Tagged: jurisprudence

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Journal of Legal Education: Volume 65, # 3, Spring 2016

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From the Editors

By Thomas D. Cobb & Kate O’Neill

Articles

           By Adam Chodorow & Philip Hackney

           By Lynn M. LoPucki

           By Justin McCrary, Joy Milligan, & James Phillips

           By Elaine Campbell

          By John C. Kleefeld & Katelyn Rattray

At the Lectern

           By Beth Hirschfelder Wilensky

Interview

           By Ronald K.L. Collins

Book Reviews

           By Duncan Farthing-Nichol

           By Michael Robertson

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The Tragedy & Lost Legacy of James M. Landis — Book Review by Duncan Farthing-Nichol

The current issue of the Journal of Legal Education has a fascinating book review by Duncan Farthing-Nichol of Justin O’Brien’s The Triumph, Tragedy and Lost Legacy of James M Landis: A Life on Fire (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014, pp. 187, $52.00 (cloth). Here is how the review opens:

Dean James Landis (1889-1964)

Dean James Landis (1889-1964)

In The Triumph, Tragedy and Lost Legacy of James M Landis, Justin O’Brien asks why Harvard Law School has so far neglected to hang its portrait of James M. Landis (11). The library’s walls bow under the weight of history; Harvard’s twentieth-century deans gaze down en masse from the south end. But Landis, dean from 1937 to 1946, is not among them.1 Professor O’Brien traces the omission to Landis’ 1963 conviction for tax avoidance, a crime for which Landis was sentenced to thirty days in jail. The school, according to O’Brien, has let the conviction overshadow Landis’ vital role in shaping law and government. O’Brien reminds readers that Landis wrote and administered the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934—the first serious efforts at federal securities regulation—and, in 1938, developed the most persuasive contemporary theory of government by administrative agency. The University of New South Wales professor also contends that Landis introduced social responsibility to legal education, an achievement that elevated law from a mere technical discipline to a means of seeking justice. Harvard, O’Brien concludes, should hang its Landis portrait.

I agree, but on somewhat different grounds. O’Brien lays a compelling case for Landis’ impact on administrative thought and practice. He moves too quickly, however, in naming Landis a transformative figure in legal education. Landis spoke in ambitious terms: He aimed for a legal education that transcended technique, reflected the rise of public law, and respected the new experts (economists, sociologists, and other specialists). He sought to instill a desire for justice in his students. Yet Landis did relatively little to institutionalize that vision, acting more as a caretaker than a reformer. If Harvard should hang Landis’ portrait, it is for his ideas and his story, rather than his deeds. . . . [read more here]

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Can We Tolerate Tolerance?  

This is the third in a series of occasional short essays about free speech in America. Earlier installments can be found here and here.

We live in a tolerant society. Of course, that is an exaggeration. But when it comes to so many flashpoint issues – ranging from blasphemy to race-hate speech – we are far more tolerant than almost all other nations, so much so that we are routinely criticized for being too tolerant. It is our badge of honor . . . and dishonor.

Professor Mark Lilla

Professor Mark Lilla

Mindful of the events in France and Denmark earlier this year, I wonder: Will we continue to tolerate toleration if our world takes a terrible turn? My question has less to do with what is being tagged as the “terrorist’s veto” than with a more complex problem, and one therefore even more difficult to resolve. This problem occurred to me when I first read an eye-opening essay by Mark Lilla in the New York Review of Books, an essay entitled “France on Fire.” Here is a very brief excerpt:

“For the past quarter-century a political and intellectual culture war over the place of Islam in French society has been bubbling along, and every few years some event — a student wears a burka to school, riots erupt in a poor neighborhood, a mosque is attacked, the National Front wins a local election — renews hostilities.”

I want to extrapolate from that essay (at once insightful and provocative) in order to outline a phenomenon that may be hurling our way, a phenomenon related to toleration and dissident speech.

Before I do, however, let turn to the glorious side of the toleration equation by way of a well-known case, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943). Recall the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ flag-salute case, the one with that liberty-inspiring majority opinion by Justice Robert Jackson. In words that should be fixed in every lawmaker’s consciousness, Jackson declared: “Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.” The judgment in that case affirming First Amendment freedom is all the more amazing given that it was rendered in wartime and involved a religious sect that was then very much hated in various quarters of American society. (See Shawn Francis Peters, Judging Jehovah’s Witnesses: Religious Persecution and the Dawn of the Rights Revolution (2000).)

The (Hypothetical) Problem

Against that backdrop, imagine the following scenario. Assume that the editors of a respectable libertarian magazine elected to publish several satirical cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in order to make a First Amendment point and to take a stand against the “terrorist’s veto.” Assume thereafter that the Charlie Hebdo incident replayed itself in Cincinnati (the headquarters of my hypothetical magazine). Ten people who work for the magazine are murdered and two Muslim extremists take credit. Both of the terrorists are later killed in a shootout with police that also results in the deaths of two local police officers.

Here is where I begin to extrapolate from Professor Lilla’s essay. Now assume the following additional scenarios, replete with a few quotations from the Lilla essay”

  1. The Governor of Ohio calls for a moment of mourning with heads bowed on the day following the tragedy (say, the time is 11:00 a.m.);
  2. A “noticeable number” of Muslim public high school students in Cincinnati refuse, on religious and political grounds, to bow their heads;
  3. “And not only that. Some [tell] their teachers that the victims got what they deserved because no one should be allowed to mock the Prophet”;
  4. “Others celebrate the killers on social media, and circulate rumors that the entire crisis was manufactured by the government and/or Zionist agents”; and
  5. The parents (some of whom work for state and local governments) of some of these Muslim-American students speak openly (though not at work) to defend their children and endorse the positions they took.

