Tagged: Legal Education

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Unto the Breach: An interview with the all too candid Dean Erwin Chemerinsky

We should realize that this is an emperor that truly has no clothes. For too long, we have treated the Court is if they are the high priests of the law, or at least as if they are the smartest and best lawyers in society. Erwin Chemerinsky (2014)

I am very pleased to interview Dean Erwin Chemerinsky in connection with his eighth book, The Case Against the Supreme Court (Viking, 2014) – this in addition to the 200-plus scholarly articles he has published. One of those articles was the foreword to the Harvard Law Review’s 1988 Supreme Court Term issue. His first scholarly article was published 36 years ago, this when he was associated with the D.C. firm of Dobrovir, Oakes, & Gebhardt. Today, Chemerinsky’s casebook, Constitutional Law, is one of the most widely read law textbooks in the country.

Dean Erwin Chemerinsky

Dean Erwin Chemerinsky

Unlike most academics, he also has a practitioner’s flare for the law, having argued five cases in the Supreme Court, among other courts. Last year, National Jurist magazine named Dean Chemerinsky as the most influential persons in legal education while the Anti Defamation League honored him for his commitment and contributions to freedom and education. And in 2007, Douglas Kmiec labeled him as “one of the finest constitutional scholars in the country.”

True to his reputation, Dean Chemerinsky’s new book invites us to think – and think hard – about some of our gospel “givens” about the Court, its members, its procedures, and its future.

Thank you Dean Chemerinsky for taking the time to answer my questions, and congratulations on the publication of your latest book.

* * * *

Question: For someone who argues cases before the Supreme Court and who writes on and teaches about the Court, yours is a rather provocative title. Why did you choose it?

Chemerinsky: The title captures the thesis of the book. As I reflect on it, I realize that the Supreme Court has often failed, often at the most important times and at its most important tasks. I think that this is a conclusion that both conservatives and liberals can agree to and need to realize. The Supreme Court’s decisions on race, its rulings in times of crisis, its decisions during the Lochner era are powerful examples where I think liberals and conservatives would agree that the Court did great harm to society. That is the foundation of the case against the Supreme Court. I want to see the Court made better and the impetus for thus must be recognizing that there is a need for reform.

Go here for Dean Chemerinsky’s oral argument in the Supreme Court in Tory v. Cochran (2005).

Question: You write: “I discovered in my own mind I have been making excuses for the Court. The Supreme Court is not the institution that I once revered.” What brought about this change of heart for you?

Carrie Buck

Carrie Buck

Chemerinsky: One semester I was teaching Buck v. Bell (1927), the Supreme Court decision that upheld Virginia’s eugenics law and where Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes infamously declared “three generations of imbeciles are enough.” After class, I realized that I had been making excuses for the Court in class. I did some research and realized that 60,000 people were involuntarily surgically sterilized as a result of the Court’s decision and the eugenics movement. As I thought about it, I realized that I often was making excuses for the Court in my teaching and writing.

Question: Like many others (both conservative and liberal), you fault Justice Holmes for his “offensive and insensitive” opinion in Buck v. Bell. Fair enough. What is often overlooked, however, is that Justice Louis Brandeis (one of the most humane defenders of civil rights and liberties) joined that opinion. Why? Does that give you any reflective pause? How do you explain that?

Chemerinsky: As always, the explanation must be complex rather than simple. It was at a time when progressives were defining themselves, in part, by urging deference to government as a way of criticizing the Lochner era decisions. It was at a time when the eugenics movement had great support in society. It was at a time when the Court had begun to protect non-textual rights concerning autonomy (e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) and Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925)), but had not gone far in this direction.

Does this give me reflective pause? Buck v. Bell was tragically wrong when it was decided and it is inexcusable that the Court allowed states to surgically sterilize people who had done nothing wrong.

[Re Brandeis: For a critical take on his civil rights/civil liberties record, consider David Bernstein, “From Progressivism to Modern Liberalism: Louis D. Brandeis as a Transitional Figure in Constitutional Law,” Notre Dame Law Review (2014)]

Question: You maintain “the Supreme Court’s legitimacy is not fragile.” That cuts against the conventional wisdom, certainly the prudential wisdom. Please explain to us why you think this so.

