant hope that “more speech” will prevail over censorship, I respectfully urge reconsideration of the decision not only to “disinvite” Flemming Rose from giving the Lecture, but also apparently to exclude him from speaking at UCT altogether, even as part of a debate or panel presentation. I don’t think that bringing any speaker to campus could reasonably be viewed as anointing that speaker “as the chosen champion of the University of Cape Town,” as Dr. Price says. Certainly, when I had the privilege of delivering the Davie Lecture, I saw myself as the champion only of my own views on academic freedom; I did not see myself as even a spokesperson for UCT, let alone its “champion.” By continuing to create fora for discussion and debate by and with speakers expressing a range of views – including such an important thinker, writer, and activist as Flemming Rose — UCT itself would continue as “the chosen champion” of academic freedom.

 Very truly yours,

 Nadine Strossen

John Marshall Harlan II Professor of Law,  New York Law School

Immediate Past President, American Civil Liberties Union (1991-2008)

APPENDIX   Read More

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The Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law

Joanna Grossman’s Nine to Five is a masterfully assembled set of commentary on sex discrimination cases. Joanna’s deft explanations and critiques of doctrine would make it great for the classroom, sort of like a volume from the “Law Stories” series but with a lot more law. Bringing the commentaries together also allows the collection to highlight some limits of discrimination law as it is now constituted. Nancy Dowd has already raised the challenge of intersectionality; another classic constraint in discrimination law is that equality can be achieved either by leveling up or by leveling down. On the issue of accommodating family responsibilities, for example, American law’s narrow conception of equality has a hard time justifying a level-up, despite the extensive body of feminist scholarship on the gendered nature of the neoliberal marketplace and its “ideal worker.” (See chapter 35, on Young v. UPS.) The demands of “the market” serve as conversation-stoppers in discrimination law, which is understood as regulation of the market, even though aspirations for sex equality include non-market goals. In light of emerging movements demanding that markets serve people instead of the other way around, the next phase in the development of discrimination law will be defined by whether it can move past the ideology of the market.

As I read through Nine to Five—especially the chapters on accommodating pregnancy, work/life balance, and the masculinity of the ideal worker—I kept coming back to the title. Joanna uses the movie 9 to 5 as a jumping off point for talking about gender in the workplace. I have long been curious about the phrase “9 to 5” and its relationship to the labor movement’s hard-won eight-hour workday. “9 to 5” has at times been a pejorative term for a corporate drone, but today it carries the aspirational tone of the past—the wish for a work day that really ends at 5, an office job that stays at the office.

An early expression of the demand for the eight-hour workday came from Robert Owen, who proposed an even division of the day: “8 hours labour, 8 hours recreation, 8 hours rest.” Today, we refer to the eight-hour workday as standard. After all, the Fair Labor Standards Act requires overtime for hourly workers above forty hours a week, and the archetypal, salaried office worker is “on the job from 9 to 5.”

Except that almost nobody is actually on the job from 9 to 5. I discovered this for myself when I started my first office job, working for the federal government. As Joanna discusses (chapter 54), the federal government is the nation’s largest employer and is therefore not only the enforcer of laws but also a standard-setter in practice. With Dolly Parton echoing in the back of my naïve mind, I learned that as a salaried employee I was expected to work a minimum of eight hours per day, with a half-hour unpaid lunch break, a 15-minute unpaid break in the morning, and a 15-minute unpaid break in the afternoon. My workday could be 8 to 5, 8:30 to 5:30, or 9 to 6, but definitely not 9 to 5. Today, the vast majority of office workers work the federal day or longer. Workers subject to FLSA rules not only get their breaks unpaid but have had to go to court over whether hours spent donning protective gear or descending into coal mines are part of their work day.

From the employer’s perspective, of course, it isn’t eight hours of work if the employee disappears for an hour at lunch. What is notable, however, is that law and culture adopted the employer’s perspective and thereby shifted from the “eight-hour work day” to “eight hours of work.” When eight hours is understood not as the portion of one’s life to be devoted to employment but as the quantity of production to which the employer is entitled, the “work day” expands, stealing time from recreation and rest because the work day has been excused from recognizing the humanity of the worker.

The work day could, instead, be “one-third of the day of a human being,” who will necessarily have to deal with some aspects of her humanity during that period. After all, no one is getting any reimbursement or comp time for having to spend some of their “8 hours for recreation” on eating or going to the bathroom, nor do we get to come in late for work when our “8 hours for rest” are interrupted by any number of human realities. “Eight hours of work” instead of an “eight-hour work day” converts time, a human experience, into a commodity defined by its alienation.

