Tagged: national security


FAN 68 (First Amendment News) Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces to hear “true threats” case

The Court’s disposition of this case is certain to cause confusion and serious problems. Attorneys and judges need to know which mental state is required for conviction under 18 U. S. C. §875(c), an important criminal statute. This case squarely presents that issue, but the Court provides only a partial answer. The Court holds that the jury instructions in this case were defective because they required only negligence in conveying a threat. — Justice Samuel Alito, concurring & dissenting in part in Elonis v. U.S. 

UnknownThe Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (the highest military court) has just agreed to review a “true threats” case in United States v. Rapert (No. 15-0476/AR). The issue the five-member court will consider is “whether the finding of guilty .  . . for communicating a threat is legally insufficient because the comments are constitutionally protected and do not constitute a threat under the totality of circumstances and in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Elonis v. United States (2015).” 

As reported in CAAFLOG, there is no opinion in Rapert on the Army Court of Criminal Appeals’ website, which may be because that “court summarily affirmed the conviction.” Communicating a threat is an  Article 134 UCMJ, offense, which not only requires some misconduct (i.e., communicating a threat), but also that the conduct is either prejudicial to good order and discipline or service discrediting.

As  Zachary Spilman pointed out in his CAAFLOG post: “for [Eric L.] Rapert a footnote in a recent CAAF opinion looms large.” That opinion is United States v. Goings, 72 M.J. 202, 205 n.3 (C.A.A.F. 2013) and the pertinent language in a footnote in that case is:

From start to finish, the contested issue in the case was whether Appellant’s conduct met the terminal element of Article 134, UCMJ. Appellant argued that his conduct was insufficient to meet the terminal element, in part, because, in his view, his conduct would be constitutionally protected in a non-military setting. The trier of fact disagreed, and the ACCA concluded that the evidence was legally sufficient. What amounts to an argument that the Government has not put forth legally sufficient evidence to support an Article 134, UCMJ, conviction is fundamentally different from a constitutional argument that, in the military context, Appellant’s conduct is protected.

 (ht: Jeffrey Barnum)

Update on Elonis on remand to 3rd Circuit: According to Ronald H. Levine, who argued the Elonis case in the Third Circuit, “the Third Circuit has not yet acted other than to recall its original mandate. Whether it will vacate and remand to the district court or seek briefing per the concurrence of Justice Alito is unknown.”

Headline: “Lawmakers want Internet sites to flag ‘terrorist activity’ to law enforcement”

Screen Shot 2015-07-14 at 1.35.09 PMA story in the Washington Post by Ellen Nakashima reports that “[s]ocial media sites such as Twitter and YouTube would be required to report videos and other content posted by suspected terrorists to federal authorities under legislation approved this past week by the Senate Intelligence Committee. The measure, contained in the 2016 intelligence authorization, which still has to be voted on by the full Senate, is an effort to help intelligence and law enforcement officials detect threats from the Islamic State and other terrorist groups.”

“. . . It would not require companies to monitor their sites if they do not already do so, said a committee aide, who requested anonymity because the bill has not yet been filed. The measure applies to ‘electronic communication service providers,’ which includes e-mail services such as Google and Yahoo. . . .”

Senate Bill 1705: Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016: The relevant provision of the proposed measure is Section 603: Requirement to report terrorist activities and the unlawful distribution of information relating to explosives.

Subsection (a) of section 603 concerns the duty to report and provides:

Whoever, while engaged in providing an electronic communication service or a remote computing service to the public through a facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce, obtains actual knowledge of any terrorist activity, including the facts or circumstances described in subsection (c) shall, as soon as reasonably possible, provide to the appropriate authorities the facts or circumstances of the alleged terrorist activities.

Subsection (b) of section 603 provides:

The Attorney General shall determine the appropriate authorities under subsection (a).

Subsection (c) of section 603 concerns facts and circumstances and provides:

The facts or circumstances described in this subsection, include any facts or circumstances from which there is an apparent violation of section 842(p) of title 18, United States Code, that involves distribution of information relating to explosives, destructive devices, and weapons of mass destruction.

