Introducing Guest Blogger Scott Peppet
I am delighted to introduce Professor Scott Peppet who will be guest blogging with us in November. Professor Peppet is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Colorado School of Law. Professor Peppet’s scholarship focuses on different kinds of legal and economic information and incentive problems. His most recent scholarship focuses on informational privacy and the ways in which structural changes to information architecture (particularly, the introduction of information intermediaries) are changing information asymmetries in modern markets. In addition, he has written about bargaining strategy and overcoming the basic information asymmetries in negotiation; deal mediation and how this could solve certain transactional information problems (Contract Formation in Imperfect Markets: Should We Use Mediators in Deals?, awarded best academic article on dispute resolution by the CPR Institute in 2004); and the information and incentive advantages of the collaborative law process. Similarly, he has explored the incentives effects of different mediator compensation arrangements (Contractarian Economics and Mediation Ethics: The Case for Contingent Fee Mediation, 2003); and the signaling possibilities of treating the legal ethics rules as a contractual device for overcoming information asymmetries (Lawyer’s Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and Collaboration, 2005).
Professor Peppet joined the faculty of the University of Colorado Law School in 2000. Prior to joining Colorado Law he taught as a Lecturer on Law at Harvard Law School and was a Senior Fellow at the Harvard Negotiation Research Project. In 2002, CU students honored him with their Excellence in Teaching Award.
Professor Peppet’s scholarship includes:
Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus & The Threat of a Full Disclosure Future, __ Northwestern Univ. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2011).
The Ethics of Collaborative Law, 2008 J. Disp. Resol. 131 (2008).
Updating Our Understanding of the Role of Lawyers, 12 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 175 (2007).
Contract Formation in Imperfect Markets, Should We Use Mediators in Deals?, 19 Ohio St. J. Disp. Resol. 283 (2004).
Contractarian Economics and Mediation Ethics: The Case for Customizing Neutrality Through Contingent Fee Mediation, 82 Texas L. Rev. 227 (2003).