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Online Symposium: Ertman’s Love’s Promises, How Formal and Informal Contracts Shape All Kinds of Families

It’s an honor to introduce Professor Martha Ertman and the participants in our online symposium on Love’s Promises: How Formal and Informal Contracts Shape All Kinds of Families (Beacon Press). This week, we will be discussing Ertman’s important book, which tells the compelling story of how contracts shape and sustain families. As Professor Vivian Zelizer remarked, “At a time of dramatic transformations in Americans’ family lives, Love’s Promises offers unique insights into how to manage diverse intimate relationships. Ertman makes a compelling case for why, when, and how contracts can enhance loving relationships. A pioneering book that should be read by all those concerned with current and future families.

Love’s Promises raises a host of fascinating and timely questions. Can and should private contracts substitute for formal marriage? Does putting a price tag on familial relationships change the nature of those relationships? Should we get state lawmakers out of the family business? Does it matter if those issues involve children or adults?

To consider these and many other issues, we have invited an all-star cast of thinkers: Jana SingerKimberly MutchersonCarlos BallMichele GoodwinDoug NeJaimeNaomi Cahn, Solangel MaldonadoZvi TrigerHillary BerkRobin LenhardtRosanna Hertz, and Judith Stacey.

We are excited for the discussion to begin!

 

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Promises Are Meant to Be Broken: Thoughts on Martha Ertman’s Love’s Promises

 

Professor Martha Ertman’s wonderful book, Love’s Promises, pushes readers to reject ingrained beliefs about the separation of love, family, marriage, parents, and children from the world of markets and contracts. She deftly uses her personal story to illustrate her central argument that contracts and deals facilitate the creation of varied family structures and that family law should continue to embrace this trend. I firmly agree with Ertman’s premise that much of family law is explicitly or implicitly based on contracts (legally enforceable) and deals (not legally enforceable). Surely anyone who has ever been in a relationship or raised a child knows that these experiences require agreements about what relationships mean and about what we owe to each other as we create and sever familial ties. Ertman’s book makes a strong case for the value of planning, focus, and deal making when creating families to help guide those families through life and, if necessary, to help dismantle them with minimum acrimony when they fail. I hope that this part of her book resonates deeply with readers who are thinking of creating Ertman like “Plan B” families, as she calls them. Despite my strong agreement with Ertman’s central premises, I left her book with lingering questions, a few concerns, and a desire to hear more about her view of the intertwining of law and family. Read More

Corporate Experimentation

Those interested in the Facebook emotional manipulation study should take a look at Michelle N. Meyer’s op-ed (with Christopher Chabris) today:

We aren’t saying that every innovation requires A/B testing. Nor are we advocating nonconsensual experiments involving significant risk. But as long as we permit those in power to make unilateral choices that affect us, we shouldn’t thwart low-risk efforts, like those of Facebook and OkCupid, to rigorously determine the effects of those choices. Instead, we should…applaud them.

Meyer offers more perspectives on the issue in her interview with Nicolas Terry and me on The Week in Health Law podcast.

For an alternative view, check out my take on “Facebook’s Model Users:”

[T]he corporate “science” of manipulation is a far cry from academic science’s ethics of openness and reproducibility. That’s already led to some embarrassments in the crossover from corporate to academic modeling (such as Google’s flu trends failures). Researchers within Facebook worried about multiple experiments being performed at once on individual users, which might compromise the results of any one study. Standardized review could have prevented that. But, true to the Silicon Valley ethic of “move fast and break things,” speed was paramount: “There’s no review process. Anyone…could run a test…trying to alter peoples’ behavior,” said one former Facebook data scientist.

I just hope that, as A/B testing becomes more ubiquitous, we are well aware of the power imbalances it both reflects and reinforces. Given already well-documented resistance to an “experiment” on Montana politics, it’s clear that the power of big data firms to manipulate even the very political order that ostensibly regulates them, may well be on the horizon.

Is the Happiness Industry Creating Algorithmic Selves?