UnknownChemerinsky: The Court’s legitimacy is the product of all that it has done over 200 years.   Over this time, it has firmly established its role.  I agree with what John Hart Ely wrote in Democracy and Distrust (1980) that the Court’s legitimacy is robust. Some such as Felix Frankfurter and Alexander Bickel argued that the Court must be restrained to preserve its fragile legitimacy. Brown v. Board of Education (1954) shows the fallacy of that position. Nothing the Court has done has been more controversial or done more to enhance its institutional legitimacy. There are virtually no instances in American history of people disobeying the Court and those that occurred, such as in defiance of desegregation orders, only enhanced the Court’s legitimacy.

No single decision (or group of decisions) will seriously affect the Court’s legitimacy. I remember after Bush v. Gore hearing people say that the decision would damage the Court’s legitimacy. I was skeptical of such claims and I was right. The Court’s approval rating was the same in June 2001, six months after the decision, as it had been in September 2000, three months before the ruling. It had gone down among Democrats and up among Republicans. It is why I strongly disagree with those who believe that Chief Justice John Roberts changed his vote to uphold the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act case so as to preserve the Court’s credibility. He knew that whatever the Court did would please about half the country and disappoint about half the country.

Go here for a 2014 video interview with Dean Chemerinsky discussing his new book.

Question: You are critical of the Court’s unanimous ruling in Hui v. Castaneda (2010). There the Court, per Justice Sonia Sotomayor, held that public health service officers and employees could not be sued for Bivens actions for violating citizens’ constitutional rights if the violation was committed in the course of their government duties. The plaintiff can only sue the federal government, not the employees. There were no separate opinions in the case. Given the vote, how do you explain your claim that the Court got it wrong? Bias? Poorly argued? The law clerks’ fault? Or what?

Francisco Castaneda testifying before Congress

Francisco Castaneda testifying before Congress, 2007

Chemerinsky: In Hui v. Castañeda, a prisoner had a lesion on his penis. Francisco Castañeda was suffering enormously and the symptoms got worse and worse. But still the public health service workers refused to let him see a doctor. By the time they let him see a doctor the cancer had spread all over his body. His penis was amputated, but he died a short time later. It was egregious deliberate indifference. But the Court unanimously ruled that the existence of a statute protecting public health workers from suit barred a constitutional claim. This seems wrong: a statute should not bar a constitutional claim.

Why did the Court come to this conclusion? I think this case reflects a much larger trend of the Supreme Court favoring the immunity of government and government officers over remedies for injured individuals. It is reflected in the expansion of sovereign immunity, the growth of absolute and qualified immunity, and the evisceration of Bivens suits.

Go here to read Francisco Castañeda’s testimony before Congress, Oct. 4, 2007; see also Gabriel Eber, “Remembering Francisco Castañeda,” ACLU website, May 5, 2010

Question: You write of the need for scholars to look “cumulatively at the Court’s decisions” re race, civil liberties, economic regulations, school desegregation, effective counsel, labor law, consumer protection, and governmental immunity. Is it really possible to look at the Court through such a broad lens? And if so, what might it tell us that we already do not know?

Chemerinsky: My concern is that the narrower the focus, the easier it is to make excuses for the Court. Any institution will make decisions that we later regard as mistakes. Virtually everyone today believes that Dred Scott (1856) and Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) and Korematsu v. United States (1944) were tragically wrong. But focusing on each creates the view that they are isolated errors. If they are seen as part of a larger pattern, it becomes clearer that there is a strong case against the Supreme Court. It then becomes clear that there is a need for reforms.

Absent extraordinary circumstances, the docket for October Term 2014 is now complete, and it has the potential to be one of the most momentous in history. – Erwin Chemerinsky (Jan. 27, 2015)

Question: You find merit in Texas Governor Rick Perry’s idea for a proposed constitutional amendment limiting each Justice to an 18-year term. Think of it, had such a rule been in place, Holmes could not have written his is dissent in Gitlow v. New York (1925), Brennan would not have authored his majority opinion in Texas v. Johnson (1989), and we would never have read Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014). Two questions: (1) Does that concern you? And (2) Isn’t it always an iffy matter to push for constitutional amendments concerning the Court? Read More

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More on the Law Clerk Hiring Process – An Interview with Federal Judge Robert Lasnik

This is the second installment of a series of interviews I am doing on judicial clerkships. The first interview was with Third Circuit Judge Thomas Ambro; that interview can be found here. In this interview the focus is on clerkships at the federal district court level.  