Subsection (d) of section 603 concerns privacy protection and provides:

Nothing in this section may be construed to require an electronic communication service provider or a remote computing service provider—

(1) to monitor any user, subscriber, or customer of that provider; or

(2) to monitor the content of any communication of any person described in paragraph (1).

The ACLU’s Gabe Rottman said that the Senate “committee had secretly inserted a provision in a spending bill that would require social media companies to report posts about “any terrorist activity” to the government. The bill is hopelessly vague on what that means. That’s because it goes far beyond a reporting requirement for wrongful conduct—terrorist activity—and will invariably result in the reporting of speech about terrorism—including by activists and other peaceful people with forceful opinions.”

“In practice, he added, “were this to become law, websites will likely do a couple of things”:

  1. “First, they will overcorrect and start taking down content wholesale. They will monitor posts for keywords like ISIS or “don’t tread on me” (a libertarian slogan that some identify with white supremacist and anti-government ideology) and pull them. That will chill an enormous amount of online debate . . .”
  2. “Second, and perhaps worse, companies—faced with the proposal’s utter lack of guidance on what the law requires them to report—will apply it inconsistently. . . .”

(ht: Emma Llansó, Free Expression Project: See also Ms. Llansó’s “Intel Authorization Bill Would Turn Online Service Providers into Law Enforcement Watchdogs,”) 

10th Circuit rejects compelled speech & compelled silence claims in Little Sisters Case

Yesterday a majority of the judges of a Tenth Circuit three-judge panel rejected the compelled speech and compelled silence claims, among others, raised by the Appellants in Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell. Judge Scott Matheson, Jr. wrote for the majority (joined by Judge Monroe G. McKay) with Judge Bobby R. Baldock writing in dissent, but on RFRA grounds.

“Plaintiffs, wrote Matheson, “contend the accommodation scheme violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment . . .  by compelling them both to speak and remain silent . . . . . First, they argue that requiring them to sign and deliver the Form or the notification to HHS constitutes compelled speech. Second, they argue that prohibiting them from influencing their TPAs’ provision of contraceptive coverage compels them to be silent. Both arguments fail.”

“To the extent such a claim requires government interference with the plaintiff’s own message, . . . . the regulations do not require an organization seeking an accommodation to engage in speech it finds objectionable or would not otherwise express. The only act the accommodation scheme requires is for religious non-profit organizations with group health plans to sign and deliver the Form or notification expressing their religious objection to providing contraceptive coverage. . . .”

“We further reject the claim that the accommodation scheme compels Plaintiffs’ silence. Like the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, we note Plaintiffs have made only general claims objecting to the non-interference regulation and have failed to indicate how it precludes speech in which they wish to engage. . . . After the issuance of the interim final rule repealing the non-interference regulation, we do not believe this question is before us. We agree with the Government and the D.C. Circuit that the repeal of the non-interference rule renders Plaintiffs’ claims regarding compelled silence moot.”

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On systematic government access to private sector data

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently decided in United States v. Skinner that police does not need a warrant to obtain GPS location data for mobile phones. The decision, based on the holding of the Supreme Court in US v. Jones, highlights the need for a comprehensive reform of rules on government access to communications non-contents information (“communications data”). Once consisting of only a list of phone numbers dialed by a customer (a “pen register”), communications data have become rife with personal information, including location, clickstream, social contacts and more.

To a non-American, the US v. Jones ruling is truly astounding in its narrow scope. Clearly, the Justices aimed to sidestep the obvious question of expectation of privacy in public spaces. The Court did hold that the attachment of a GPS tracking device to a vehicle and its use to monitor the vehicle’s movements constitutes a Fourth Amendment “search”. But it based its holding not on the persistent surveillance of the suspect’s movements but rather on a “trespass to chattels” inflicted when a government agent ever-so-slightly touched the suspect’s vehicle to attach the tracking device. In the opinion of the Court, it was the clearly insignificant “occupation of property” (touching a car!) rather than the obviously weighty location tracking that triggered constitutional protection.

Suffice it to say, that to an outside observer, the property infringement appears to have been a side issue in both Jones and Skinner. The main issue of course is government power to remotely access information about an individual’s life, which is increasingly stored by third parties in the cloud. In most cases past – and certainly present and future – there is little need to trespass on an individual’s property in order to monitor her every move. Our lives are increasingly mediated by technology. Numerous third parties possess volumes of information about our finances, health, online endeavors, geographical movements, etc. For effective surveillance, the government typically just needs to ask.

