More on Interpreting the ERA
In Dillon v. Gloss, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that the ratification of a constitutional amendment must “sufficiently contemporaneous in that number of states to reflect the will of the people in all sections at relatively the same period, which, of course, ratification scattered through a long series of years would not do.” The Twenty-Seventh Amendment violates this principle, but Dillon does highlight an important assumption of originalism.
Simply put, originalism works for a constitutional above a very basic level only if the condition expressed in Gloss is met. This does not present a problem for any existing part of the text. No provision was ratified over an extended period before the 27th Amendment, and that one is basic enough to avoid an issue.
Not so the ERA if it gets ratified. This is an argument that could be used by Congress to deny ratification. In effect, can there be a portion of the Constitution where originalism fails? If there can, then originalism is arguably not a comprehensive theory of interpretation? Originalist theory will need to adapt to the ERA in some fashion if Congress chooses ratification if and when the time comes.