Note that the Muslim-Americans in the above scenarios were otherwise peaceful and law abiding. And some Muslim-American leaders sought to counteract the messages of the violent extremists among them. That said, let me stir the pot a bit more with a few more scenarios and related questions:

  1. So far as government entities are involved, how far are we willing to go to accommodate (culturally, statutorily, and constitutionally) the religious views of the more observant and separatist Muslim-Americans who harbor what we would see as extreme views concerning homosexuality, female purity, and Jews and Israel?
  2. Finally, let me again from quote Professor Lilla to raise a final question: Some “students and their parents demand separate swimming hours or refuse to let their children go on school trips where the sexes might mix. . . . There are fathers who won’t shake hands with female teachers, or let their wives speak alone to male teachers. There are cases of children refusing to sing, or dance, or learn an instrument, or draw a face, or use a mathematical symbol that resembles a cross. The question of dress and social mixing has led to the abandonment of gym classes in many places. Children also feel emboldened to refuse to read authors or books that they find religiously unacceptable: Rousseau, Molière, and Madame Bovary. Certain subjects are taboo: evolution, sex ed, the Shoah. As one father told a teacher, ‘I forbid you to mention Jesus to my son.’” Does our commitment to religious freedom extend that far so as to accommodate the genuine religious views of those who hold them?

Let me be clear: I do not mean to demean Muslim-Americans as a class, nor do I wish to be understood as saying the above scenarios mirror the sentiments of most Muslim-Americans . I trust they are not. Then again, I may disagree with some of them, and sometimes vigorously, on several of the issues flagged above. But I also believe in toleration, and the ever-present need to be sensitive to the plight of minorities of all ideological, political, and religious stripes.

So where does that leave us?

Testing Our Tolerance Read More

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What does it mean to vindicate a First Amendment right of free expression?

The following short essay is substituting for this week’s issue of First Amendment News, which will resume next week.

* * * *

In times past if you wanted to get a real sense of the Supreme Court’s record on civil liberties you prepared charts indicating the Justices’ voting record in sustaining a claim of right. Take, for example, C. Herman Pritchett’s The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and Values (1948). In chapter 9 of that book (p. 254, table 23) he calculated the percentage of times each Justice voted “pro” in civil liberties cases. Likewise in Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court (1954), he did something of the same. In chapter 10 of that book (p. 225, table 10), he calculated the percentage of times each Justice voted to “support . . . libertarian claims.” Justices Frank Murphy and Wiley Rutledge were at the top with a 100% record, while Chief Justice Fred Vinson and Justice Stanley Reed were well below at the bottom.

imagesHelpful as such studies were in past times, I wonder about their value in today’s tug-and-pull First Amendment world of free expression cases. Consider, for example, the record of the Roberts Court in the 41 such cases its has decided since 2006. It has upheld a First Amendment claim of right in 17 of 41 cases (in one case, a per curiam, the Court vacated and remanded the matter). That is a 41% record. But is it a 41% record of vindicating such First Amendment rights?

In one sense, the answer is simple: yes. The parties raised a First Amendment claim and a majority of the Court sustained it. End of story. Or is it?

To raise this question is to raise a more puzzling one. What exactly does it mean to vindicate a First Amendment freedom of expression claim? In today’s volatile atmosphere of supercharged liberalism and fortified conservatism, it can mean almost anything depending on which side of the ideological fence one stands. If you have a collective or “democratic” political-theory view of the Amendment — e.g. like that of Justice Stephen Breyer or Dean Robert Post or Professor Burt Neuborne — then that very much informs your constitutional calculus as to whether a First Amendment right has been vindicated or violated. By that collective constitutional measure, the “fairness doctrine” and he “net neutrality” one are formulas for vindicating First Amendment rights. But that view is radically different from, say, an atomistic understanding of the First Amendment like the one championed by Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice Anthony Kennedy, Floyd Abrams, and the Cato Institute.

Perhaps this is a modern-day version of an old debate. Merely consider the thinking displayed by Justice Byron White in his dissent in Gertz v. Welch (1974): “It is not at all inconceivable that virtually unrestrained defamatory remarks about private citizens will discourage them from speaking out and concerning themselves with social problems. This would turn the First Amendment on its head.” Likewise, analyzing the relationship between the First Amendment and copyright law created a sharp division in the Court in Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises (1985) owing to the similar problem of a constitutional guaranty at war with itself. What makes such “constitutional tension unusual, as Professor Eugene Volokh once tagged it in a slightly different context,” is the conflict between opposing views of the First Amendment as to what it means to vindicate that right. After all, the tension here is not between the First Amendment and other rights (such as equal protection or a right to a fair trial), but between the First Amendment and itself.

To return to the free-speech mindsets of Breyer, Post , Neuborne and company, cases such as McCutcheon v. FEC (2014) and Citizens United v. FEC (2010) — both of which sustained rights claims — cannot be listed in the “pro” First Amendment column. Worse still, they are listed as “anti” First Amendment rulings. Much the same could be said of Harris v. Quinn (2014) where the Court divided 5-4 along conservative-liberal lines and struck down a compulsory collection of union fees provision. By the same new liberal norm, a case such as Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar (2015) (denying a claim of right) might be seen as a “pro” First Amendment case.