This same shift from human-centered goals to market-centered rules, which ultimately place the values of the market above all else, operates in the difficult corners of discrimination law. For example, Nine to Five tackles several problems that arise in the context of school-affiliated sports: pay disparities between the coaches of boys’ and girls’ teams (chapter 3); unequal treatment of the teams themselves (chapter 9); and the toxic masculinity of sports culture, which bleeds into politics, business, and education (chapters 55 and 56). One reason discrimination law often fails to advance equality in these contexts is that it allows market ideology to trump not only non-discrimination principles but also the purported values of sports and educational institutions themselves.

In the case of coaches’ salaries, Joanna dissects the “market defense” that the EEOC has made available to schools: to justify discriminatory salaries, a school need only refute that coaching its girls’ team requires as much skill, effort, or responsibility as coaching its boys’ team. Schools routinely argue that male coaches are responsible for more money and more media management, and that male coaches arrive at the school with higher prior salaries and more experience coaching and playing sports. (p. 20) Joanna points out that these factors allow the school to “buil[d] on past discrimination against female coaches” and that the school itself creates the expectation that boys’ teams will play for higher stakes in both prestige and money. Here, not only the logic of the market but also the explicit sexism of the market is invoked to constrain discrimination law, even when the market defense is offered by non-profit institutions who claim that they sponsor athletic contests not to make money but to support “the higher education mission” and create “an inclusive culture” with “career opportunities for coaches and administrators from diverse backgrounds.”

Players from the U.S. women’s national soccer team (of which Joanna is clearly a fan!) have filed a pay equity suit that will raise these issues, albeit without a school affiliation: the soccer federation’s main defense is that the women’s game doesn’t make as much money as the men’s because it isn’t as popular with fans. There are factual questions about whether this is true and the extent to which, if true, it is the result rather than the cause of discrimination. But a larger question is whether that should matter. Assuming the market defense to be factually true, it should not end the conversation but begin it. Joanna demonstrates how this conversation should proceed in a different context: Discussing employer liability for “sudden, severe [sexual] harassment” (chapter 25), she notes that, sometimes, severe harassment will occur that no reporting system could have prevented. The question, then, is who should bear that cost? Nothing in the logic of sex discrimination law, or greater aspirations for an equal and just society, suggests that the victim rather than the employer should bear 100% of the cost. Similarly, it is not written in stone that women rather than soccer federations should bear the costs of sexist sports culture.

Other workplaces have their own versions of this market defense. In academia, it is a commonplace at many institutions that the only way to increase one’s salary is to get a job offer elsewhere. It is also a commonplace that this is a terrible policy and that it has a disproportionately negative impact on women. It persists because of the market defense.

In public debates about the gender wage gap, various factions talk past each other about whether the gap reflects “real discrimination” or “women’s choices,” which include things like taking “time off” for children or subordinating one’s own career to a spouse’s. This dichotomy is largely beside the point. Some portion of the wage gap is due to flat-out pay discrimination; some is due to discrimination in hiring; some to discrimination in the “pipeline”; some to job segregation that is linked to historical pay inequities between men’s work and women’s work; and some is due to women continuing to perform the bulk of unpaid family labor (details in chapter 51). Why does any of those things justify a skewed distribution of economic security and wealth? The market defense, writ large, puts artificial limits on aspirations for equality.

Speaking of family labor: Readers of this symposium were likely amused by Robert Owen’s facile division of the day into “8 hours labour, 8 hours recreation, 8 hours rest.” When, pray tell, was dinner to be cooked, the house cleaned, and the children’s noses wiped? Those tasks, in Owens’s mind, presumably belonged in someone else’s work day, but today we know them as the second shift, performed by people who “talk about sleep the way a hungry person talks about food.” It’s time to revisit not just minimum wages but maximum hours so we can earn our bread and bake it too, and still have time to tend our roses.