Judge Robert Lasnik with Justice Sandra Day O'Connor at the University of Washington Law School

Justice Sandra Day O’Connor with Judge Robert Lasnik at the U.S. Courthouse in Seattle

Robert S. Lasnik is a United States federal judge who sits on the District Court for the Western District of Washington State.

Born in 1951 in Staten Island, New York, Judge Lasnik attended Brandeis University (B.A., 1972) and then Northwestern University (M.S., journalism, 1973 & M.A. in education, 1974). Following that, he went on to the University of Washington School of Law where he received his J.D. in 1978.

Prior to his service on the Court, he was a deputy prosecutor in the King County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office (1978-1981) and then a senior deputy prosecutor (1981-1983), and later chief of staff in that office (1983-1990). Thereafter, he served as a Superior Court judge in King County (1990-1998).

President Bill Clinton nominated him to the Court on May 11, 1998.  He was confirmed unanimously by the United States Senate on October 21, 1998, and received his commission on October 22, 1998. He served as Chief Judge from 2004 to 2011. Chief Justice John Roberts appointed him to serve as a member of the Judicial Conference Executive Committee

 Some of Judge Lasnik’s more notable opinions include Browne v. Avvo, Inc. (2007) (“To the extent that their lawsuit [contesting lawyer rankings on a public website] has focused a spotlight on how ludicrous the rating of attorneys (and judges) has become, more power to them. To the extent that they seek to prevent the dissemination of opinions regarding attorneys and judges, however, the First Amendment precludes their cause of action”), and Video Software Dealers Association v. Maleng, et al (2004) (enjoining Washington State law prohibiting the sale of video games depicting violence against police officers). More recently, he authored Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon (2013), which the ACLU labeled as a “landmark case on indigent defense.”

Welcome, Judge Lasnik, to our corner of the blogosphere here at Concurring Opinions. It is an honor for us to have you contribute to this blog. 

Question: How many law clerks do you have, and how long are their terms?

Answer: I have one career law clerk who has been with me since my appointment in 1998, and a one-term law clerk whom I hire on a one-year basis. Occasionally, where there is mutual agreement by mid-year, I have extended the clerkship to a second year.

Question: Tell us a little bit about how the clerkship application process and how it works in your chambers. For example, when do you first start accepting applications, and up to what point do you stop considering them?

Answer: I start accepting applications in September, the year prior to the start of the clerkship. Interviews begin in January/February and are on-going until I fill the position.

Question: How much do you rely on OSCAR?

Answer: I post open positions on OSCAR. However, we do request hard copies of materials.

Question: Some district judges are now seeking law clerks with some experience as a practicing attorney. What do you think of that and is it something you either are now doing or plan to do?

Answer: I do require a year of experience either clerking in federal court or for a state’s highest court or practicing law. I find that having some real-world experience makes for better clerks and that the clerks also get more out of the year.

Question: How far in advance do you select your clerks? Some federal judges are now hiring two years in advance? What is your practice?

Answer: I hire the same year of the opening although occasionally, where I have two outstanding candidates, I will extend an offer for the next year to the one who comes in second. This has happened on two occasions and I’m so glad I got both outstanding clerks.

Question: About how many trials do you preside over in a calendar year?

Answer: I do approximately eight trials per year—half civil and half criminal.

Question: Do you have any idea of how many orders you issue in a year?

Answer: 2,039 civil orders, 206 criminal orders, and 194 miscellaneous for a total of 2,439. This covers the period from the June 2013 to June 2014.  Read More

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FAN 19.1 (First Amendment News) — Media Scholar Named Next Dean of GW Law School

It’s now official: Blake D. Morant, dean of the Wake Forest University School of Law and president-elect of the Association of American Law Schools, will be the next Dean of the George Washington Law School. According to a GW press release: Dean Morant “will assume the deanship on Sept. 1 after having served seven years as dean of the Wake Forest University School of Law. ‘Blake Morant is not only a seasoned dean but also a national leader in legal education,’ said GW President Steven Knapp. ‘He brings to this important position a proven record of accomplishments, and his extensive leadership experience will make him an extremely valuable addition to our law school and the entire university.'”