Phrased another way, one First Amendment “right” is being swapped out for another but in the same case. Of course, this may seem strange because one thinks of rights on one side and the government on the other. And remember: rights runs against the government. So how can there be any swapping since the government does not have rights? — it has only constitutionally authorized powers.

This riddle might be “solved” in two ways: (1) by the government siding with one conception of First Amendment rights (e.g., with labor unions in compulsory support cases), or (2) by a third party entering a suit to assert its own version of a First Amendment right (e.g., invoking an argument in line with Breyer’s dissent in McCutcheon). To be sure, such moves might, among other things, implicate Article III standing issues. There is also the peculiar specter of the government siding with one conception of First Amendment in order to defeat another. In the old world, the government could abridge a First Amendment right, whereas in the new world it “vindicates” a right (depending on which side of the constitutional divide one is on).

In all of this there is more at work than dethroning a once-recognized constitutional right (as in the case of the demise of economic due process). There is, I think, a move to both defeat certain tenets of First Amendment law (e.g., campaign finance) and to erect others (net neutrality). In the case of the latter, the goal is to develop new notions of First Amendment law (e.g., in the compulsory support of unions line of cases and in the fairness doctrine area).

The old paradigm: Liberals demanded the vindication of First Amendment claims while conservatives tendered reasons why societal interests should trump such claims.

The new paradigm: Conservatives demand the vindication of certain First Amendment claims while liberals tender reasons why societal interests should override such claims.

The result: Conflicting norms of First Amendment rights. In this new constitutional environment, the conflict-of-rights dilemma of the Religion Clauses (Establishment vs Free Exercise) is destined to become the rights-in-conflict dilemma of the Free Speech and Press Clauses.

imagesOf course, this remove-and-restructure constitutional mindset is still in its theoretical phase and has yet to garner any formal recognition by a majority of the current Court. But now that this cat is out of its conceptual bag, might it begin to influence the way lawyers litigate free expression First Amendment cases? (Something of that very thing has already occurred, though not in entirely explicit way, in an amicus brief filed on behalf of Norman Dorsen, Aryeh Neier, Burt Neuborne and John Shattuck (“Past leaders” of the ACLU) in the Williams-Yulee case.)

What are we to make of this new way of considering whether a First Amendment right has been upheld or not? How are we to gauge whether our rights are being vindicated or violated? Will First Amendment law begin to change, both jurisprudentially and operationally?

While you ponder such questions, step back and ask yourself one more question: Have we entered some postmodern maze in which we have lost our constitutional bearing . . . or we are struggling to find our way out in the hope of discovering a new one?

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A sequel to this essay appears in the Boston University Law Review Annex symposium and is titled “The Liberal Divide & the Future of Free Speech” (commentary on Danielle Citron’s Hate Crimes in Cyberspace).

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FAN 76.1 (First Amendment News) Chemerinsky & Volokh discuss the Roberts Court & The First Amendment (video posted)

Eugene Volokh, Erwin Chemerinsky & Kelli Sager

Eugene Volokh, Erwin Chemerinsky & Kelli Sager

UPDATE: Access to the video link below is now available to the public.   

It was a remarkable late-afternoon program last month as the First Amendment Salon went on the road for the first time with an event held at the Los Angeles office of Davis Wright Tremaine. There was a live feed to DWT’s offices in New York City and Washington, D.C. Those participating in the Salon (the sixth) were UC Irvine Dean Erwin Chemerinsky and UCLA Law Professor Eugene Volokh with DWT lawyer Kelli Sager moderating the exchange between the two. The Salons are conducted in association with the law firm of Levine Sullivan Koch & Schulz and the Floyd Abrams Institute for Free Expression at Yale Law School. (Chemerinsky and Volokh are on the Salon’s advisory board). Lee Levine introduced the program. The topic of discussion for the 90-minute exchange, replete with questions from the audience, was “The Roberts Court and the First Amendment.”

The video link to the discussion can be found here. (Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski was present and asked a question.)

A list of the topics covered can be found here.

 Again, thanks to the fine folks at Davis Wright Tremaine for hosting the Los Angeles Salon.

NEXT SALON: November 2, 2015: Floyd Abrams and Robert Post will discuss the ramifications of Reed v. Town of Gilbert (2015) with Linda Greenhouse moderating.

EARLIER SALON: “Is the First Amendment Being Misused as a Deregulatory Tool?” — Professors Jack Balkin and Martin Redish with Floyd Abrams moderating. (video here)

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Posner Mania — Two New Books Coming this January: One by Posner, the other on Posner

Can one ever have his or her fill of Richard Posner? Perhaps, perhaps not. However that may be, the maverick jurist will be in the limelight once again by way of two forthcoming books — yet another book by him, and biography about him (the first of its kind).

On New Years day of next year, Oxford University Press will release Richard Posner by William Domnarski. The book is slated to be 336 pages long and will sell for $29.95 in hardcover. Here is the publisher’s blurb on the book:

Unknown“Judge Richard Posner is one of the great legal minds of our age, on par with such generation-defining judges as Holmes, Hand, and Friendly. A judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and the principal exponent of the enormously influential law and economics movement, he writes provocative books as a public intellectual, receives frequent media attention, and has been at the center of some very high-profile legal spats. He is also a member of an increasingly rare breed-judges who write their own opinions rather than delegating the work to clerks-and therefore we have unusually direct access to the workings of his mind and judicial philosophy.”

