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UCLA Law Review Vol. 63, Issue 6

Volume 63, Issue 6 (August 2016)
Articles

President Nixon’s Indian Law Legacy: A Counterstory Carole Goldberg 1506
Principles of International Law That Support Claims of Indian Tribes to Water Resources Reid Peyton Chambers & William F. Stephens 1530
Crime and Governance in Indian Country Angela R. Riley 1564
Recentering Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction Addie C. Rolnick 1638
The Politics of Inclusion: Indigenous Peoples and U.S. Citizenship Rebecca Tsosie 1692

 

Comments

Tribal Sovereignty, Tribal Court Legitimacy, and Public Defense Lindsay Cutler 1752
The Double-Edged Sword of Sovereignty by the Barrel: How Native Nations Can Wield Environmental Justice in the Fight Against the Harms of Fracking Geneva E.B. Thompson 1818
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The Mystery of the Title

I’m delighted to have the opportunity to comment on Susanna Blumenthal’s wonderful new book, Law and the Modern Mind.  This book unearths and synthesizes a treasure trove of civil lawsuits in the late 18th and 19th centuries involving capacity disputes relating to, among other things, wills, contracts, divorce, and tort liability.  Susanna gives us a detailed and comprehensive portrait of these lawsuits and the lawyers, judges and jurists who shaped them.  She works from the bottom up, tying a close reading of the litigation over capacity to the intellectual, political and cultural forces of the day.  We learn about the ways in which civil capacity lawsuits challenged the reigning Enlightenment conception of the rational individual – the default legal person, as she puts it – and how these challenges reflected and reinforced social, political and legal anxiety over sustaining a republican form of government in an emerging capitalist economy.  As she writes, “[t]hough litigation was about abnormality, the alleged maniacs unwittingly dramatized the vulnerability of the freestanding individual” (p. 14).  She brings to our attention the fact that litigating sanity and competency was not simply the province of the criminal courts, and questions about capacity were not confined to those situated on the margins of social and political life.  How were we to maintain a liberal republic of autonomous, rational citizens when the alienists, with their new science of the mind, were coming into court on a daily basis challenging the competency and sanity of parties to civil lawsuits?  What did these challenges say about the mental stability of judges, or people generally?  In what ways did judges draw the line between sanity and insanity, or between competence and incompetence, when almost everyone seemed to be suffering from some form of mental alienation?  These are only some of the fascinating questions Susanna explores in this important book.

I am going to focus my brief comments here on the title of Susanna’s book, Law and the Modern Mind, and what it might say about the place of book – and Susanna’s work more generally – in the history of legal thought.  As far as I could tell, neither the title, nor the phrase “the modern mind,” is expressly discussed in the book.  Of course, one might be inclined to assume that “modern mind” references an Enlightenment view of the rational subject, or conversely perhaps the mind as depicted by the nineteenth century alienists who came along to dethrone Enlightenment rationality.  Perhaps the title is intentionally meant to be ambiguous, straddling both sides of the debate.  Yet there is clearly more to this title than the dueling sides of a nineteenth century dispute over the liberal ideal of the rational, autonomous individual.

Read More

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Law and the Modern Mind Book Symposium

 

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Concurring Opinions is delighted to introduce Professor Susanna  Blumenthal, and the participants in our online symposium on Law and the Modern Mind: Consciousness and Responsibility in American Legal Culture (Harvard University Press, 2016).

In the book, Susanna explores how American jurisprudence has been shaped by differing conceptions of rationality,consciousness, agency, and accountability.  Focusing on the period dating from America’s founding through the end of the nineteenth century, the book shows how the developing conception of what she terms the “default legal person” (p. 7), modeled after cultural notions of the “free and independent man,” (id.) was both at the core of  the early Americans’ legal philosophy and simultaneously a threat to the founders’ vision of ordered liberty. Because they viewed self-government as both a psychological and political enterprise, jurists built a republic of laws upon the Enlightenment science of the mind with the aim of producing a responsible citizenry.

Focusing on everyday private law adjudication, such as will contests and intrafamilial contracts, Susanna shows how judges struggled to reconcile common sense notions of rationality with novel scientific concepts that suggested deviant behavior might result from disease rather than conscious choice. Questions of capacity, for example, were particularly salient as lawsuits raised questions about “unnatural dispositions” (the title of one of her chapters).  She explores the connections between changing scientific views of insanity and the jurisprudence of culpability.