Dean Blake Morant

Dean Blake Morant

“‘I have respected and admired the George Washington Law School throughout my career and consider serving as its next dean to be a distinct privilege,’ Mr. Morant said. “‘I look forward to working with the constituency of this historic institution during this time of both challenge and extraordinary opportunity.'”

Media Law Scholarship

Though his scholarship includes other areas of law (such as contracts, administrative law, and legal education), Dean Morant’s articles on media law include the following:

Advance Greeting: Welcome to Washington, D.C., Dean Morant!

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FAN 15.2 (First Amendment News) — Justice Scalia on the First Amendment & Legal Education

In a recent speech entitled “Reflections on the Future of the Legal Academy,” Justice Antonin Scalia had a few things to say about legal education and the First Amendment. The remarks were made on May 11, 2014 at the William & Mary Law School, this by way of a commencement address. The relevant passage is:

In more than a few law schools, including some of the most prestigious (the University of Chicago, for example), it is possible to graduate without ever having studied the recent First Amendment. Can someone really call himself an American lawyer who has that gap in his compendious knowledge of the law? And can a society that depends so much upon lawyers for shaping public perceptions and preserving American traditions regarding the freedom of speech and religion, afford so ignorant a bar?

[Hat tip to William Baude]

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Legal education, opportunity, and bottlenecks

Joseph Fishkin’s Bottlenecks offers a new theory of equal opportunity. (See symposium posts here and here.)

What does it mean for legal education?

One of the major contributions of the book is to offer a new social justice perspective from which to evaluate a wide variety of laws and policies, both public and private. The book invites us all to treat opportunity not just as a catch phrase, but really deeply explore its meaning and ramifications.

If we reform legal education not only to attract more students but also to promote social justice, how should we think about legal education’s role in the broader opportunity structure?

Read More

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Diversity on the Supreme Court

While in recent decades the Court has become more diverse in some areas, such as gender and race, presidents have also appointed Justices with increasingly uniform educational and professional backgrounds. This lack of professional and educational diversity may be sub-optimal. Adrian Vermeule, for example, offers a carefully-reasoned argument for having at least one Justice with training in another discipline (he suggests appointing a Justice with a PhD in economics). At its most extreme, Vermeule’s argument insists that the professionally-diverse Justice have no training in law, to correct for correlated biases held by lawyer Justices.

My research suggests, however, that the extreme step of eliminating formal legal training will introduce a particular bias which some will find objectionable. In the past, Justices who did not attend law school were significantly more politically predictable than Justices who shared the benefit of formal legal education. Today, of course, a president choosing a Justice who did not attend law school would likely select a person who also has expertise in another field. But it is not clear a Justice with an advanced degree in economics or another discipline would exhibit the same political restraint as a Justice who went to law school. It seems more likely that Justices who attend law school will be either better-equipped or more inclined than others to vote independently of their personal political views. This may be reflected in greater levels of judicial restraint, incremental decision-making, and application of doctrines such as stare decisis.

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More on legal education

One of the commenters on my opening salvo on legal education raises a point I thought might come up – essentially the much ballyhooed assertion that clients are no longer willing to pay for the training of young associates. The implication being that because clients are less willing to pay for hours billed by ignorant or inefficient legal rookies then law schools must necessarily adjust curricula to provide training no longer available through law firms. Although I’m in favor of doing more to prepare practice-ready graduates, I’m not at all sure the “clients won’t pay for training” story really flies as a rationale for doing it.

First, I don’t think clients were ever consciously “paying for new associate training.” What may have been true is that, in flusher times, big firm clients more readily accepted the overstaffing of cases and the sometimes comically high hourly rates big firms billed for the low-value-added time of young associates. The result was that big firm clients “paid for” associate training in the sense that the associates were learning on the job and their firms were able to earn big profits from their time while they did so. Now, it appears that big firm clients are more sensitive to overstaffing and are unwilling to pay high hourly rates for inefficient or low-value-added associate labor. The result cannot be that big firms aren’t training their new associates. That would be suicidal. The associates have to be trained or they will be unable to produce the high-quality work for which clients ARE willing to pay and on which the firm’s reputation and long-term survival depends. Rather, to the extent a client rebellion against expensive associate billing is underway, the real effect will be to reduce the number of associates hired because they are no longer automatic profit centers. Which is pretty consistent with what we see in the marketplace.

