Tagged: First Amendment law

stairway-to-heaven-1319562-m-720x340
1

FAN 119 (First Amendment News) — Snapshots of David Cole, the ACLU’s New National Legal Director

Professor David Cole

Professor David Cole

Now that Professor David Cole has been named the new national legal director for the American Civil Liberties Union, I plan to do several posts on him and some of his views on the First Amendment.

As some may know, David Cole was the main author of the briefs in two landmark flag-burning cases:  Texas v. Johnson (1989); and United States v. Eichman (1990). William Kunstler, who argued both cases, commented that as the author of those briefs Cole was “the intellectual architect of the courtroom victories.” (See also Collins & Chaltain, We Must not be Afraid to be Free.)

David Cole likewise argued Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (1999) (First Amendment challenge to the selective enforcement of the immigration law against Palestinian immigrants based upon their political associations and activities). National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley (1998) was another First Amendment case Professor Cole argued (First Amendment challenge to NEA’s politically-based denial of federal funding to four performance artists whose works address issues of sexuality, and to the 1990 statutory provision requiring NEA grants to made “taking into consideration general standards of decency.”) He also served on the Advisory Board of The Free Expression Policy Project.

His most recent book, Engines of Liberty: The Power of Citizen Activists to Make Constitutional Law (2016) (see also his remarks at Politics & Prose Bookstore, April 2016) (YouTube)

* * * * 

For now, let us turn to Professor Cole’s arguments to the Court in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (2010), the “material support” to terrorist organizations case.  Below are some selected excerpts from the oral arguments in that case:

Core political speech

Mr. Cole: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This as-applied challenge asks whether the government can make it a crime for Ralph Fertig and the Humanitarian Law Project to speak in association with the Kurdistan Workers Party.

Specifically, they seek to advocate for legal reform in Congress and the UN, to write and distribute articles supportive of Kurdish rights, to inform the Kurds of their international human rights and remedies, and to advise them on peaceful conflict resolution.

It is undisputed that the Kurdistan Workers Party engages in a wide range of lawful activities and that plaintiffs seek to support only lawful ends.

The government has a concededly compelling interest in combatting terrorism, yet it has not even tried to defend these prohibitions under strict scrutiny.

Instead, it rests its entire case on the proposition that criminalizing plaintiffs’ speech is a regulation of conduct, not speech, and therefore can be upheld under O’Brien. . . .

Justice Stevens: But, Mr. Cole, don’t you agree that some of the speech could be regulated?

Mr. Cole: –Some of my clients’ speech?

Justice Stevens: Some of the speech of your client.

Mr. Cole: I don’t think — I don’t think any of it could be prohibited, Your Honor, unless the government can satisfy the stringent scrutiny that this Court applies when Congress seeks to prohibit pure speech. . . .

Justice Stevens: You think all of the speech at issue is protected?

Mr. Cole: –I think that certainly all of the speech that I’ve just identified, which is the core–

 . . . . It’s core — and I think the reason, Your Honor, is it is core political speech on issues of public concern.

It is advocating only lawful, peaceable activities.

This Court has never upheld the criminal prohibition of lawful speech on issues of public concern.

“Money is different”

Justice Kennedy: Well, could the government, I assume — I assume you will say NGO or other organization or person from giving tsunami aid to one of these organizations, from giving them money?

Mr. Cole: I think money is different, Your Honor.

Justice Kennedy: Could they — could the government prohibit that?

Mr. Cole: I think money is different because it’s  . . . conduct, not speech.

Make Distinctions: Aid, support & membership

Justice Scalia: Any assistance you provide to these organizations cannot be separated from assistance to their terrorist activities.

Mr. Cole: Well, Your Honor, that is precisely the argument that the United States made to this Court in Scales.

And here I’m quoting from the government’s brief:

“Active membership can be proscribed even though the activity be expended along lines not otherwise illegal, since active support of any kind aids the organization in achieving its own illegal purposes. “

That was with respect to an organization that Congress spent 10 years studying, made findings that it was an international conspiracy directed and controlled by the Soviet Union with the aim of overthrowing the United States by force and violence, using terrorism.

And, nonetheless, this Court in Scales held you’ve got to distinguish between that aid and support and membership which is furthering the lawful activities and that which is furthering the illegal activities; otherwise you are penalizing the exercise of lawful speech.

The Court said the same thing in De Jonge.

