Monthly Archive: February 2012

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The George Washington Law Review, Issue 80:2 (February 2012)

The George Washington Law Review, Issue 80:2 (February 2012)

(Contents of current and past issues are available from our website.)

Article

Maxwell L. Stearns, Direct (Anti-)Democracy, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 311 (2012)

Mehrsa Baradaran, Reconsidering the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 385 (2012)

Brigham Daniels, When Agencies Go Nuclear: A Game Theoretic Approach to the Biggest Sticks in an Agency’s Arsenal, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 442 (2012)

Corey Rayburn Yung, Beyond Ideology: An Empirical Study of Partisanship and Independence in the Federal Courts, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 505 (2012)

Notes

Richard A. Crudo, A Patently Public Concern: Using Public Nuisance Law to Fix the False Patent Marking Statute After the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 568 (2012)

Kyle Noonan, The Case for a Federal Corporate Charter Revocation Penalty, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 602 (2012)

Joseph A. Schoorl, Clicking the “Export” Button: Cloud Data Storage and U.S. Dual-Use Export Controls, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 632 (2012)

Collin D. Swan, Dead Letter Prohibitions and Policy Failures: Applying Government Ethics Standards to Personal Services Contractors, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 668 (2012)

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Disenfranchised in the District

July 2012 will mark my 33rd anniversary of living in the heart of the District of Columbia. An Iowa native, I moved to D.C. in 1979 to take a one-year clerkship, fully intending to move back to my adopted state of California when the clerkship ended. I clerked for Justice Byron White, the only Supreme Court Justice whose name my father recognized (due to the Justice ’s remarkable athletic career). I rented a Capitol Hill townhouse to be within walking distance of the Court. Despite interviewing only with California public interest groups for post-clerkship employment, I never left D.C. because my new employer — the Berkeley office of the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) — acceded to a request from the group’s headquarters to lend the D.C. office a new lawyer to help fight the incoming Reagan administration.

Today I find myself still living on Capitol Hill just four blocks away from my first apartment. Over the decades the neighborhood has gentrified, real estate prices have soared, and Hill residents have stopped moving to the suburbs when their children reach school age. Cool new restaurants have sprung up in the neighborhood and, despite dirty tricks by a competing owner to the north, baseball is back. But two things have not changed: political candidates of both parties continue to vilify Washington and I and my family still have no voting representation in Congress.

During his 2008 presidential campaign, Barack Obama, who as a Senator lived in an apartment three blocks from my home, had nothing but harsh words for Washington. After taking office, he refused the invitation to throw out the first pitch at the Washington Nationals 2009 season opener — in my view one of his few mistakes of that year (to his credit, he realized the error of his ways and threw out the first pitch in 2010). The ranks of politicians who settle in D.C. after retiring are legion, and they include many who denounced the District on the campaign trail and piously promised to move back home when their terms were completed (remember the fierce insistence of Bob Dole, who now works for a D.C. law firm, that he would return to Russell, Kansas if defeated in 1996?).

To be sure, people of good will have worked hard to end the injustice of D.C’s disenfranchisement. In February 2009 a bill to expand the size of the House of Representatives by two and to award the two new seats to Utah and the District passed the Senate by a vote of 61-37. But it ultimately was scuttled when the NRA, not content with the Supreme Court’s Heller decision striking down D.C.’s handgun ban as violative of the Second Amendment, insisted that the price of voting representation should be a wholesale repeal of D.C.’s gun control.

In today’s toxic political climate there seems little chance of progress in ending this injustice. In September I met Mark Meckler, the founder of the Tea Party Patriots, at Harvard’s Law School’s Conference on the Constitutional Convention. He had just given a speech passionately asserting that the Tea Party actually was non-partisan and non-ideological. I pointed out to him that the original Tea Party was about taxation without representation, the phrase that now appears on D.C. license plates as a protest against our disenfranchisement. If the Tea Party truly were non-partisan and non-ideological, one would hope that voting representation for D.C. in Congress would be one of their top priorities. But I am not that naïve.

I freely admit that in one respect I am grossly overrepresented in our electoral process thanks to the 23rd amendment. The 23rd Amendment gives the District 3 electoral votes, the number of electors “to which the District would be entitled if it were a State.” That means we have 1 electoral vote for every 200,000 D.C. residents at the time of the 2010 census (when 601,723 people lived in the District). By contrast Texans have only 1 electoral vote for each 661,000 residents (a population of 25,145,000 divided by 38 electoral votes) – do I hear howls of outrage from Republican presidential candidates (no Republican candidate has received even 10% of the D.C. vote since 1988)? But the outrage can be bipartisan — Californians have only one electoral vote for every 677,000 people (55 electoral votes and a population of 37,254,00). Only one state – Wyoming – is more overrepresented than D.C. in the process of electing our presidents – it has one electoral vote for each 188,000 residents (3 electoral votes for 563,626 residents).