Now, reduced big firm associate hiring is bad for our graduates because there are fewer job opportunities and bad for law schools in the sense that, as the market for lawyers shrinks, so too does the market for law training. BUT it is not at all clear that this market perturbation can be remedied, or even much affected, by alterations in law school curriculum. We can and should make our graduates more practice-ready, but no conceivable modification of law school curriculum would provide the highly specialized subject matter and skills training necessary to transform a Big Law rookie into a midlevel associate worth her $400/hour. That sort of refined training will always be performed on the job. The very best law schools can do would be to provide a better foundation that might speed the developmental process by 6 mos or a year.

Second, most of the talk about changed client willingness to “pay for” associate training is Big Law talk. In the less rarified regions where most students from non-top-20 law schools find jobs, clients have never been willing to “pay for” young lawyer training in any sense. So firms bill young associate time at low rates or bill for fewer hours than the new lawyers spend in order to avoid alienating clients. Nonetheless, such employers – like those in Big Law – know that they have to train their new lawyers if they are to become assets. And they do – some better than others – as an investment in future improved productivity and economic return. I don’t think there is anything new about this. The change, if any, in current circumstances is the overall decline in legal business with a concomitant lower demand for investment in new associates to grow practices.

Still, law schools may be able to help our students and their prospective employers (large and small) by shortening the interval during which they are unproductive assets of the firm. More practice-ready graduates can develop faster into lawyers worth their hourly rates. This in turn shortens the payout period on a firm’s investment in a new associate and raises its rate of return. All of which should, in theory,increase lawyer hiring (or at least give a competitive advantage to graduates of schools who produce practice-ready diplomates).

Does this make sense?

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An opening musing on legal education

Well, several days later than planned, here I am with my inaugural post as May’s guest blogger here at Concurring Opinions. Thanks to Gerard for the flattering invitation. This is my first venture as a blogger, so I’m not quite sure I’ll strike the right note. But here goes.
I’ve been thinking a good deal about the structure of American legal education lately. This bout of introspection has been prompted by the national mood of unease in the profession, and more personally, by Missouri’s three-year rollercoaster ride in the US News rankings — from 60-something to 100-something and now back up to 70-something — and by my work as chair of a curriculum committee debating whether we have to reinvent ourselves for our own and our students’ sakes.  Here, in short form suitable for the blogosphere, are some of my tentative conclusions:
1) So long as US News rankings remain the primary indicator of institutional quality in the eyes of student consumers, the top 20 or perhaps 30 law schools are at liberty to change or stand pat, as suits them. So long as they continue taking in and spending a lot of money per student on whatever it is they do, the combination of reputational inertia and a US News algorithm in which most of the supposed measures of educational quality are actually proxies for money, these schools will remain on top and free to deliver legal education however they like. Their high ranking will guarantee a constant stream of the statistically best students willing to pay top tuition dollar. The raw intellectual talent of their graduates (regardless of how well or badly they were educated) will guarantee employment of those graduates by the most elite employers. And so the cycle will continue, forever and ever. Amen.
2) This model cannot work for the rest of us. In a generally stagnant economy with a legal market offering fewer jobs at less pay, we cannot continue to compete with each other in what amounts to an endless race to drive up per-student costs. Legislatures will not fund perennial increases for state-supported schools like mine. For both public and private schools, philanthropic funding is not bottomless. And trying to fund our academic arms race with ever-rising tuition is neither economically sustainable nor, frankly, moral.
3) Exacerbating the stress on non-elite institutions is the emerging emphasis on producing more practice-ready graduates. I happen to favor this trend. Indeed, over thirty years ago I wrote my third-year paper at Harvard on how to restructure upper-division legal education to achieve this end. But any serious effort to enhance practice-readiness runs head-on into the economics and sociology of law schools:
      a) Increasing practice-readiness requires more training in the skills performed by actual lawyers. This in turn requires either more “experiential learning” (basically various forms of clinical education) or more in-house simulation-based skills training or some combination of both.
     b) Skills training, whether experiential or simulated, requires much lower teacher-student ratios than doctrinal courses. Therefore, at least if the law school is to maintain quality control and not simply farm the whole thing out to adjuncts, it is probably more expensive.
     c) I say that increasing skills training is “probably” more expensive if we conceive of the additional skills training capacity as an add-on to what we already do, and if we assume that the doctrinal faculty of law schools will continue to do what they now do in the same way they’ve grown accustomed to doing it. In other words, if law schools continue hiring the same number of doctrinal tenure-track faculty with the same set of entering qualifications, give them the same teaching loads, pay them in roughly the same way, and set the same standards for type and quantity of scholarship, then adding the staff and programs required to make graduates more practice-ready will necessarily increase the cost of legal education. And I’ve just argued that the vast majority of law schools can’t keep raising costs.
     d) There are only two obvious ways out of this box. Either we abandon the objective of making our graduates more practice-ready or we rethink the role of doctrinal tenure-track faculty.
The first option is not crazy. One could fairly argue that law schools should never have gotten into the skills training business in the first place. What was good enough for Langdell should be good enough for us. Teach ‘em basic legal doctrine and the intellectual skill of legal analysis and leave the rest to the first years of practice. Or, less dogmatically, we’ve added a lot of skills training options over the last three decades (legal writing, clinics, trial advocacy) and what we have is enough.
But if you think we could and should do a better job of preparing our students for legal work, then that requires an uncomfortable self-analysis by the tenured and tenure-track class at the top of the law school hierarchy. As a conversation starter, let me suggest several changes in our comfortable lives that would make law schools better for our students, and for matter, for the legal communities of which law schools are a part:

  • Reverse the trend toward competing for faculty by offering ever-lower teaching loads to tenure-track professors. I like working less for more money as well as the next guy, but paying law professors premium salaries in relation to virtually everyone else in the university for teaching 11 or 10 or 9 hours per year is increasingly hard to justify. In the Bizzarro World of US News rankings, this practice makes weird sense because reducing professors’ teaching loads requires hiring more of them, which reduces the student-teacher ratio and increases the overall expenditures per student, which raises a school’s ranking. If, however, one is trying to increase skills training without cripplingly raising costs, an obvious means of doing so is by covering the curriculum with fewer faculty and thus freeing budgetary space for the additional staff required for more skills training.
  • Rethink the constellation of preferred qualifications for entry-level tenure-track law professors. Right now, we tend to hire young people with high grades from a handful of elite law schools whose work experience consists of a judicial clerkship and a couple of years at a fancy big-city law firm. With all these youngsters’ potential, in practice, no sensible senior lawyer would entrust them with unsupervised responsibility for any matter of real importance. But law schools confer on them the mantle of wisdom that comes with the title “professor” and not only ask them to educate students about a world they themselves have barely experienced, but also to write authoritative “scholarship” about that world. Because they are surpassingly talented people, newby law professors figure out their jobs, teach well enough (and sometimes brilliantly), and churn out law review articles as required. In a Langdellian model of legal education, this approach to hiring works well enough since the core subject matters are legal doctrine and legal reasoning, subjects those in our hiring pool have self-evidently mastered. And if the legal scholarship produced by professorial rookies is not profound, well, no one is much hurt. But if law schools are reimagined as institutions devoted to producing practice-ready graduates, then the practical inexperience of most of the professoriate becomes a problem. Professors with little real-world experience are ill-suited either to teach skills-rich courses themselves or to supervise or assess the content of such courses taught by others. 
  • Reconsider the role of “legal scholarship” in American law schools. An immediate (and horrified) objection to the suggestion of increased teaching loads will surely be the decreased time available for scholarship. And the idea of hiring more tenure-track faculty with real practice experience will surely be rejected by those who view exposure to the law in action as an irremediable pollution of the mind of the young scholar. To which I say, “Fiddlesticks!” There is far too much “legal scholarship” now. Most of it is mediocre or worse. Much of its mediocrity stems from the naivete of inexperienced professorial authors. Even if it were far better than it is, the sheer number of law review articles spewed forth each year means that only the tiniest fraction of them will ever be read by anyone other than their author’s immediate relatives or P&T committees. In saying this, I cast no aspersions on the talents of my academic fellows. To the contrary, law schools are brimming with brilliant minds, but the odd conventions of our trade often force them to opine too soon about subjects of which they know relatively little and to channel much of their creative energies into the writing of law review articles — an exercise customarily equal in practical effect to shouting down a well. As a class, law professors should probably write less, not more. If possible, they should write about subjects they have some practical familiarity with.  If professors come to the academy without such familiarity, they should find ways to gain it.  This means we should hire more people with more real-world experience and encourage those already hired to gain it, not only to assist in producing practice-ready graduates, but in order to improve legal scholarship. And, finally, we should most often write with a conscious view to influencing real-world legal actors.