In a recent podcast called “Thinking Allowed,” host Laurie Taylor covered two fascinating books: The Wellness Syndrome, and The Happiness Industry. One author discussed a hedge fund that’s now managing what it calls “biorisk” by correlating traders’ eating, drinking, and sleeping habits, and their earnings for the firm. Will Davies, author of The Happiness Industry, discussed less intrusive, but more pervasive, efforts to assure that workers are fitter, happier, and therefore more productive. As he argues in the book,

[M]ood-tracking technologies, sentiment analysis algorithms and stress-busting meditation techniques are put to work in the service of certain political and economic interests. They are not simply gifted to us for our own Aristotelian flourishing. Positive psychology, which repeats the mantra that happiness is a personal ‘choice’, is as a result largely unable to provide the exit from consumerism and egocentricity that its gurus sense many people are seeking.

But this is only one element in the critique to be developed here. One of the ways in which happiness science operates ideologically is to present itself as radically new, ushering in a fresh start, through which the pains, politics and contradictions of the past can be overcome. In the early twenty-first century, the vehicle for this promise is the brain. ‘In the past, we had no clue about what made people happy – but now we know’, is how the offer is made. A hard science of subjective affect is available to us, which we would be crazy not to put to work via management, medicine, self-help, marketing and behaviour change policies.

The happiness industry thrives in a culture premised on an algorithmic model of the self. People (or “econs“) are seen a bundle of inputs (data collection), algorithmic processes (data analysis), and outputs (data use). Since the demands of affect can only be extirpated in robots, the challenge for the happiness industry is to optimize some quantum of satisfaction for its human subjects, compatible with their maximum productivity. Objectively, the algorithmic self is no more (nor less) than the goods and services it uses and creates; subjectively, it strives to convert inputs of resources into outputs of joy, contentment–name your positive affect. As “human resources,” it is simply raw material to be deployed to its most profitable use.

Audit culture, quantification (e.g., the quantified self), commensuration, and cost-benefit analysis all reflect and reinforce algorithmic selfhood. Both the Templeton Foundation and the Social Brain Centre in Britain are developing some intriguingly countercultural alternatives to big data-driven behaviorism. As he highlights the need for such alternatives, Davies deserves great credit for exposing the political economy behind corporate appropriations of positive psychology.

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A Judicial Conniption

 

Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion today in Davis v. Ayala is quite extraordinary.  In response to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence that attacked the practice of extended solitary confinement (not an issue raised in this case), here is what he said:

I join the Court’s opinion explaining why Ayala is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus from this or any other federal court. I write separately only to point out, in response to the separate opinion of JUSTICE KENNEDY, that the accommodations in which Ayala is housed are a far sight more spacious than those in which his victims, Ernesto Dominguez Mendez, Marcos Antonio Zamora, and Jose Luis Rositas, now rest. And, given that his victims were all 31 years of age or under, Ayala will soon have had as much or more time to enjoy those accommodations as his victims had time to enjoy this Earth.

It is true that convicted murderers get treated a far sight better than their victims.  I’m not sure what that’s supposed to prove though.

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FAN 64.1 (First Amendment News) Court Hands Down License-Plate Case — 5-4 Rejects 1-A Claim

1000Earlier today the Court handed down its ruling in Walker v. Sons of Confederate VeteransThe vote was 5-4 with Justice Stephen Breyer writing for the majority and Justice Samuel Alito in dissent (joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Kennedy). In an unusual twist, Justice Clarence Thomas voted with the Court’s liberal bloc.

The Court held that Texas’s specialty license plate designs constitute government speech, and thus Texas was entitled to refuse to issue plates featuring SCV’s proposed design. Specifically, the Court ruled that

  1. When the government speaks it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what it says, and
  2. The Court’s precedents regarding government speech provide the appropriate framework through which to approach the case

“The fact that private parties take part in the design and propagation of a message,” wrote Breyer, “does not extinguish the governmental nature of the message or transform the government’s role into that of a mere forum-provider.” He added: “Additionally, the fact that Texas vehicle owners pay annual fees in order to display specialty license plates does not imply that the plate designs are merely a forum for private speech.”