“Now, for the first time, this fascinating figure receives a full-length biographical treatment. In Richard Posner, William Domnarski examines the life experience, personality, academic career, jurisprudence, and professional relationships of his subject with depth and clarity. Domnarski has had access to Posner himself and to Posner’s extensive archive at the University of Chicago. In addition, Domnarski was able to interview and correspond with more than two hundred people Posner has known, worked with, or gone to school with over the course of his career, from grade school to the present day. The list includes among others members of the Harvard Law Review, colleagues at the University of Chicago, former law clerks over Posner’s more than thirty years on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and even other judges from that court.”

“Richard Posner is a comprehensive and accessible account of a unique judge who, despite never having sat on the Supreme Court, has nevertheless dominated the way law is understood in contemporary America.”

 → See The Promethean Posner – An Interview with the Judge’s Biographer, Concurring Opinions (Dec. 29, 2014)

℘ ℘ ℘

Three days after the release of the Oxford biography, Harvard University Press will release Divergent Paths: The Academy and the Judiciary by Judge Posner.  The 350-page book (he has done some 40 or so of them) will also sell for $29.95 in hardcover. Here is the publisher’s blurb on the book:

Unknown“Judges and legal scholars talk past one another, if they have any conversation at all. Academics couch their criticisms of judicial decisions in theoretical terms, which leads many judges—at the risk of intellectual stagnation—to dismiss most academic discourse as opaque and divorced from reality. In Divergent Paths, Richard Posner turns his attention to this widening gap within the legal profession, reflecting on its causes and consequences and asking what can be done to close or at least narrow it.”

“The shortcomings of academic legal analysis are real, but they cannot disguise the fact that the modern judiciary has several serious deficiencies that academic research and teaching could help to solve or alleviate. In U.S. federal courts, which is the focus of Posner’s analysis of the judicial path, judges confront ever more difficult cases, many involving complex and arcane scientific and technological distinctions, yet continue to be wedded to legal traditions sometimes centuries old. Posner asks how legal education can be made less theory-driven and more compatible with the present and future demands of judging and lawyering.”

“Law schools, he points out, have great potential to promote much-needed improvements in the judiciary, but doing so will require significant changes in curriculum, hiring policy, and methods of educating future judges. If law schools start to focus more on practical problems facing the American legal system rather than debating its theoretical failures, the gulf separating the academy and the judiciary will narrow.”

℘ ℘ ℘

  For more on Posner, see The Complete Posner on Posner SeriesConcurring Opinions (12 postings, Nov. 24, 2014 – Jan. 5, 2015)

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Grant Gilmore’s Resurrection . . . with a little help from Philip Bobbitt

 Grant was a magician in an age of bureaucrats. — Anthony Kronman (1982)

Grant Gilmore

Grant Gilmore

The Ages of American Law has been reissued with a new foreword and a new final chapter by Columbia Law School Professor Philip Bobbitt. More about that soon, but first a few words about the man recently reincarnated.

Grant Gilmore died on May 24, 1982 — the same date of Benjamin Cardozo’s birth (May 24, 1870). G.G. died in his sleep; he was 72.

Gilmore was a Yale man (AB, 1931, PhD, 1936 & L.L.B, 1942) bred in the Boston suburbs. He began his academic career teaching French at Yale, but he tired of it and so ventured into law. He taught at Yale Law School, University of Chicago Law School, the College of Law (now Moritz College of Law) at Ohio State University, and finally at Vermont Law School. His books included:

Though he was picked by the executors of the Oliver Wendell Holmes papers to do the definite biography of Justice Holmes (very strange!), it never came to pass. And he never published his PhD dissertation — Stephane Mallarme: A Biography and Interpretation (1936). By way of an interesting aside: In 1959 Professor Arthur Corbin privately recommended Gilmore to serve as an advisor for the drafting of The Restatement (2nd) of Contracts (also strange). As fate had it, that, too, never came to pass and Gilmore never became a “restater.”

By the time he died, the complex and cantankerous Gilmore had made his mark on the law, and a notable though peculiar mark it was. For all his fame and infamy, no gravestone marked his memory. His scattered ashes were his final consideration, illusory as that may seem.

Ironically, this bold and blazing scholar left his papers to the Harvard Law School — the same institution that held firmly to the conviction that “inspiration should be distrusted,” or so Gilmore put it in 1963, albeit with a critical cutting edge.

∇ ∇ ∇

Philip Bobbitt

Philip Bobbitt

And now, like the Phoenix of old, he returns to find new life. Or at least that part of him arising from The Ages of American Lawwhich has just been republished in Kindle form. Here, as Professor Bobbitt recounts it, is how it came to pass: “In late 2011, I was approached by an editor at Yale University Press, who was considering a revised edition of Grant Gilmore’s classic, The Ages of American Law. I responded that I would be pleased if the Press would publish, as a Foreword to such an edition, my 1975 essay in the Yale Law Journal introducing one of Gilmore’s lectures, ‘The Age of Anxiety,’ which he reworked to form Chapter 4 of the book. After reading that essay,” adds Bobbitt, “the editor proposed that it be published as a ‘historical document with a preface to provide context’ and that I should also draft a new section bringing it up to date, as apparently some readers wished in the classes in which the book is taught.”