This seeming inequity is a product of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution that assigns electoral votes not on the basis of population, but rather on the basis of the number of Senators and Representatives that each state has in Congress. Since even small states like Wyoming have two Senators, their impact in the Electoral College is unduly magnified. Should this be changed? One answer, of course, would be to amend the Constitution to scrap the Electoral College and elect Presidents by popular vote. I erroneously thought the public would demand this change after the 2000 election when the candidate elected president by the Electoral College received more than 543,000 fewer votes than his opponent.

How did the 23rd Amendment come to be adopted? The surprising answer is that a bipartisan coalition led by Republicans championed its passage. Republican Senator Prescott Bush of Connecticut (father of President George H.W. Bush and grandfather of President George W. Bush) led the charge with the support of Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Congress proposed the amendment on June 17, 1960, and it was ratified by 38 states less than 10 months later. Forty states eventually ratified the amendment – all but Florida, Kentucky. Mississippi, Georgia, South Carolina, Louisiana, Texas, North Carolina, and Virginia (Arkansas was the only state to vote against ratification – but hey, at least they gave us a vote). Rumor has it that part of the impetus for the amendment was Cold War claims by the Soviet Union that the U.S. was denying human rights to District residents. (In 2003 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the OAS concluded that D.C.’s disenfranchisement was a violation of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, but the OAS does not have a nuclear arsenal).

Senator Prescott Bush did not want to stop with the 23rd Amendment. He also supported giving the District full voting representation in Congress. Republicans like Bob Dole (“in justice we could do nothing else”), Howard Baker, and even Richard Nixon (after he resigned) endorsed voting representation for the District in Congress. A subsequent effort was made to amend the Constitution to give D.C. full voting representation in Congress (2 Senators and 1 Representative). The District of Columbia Voting Rights Amendment was proposed by two-thirds majorities of Congress in August 1978. However, the proposed amendment died when only 16 states ratified it before its seven-year expiration date.

Over the years we District residents have regularly had to endure Congressional intervention to bar us from spending our own tax money on things like lobbying for D.C. voting rights, funding abortions for women too poor to afford them, and even counting the votes in the initial referendum we held on legalizing medical marijuana. My own favorite outrage is when President George W. Bush in his 2005 State of the Union Message touting his efforts to spread democracy around the world boasted that because of the invasion of Iraq, residents of the Iraqi capital of Baghdad could now vote for members of their National Assembly. D.C. Mayor Anthony Williams, who was sitting in the gallery, should have walked out in outrage.

It would be nice if persons of principle from all ends of the political spectrum stepped up and spoke out for D.C. voting rights like Senator Prescott Bush did. But I’m enough of a realist to understand that only a truly cataclysmic event could change the political dynamic to favor voting representation for the District. I just hope that it will not be something on the order of a devastating terrorist assault on my beloved neighborhood (which fortunately was averted on 9/11 by the brave souls on United Flight 93). Nevertheless, I continue to feel that it is my duty as a D.C. resident to start every talk I give before a Federalist Society audience by raising the issue. Years ago, I would have someone come up to me after my talk to say, “You don’t understand – D.C. is not a state.” However, the last time I mentioned it I heard instead, “You know, Ken Starr, who is on our board, agrees with you.” Perhaps this is progress.

I do have a few modest requests. First, it would be nice to hear someone mention this issue in the current presidential campaign – it does not seem to be on President Obama’s radar screen – after all no candidate wants to be accused of favoring anything connected to Washington. Second, could a few brave politicians at least try to re-focus their anti-Washington campaign rhetoric on our guests who run Congress and the executive agencies (many of whom will grow to love the District and stay here after they retire) and NOT on the city that we residents love? And DON’T try to tell me that we voluntarily chose to be disenfranchised simply because we moved to the District to serve our government and liked it so well that we never left.

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Teaching Sexual Assault

This week, I began teaching the unit on sexual assault to my Criminal Law class. I – untenured, female, and in my second year of teaching – walked into my classroom and wrote “carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will” on the chalkboard, thus beginning a two week exploration of the law of rape. Am I brave? Am I foolish? Or am I simply doing what I am supposed to do as a Criminal Law professor?