Writing in dissent, Justice Alito argued: “The Court’s decision passes off private speech as government speech and, in doing so, establishes a precedent that threatens private speech that government finds displeasing. Under our First Amendment cases, the distinction between government speech and private speech is critical. The First Amendment “does not regulate government speech,” and therefore when government speaks, it is free “to select the views that it wants to express.” Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U. S. 460, 467–468 (2009). By contrast, “[i]n the realm of private speech or expression, government regulation may not favor one speaker over another.” Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 828 (1995).”

Later, Alito argued that the majority’s “capacious understanding of government speech takes a large and painful bite out of the First Amendment. Specialty plates may seem innocuous. They make motorists happy, and they put money in a State’s coffers. But the precedent this case sets is dangerous. While all li- cense plates unquestionably contain some government speech (e.g., the name of the State and the numbers and/or letters identifying the vehicle), the State of Texas has converted the remaining space on its specialty plates into little mobile billboards on which motorists can display their own messages. And what Texas did here was to reject one of the messages that members of a private group wanted to post on some of these little billboards be- cause the State thought that many of its citizens would find the message offensive. That is blatant viewpoint discrimination.”

Commentary: Ilya Shapiro, Supreme Court Allows Texas to Offend the First Amendment,” Cato Institute, June 18, 2015

THE COURT’S 2014-15 FREE EXPRESSION DOCKET

[last updated: 6-18-15]

Cases Decided 

  1. Elonis v. United States (argue: 12-1-14 / decided: June 1, 2015) (8-1 per Roberts) (statutory-based ruling)
  2. Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar (argued: Jan. 20, 2015 / decided: April 29, 2015) (5-4 per Roberts)
  3. Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans (argued 3-23-15 / decided 6-18-15) (5-4 per Breyer)
  4. Reed v. Town of Gilbert (argued 1-12-15 / decided 6-18-15) (9-0 per Thomas)

Pending Petitions*

  1. Berger v. American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina (license plate case)
  2. Thayer v. City of Worcester (last distributed for Conference of January 9, 2015)
  3. Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, et al. (4-27-15: The Court asked the Calif. AG to respond to the petition)
  4. Central Radio Co., Inc. v. City of Norfolk (amicus brief by Eugene Volokh)
  5. Center for Competitive Politics v. Harris (emergency application for injunction pending Cert.)

Review Denied*

  1. Walker-McGill v. Stuart
  2. O’Keefe v. Chisholm
  3. King v. Christie
  4. Apel v. United States 
  5. Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified School District
  6. The Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Education of the City of New York 
  7. Arneson v. 281 Care Committee
  8. Kagan v. City of New Orleans
  9. ProtectMarriage.com-Yes on 8 v. Bowen
  10. Clayton v. Niska
  11. Pregnancy Care Center of New York v. City of New York 
  12. City of Indianapolis, Indiana v. Annex Books, Inc.
  13. Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc. v. United States 
  14. Mehanna v. United States
  15. Stop This Insanity Inc Employee Leadership Fund et al  v. Federal Election Commission
  16. Vermont Right to Life Committee, et al v. Sorrell

Though these lists are not comprehensive, I try to track as many cases as possible. If you know of a cert. petition that is not on these lists, kindly inform me and I will post it.   

Worker Replaceability: A Question of Values

One reason I decided to write on law practice technology was because of a general unease about the shape of debates on automation. Technologists and journalists tend to look at jobs from the outside, presume that they are routine, and predict they’ll be further routinized by machines. But some reality checks are important here.

As David Rotman observes, “there is not much evidence on how even today’s automation is affecting employment.” Many economists believe that technology will create more jobs than it destroys. MIT’s David Autor, writing for the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s economic policy symposium on “Reevaluating Labor Market Dynamics,” states that “journalists and expert commentators overstate the extent of machine substitution for human labor and ignore the strong complementarities”—in other words, the ways that automation can increase, rather than decrease, the value of human labor. Consider, for instance, the use of voice recognition software: it may put transcriptionists out of work, but increases the value of the labor of a person who can now, say, transcribe what they’ve dictated 24 hours a day, rather than just when the transcriptionist is near. The selfie-stick may have a similar effect on cameramen and journalists. Legal tech may put some lawyers out of a job, while creating jobs for others.