41seNslJYSL._BO2,204,203,200_PIsitb-sticker-v3-big,TopRight,0,-55_SX278_SY278_PIkin4,BottomRight,1,22_AA300_SH20_OU01_That is how Bobbitt’s fascinating foreword begins. But there is much more, about Robert Cover, the famed Storrs Lectures (Oct. 1974), and young Philip Bobbitt’s role in it all. (Gilmore thanked Bobbitt in the acknowledgements to Ages. It was, after all, Bobbitt who had drafted the “Editors’ Introduction” to Gilmore’s “The Age of Anxiety” essay published in 1975 in the Yale Law Journal).

Bonus: There is a new 50-age chapter (#6) added to Ages: it is by Bobbitt and is titled “The Age of Consent,” which first appeared last year in the Yale Law Journal.

* * * *

 Book Review of The Ages of American Law, Mark Tushnet, American Journal of Legal History (1977).

→ Ellen A. Peters, “Grant Gilmore and the Illusion of Certainty,” Yale Law Journal (1982)

Posner
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The Complete Posner on Posner Series

The Posner on Posner series began on November 24, 2014 and ended with the Afterword on January 5, 2015. Below is a hyperlinked list of all the posts.

 Table of Contents

  1. The Maverick – A Biographical Sketch of Judge Richard Posner: Part I
  1. The Maverick – A Biographical Sketch of Judge Richard Posner: Part II, The Will to Greatness
  1. The Man Behind the Robes — A Q & A with Richard Posner
  1. The Judge & Company – Questions for Judge Posner from Judges, Law Professors & a Journalist
  1. On Legal Education & Legal Scholarship — More questions for Judge Posner
  1. On Free Expression & the First Amendment — More questions for Judge Posner
  1. On Privacy, Free Speech, & Related Matters – Richard Posner vs David Cole & Others
  1. On Judicial Reputation: More questions for Judge Posner
  1. Posner on Same-Sex Marriage – Then & Now
  1. Posner on Case Workloads & Making Judges Work Harder
  1. The Promethean Posner – An Interview with the Judge’s Biographer
  1. Afterword: Posner at 75 – “It’s My Job”

→ Forthcoming: Richard Posner (Oxford University Press, Spring, 2015) by William Domnarski.

Posner
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Afterword: Posner at 75 – “It’s My Job”

Take him for all and all. William Shakespeare (circa 1600)

I live on my own credit. Friedrich Nietzsche (1888)

I believe in cremation. No tombstone for me. – Richard Posner (2013)

This is twelfth and final installment in the Posner on Posner series. (Note: some of the hyperlinks below may open in Firefox or Chrome but not in Safari.)

His temperament: largely solitary and characteristically confident. His manner: often distant and frequently detached. His character: habitually unconventional. He seems indifferent to creeds and causes. And he can be steel-like — cold, calculating, and controlling. Then again, catch him at the right part of the day, at the right tick of  the clock, and with the right circle of people and he can be witty and lively in his own unique way.

In all of these respects and others, one soon enough senses the obvious: Richard Posner is different. Nothing pejorative here, just descriptive. Besides, it has been a feature of his persona for so long as to have become his trademark. While there have been a few modifications of his views over the decades, the man himself has remained basically the same, though he may (?) have mellowed a bit. That said, Posner is ever the maverick; that is his calling card to the world.

The more we learn of him, the more he defies the norm of how most people think about most judges. Though we already know much about the public work of this jurist, there is still much to learn about the man himself — his inner thoughts, his private communications, and his personal traits. The biographical story is, after all, the most revealing of all stories.

The Boxer

Richard Posner turned 75 earlier this year (on January 11th – the same date of William James’ birth). The New York born jurist is in good health and exercises regularly: “A great deal,” he told me. “It’s my principal non-working activity.” When not reading or writing, he expends his energy on an elliptical trainer and does balance exercises. “I have an elliptical trainer at home and also do a lot of walking outside,” he adds. He takes heart-pumping walks inside, too, and is known for climbing “the stairs to his office on the 27th floor of the Everett M. Dirksen Federal Building in Chicago.”

UnknownTo look at his fit frame one might guess that he exercises. And like all else in his life – be it mental or physical – Posner takes such matters seriously. “I have a personal trainer twice a week. He puts me through all sorts of strenuous exercises, including push-ups and pull-ups.” And then there is “boxing with a sixty-pound hanging leather punching bag (not a live person).”

Though he dislikes professional boxing, he sure loves to box . . . with a boxing bag, that is. He pounds away with his Everlast gloves landing blow after body blow at this stuffed specimen of a man. It is all part of his private workout regimen in the basement of his trainer’s quarters. “I had [a punching bag] of my own,” he says, “but I had to give it away because it upset the cat [the famed Pixie]. The bag was suspended from a steel frame that, because of the unevenness of the floor in the only room in which the contraption fit, rattled disconcertingly.” So he took his pounding elsewhere. And why this form of exercise? “My doctor says that boxing is excellent exercise,” he adds.

The boxing image fits – well, sort of. On the one hand, Richard Posner is a natural born boxer given all the cerebral bouts he has been in over the years – and he still returns to that ring time and again like a resilient Rocky Balboa. On the other hand, Richard Posner is too brainy / too soft mannered / and too genteel to engage in the real sport. Besides, he’s too pragmatic to like such a brutal sport: “I worry about brain damage to professional boxers,” he tells me.