Justice Ginsburg: Mr. Cole, as I remember, Scales upheld a conviction, wasn’t–

Mr. Cole: It did, Justice Ginsburg, but only because it interpreted the statute to be — to be limited to specific . . . members — active membership that is specifically intended to further the illegal ends of the group, precisely–

. . . .

Speech Tantamount to Material Support

Justice Kennedy: Suppose the speech is tantamount to material support in that it legitimizes, encourages, or strengthens the organization.

Mr. Cole: Well, two things in response to that, Justice Kennedy.First, that is what the United States argued in Scales. And, again, the Court, not only in Scales but in a host of cases striking down Communist Party statute, said you have to distinguish between aid that’s intended to further lawful activity and aid that’s intended to further illegal activity when it’s in the form of protected activity — association, here speech and association.

And, secondly–

Justice Stevens: In those cases, the real question was whether membership was enough, wasn’t it?

Mr. Cole: Active membership . . .  which the government says constitutes more than mere nominal membership.

Justice Kennedy: And this is support. It’s different.

Mr. Cole: Well, Your Honor, in De Jonge, one of these cases, one of this Court’s first First Amendment cases, the government argued that Mr. De Jonge aided the Communist Party in its illegal ends by conducting a meeting for them and being their lead speaker at the meeting.

And this Court said: We’ve got to look at what he did, and what — yes, he conducted the meeting; yes, he was a member of the Communist Party; yes, he solicited people to join the Communist Party.

But what did he do? He advocated lawful peaceable activities.

Justice Kennedy: But there wasn’t a statute on the books that prohibited material support–

Mr. Cole: Well, I don’t think it would–

Justice Kennedy: And here there is, and this is in aid of that prohibition.

Mr. Cole: Right, but Your Honor, what would — if Congress came along after the Communist Party cases and said, okay, you’ve said we can’t make it a crime to criminalize membership in the Communist Party; we are now going to make it a crime to speak in conjunction with the Communist Party — do you think the decisions would have come out any differently?I don’t think so, because this Court has said that speech is different from money, that it–

Justice Scalia: I think it’s very unrealistic to compare these terrorist organizations with the Communist Party. Those cases involved philosophy. The Communist Party was — was — was more than a — than an organization that — that had some unlawful ends. It was also a philosophy of — of — of extreme socialism.And — and many people subscribed to that philosophy. I don’t think that Hamas or any of these terrorist organizations represent such a philosophical organization.

Mr. Cole: Your Honor, this Court accepted Congress’s findings.Congress’s findings were not that this was a philosophical debating society, but that it was an international criminal conspiracy directed by our enemy to overthrow us through terrorism. . . .

Justice Scalia: They joined it for philosophical reasons. These terrorist organizations have very practical objectives. And the only reason for joining them or assisting them is to assist those practical objectives.

Mr. Cole: Well, I don’t think that’s — I don’t think that’s fair, Justice Scalia. The Humanitarian Law Project has no interest in furthering terrorism, but the Kurdistan Workers Party are the principal representatives of the — of the Kurds in Turkey. They do have an interest in protecting the rights of the Kurds. They do have an interest in encouraging the Kurdistan Workers Party to — to disavow violence and engage in lawful peaceful means of resolving their disputes . . . .

*  * Additional Materials  * * 

David Cole on the ‘Material Support’ Law and the Constitution, American Constitution Society, November 30, 2010 (YouTube)

David Cole, “The First Amendment’s Borders: The Place of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project in First Amendment Doctrine,” 6 Harv. L. & Pol. Rev. 147 (2012)

James Bamford, David Cole & Margaret Russell — PATRIOT Acts I & II: New Assault on Liberty?, The Independent Institute, November 2003 (YouTube)

Ron Rotunda: “The ABA Overrules the First Amendment” Read More

0

Lenny Bruce – 50 Years Later: Still Funny & “Unsafe”

Warning: The man of whom you are about to read once offended many, and his words continue to do so today.  

Lenny Bruce died for our sins.

FileLenny-bruce-on-stage.jpgOkay, it’s just a joke.

Still, the uninhibited comedian’s legacy did have its redemptive side. After he died, fifty years ago today, no comedian was ever again prosecuted for word crimes uttered in a comedy club. By that cultural measure, Lenny Bruce became the patron saint of standup comedians who freely mock those who trade in hypocrisy.

Before there was Larry David, Penn Jillette, Margaret Cho, Lisa Lampanelli, Chris Rock, or George Carlin, there was Lenny Bruce. He was the quintessential take-no-prisoners comedian. His comedic fare was robust; his style avant-garde; his method crude-blue; and his message upset some and delighted others. Did he shock? – yes. Did he offend? – yes. And was he funny? – yes, outrageously so, at least at his best moments. It’s all in a new documentary titled Can We Take a Joke?