It’s also easy to overestimate the scope of automation. Autor gives a sobering example of windshield repair:

Most automated systems lack flexibility—they are brittle. Modern automobile plants, for example, employ industrial robots to install windshields on new vehicles as they move through the assembly line. But aftermarket windshield replacement companies employ technicians, not robots, to install replacement windshields. Why not robots? Because removing a broken windshield, preparing the windshield frame to accept a replacement, and fitting a replacement into that frame demand far more real-time adaptability than any contemporary robot can
approach.

The distinction between assembly line production and the in-situ repair highlights the role of environmental control in enabling automation. While machines cannot generally operate autonomously in unpredictable environments, engineers can in some cases radically simplify the environment in which machines work to enable autonomous operation.

Admittedly, the “society of control” scenario discussed here, or even milder versions of the “smart city,” may lead to far more controllable environments. But they also raise critical questions about privacy, fair data practices, and liberty.

There are also conflicts over values at stake in worker replacement. Osborn & Frey’s study The Future Of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs To Computerisation? tries to rank order 702 positions on the degree of likelihood of their automation. They characterize recreational therapists as least automatable, and title examiners and searchers as the second most automatable. But many video games offer forms of therapy, and therapeutic jobs (like masseur) and even higher-touch jobs could, in principle, be computerized. Furthermore, at least in the United States in the wake of MERS, there has been a loss of “confidence in real property recording systems.” Title insurance may hinge on legal questions that are still up in the air in certain states. Yes, further automation and recognition of things like MERS might “cut the Gordian knot,” but that solution would also inevitably trench on other values of legal regularity and due process.

In summary: automation anxieties could be as overblown now as they were in the 1960s. And the automation of each occupation, and tasks within occupations, will inevitably create conflicts over values and social priorities. Far from a purely technical question, robotization always implicates values. The future of automation is ours to master. Respecting workers, rather than assuming their replaceability of, would be a great start.

Dulce et Decorum Est: Critics of Student Loan Forgiveness Rally the Troops

For years, critics of loan forgiveness programs for students have argued that they are a form of “welfare,” when in fact they’re a necessary corrective to the excessively harsh bankruptcy regime imposed on student debt. But the critics are getting a hearing, and guess where the money is probably going:

[A]t some point, there is going to be a deal on appropriations and raising the debt ceiling. There is a lot of pressure to raise defense spending. Some of these student loan items [like the Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program] could wind up on the table in such a deal.

We’ve seen this pattern again and again: 1) create a scare about excessive “entitlement” spending, 2) spur either tax cuts for the rich or reallocation of “entitlement” money to the force or finance sectors, and 3) repeat once excess military spending once again drives budgetary imbalances. The PLSF is a low-cost program designed to promote provision of important services to the underserved. It’s amazing to think, of all the expenditure lines that could be attacked, this was the one chosen. But it is of a piece with larger social trends to shift money away from human services, and toward force and finance.
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FAN 64 (First Amendment News) More on the Roberts Court & the First Amendment — the Women Justices

How is First Amendment freedom of expression law being shaped by the current Court? One way to answer that question is to focus on the Justices themselves and on their assignments, voting records, and voting alignments. Mindful of such concerns, I plan to do a series of posts on the Roberts Court. When complete, I hope to prepare a summary and analysis of the Roberts Court and its record in this area of the law.

In this second installment, and following my profile of Chief Justice John Roberts, I continue by way of some facts and figures about the contributions of Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Here are a few for starters:

  • Though the Roberts Court has handed down 39 First Amendment free expression opinions, it has rendered only 17 during the tenure of all three of the Court’s female Justices.
  • Justice Sotomayor took her seat in August of 2009, and the first First Amendment free expression case she voted on was Citizens United v. FEC (2010) (5-4, joined dissent). Since her time on the Court the Justices have rendered 23 First Amendment free expression opinions.
  • Justice Kagan took her seat in August of 2010, and the first First Amendment free expression case she voted on was Snyder v. Phelps (2011) (8-1, joined majority). Since her time on the Court the Justices have rendered 17 First Amendment free expression opinions (she did not participate in 2 of those cases).