Mix his cerebral and physical sides and what do you have? Quite simply, a man who likes to punch but doesn’t like boxing; a man who savors the sport of dialogic give-and-take but disdains the mano a mano reality of the ring; and a man who, at 75, is determined to remain mentally and physically fit, if only to force the Grim Reaper to go several extra rounds.

Holmes & Posner: Similar Yet Very Different

Justice Holmes

Justice Holmes

Sometimes comparisons are made between Oliver Wendell Holmes and Richard Posner. And Holmes is the jurist Posner most respects – that “most illustrious figure in the history of American law” is how he described him in the book Posner edited of the great Justice’s works. However true such comparisons might be, it is useful to consider how the two jurists were situated at the same points in their lives. To do that, one must turn the biographical clocks back and then forward.

* * * *

1916 was a good year, a very good one for Justice Holmes. That said, he penned no great opinions or scholarly works and gave no significant speeches that year. And yet it was a memorable year. Why? Because that was the year that Holmes turned 75 on March 8th. Four events occurred that year that made it a special one in the jurist’s life.

First, there was the small dinner party that his wife Fanny had arranged. It was a modest affair: a few friends (all accomplished men), some good food and drink, and birthday well wishes to cap it all off. As the guests left, the tall and tired jurist headed towards his library when he suddenly heard strange sounds – the sounds of birds, many of them. What could it be? He went downstairs to find out. Much to his surprise, and there beyond the parlor, was young group of admirers tooting away with bird callers in his birthday honor. All Fanny’s doing, of course. There was “much laughter and jaw,” recalled Holmes, “until after midnight.” One of celebrants went so far as to write “some very pretty verses,” which touched the white-haired Justice. By the time the parting hour arrived, Holmes was quite content: “Altogether it was very charming.”

UnknownSecond, there was the Harvard Law Review festschrift (29 Harv. L. Rev. 565) that Felix Frankfurter had organized. Now OWH was being publicly honored, and in print. And what an esteemed group of men: Professors Felix Frankfurter and Frederick Pollock, Deans Roscoe Pound and John Henry Wigmore, Judge Learned Hand, and Morris Cohen, the philosopher. Writing to Frankfurter in April of 1916, Holmes expressed his appreciation: “Very few things in life have given me such pleasure.”

Third, in June of 1916 the Senate confirmed Louis Brandeis. Once confirmed, Holmes opined that Brandeis “will make a good judge.” And so he sent him a very short telegram: “WELCOME.” It was the beginning of a judicial friendship that would help buttress Holmes’ fame . . . even at 75.

And finally, that was the year that Holmes met Harold Laski, a young British political theorist who would also have a hand in shaping the future of Holmes’ thought.

Of course, Holmes lived another 15 years, during which time he solidified his reputation and further secured his position in the gallery of great jurists. In the years following his 1916 birthday, Holmes wrote memorable opinions (majority and separate) in cases such as: Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918), Schenck v. United States (1919), Abrams v. United States (1919), Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States (1920), Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923), Gitlow v. New York (1925), United States v. Schwimmer (1929), and Baldwin v. Missouri (1930).

* * * *

Holmes savored the shared life; Posner bears it. Holmes socialized, Posner exercises. As for birthday celebrations and the like, RP has no time and little patience for such flattery: “I don’t like celebrations or parties” he says with icy certitude. At 75, there were no festschrifts for Posner (though an issue of the University of Chicago Law Review commemorated his 25 years on the bench – notably, the issue contained several critical essays). And no Louis Brandeis or Harold Laski is likely to influence his cerebral course (though in earlier years he had Aaron Director, George Stigler, and Gary Becker, who all helped to shape his thoughts). And so, when his life clock turned 75, it came and went sans any surprises . . . and that’s the way he likes it.

Screen Shot 2015-01-02 at 10.57.57 AMBy three score and fifteen, Posner, like Holmes, has accomplished much. Notably, he has written more (far more) than the famed jurist, and Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law may well have as much influence and staying power as Holmes’s The Common Law. And in his finer opinions, Posner displays “a fierce intellectual curiosity, a genuine engagement with ideas, an eagerness to cut through the legal babble to get to the core of the issue,” says Professor Geoffrey Stone, “and an evident delight in occasionally reaching results that startle admirers and critics alike” — all exceptional traits for a sitting federal appellate judge.

While Judge Posner has no single opinion that is likely to be as memorable as Holmes’s Lochner dissent (he is, after all, a circuit judge, not a Justice), the cumulative impact of Posner’s many writings (both on and off the bench) has certainly left a significant imprint on American law. Even so, the question remains: Will he prove to be like Holmes and further solidify his fame, or has he already reached the pinnacle of his career in law and letters?

Methodology Matters

Judicial greatness is often in the eye of the beholder. Many of the standards adopted for determining the greatness of a judge are designed to ensure the selection of particular judges or to favor judges who reach certain substantive outcomes. For example, in suggesting creativity, intelligence, and frequency of citation as plausible yardsticks for measuring judicial greatness, Judge Richard Posner has largely settled on standards that reflect best on himself. — Michael J. Gerhardt (1995) 

Though he cares not about reputation or greatness when it comes to his own record (or so he likes to say), he does like to fish in such waters – only witness his book Cardozo: A Study in Reputation (1990) and his 1994 Yale Law Journal review essay of Gerald Gunther’s biography of Learned Hand (the review is titled “The Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial Greatness”). In both works Posner went to great lengths to formulate criteria for measuring judicial reputation and/or greatness. Though it is hard to imagine that the idea did not occur to him, Professor Gerhardt’s point is surely true – Posner does rather well by Posnerian criteria. (See Ronald Collins & David O’Brien, “Gauging Reputations, National Law Journal, pp. 13-14, April 1, 1991.)