 

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UCLA Law Review Vol. 64, Discourse

Volume 64, Discourse
Discourse

Citizens Coerced: A Legislative Fix for Workplace Political Intimidation Post-Citizens United Alexander Hertel-Fernandez & Paul Secunda 2
Lessons From Social Science for Kennedy’s Doctrinal Inquiry in Fisher v. University of Texas II Liliana M. Garces 18
Why Race Matters in Physics Class Rachel D. Godsil 40
The Indignities of Color Blindness Elise C. Boddie 64
The Misuse of Asian Americans in the Affirmative Action Debate Nancy Leong 90
How Workable Are Class-Based and Race-Neutral Alternatives at Leading American Universities? William C. Kidder 100
Mismatch and Science Desistance: Failed Arguments Against Affirmative Action Richard Lempert 136
Privileged or Mismatched: The Lose-Lose Position of African Americans in the Affirmative Action Debate Devon W. Carbado, Kate M. Turetsky, Valerie Purdie-Vaughns 174
The Right to Record Images of Police in Public Places: Should Intent, Viewpoint, or Journalistic Status Determine First Amendment Protection? Clay Calvert 230
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Developmental Equality

We live in a time where we can accurately predict the risks and opportunities for many children.  As surely as if we marked them at birth (or even before), we can identify who will likely succeed and who will likely fail by adulthood.  Race and gender, alone and in combination, generate clear odds.  Disparate risk generates a hierarchy of children, and we know who will be at the bottom.  Children’s inequalities are linked to developmental supports for some children, coupled with not only the lack of support for others, but also the presence of barriers and challenges, designed for children to fail, not to succeed.

Children’s inequalities, by race and gender, are particularly evident in the life course of Black boys.  Their patterns from birth to 18 are an example of similar patterns for other children at the bottom.  I do not mean to suggest here a hierarchy of inequalities, but rather to use their life course to adulthood as an example of the marked outcomes for certain children.  At birth, a Black baby boy has more than a one in three risk of being born into poverty.  He has a one in two risk of never graduating from high school.  And he has a one in three risk of being incarcerated in his lifetime, in the juvenile justice system or the adult criminal justice system.  His risk of incarceration doubles if he is born at the lower end of the socio-economic scale.  While he may transcend these risks, the trajectory funnels him toward failure and subordination, to the low end of what is a hierarchy of opportunity for kids.

These disparate negative risks to development are linked to systems that fail him:  systems that do little to support, and much to undermine, his growth to his full potential.  These are systems constructed and perpetuated by the state, at federal, state, and local levels, by the choice of policies despite the evidence of disparate, unequal outcomes along known, identifiable identity lines. Those systems include the poverty system (the clutch of policies that perpetuate poverty, and income inequality by race, rather than provide pathways out of poverty); the education system (highly segregated by race, disparate in resources and outcomes school-to-school, and especially negative in outcomes for Black boys), and the juvenile justice system (a largely boys’ system designed to punish and disadvantage for life rather than rehabilitate; and a sharply disparate system in every negative way for boys of color, particularly Black boys).  In combination, these systems and others directly impact the lives of Black boys, their families, and their communities in negative ways that replicate inequality.  The pattern is not merely one of insufficiency or inadequacy, but of barriers and harms.

The inequalities of Black boys are not unique.  There are other children who are predictably at the bottom, that we expect to be there.  And unequal hierarchies are not unique to American children.  In many countries, data reveal which children are marked for failure.  So, for example, in all countries in Europe in which they are present, Roma children are disproportionately poor, minimally educated, and jobless; the most unequal are Roma girls.  Muslim children similarly are targeted in many European countries, as are migrant and refugee children.

How can we address these inequalities, and those of other identifiable groups of children who reach adulthood lacking in opportunity due to failed outcomes and barriers placed in their way?   I propose that we have to think about these blatant inequalities differently, in order to craft meaningful change, by embracing a model I call “Developmental Equality.”

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West Point, Swimming, and Developmental Equality

Two separate stories in the news speak volumes about our expectations, assumptions, and knowledge about the lives of children of color.  We know they develop under an expectation of failure rather than success.  Rather than an equal opportunity to succeed, we know, implicitly, that they are funneled to failure.  Thus, when we find children of color unexpectedly successful, we are startled by their transcendence.

We should examine our expectations, our acceptance of the structural discrimination that we passively support or ignore that perpetuates inequality.  Once we do, we have to confront the harshly unequal developmental path for children of color.

The first story is about a photograph of a group of 16 African American women in their dress uniforms as graduating seniors at West Point. West Point still has only a minority of women (the 2014 entering class was 78% male), and remains mostly white (70%).  The women in the photo represented all but one of the Black women graduating, a mere 1.7% of the graduating class.  The women are posed outside the oldest barracks,  a favorite setting for graduation pictures replicating similar groups of graduates for over a 100 years.  Each of the women stands with her arm bent upward ending in a raised fist; some have their arms simply at their side, while a few extend theirs over their heads.