A couple of senior professors from other law schools had advised me not to cover sexual assault as part of my Criminal Law class at all. It was too risky, I was told. And this is generally true. All classes have an element of risk and uncertainty: one can never be quite sure how any given class is going to turn out on any given day. The most beautifully constructed notes containing the most carefully (and charmingly!) written lecture can produce quizzical looks, yawns, and dead silence during the discussion period; meanwhile, those notes that might as well have been written on napkins during the faculty meeting that preceded the class can produce the most brilliant, Socratic unveiling of that hard-to-understand, but oh-so-fundamental concept. So, yeah: there’s uncertainty built into all classes. But, the uncertainty associated with teaching sexual assault is terrifying. Will my question about the mens rea of nonconsent yield a response that indicates that one of my students has been accused of rape? Will another response indicate that another student has been raped? Will a screaming match break out? Will someone break down in tears? Will that person be me?

I have my strategies, though: first, I avoid any attempts at humor during the unit, which is a departure from my approach to the rest of the class. Criminal Law frequently involves people doing horrible things to other people. The fact patterns of the cases are awful much of the time. So, as a professor, one could go into the classroom and lament man’s inhumanity to fellow man for an hour and a half; or, one could treat it like a dark comedy. I typically choose the latter. I prefer the Fargo approach to the There Will Be Blood approach … except during the unit on sexual assault. During those weeks, I am Daniel Day-Lewis as a turn-of-the-century oil prospector. (Interestingly, even dark comedies tend not to make light of sexual assault. People are killed all the time in dark comedies; but they are infrequently raped. If they are (think of Ving Rhames’ character in Pulp Fiction), the rape scenes are not supposed to be funny; they are supposed to be horrifying.)

My second strategy: instead of calling on students at random, I only call on volunteers. But, I am not entirely comfortable with this strategy. Undeniably: rape is terrible, and talking about it can make some people profoundly uncomfortable. But, you know what else is terrible? Murder. Voluntary manslaughter – which involves case after case of men experiencing sometimes adequate/sometimes inadequate provocation and killing their wives – is terrible, too. Yet, I do not hesitate to call on students randomly during the homicide unit. Some Constitutional Law professors tell me that, during their units on abortion (and definitely on the day that they teach Gonzales v. Carhart, if they teach it at all), they only call on volunteers. The exceptions that professors are willing to make to their usual pedagogy might be a bit problematic. Both abortion and sexual assault are gendered subjects. Is there something about topics that disproportionately and distinctly affect women that makes it appropriate to remove them from normal classroom procedure? One cannot argue that professors make these exceptions with respect to abortion and sexual assault because these topics are especially controversial. You know what else is controversial? Same-sex sodomy. Also controversial: affirmative action. But, the professors whom I have come across do not make exceptions to their practice of cold-calling when they teach Lawrence v. Texas or Grutter. (Indeed, I feel for the student who is a racial minority and who is called upon to be Socratically drilled about Grutter. A sufficiently competent performance may exonerate him or her from an implicit accusation that he or she is a beneficiary of the very program upheld in Grutter. And a bad performance? Well, that’s pretty good evidence that Justice Thomas was absolutely correct in that vigorous dissent….) So, why should we, as professors, be especially sensitive about abortion and sexual assault? Does our sensitivity construct women as especially sensitive? Or does it reflect the belief that crimes against women and gendered issues such as reproductive rights are Other?

Nevertheless, I shall adhere to my strategies, and I shall humorlessly and sensitively teach my students the law of sexual assault. And I shall sigh a huge sigh of relief when the unit is over and we can move on to lighter things – like Bernie Goetz shooting four, young, unarmed racial minorities on a New York City subway. [sigh]

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Santorum: Please Don’t Google

If you Google “Santorum,” you’ll find that two of the top three search results take an unusual angle on the Republican candidate, thanks to sex columnist Dan Savage. (I very nearly used “Santorum” as a Google example in class last semester, and only just thought better of it.) Santorum’s supporters want Google to push the, er, less conventional site further down the rankings, and allege that Google’s failure to do so is political biased. That claim is obviously a load of Santorum, but the situation has drawn more thoughtful responses. Danny Sullivan argues that Google should implement a disclaimer, because kids may search on “Santorum” and be disturbed by what they find, or because they may think Google has a political agenda. (The site has one for “jew,” for example. For a long time, the first result for that search term was to the odious and anti-Semitic JewWatch site.)