Whatever the methodology of measuring judicial greatness, the sheer volume and diversity of the Posner corpus of writings render the evaluative biographical task rather daunting. It is a brute biographical fact: The Posnerian tentacles are too numerous and reach too far for any single work by a lone biographer to grapple with authoritatively. To further the biographical process along, some exacting scholarly work would have to be done by several experts who could evaluate Posner’s take on a given field of the law (see e.g. here). Those areas would include:

  • administrative law
  • animal rights (see here & here for RP’s views)
  • antitrust
  • arbitration
  • bankruptcy
  • civil procedure
  • constitutional law
  • contracts
  • corporate law
  • criminal procedure
  • federal courts
  • habeas corpus
  • insurance
  • intellectual property
  • jurisprudence
  • labor law
  • prisoners’ rights
  • securities law
  • taxation
  • telecommunications law, and
  • women’s rights

By the same measure, there would also need to be experts in economics and various areas of the humanities. Posner’s writing style would have to be studied as well (on this count Mr. Domnarski has already done much, and ably so, and will do more in his forthcoming biography of the Judge). Then there is Posner’s view of judging.

Judges are not umpires, calling balls and strikes.Richard Posner (1995)

My job is to call balls and strikesJohn Roberts (2005)

Additionally, there would have to be some allowance for a probing study the man himself — the persona of Richard Posner. After all that, someone would have to step back and compile a comprehensive overview in order to put things in full biographical perspective. (Such a work might be along the lines of one of the books in the Cambridge Companion series.)

And yet more is needed: If it were to be rigorously true to its subject, any intellectual-biographical portrait of Richard Posner would include, but could not be limited to, some tabulation of how other courts and scholars have referenced him – not just the number, but also the nature of the citations. Beyond the citation count, there is this question: If one were to map out the effects, if any, of Posnerian thinking over time, what would they show? Not just the economic effects, but also the jurisprudential, political, social, psychological, environmental, and human (as in humane) effects? If his reputational footprint were to prove as immense as his publication record, what would what future generations think of a Posnerian social order?

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Posner on Same-Sex Marriage: Then and Now

. . .  I disagree with contentions that the Constitution should be interpreted to require state recognition of homosexual marriage on the ground that it is a violation of equal protection of the laws to discriminate against homosexuals by denying them that right. Given civil unions, and contractual substitutes for marriage even short of civil unions, the discrimination involved in denying the right of homosexual marriage seems to me too slight (though I would not call it trivial) to warrant the courts in bucking strong public opinion . . . . — Richard Posner (2005)

At various points [in oral arguments in the same-sex cases], Judge Posner derided arguments from the Wisconsin and Indiana lawyers as “pathetic,” “ridiculous,” and “absurd.” — David Lat (2014)

This is the ninth installment in the “Posner on Posner” series of posts on Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner. The first installment can be found here, the second here, the third here, the fourth here, the fifth here, the sixth here, the seventh here, and the eighth one here.

Following the fourth installment in the Posner on Posner series of posts, someone commented on a point Judge Posner made in response to a question posed to him by Professor Kathryn Watts. That comment is set out below. Following it are excerpts from Judge Posner’s 1997 Michigan Law Review essay critiquing Professor William Eskridge’s The Case for Same-Sex Marriage: From Sexual Liberty to Civilized Commitment (1996). Accompanying them are some excerpts from Judge Posner’s opinion Baskin v. Bogan (7th Cir., Sept. 4, 2104, cert. denied and cert denied sub nom., 135 S. Ct. 316) in which he struck down two state laws banning same-sex marriage.

judgeposner_2010All of this is offered up duly mindful what Judge Posner said in a July of 2014 interview: “I’ve changed my views a lot over the years. I’m much less reactionary than I used to be. I was opposed to homosexual marriage in my book Sex and Reason (1992) [see here re those arguments], which was still the dark ages regarding public opinion of homosexuality. Public opinion changed radically in the years since. My views have changed about a lot of things.”

Of course, those comments from his 2014 interview with Joel Cohen were rendered before the Baskin case came before his court. Since the same-sex marriage cases are not  before the Supreme Court for review, I did not ask the Judge to comment on the matter.

That said, I begin with the online commentators remarks and will thereafter proceed to offer some excerpts:

  1. from Posner’s Sex and Reason (S&R)
  2. his Michigan Law Review essay (MLR)
  3. his Baskin opinion (BB), and
  4. some excerpts from the petition (CP) filed by the Attorney General of Indiana in Baskin since it references Judge Posner’s Michigan Law Review Essay and does so in support of its arguments for reversing the Seventh Circuit’s ruling.

Before offering any excerpts, however, I offer a historical sketch of the legal context in which Judge Posner found himself when he first wrote his book and law review essay and thereafter when he wrote his Baskin opinion.  

(Note: Some of the links below will open in Firefox and Chrome but not in Safari.)