In short, the move to restructure law schools so their graduates are better prepared to practice presents a fundamental challenge to the existing comfortable world of the tenure-track law professor. I think that is a good thing, one that would make our students and the legal profession a good deal better off. But I imagine others may differ…

Frank Bowman

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Evolving Towards the Law Classroom of Tomorrow

Are the law schools of today preparing new attorneys for the legal profession of tomorrow? The Carnegie Foundation’s Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law provided a strong critique of legal academia, and contended that new attorneys are not taught the practical, real-world skills, that attorneys need. As the report noted, to the extent that professors can “bridge the gap between the analytical and practical knowledge,” new attorneys would be better situated to compete in the marketplace and obtain the ever-so-important first job. A 2010 study by NALP similarly found that “experiential learning opportunities,” “hands-on” or “simulated learning opportunities,” are “instrumental in preparing new associates for the demands of the practice of law.”

Putting aside any disagreements over these studies, most in the academy and in practice would probably agree that there is a gap–of some size–between what is taught in law schools today, and what students today need to work as lawyers.

What about the skills that lawyers will need in the near-future? That, is a tougher question. The legal profession has remained largely the same for some time. Attorneys, as a bunch, are generally resistant to change. Sure, new areas of law come into vogue (e.g., international law), and new tools are introduced to make research easier (e.g., WestLaw Next), but for the most part, the legal profession consists of a lawyer, or group of lawyers, providing a one-off, customized service–such as a brief, memo, will, contract, trust, etc.–to a single client. Law schools aim to prepare students for this manner of work.

The future of the legal profession may look different. Richard Susskind in The End of Lawyers? Rethinking the Nature of Legal Services, augurs an evolution–enabled by advanced technologies, outsourced labor, and weak demand for expensive associates–from a time-consuming, customized labor-intensive legal market to an on-demand, commoditized information-based legal service. Professor Larry Ribstein, co-author of Law’s Information Revolution, similarly writes “that much of law’s future isn’t in how to price one-to-one customized legal services, but in the development of legal information products.” Many legal services that are created today through individualized, customized efforts by toiling associates, will be replaced by information products that can be downloaded on demand, like a commodity. Think of a hybrid of LegalZoom.com, Google,and Facebook: instantly obtain legal services customized to your personal situation with the click of a mouse. To preempt many objections, don’t be so certain your practice of law will be excluded from this automation. This transform no doubt would dramatically change the skills attorneys of the not-so-distant future will need.

To repeat the question I opened with, are the law schools of today preparing new attorneys for the legal profession of tomorrow? In many respects, the law student depicted in Norman Rockwell’s 1927 classic portrait (pictured above, I call him Abe) is not too different from the law student of today. Students are taught (hopefully) basic legal research skills, how to write, how to make oral arguments, how to read cases, and how to “think like a lawyer” (whatever that means). If Susskind, Ribstein, and others are right about the progression of how law is practiced, I ponder whether law students–as well as the Professoriate–will be prepared for the future legal profession. Will the gap between academia and practice grow even further?

So how do we prepare law students for the legal profession of tomorrow? The answer is well beyond the scope of this post, which I provide as food for thought. Though, for starters, banning laptops in the classroom is probably not going in the right direction. I hope to blog about this topic more in the coming month, but for now check out my liveblogged Google Doc article work-in-progress, as well as here, here, here, and generally here.

Crossposted at JoshBlackman.com.