Taboo: That was his off-limits destination. En route he tore into hypocrisy with buzz-saw vigor. No matter the subject – race, religion, politics, or sex – Bruce gave no dime to the Sunday-pious crowd. But when one deals in the forbidden, when one mocks the righteous, and when one does so with razor-cutting humor, there are consequences.

Such as?

Lenny Bruce was prosecuted for obscenity in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York for his comedy club bits. At great professional and financial cost, he was nonetheless exonerated in all of the cases except the one in New York. By the time the New York club owner (Bruce’s co-defendant) successfully appealed his conviction, Lenny was dead (broke, and with a needle spiked in his arm). He died a convicted comedian – the last one in our history.

(ht: Chuck Harter]

(ht: Chuck Harter]

December 23, 2003. On that day New York Governor George Pataki posthumously pardoned Lenny Bruce. “Freedom of speech,” he declared, “is one of the greatest American liberties, and I hope this pardon serves as a reminder of the precious freedoms we are fighting to preserve as we continue to wage the war on terror.”

The people who must never have power are the humorless. — Christopher Hitchins

Have we remembered that “reminder”? Yes, and no.

On the one hand, we now enjoy an almost unprecedented degree of free-speech freedom. It is our American badge of liberty — that willingness to tolerate that with which we disagree. On the other hand, anything deemed offensive is today banned on many college campuses. The trend is to create “safe zones” where students are protected from ideas or words that might upset them.

At Clemson University, unwelcome “verbal . . . conduct of a sexual nature” constitutes “sexual harassment.” This definition includes a vast amount of protected speech such as a joke or comment that any student subjectively finds to be offensive.

At Clark University, its Code of Student Conduct prohibits “telling jokes based on a stereotype.” Of course, that is something Lenny Bruce often did in order to combat the kind of prejudice lurking behind offensive stereotyping.

Grinnell College bans “bias-motivated incidents,” which include “an expression of hostility against a person, group, or property thereof because of such person’s (or group’s) . . . religion . . .” By that measure, Bruce’s irreverent “Religions Incorporated” and “Christ and Moses” routines could be banned at Grinnell.

Florida State University’s “A Summons to Responsible Freedom” defines “Sexual Misconduct” to include “unwanted [or] unwelcome . . . sexual or gender-based . . . comments.” By that punitive gauge there is much in Bruce’s How to Talk Dirty and Influence People (1992, reissued 2016) that would catch the censorial eye.

And then there is the capper: Northeastern University’s acceptable use policy, which prohibits the electronic transmission of any material “which in the sole judgment of the University is offensive.” Lenny Bruce’s prosecutors used much the same subjective yardstick to indict him. If “Saint Lenny” were alive, he would have a devil of a time ripping into campus such speech codes, the ones that cabin the mind in solitary confinement.

When Bruce was posthumously pardoned, the comedian Tom Smothers said: “So many of us today owe so much to Lenny Bruce.” Indeed. Regrettably, it is a debt still owed on far too many campuses across this land. No joke!

0

Looking Back: Lenny Bruce’s Obscenity Prosecutors & First Amendment Defense Lawyers

Ephraim London

Ephraim London (NY defense lawyer) (credit: Getty Images)

Al Bendich (SF lawyer) (credit: NYT)

Harry Kalven, Jr. (IL appellate counsel)

Harry Kalven, Jr. (Illinois appellate counsel)

Al Bendich (SF defense counsel) (credit: NYT)

The Lenny Bruce story — the one about his obscenity trials (circa 1961-64 in SF, LA, Chicago & NY) — is a remarkable story in the history of the First Amendment as well as in the culture of comedy. You’ll not find the story on the pages of the the United States Supreme Court, though Bruce forever changed the law when it came to uninhibited comedy. You will, however, find traces of that story in the 3,500 pages of trial transcripts titled People v. Bruce (sometime this fall those transcripts will be available in their entirety on FIRE’s online First Amendment Library). There in black-and-white you will find a story about laws invoked in factual situations where it was unclear that any prosecution was warranted.  It is also the story of using the law in ways that at the time were constitutionally suspect. And then there is the human story, the tragic one that first destroyed a man’s career and then destroyed him.