Now onto the tallies in First Amendment free expression cases:

Number of Majority/Plurality Opinions

  • Justice Ginsburg: 3 out of 39 [Roberts = 13 & Kennedy & Scalia 5 each during same period]
  • Justice Sotomayor: 2 out of 23 [Roberts = 9 & Kennedy = 4 during same period]
  • Justice Kagan: 0 out of 15* [Roberts = 6 & Kennedy = 3 during same period] [*EK did not participate in 2 of the 17 cases decided during her tenure]

Number of Separate Opinions

  • Justice Ginsburg: 5 out of 39 (2 dissenting opinions, 1 dissenting & concurring in part & 2 concurring opinions)
  • Justice Sotomayor: 2 out of 23 (2 concurring opinions)
  • Justice Kagan: 2 out of 15 (2 dissenting opinions) [*EK did not participate in 2 of the 17 cases decided during her tenure]

Total Number of Opinions by RBG, SS & EK

  • 14 (includes total majority & separate opinions) [By contrast: CJ Roberts alone has authored 13 majority/plurality opinions]

Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinions

  1. Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (5-4, 2010) (1-A claim denied)
  2. Golan v. Holder (6-2, 2012) (1-A claim denied)
  3. Wood v Moss (9-0, 2014) (1-A claim denied)

Justice Sotomayor’s majority opinions

  1. Milavetz, Gallop, & Milavetz v. United States (9-0, 2010) (1-A claim denied)
  2. Lane v. Franks (9-0, 2014) (1-A claim sustained)

Thus, in the 15 such cases in which all the women Justices participated, they authored only one majority opinion (Lane v. Franks). (Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor participated in 17 such cases during the same period and the number of majority remained the same.)

Record re 5-4 Majority/Plurality Opinions: Of the eleven 5-4 Roberts Court majority or plurality opinions in First Amendment free expression cases, only one was authored by any of the Court’s female members (Justice Ginsburg). There were six 5-4 judgments during Justice Sotomayor’s tenure, and four such judgments during Justice Kagan’s tenure.

(CJ Roberts leads in this area with 5 such opinions followed by Justices Kennedy and Alito with two apiece.)

Justice Ginsburg’s separate opinions Read More

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Five Reasons to Cheer for Starr v. United States (AIG Nationalization Case)

AIG coverYesterday, the US Federal Court of Claims ruled that the US government and its leaders acted illegally in nationalizing AIG during the 2008 financial crisis, in a shareholder suit led by Hank Greenberg, the man who built AIG until his departure in 2005. But the judge (Wheeler) also ruled against awarding any damages, saying AIG shareholders were not harmed.

A top journalist at a major financial magazine asked me the following five questions, and I gave the answers indicated–being five reasons you should celebrate the ruling. Please note that I wrote the book, The AIG Story (Wiley 2013), with Greenberg, where we laid out the legal basis for Wheeler’s ruling on illegality.

1) Is this a moral victory for Hank Greenberg? Do you think he sees it that way? 
Yes, it is a moral victory for Greenberg and for everyone else who cares about the rule of law.  I can’t speak for Hank other than to say he cares deeply about the rule of law.

2) Andrew Ross Sorkin calls this a split decision in today’s New York Times. Is that true and if not who won?
It is a Solomonic split decision but designed to invite an appeal by Greenberg and not by the government, so Hank gets a second bite at the apple on appeal.

3) Given the collateral calls that were pending and the certainty of an AIG bankruptcy, did Greenberg ever have a real chance to recover $40 billion?
No, but given the possibility of hiving off the insurance companies outside of bankruptcy, Judge Wheeler’s conclusion on no damages is vulnerable to reversal on appeal.

4) What will this ruling mean for government intervention in future financial crises? Is that good or bad?
No more violating the law or the rule of law by government officials, whatever they may think at the time. Very good–a win for justice and true American legal values.

5) The judge says that government broke the law in taking over AIG. Do you agree with that assessment?
Yes. Virtually every major figure in the takeover violated the law, certainly fiscal authorities such as Bernanke and Geithner, and maybe cabinet secretaries such as Paulson, and many of their bankers and lawyers, including those from Davis Polk, Goldman Sachs and Sullivan & Cromwell. They should all feel disgraced.