Law and the Modern Mind is extremely thought-provoking as it calls attention to the problematic relationship between consciousness and liability in American jurisprudence, to the difficulties reconciling medical knowledge of the mind with legal culpability.

To consider these and many other issues raised by Blumenthal’s book, we have invited an all-star – and multidisciplinary — cast of thinkers: Anne Dailey, Concurring Opinion’s own Gerard Magliocca, Michele McKinley, Nomi Stolzenberg, Martha Umphrey, and Steven Wilf.

We look forward to this discussion, and please join in with comments!  Susanna will also be responding to the commentary.

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FAN 119 (First Amendment News) — Snapshots of David Cole, the ACLU’s New National Legal Director

Professor David Cole

Professor David Cole

Now that Professor David Cole has been named the new national legal director for the American Civil Liberties Union, I plan to do several posts on him and some of his views on the First Amendment.

As some may know, David Cole was the main author of the briefs in two landmark flag-burning cases:  Texas v. Johnson (1989); and United States v. Eichman (1990). William Kunstler, who argued both cases, commented that as the author of those briefs Cole was “the intellectual architect of the courtroom victories.” (See also Collins & Chaltain, We Must not be Afraid to be Free.)

David Cole likewise argued Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (1999) (First Amendment challenge to the selective enforcement of the immigration law against Palestinian immigrants based upon their political associations and activities). National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley (1998) was another First Amendment case Professor Cole argued (First Amendment challenge to NEA’s politically-based denial of federal funding to four performance artists whose works address issues of sexuality, and to the 1990 statutory provision requiring NEA grants to made “taking into consideration general standards of decency.”) He also served on the Advisory Board of The Free Expression Policy Project.

His most recent book, Engines of Liberty: The Power of Citizen Activists to Make Constitutional Law (2016) (see also his remarks at Politics & Prose Bookstore, April 2016) (YouTube)

* * * * 

For now, let us turn to Professor Cole’s arguments to the Court in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (2010), the “material support” to terrorist organizations case.  Below are some selected excerpts from the oral arguments in that case:

Core political speech

Mr. Cole: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This as-applied challenge asks whether the government can make it a crime for Ralph Fertig and the Humanitarian Law Project to speak in association with the Kurdistan Workers Party.

Specifically, they seek to advocate for legal reform in Congress and the UN, to write and distribute articles supportive of Kurdish rights, to inform the Kurds of their international human rights and remedies, and to advise them on peaceful conflict resolution.

It is undisputed that the Kurdistan Workers Party engages in a wide range of lawful activities and that plaintiffs seek to support only lawful ends.

The government has a concededly compelling interest in combatting terrorism, yet it has not even tried to defend these prohibitions under strict scrutiny.

Instead, it rests its entire case on the proposition that criminalizing plaintiffs’ speech is a regulation of conduct, not speech, and therefore can be upheld under O’Brien. . . .

Justice Stevens: But, Mr. Cole, don’t you agree that some of the speech could be regulated?

Mr. Cole: –Some of my clients’ speech?

Justice Stevens: Some of the speech of your client.

Mr. Cole: I don’t think — I don’t think any of it could be prohibited, Your Honor, unless the government can satisfy the stringent scrutiny that this Court applies when Congress seeks to prohibit pure speech. . . .

Justice Stevens: You think all of the speech at issue is protected?

Mr. Cole: –I think that certainly all of the speech that I’ve just identified, which is the core–

 . . . . It’s core — and I think the reason, Your Honor, is it is core political speech on issues of public concern.

It is advocating only lawful, peaceable activities.

This Court has never upheld the criminal prohibition of lawful speech on issues of public concern.

“Money is different”

Justice Kennedy: Well, could the government, I assume — I assume you will say NGO or other organization or person from giving tsunami aid to one of these organizations, from giving them money?

Mr. Cole: I think money is different, Your Honor.

Justice Kennedy: Could they — could the government prohibit that?

Mr. Cole: I think money is different because it’s  . . . conduct, not speech.

Make Distinctions: Aid, support & membership

Justice Scalia: Any assistance you provide to these organizations cannot be separated from assistance to their terrorist activities.

Mr. Cole: Well, Your Honor, that is precisely the argument that the United States made to this Court in Scales.