This suggestion is well-intentioned but flatly wrong. I’m not an absolutist: I like how Google handled the problem of having a bunch of skinheads show up as a top result for “jew.” But I don’t want Google as the Web police, though many disagree. Should the site implement a disclaimer if you search for “Tommy Lee Pamela Anderson”? (Warning: sex tape.) If you search for “flat earth theory,” should Google tell you that you are potentially a moron? I don’t think so. Disclaimers should be the nuclear option for Google – partly so they continue to attract attention, and partly because they move Google from a primarily passive role as filter to a more active one as commentator. I generally like my Web results without knowing what Google thinks about them.

Evgeny Morozov has made a similar suggestion, though along different lines: he wants Google to put up a banner or signal when someone searches for links between vaccines and autism, or proof that the Pentagon / Israelis / Santa Claus was behind the 9/11 attacks. I’m more sympathetic to Evgeny’s idea, but I would limit banners or disclaimers to situations that meet two criteria. First, the facts of the issue must be clear-cut: pi is not equal to three (and no one really thinks so), and the planet is indisputably getting warmer. And second, the issue must be one that is both currently relevant and with significant consequences. The flat earthers don’t count; the anti-vaccine nuts do. (People who fail to immunize their children not only put them at risk; they put their classmates and friends at risk, too.) Lastly, I think there’s importance to having both a sense of humor and a respect for discordant, even false speech. The Santorum thing is darn funny. And, in the political realm, we have a laudable history of tolerating false or inflammatory speech, because we know the perils of censorship. So, keeping spreading Santorum!

Danielle, Frank, and the other CoOp folks have kindly let me hang around their blog like a slovenly houseguest, and I’d like to thank them for it. See you soon!

Cross-posted at Info/Law.

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A Nice Test of the Calder “Exception” to McIntyre v. Nicastro

In last year’s McIntyre v. Nicastro, Justice Kennedy, writing for four Justices, emphasized that personal jurisdiction rested on purposeful availment of the forum state.  But, he quickly qualified, “in some cases, as with an intentional tort, the defendant might well fall within the State’s authority by reason of his attempt to obstruct its laws.” As many have noted, this leaves the Calder v. Jones libel jurisdiction line of cases up in the air.  Do they remain good law?  Would it matter if the libel happened only over the ‘net?

I guess we’ll see. Read the complaint in O’Keefe v. Current Media.  It’s a good example of what’s coming — a news report delivered mostly on the web, which happened to reach New Jersey, where the plaintiff now seeks redress in State Court for libel.  Does New Jersey have jurisdiction over Current Media, Keith Olberman, and David Shuster?  Only Justices Breyer and Alito know.

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Corporate Boards and Private Prison Corporations

This month, I’ve posted about the moral dilemma that I see facing the Board members and Executives of Private Prison Corporations.  As Board members are duty bound to increase profits for shareholders, I’ve suggested that one of the primary ways that Board members can increase profits for shareholders is to engage in planning for, lobbying for and affirmatively making efforts to imprison more American citizens (and increasingly, illegal immigrants).  In comments to these posts, I’ve been queried as to whether this practice is illegal or why I believe that the profit maximization duty would necessarily lead private prison executives to engage in this kind of planning.

I want to be clear that I do not believe that a duty exists for private prison executives and Board members to aggressively seek to imprison more human beings, I am simply suggesting that the duty to increase profits requires executives to consider growth as one way to maximize profits.  Growth in companies that manufacture products or deliver most services, does not implicate locking people up and increasingly locking up people of color.  I am perfectly willing to believe that private prison Board meetings consist of discussions about cutting costs and running more efficiently to increase profits.  I also believe that private prison Board meetings involve long and intense discussions about how to convince state legislatures and federal politicians to privatize more prison facilities.  Still, I remain convinced that the duty to increase profits leads private prison Boards to discuss growth which necessarily includes increasing prison sentences for those already locked up and seeking new avenues to criminalize and imprison those that are currently free.  That said, the business judgment rule likely protects any and all of the above considerations.  Moral or not, these are business decisions.

To the commentator that states: “There is nothing unlawful about convincing politicians seeking to be “tough on crime” to lock more people up for longer,” Professor Annette Gordon-Reed captures my thinking and states it eloquently (per her comment):

“As is often the case, what is “legal”/“lawful” is the real scandal. The end of slavery in this country brought new methods to “deal with” the black population that was not to be truly assimilated into society and was, in fact, despised. Legislators, former slave owners and their kids and grandkids, used law–being “tough on crime”– to round up black men and women whose labor was then hired out. Whether it was for profit or just to get them out of sight, law was used as a direct tool for social oppression. It was all legal, and all morally reprehensible.