Praise for Posner: On Judges Educating the Public

LGBT (12-3-14)Judge Posner, I am thinking you will probably read comments so I am taking this opportunity to reach out to you and sincerely thank you for your decision on the Wisconsin & Indiana cases on Gay Marriage. Your ruling was a Tour de Force (!) that got quoted & re-quoted all over the gay blogosphere. The lawyers and other Judges will remember other things you did, but the PUBLIC will remember your decision in the Gay Marriage cases. This will be the opinion that will be cited in the History books. And what was REALLY GREAT is how fast you turned it around. It was oral arguments, then BAM! . . .”

“How wrong you are when you say in your interview, ‘it’s unrealistic for judges to try to educate the general public. I don’t think the general public is interested in anything about judicial opinions except who won the case.’ Not in the Gay Marriage cases; the interest is not simply that we won, but WHY we won. Your words have been copied and pasted all over the gay blogosphere. I know that there is one gay website that gets 30 million hits a year, just that one site. Trust me your opinion was read by millions. It wasn’t simply who won, but WHY the gays won. It was validation to them, they read it and felt validated. You told them they were Equal, and that raised a lot of emotions. Tears were shed, a lot of them. People were commenting how they were reading your opinion and crying, it was very emotional for many, many people. Your opinion will most certainly go down in the history books on the history of the Gay Rights Movement. And I thank you deeply for it.”

______________________

The Historical Backdrop

UnknownTurn the clock back to 1992, the time when then Judge Posner published Sex and Reason. That was before the Hawaii Supreme Court’s seminal ruling in Baehr v. Lewin (1993) in which it ruled that denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated the equality of rights provision of the state constitution unless the state could demonstrate a compelling interest for such discrimination. And the year before Posner published his Michigan Law Review essay (when Eskridge taught at Georgetown), President Bill Clinton signed the Defense of Marriage Act into law. Recall, that law permitted the states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages and remained on the books until Section 3 of the Act was declared unconstitutional by a 5-4 margin in United States v. Windsor. In 1999 Vermont Supreme Court took the lead in ordering the state legislature to establish laws permitting same-sex marriages (Baker v. Vermont was the case). In 2000 the Vermont legislature enacted just such a law, making Vermont the first state in the Union to recognize same-sex marriages.

 As for guidance from the Supreme Court, recall that Romer v. Evans (a rather confusing opinion by a divided Court) was handed down in 1996 and Lawrence v. Texas in 2003.

Different Domains: Scholarly Opinions vs Judicial Opinions 

If pursued with characteristic Posnerian relentlessness, [several of his] premises [in Sex and Reason] could yield radically pro-gay policies. But Posner does not press his analysis and, instead, neglects his stated first principles. His treatment of gaylegal issues tends to collapse into well-meaning ad hoc-ness.

[R]epealing sodomy laws and outlawing overt discrimination against bisexuals, gay men, and lesbians are easy cases for a rationalist, libertarian analysis. But a tough-minded cost-benefit analysis [such as the one Posner employs] would not stop with the easiest cases. Recognizing the same constitutional right to privacy for same-sex intimacy as is accorded different-sex intimacy, ending the military’s exclusion of bisexuals, gay men, and lesbians, and requiring states to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples are conclusions that are scarcely less compelling under Posner’s first principles. Yet Posner himself rejects or avoids these latter conclusions. And he does not even discuss other issues of profound importance to lesbian, gay, and bisexual communities.                        – William Eskridge (1992)

Professor William Eskridge

Professor William Eskridge

One does not have to defend Richard Posner’s early views on same-sex marriage to concede the obvious: it was a different legal world. Still, a new legal order was emerging as evidenced by two noteworthy pieces by Professor William Eskridge: First, his 1992 Yale Law Journal review essay of Sex and Reason, and second, his 1993 Virginia Law Review article, “A History of Same-Sex Marriage.” And then there was Professor Robin West’s critical 1993 Georgetown Law Journal review essay on Sex and Reason.

 Richard Posner, an intermediate appellate judge, was not then a part of that emerging order. As a jurist he yielded, so he asserted, to the dictates of judicial modesty. While such dictates understandably restricted the direction of his judicial opinions, they need not have dictated the direction of his scholarly opinions in which he often demonstrated a unique cerebral bravado and a willingness to be a maverick in forging creative arguments. Moreover, in his capacity as a public intellectual and legal scholar, Posner was quite outspoken in refuting the critics of his work. See, e.g., his “The Radical Feminist Critique of Sex and Reason” (1993) article. In all of this, it is important to note that Posner nonetheless: (1) favored decriminalizing homosexual sex; (2) endorsed contracts of cohabitation for same-sex couples; and (3) was fine with legislative enactments legalizing same-sex marriage.

Thus, prior to the oral arguments in Baskin v. Bogan and the opinion in that case, what Posner had written in Sex and Reason and in his Michigan Law Review essay gave a meaningful degree of legal legitimacy to the campaign to oppose same-sex marriage. As late as 2004, Posner’s arguments were reproduced in a collection of essays (edited by Andrew Sullivan and first published in 1997) on same sex-marriage. And then there is his 2005 statement quoted at the outset of this post. It took nearly 17 years after the Michigan Law Review essay was published before Judge Posner expressed any significantly different views, first in a 2014 interview and then in a 2014 judicial opinion. Why so long?

A pragmatic reformer is concerned with what works and therefore cannot ignore public opinion or political realities just because the things he wants to change are not rooted in nature but instead are “mere” constructs. — Richard Posner (1995)

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