And here I’m quoting from the government’s brief:

“Active membership can be proscribed even though the activity be expended along lines not otherwise illegal, since active support of any kind aids the organization in achieving its own illegal purposes. “

That was with respect to an organization that Congress spent 10 years studying, made findings that it was an international conspiracy directed and controlled by the Soviet Union with the aim of overthrowing the United States by force and violence, using terrorism.

And, nonetheless, this Court in Scales held you’ve got to distinguish between that aid and support and membership which is furthering the lawful activities and that which is furthering the illegal activities; otherwise you are penalizing the exercise of lawful speech.

The Court said the same thing in De Jonge.

Justice Ginsburg: Mr. Cole, as I remember, Scales upheld a conviction, wasn’t–

Mr. Cole: It did, Justice Ginsburg, but only because it interpreted the statute to be — to be limited to specific . . . members — active membership that is specifically intended to further the illegal ends of the group, precisely–

. . . .

Speech Tantamount to Material Support

Justice Kennedy: Suppose the speech is tantamount to material support in that it legitimizes, encourages, or strengthens the organization.

Mr. Cole: Well, two things in response to that, Justice Kennedy.First, that is what the United States argued in Scales. And, again, the Court, not only in Scales but in a host of cases striking down Communist Party statute, said you have to distinguish between aid that’s intended to further lawful activity and aid that’s intended to further illegal activity when it’s in the form of protected activity — association, here speech and association.

And, secondly–

Justice Stevens: In those cases, the real question was whether membership was enough, wasn’t it?

Mr. Cole: Active membership . . .  which the government says constitutes more than mere nominal membership.

Justice Kennedy: And this is support. It’s different.

Mr. Cole: Well, Your Honor, in De Jonge, one of these cases, one of this Court’s first First Amendment cases, the government argued that Mr. De Jonge aided the Communist Party in its illegal ends by conducting a meeting for them and being their lead speaker at the meeting.

And this Court said: We’ve got to look at what he did, and what — yes, he conducted the meeting; yes, he was a member of the Communist Party; yes, he solicited people to join the Communist Party.

But what did he do? He advocated lawful peaceable activities.

Justice Kennedy: But there wasn’t a statute on the books that prohibited material support–

Mr. Cole: Well, I don’t think it would–

Justice Kennedy: And here there is, and this is in aid of that prohibition.

Mr. Cole: Right, but Your Honor, what would — if Congress came along after the Communist Party cases and said, okay, you’ve said we can’t make it a crime to criminalize membership in the Communist Party; we are now going to make it a crime to speak in conjunction with the Communist Party — do you think the decisions would have come out any differently?I don’t think so, because this Court has said that speech is different from money, that it–

Justice Scalia: I think it’s very unrealistic to compare these terrorist organizations with the Communist Party. Those cases involved philosophy. The Communist Party was — was — was more than a — than an organization that — that had some unlawful ends. It was also a philosophy of — of — of extreme socialism.And — and many people subscribed to that philosophy. I don’t think that Hamas or any of these terrorist organizations represent such a philosophical organization.

Mr. Cole: Your Honor, this Court accepted Congress’s findings.Congress’s findings were not that this was a philosophical debating society, but that it was an international criminal conspiracy directed by our enemy to overthrow us through terrorism. . . .

Justice Scalia: They joined it for philosophical reasons. These terrorist organizations have very practical objectives. And the only reason for joining them or assisting them is to assist those practical objectives.

Mr. Cole: Well, I don’t think that’s — I don’t think that’s fair, Justice Scalia. The Humanitarian Law Project has no interest in furthering terrorism, but the Kurdistan Workers Party are the principal representatives of the — of the Kurds in Turkey. They do have an interest in protecting the rights of the Kurds. They do have an interest in encouraging the Kurdistan Workers Party to — to disavow violence and engage in lawful peaceful means of resolving their disputes . . . .

*  * Additional Materials  * * 

David Cole on the ‘Material Support’ Law and the Constitution, American Constitution Society, November 30, 2010 (YouTube)

David Cole, “The First Amendment’s Borders: The Place of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project in First Amendment Doctrine,” 6 Harv. L. & Pol. Rev. 147 (2012)

James Bamford, David Cole & Margaret Russell — PATRIOT Acts I & II: New Assault on Liberty?, The Independent Institute, November 2003 (YouTube)

Ron Rotunda: “The ABA Overrules the First Amendment” Read More

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Secret Service Investigations of Presidential Threats

Donald Trump’s recent comments about “Second Amendment people” raises an issue that I’ve wondered about for a long time. What standard does the Secret Service use in determining whether its agents need to contact someone who makes a threat against the President or a presidential candidate?  And what does the Secret Service do when they contact someone like that?