This is why an upcoming issue of International Data Privacy Law (IDPL) (an Oxford University Press law journal), which is devoted to systematic government access to private sector data, is so timely and important. The special issue covers rules on government access in multiple jurisdictions, including the US, UK, Germany, Israel, Japan, China, India, Australia and Canada.

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Hearing on National Security Leaks

On Wednesday morning the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and National Security held a hearing on the recent national security leaks.  I have just finished watching a video of the hearing so you won’t have to (you can thank me later).  Experts testifying included President George W. Bush’s homeland security advisor Kenneth Wainstein, American University Professor Stephen Vladeck, George Mason Professor Nathan Sales, and US Army (Ret.) Colonel Kenneth Allard.

As the witnesses pointed out, this is the third time in a year and a half that Congress has called for testimony on national security leaks.  The sheer frequency of the hearings indicates that Congress should really try to figure out how to reform the Espionage Act, but I am not going to be holding my breath waiting for this to happen.  Today’s hearing raised some interesting questions but unfortunately provided little guidance on how Congress might revise the Espionage Act.

Not surprisingly, Republican members of the Subcommittee largely used this hearing as an opportunity to rail against the lack of a special prosecutor to investigate the most recent national security leaks, while Democrats spent their time pointing out the most recent leaks were nothing new because leaks have been going on since the founding of this country.

The most interesting part of the hearing from my perspective was the Republicans’ attacks on the media for publishing national security secrets.  As I had mentioned in one of my first posts, almost all of the hostile reaction to the most recent round of high-profile leaks was initially directed at the leakers themselves and not the media entities that published those leaks.  Well, no more.  Rep. Lamar Smith of Texas began the attacks on the media at the outset of the hearing when he said that newspapers publish national security secrets not because they are committed to transparency but rather because they want to increase circulation.  Colonel Allard happily jumped on the media-bashing bandwagon, stating that the N.Y. Times “abuses its position” and that David Sanger’s reporting was “the equivalent of having a KGB operation running against the White House.”  (Colonel Allard also had one of the best quotes from the hearing: “In wartime, I am as opposed to the free flow of information as I am to the free flow of sewage.”  Yikes!)

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Leakers and the First Amendment

There has always been an active debate about whether the First Amendment affords government outsiders (like the media) any protection when they disseminate classified national security information without authorization.  As I mentioned in my blog post last week, however, critics of the most recent round of high-profile leaks have targeted their attacks almost exclusively on the leakers themselves and not on the news outlets that published the leaks.  So the question is, do leakers have any First Amendment right to disclose national security information to government outsiders without authorization?

At the outset, let me just say leakers have a variety of statutory arguments they might make if prosecuted under the Espionage Act and related statutes.   Charlie Savage recently outlined a few of these arguments here.  In addition, one of the obstacles the government might face is that in order to prove that the disclosure was harmful to national security, they might have to reveal even more national security secrets (often called “graymail”).  This is one reason why the Drake prosecution fell apart.

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(Don’t) Blame the Messenger: What to Do about National Security Leaks

Many thanks to Danielle Citron for inviting me to serve as a guest blogger.  Lately I have been following the discussion about the most recent series of national security leaks, including those that detailed the White House’s terrorist “kill lists,” the foiling of a terrorist plot by a double agent in Yemen, and cyberattacks against Iran.  Outrage about leaks is hardly new.  Neither are leaks.  (See my prior article detailing the long history of leaks in this country.)  What is new is that the outrage this time around seems to be directed at the leakers and not at the media outlets that published the leaked information.

Back in December 2005, when the New York Times published its story about the NSA’s warrantless wiretapping program, the paper and its reporters were condemned just as vigorously as the leakers themselves.  It is interesting to think about why the politicians and commentators have held their fire against the media after this latest round of leaks (at least so far).  Perhaps critics’ suspicions that these leaks were politically motivated during an election year to make President Obama look like a strong leader has made them forget to take their usual shots at the “liberal media” that disseminated them to the public.  But given that leaks often appear politically motivated, this answer is not all that satisfying.

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