The US locks up more people than any nation in the world, certainly any other industrialized nation. There is no question that blacks and people of color are disproportionately represented in the prison population. The policy of targeting those communities in the war on drugs helped to drive the rise in the jail and prison population over the past few decades. History’s fingerprints are all over this. So, I see a difference between being tough on crime because you want to raise profits and being tough on crime out of a desire to protect the public. If it’s about profits, there will be an incentive to criminalize behavior whether it harms society or not. You can do that more easily with disfavored members of society, blacks and Hispanics, for example.”

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Unseaworthiness and Product Liability

I thought I’d make the following observation for those of you who study or work on product liability issues.  The maritime equivalent of product liability is the unseaworthiness action, which is based on the vessel owner’s provision of a defective ship. (There is also a contract version of unseaworthiness.) Much like product liability, the unseaworthiness tort action evolved from nothing, to negligence, and then to strict liability, which is the current rule.  I don’t know enough about the details of what makes a ship unseaworthy to know if there are some useful analogies or insights in that doctrine for product liability, but it’s worth a look.

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Is the Alien Tort Statute Really Limited to Suits Against U.S. Citizens?

(Marco Simons is Legal Director of EarthRights, International.  He is a graduate of Yale Law School, where he received the Robert L. Bernstein Fellowship in International Human Rights.)

The Supreme Court will hear argument in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Tuesday, to determine whether corporations can be sued for serious human rights abuses under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 USC 1350. But some scholars are urging the court to decide the case on other grounds.

There is a set of conservative legal scholars who intensely dislike the ATS and especially its modern use in international human rights cases. This dislike is somewhat mystifying – what the ATS essentially does is allow cases to be brought in federal court, rather than state court, where they implicate torts against aliens in violation of serious international law violations, such as torture or genocide. Would it really be better to hear cases against Paraguayan torturers or Rwandan genocidaires in state court?

Led by Curtis Bradley, Anthony Bellia, and Bradford Clark, this group of scholars argued strenuously that the ATS did not allow cases under modern human rights law at all. After this position was thoroughly repudiated by the Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, they have trotted out new arguments. The latest, from Bellia & Clark, is that the ATS only allows suits by aliens against U.S. citizens; it’s started to get some traction, as four Ninth Circuit judges adopted a version of this argument in their dissent in the Sarei v. Rio Tinto case decided in October.

Read More

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Introducing Guest Blogger Susan Freiwald

I’m delighted to introduce Professor Susan Freiwald who will be guest blogging with us this month.  Professor Freiwald is a Professor of Law at the University of San Francisco School of Law where she teaches Cyberspace Law, Information Privacy Law, and Contracts.  She received her B.A. and J.D. from Harvard.   She served as the Books and Commentaries Editor of the Harvard Law Review.   After law school, Freiwald clerked for Judge Amalya Kearse on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.  Freiwald worked as an applications (software) developer at Oracle Corporation in Silicon Valley prior to law school.  She has written law review articles on the intersection of high technology and law, focusing primarily on online surveillance and the Fourth Amendment regulation of communications privacy.  She has also written or co-written several amicus briefs in federal district and appellate courts, including in the Warshak case and in recent cases concerning Cell Site Location Information (CSLI).  Along with EFF, she argued the CSLI case in front of a panel of the 3rd Circuit in February of 2010.

Recent articles include:

Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact,” 70 Maryland Law Review 677 (2011).

A Comment on James Grimmelmann’s Saving Facebook,” 94 Iowa Law Review 1137 (2009).

Electronic Surveillance at the Virtual Border,” 78 Mississippi Law Journal (2008).

 

 

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Fair Use? A Poll

HLS grads Maddy Dodson and Stu Rees run a good law cartoon site, Stu’s Views.  One of the cartoons they’ve created perfectly exemplifies a very popular theory of how the Delaware Corporate Law works.  The cartoon is here.

Now I’d love to use the work in my corporations class, but Stu and Maddy have asserted on Stu’s Views that they have the right to license the presentation of the work for teaching purposes, at $25 a pop. By comparison, the price for a one-time presentation of the cartoon is $50, and the price to use it on this blog would have been $100.

Keep in mind that licensing the cartoon is fairly easy, but non-trivially expensive.  What’s your view?

[poll id=”5″]