I ask these questions because there is a chilling quality to such a visit on political speech. Now the Secret Service does not visit every person who makes a crazy comment, as they lack the resources for that and correctly conclude that the vast majority of those statements are harmless. But are there written guidelines that help them assess this?  If so, what are they? And would there be a First Amendment claim, say against individual Secret Service agents, if someone felt that they were being unfairly targeted or harassed for things that they said?

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UCLA Law Review Vol. 63, Issue 5

Volume 63, Issue 5 (June 2016)
Articles

How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform Joanna C. Schwartz 1144
Second-Order Participation in Administrative Law Miriam Seifter 1300
The Freedom of Speech and Bad Purposes Eugene Volokh 1366

 

Comments

Evolving Jurisdiction Under the Federal Power Act: Promoting Clean Energy Policy Giovanni S. Saarman González 1422
Election Speech and Collateral Censorship at the Slightest Whiff of Legal Trouble Samuel S. Sadeghi 1472
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Representing the Bill of Rights During the Cold War

Bill_of_Rights_1966_U.S._stamp.1Building on my prior post, I want to highlight this image. It is a stamp that was issued in 1966-67 to mark the 175th anniversary of the ratification of the Bill of Rights. The design was by Herb Block, the longtime political cartoonist for The Washington Post, and was called “Freedom Checking Tyranny.” The mailed fist on the opposite side of the open hand is meant to evoke totalitarianism, which at the time was widely understood as communism.

I also find it amusing that the quote on the stamp is not in the Bill of Rights (and, as far as I know, does not come from any famous speech or Supreme Court opinion).

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The Future of the Supreme Court

Every four years the tired claim is trotted out that the winner of the presidential election could appoint three or four Justices. In fact, no President has appointed this many Justices in a single term since Richard Nixon, but this may be the year where hyperbole is true.

We know that there is one vacant seat on the Court, but consider what might happen if Hillary Clinton is elected.  Justices Ginsburg and Breyer would have to doubt seriously that the Democrats would win a fourth consecutive term in the White House, something that last occurred in the 1940s. Thus, they would have a strong incentive to retire in the next few years rather than wait until 2020 or beyond.  That would create a total of three vacancies without including any unexpected change (say, if Justice Kennedy also decides to retire). Of course, Breyer and Ginsburg could decide to go with the example of Justice Stevens and stay until they are 90 years old, but that is unlikely.

Note that if Ginsburg and Breyer retire (say over the next two years), that would make Justice Sotomayor the senior member of the liberal bloc–a rather amazing development for someone who joined the Court only seven years ago.

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Tribute to Lenny Bruce on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of His Death

This series is dedicated to the memory of John Sisko (1958-2016) —  artist, writer, teacher, gallerist, friend, and free-spirit. Sadly, his artistic tribute to Tom Paine never came to pass. Still, his last words revealed the measure of the man, his revolutionary grain: “I have lived my life creatively and uniquely and on my own terms.” Yes you did, John. 

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(credit: NYT)

To commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the death of America’s most uninhibited comedian, I have prepared five posts for the occasion. My interest in Bruce traces back to my book with David Skover, The Trials of Lenny Bruce (2002 & 2012 — 10th anniversary issue / NPR interview), followed by our successful petition to Governor George Patakai to posthumously pardon the comedian.  

Recent & Related 

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 “Lenny Bruce – In His Own, Unheard, Words,” BBC, July 30, 2016 (“Fifty years since Lenny Bruce died, Mark Steel explores his legacy in the 21st century, drawing on personal tape recordings from a newly established Lenny Bruce archive at Brandeis University, as well as classic clips from some of his ground-breaking comedy and social commentary routines. With contributions from Lenny’s daughter, Kitty Bruce, and from those who knew and wrote about him, including author Laurence Schiller.”)