So what did the women in this photograph mean by their pose?

A statement of black female empowerment?  A statement of personal fortitude and accomplishment, and group solidarity?  A statement of protest?  A statement of difference, separating them from other graduates?  A statement of political content, perhaps with #Black Lives Matter or #Say Her Name, movements that have raised consciousness about the inequalities in black lives?

Read as protest, it would violate the norms of universality, of color and gender blindness, and of conduct becoming an officer.  The picture generated enormous controversy for several days.  Each person viewed it from their context, including their view of women, of women of color, and of these women’s place in this setting and institution historically male and white.  Also part of the context was making meaning of their common gesture of a raised clenched fist.   Triggering calls for disciplinary action against the seniors, the controversy finally ended when it was determined that the students had done nothing that required disciplinary action.

For me, in addition to the debate about meaning was the universal unspoken assumption that black women in this place were out of place; not because they did not deserve to be there or to pose like countless other graduates of West Point, but rather, they had transcended the expectation that their place was elsewhere.  Read More

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FAN 99.3 (First Amendment News) Court Denies Review in Off-Campus Speech Case

Today the Court denied review in Bell v. Itawamba County School Board. The issue in the case was whether and to what extent a public high school, consistent with the First Amendment, may discipline students for their off-campus speech. In a divided en banc ruling, the Fifth Circuit denied the First Amendment claim.

The Court’s 2015-2016 First Amendment Docket

Cases Decided

** Shapiro v. McManus (9-0 per Scalia, J., Dec. 8, 2015: decided on non-First Amendment grounds) (the central issue in the case relates to whether a three-judge court is or is not required when a pleading fails to state a claim, this in the context of a First Amendment challenge to the 2011 reapportionment of congressional districts) (from Petitioners’ merits brief: “Because petitioners’ First Amendment claim is not obviously frivolous, this Court should vacate the judgments of the lower courts and remand the case with instructions to refer this entire action to a district court of three judges.”) (See Rick Hasen’s commentary here)

Review Granted

  1. Heffernan v. City of Paterson (cert. petition,  amicus brief) (see blog post here)
  2. Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, et al. (all briefs here) (Lyle Denniston commentary)

Oral Arguments Schedule 

  1. January 11, 2016:  Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, et al. (transcript here)
  2. January 19, 2016:  Heffernan v. City of Paterson (see Howard Wasserman SCOTUSblog commentary here)(transcript here)

Review Denied

  1. Bell v. Itawamba County School Board (see also Adam Liptak story re amicus brief)
  2. Town of Mocksville v. Hunter
  3. Miller v. Federal Election Commission
  4. Sun-Times Media, LLC v. Dahlstrom
  5. Rubin v. Padilla
  6. Hines v. Alldredge
  7. Yamada v. Snipes
  8. Center for Competitive Politics v. Harris
  9. Building Industry Association of Washington v. Utter (amicus brief)

Pending Petitions*

  1. Justice v. Hosemann 
  2. Cressman v. Thompson
  3. POM Wonderful, LLC v. FTC (Cato amicus brief) (D.C. Circuit opinion)
  4. Electronic Arts, Inc. v. Davis
  5. American Freedom Defense Initiative v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (relisted)

First Amendment Related Case

  • Stackhouse v. Colorado (issue: Whether a criminal defendant’s inadvertent failure to object to courtroom closure is an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right” that affirmatively waives his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, or is instead a forfeiture, which does not wholly foreclose appellate review?)  (see Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press amicus brief raising First Amendment related claims)

Freedom of Information Case

 The Court’s next Conference is on March 4, 2016.

Though these lists are not comprehensive, I try to track as many cases as possible. If you know of a cert. petition that is not on these lists, kindly inform me and I will post it.

Private Lenders’ Troubling Influence on Federal Loan Policy

Hundreds of billions of dollars are at stake in the upcoming reauthorization of the Higher Education Act (HEA). Like the confirmation of a new Supreme Court justice, it may be delayed into 2017 (or beyond) by partisan wrangling. But as that wrangling happens, Washington insiders are drafting “radical” proposals to change the federal government’s role.

Faculty at all institutions need to examine these proposals closely. The law and public finance issues raised by them are complex. But if we fail to understand them, and to weigh in against the worst proposals, we could witness developments that will fundamentally change (and perhaps end) the university as we know it. Moreover, even if universities find ways to shield themselves from change, some proposals will leave students vulnerable to worse financing terms and lower-quality programs.