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Philip Eil, “50 Years After His Death, Lenny Bruce’s Spirit Lives,” The Forward, August 1, 2016

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Kelly Carlin, Rain Pryor, and Kitty Bruce Speak Out About Their Fathers and the Fight for Free Speech in Comedy” (FIRE: Video/Podcast) (really a remarkable video)

Kelly Carlin, Rain Pryor, & Kitty Bruce

        Kelly Carlin, Rain Pryor, & Kitty Bruce

Can We Take a Joke? (FIRE documentary featuring Lenny Bruce)

Paul Krassner, Remembering Lenny Bruce, 50 years after his death, Los Angeles Times, July 28, 2016

 Alex Wohl, Standup Philosopher, Brandeis Magazine, Summer (2016)

(Credit: Vice Squad Mag., April, 1963)

(Credit: Vice Squad Mag., April, 1963)

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Lenny Bruce – 50 Years Later: Still Funny & “Unsafe”

Warning: The man of whom you are about to read once offended many, and his words continue to do so today.  

Lenny Bruce died for our sins.

FileLenny-bruce-on-stage.jpgOkay, it’s just a joke.

Still, the uninhibited comedian’s legacy did have its redemptive side. After he died, fifty years ago today, no comedian was ever again prosecuted for word crimes uttered in a comedy club. By that cultural measure, Lenny Bruce became the patron saint of standup comedians who freely mock those who trade in hypocrisy.

Before there was Larry David, Penn Jillette, Margaret Cho, Lisa Lampanelli, Chris Rock, or George Carlin, there was Lenny Bruce. He was the quintessential take-no-prisoners comedian. His comedic fare was robust; his style avant-garde; his method crude-blue; and his message upset some and delighted others. Did he shock? – yes. Did he offend? – yes. And was he funny? – yes, outrageously so, at least at his best moments. It’s all in a new documentary titled Can We Take a Joke?

Taboo: That was his off-limits destination. En route he tore into hypocrisy with buzz-saw vigor. No matter the subject – race, religion, politics, or sex – Bruce gave no dime to the Sunday-pious crowd. But when one deals in the forbidden, when one mocks the righteous, and when one does so with razor-cutting humor, there are consequences.

Such as?

Lenny Bruce was prosecuted for obscenity in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York for his comedy club bits. At great professional and financial cost, he was nonetheless exonerated in all of the cases except the one in New York. By the time the New York club owner (Bruce’s co-defendant) successfully appealed his conviction, Lenny was dead (broke, and with a needle spiked in his arm). He died a convicted comedian – the last one in our history.

(ht: Chuck Harter]

(ht: Chuck Harter]

December 23, 2003. On that day New York Governor George Pataki posthumously pardoned Lenny Bruce. “Freedom of speech,” he declared, “is one of the greatest American liberties, and I hope this pardon serves as a reminder of the precious freedoms we are fighting to preserve as we continue to wage the war on terror.”

The people who must never have power are the humorless. — Christopher Hitchins

Have we remembered that “reminder”? Yes, and no.

On the one hand, we now enjoy an almost unprecedented degree of free-speech freedom. It is our American badge of liberty — that willingness to tolerate that with which we disagree. On the other hand, anything deemed offensive is today banned on many college campuses. The trend is to create “safe zones” where students are protected from ideas or words that might upset them.

At Clemson University, unwelcome “verbal . . . conduct of a sexual nature” constitutes “sexual harassment.” This definition includes a vast amount of protected speech such as a joke or comment that any student subjectively finds to be offensive.

At Clark University, its Code of Student Conduct prohibits “telling jokes based on a stereotype.” Of course, that is something Lenny Bruce often did in order to combat the kind of prejudice lurking behind offensive stereotyping.

Grinnell College bans “bias-motivated incidents,” which include “an expression of hostility against a person, group, or property thereof because of such person’s (or group’s) . . . religion . . .” By that measure, Bruce’s irreverent “Religions Incorporated” and “Christ and Moses” routines could be banned at Grinnell.

Florida State University’s “A Summons to Responsible Freedom” defines “Sexual Misconduct” to include “unwanted [or] unwelcome . . . sexual or gender-based . . . comments.” By that punitive gauge there is much in Bruce’s How to Talk Dirty and Influence People (1992, reissued 2016) that would catch the censorial eye.

And then there is the capper: Northeastern University’s acceptable use policy, which prohibits the electronic transmission of any material “which in the sole judgment of the University is offensive.” Lenny Bruce’s prosecutors used much the same subjective yardstick to indict him. If “Saint Lenny” were alive, he would have a devil of a time ripping into campus such speech codes, the ones that cabin the mind in solitary confinement.

When Bruce was posthumously pardoned, the comedian Tom Smothers said: “So many of us today owe so much to Lenny Bruce.” Indeed. Regrettably, it is a debt still owed on far too many campuses across this land. No joke!