In a series of posts over the next few weeks, I’ll be explaining the stakes of the HEA reauthorization. For now, I want to start with a thought experiment on how education finance may change, based on recent activities of large banks and digital lending services I’ve studied. What would be ideal, in terms of higher education finance, for them?

Financiers consider government a pesky and unfair competitor. While federal loans offer options to delay payments (like deferment and forbearance), and discharge upon a borrower’s death or permanent disability (with certain limitations), private loans may not offer any of these options. Private lenders often aim to charge subprime borrowers more than prime borrowers; federal loans offer generally uniform interest rates (though grad students pay more than undergrads, and Perkins loans are cheaper than average). Alternatively, private lenders may charge borrowers from wealthy families (or attending wealthy institutions) less. Rates might even fluctuate on the basis of grades: just as some students now lose their scholarships when they fail to maintain a certain GPA, they may face a credit hit for poor performance.*

Now in conventional finance theory, that’s a good thing: the “pricier” loan sends a signal warning students that their course may not be as good an idea as they first thought. But the commitment to get a degree is not really analogous to an ordinary consumer decision. A simple Hayekian model of “market as information processor” works well in a supermarket: if bananas suddenly cost far more than apples, that signal will probably move a significant number of customers to substitute the latter for the former. But education does not work like that. College degrees (and in many areas further education) are necessary to get certain jobs. The situation is not as dire as health care, the best example of how the critical distinction between “needs” and “wants” upends traditional economic analysis. But it is still a much, much “stickier” situation than the average consumer purchase. Nor can most students simply “go to a cheaper school,” without losing social networks, enduring high transition costs, and sacrificing program quality.

For financiers, a sliding scale of interest rates makes perfect sense as “calculative risk management.” But we all know how easily it can reinforce inequality. A rational lender would charge much lower interest rates than average to a student from a wealthy family, attending Harvard. The lender would charge far more to a poorer student going to Bunker Hill Community College. “Risk-based pricing” is a recipe for segmenting markets, extracting more from the bottom and less from the top. The same logic promoted the tranching of mortgage-backed securities, restructuring housing finance to meet investor demands. Some investors wanted income streams from the safest borrowers only–they bought the AAA tranches. Others took more risk, in exchange for more reward. Few considered how the lives of the borrowers could be wrecked if the “bets” went sour.

Now you might ask: What’s the difference between those predictable disasters, and those arising out of defaults of federal loans? They’re very difficult to discharge in bankruptcy. But federal loans have income-based repayment options. For loans made after 2007, lenders in distress can opt into a payment plan keyed to their income level, which eventually forgives the debt. Private loans don’t offer IBR.

But IBR is not that great a deal, you may counterAnd in many cases, you’re right, it isn’t! Interest can accumulate for 20 or 25 years. Then, when the debt is finally forgiven, the forgiven amount could be treated as income which must be taxed. There is no IBR for the tax payment. Moreover, the impact of growing debt (even it is eventually to be forgiven) on future opportunities is, at present, largely unknown. Many consumer scores may factor it in, without even giving the scored individual notice that they are doing so.

So why keep up the federal role in higher ed finance? Because one key reason federal loans are so bad now is because private lenders have had such a powerful role in lobbying, staffing the key loan-disbursing agency (Department of Education), and supporting (indirectly or directly) think tank or analyst “research” on higher ed finance. When government is your competitor, you use the regulatory process to make the government’s “product” as bad as possible, to make your own look better by comparison. And the more of the market private lenders take, the more money they’ll have to advocate for higher rates and worse terms for federal loans–or getting rid of them altogether.

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*The CFPB has warned lenders that using institutional cohort default rates to price loans could violate fair lending laws, and that may have scared some big players away from doing too much risk based pricing. However, with the rise of so many fringe and alternative lenders, and the opacity of algorithmic determinations of creditworthiness, the risk of disparate impact is still present.

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Journal of Legal Education: Volume 65, # 3, Spring 2016

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From the Editors

By Thomas D. Cobb & Kate O’Neill

Articles

           By Adam Chodorow & Philip Hackney

           By Lynn M. LoPucki

           By Justin McCrary, Joy Milligan, & James Phillips

           By Elaine Campbell

          By John C. Kleefeld & Katelyn Rattray

At the Lectern

           By Beth Hirschfelder Wilensky

Interview

           By Ronald K.L. Collins

Book Reviews

           By Duncan Farthing-Nichol

           By Michael Robertson