The backdrop of this story is the lawyers who prosecuted and defended the uninhibited comedian. It is said that the dead live on the lips of the living. Mindful of that admonition, below I have listed the names of those lawyers (adapted from my book with David Skover: The Trials of Lenny Bruce). In our judge-centric world, we tend to overlook the lawyers, the ones who are the first to plow the earth of the law. So note their names and roles in People v. Bruce.

The names listed below are those involved in Lenny Bruce’s obscenity trials (as distinguished from, say, his drug arrests and trials).

My experience with Lenny Bruce . . . was the first time I saw in action the government’s use of the might and power of the criminal justice system to crush dissent. William M. Kunstler 

Prosecutors (12)

San Francisco:

  1. Arthur Schaefer (1st Jazz Work Shop obscenity trial)
  2. Albert C. Wallenberg (2nd Jazz Work Shop obscenity trial)

Los Angeles

  1. Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr. (pretrial hearing on motion to dismiss Trolly Ho obscenity case)
  2. Ronald Ross  (consolidated Troubadour & Unicorn obscenity trial)

Chicago

  1. Samuel V. Banks (Gate of Horn obscenity trial)
  2. Edward J. Egan (Gate of Horn obscenity trial)
  3. Willie Whiting (Gate of Horn obscenity trial)
  4. William J. Martin (appeal of conviction in Gate of Horn obscenity trial)
  5. James R. Thompson (appeal of conviction in Gate of Horn obscenity trial)
Richard Kuh (NY prosecutor) (credit: Getty Images)

Richard Kuh (NY prosecutor) (credit: Getty Images)

New York

  1. Gerald Harris (grand jury & pretrial matters in Cafe Au Go Go obscenity trial)
  2. Richard H. Kuh (Cafe Au Go Go obscenity trial)
  3. Vincent J. Cuccia (procedures for appeal of Cafe Au Go Go conviction)

Prosecutors re Appeal of Companion Case (People v. Solomon)

  1. H. Richard Uviller (post judgment motions before New York Supreme Court, Appellate Term)
  2. Harold R. Shapiro (appeal of Cafe Au Go Go conviction before New York Supreme Court, Appellate Term)

First Amendment Defense Lawyers (23)

San Francisco:

  1. Seymour Fried (1st Jazz Work Shop obscenity trial)
  2. Albert M. Bendich (2nd Jazz Work Shop obscenity trial)

Los Angeles

  1. Melvin Belli  (represented by his associate, Charles Ashman, in Troubadour obscenity case)
  2. Seymour Lazar (pretrial matters in Trolly Ho obscenity case)
  3. Sydney M. Irmas (Trolly Ho obscenity case)
  4. Burton M. Marks (consolidated Troubadour & Unicorn obscenity trial)
  5. John Marshall (Illinois extradition order in Gate of Horn obscenity case)

Chicago

Maurice Rosenfield (IL appellate counsel w Kalven)

Maurice Rosenfield (IL appellate counsel w Kalven)

  1. George J. Cotsirilos (pretrial matters in Gate of Horn obscenity trial)
  2. Donald Page Moore (pretrial matters in Gate of Horn obscenity trial)
  3. Samuel Friedfeld (Gate of Horn attorney originally retained to represent Bruce & club owner Alan Robback in Gate of Horn obscenity trial)
  4. Earl Warren Zaidans (Gate of Horn obscenity trial)
  5. George C. Pontiffs (sentencing hearing in Gate of Horn obscenity trial)
  6. Harry Kalven, Jr. (appeal of conviction  in Gate of Horn obscenity trial)
  7. William R. Ming, Jr. (appeal of conviction  in Gate of Horn obscenity trial)
  8. Maurice Rosenfield (appeal of conviction  in Gate of Horn obscenity trial)
Martin Garbus (one of NY defense counsel)

Martin Garbus (one of NY defense counsel w London)

New York

  1. Howard Squadron (bail & bond for arrest in pretrial matters in Cafe Au Go Go obscenity trial)
  2. Lawrence H. Rogovin (appears for Howard Squadron in pretrial matters in Cafe Au Go Go obscenity trial)
  3. Ephraim London (lead counsel in Cafe Au Go Go obscenity trial)
  4. Martin Garbus (co-counsel in Cafe Au Go Go obscenity trial)
  5. Harry Herschman (sentencing hearing  in Cafe Au Go Go obscenity trial)
  6. Allen G. Schwartz (certificate of reasonable doubt for appeal in  in Cafe Au Go Go obscenity case)
  7. Edward de Grazia (§1983 civil rights law suit)
  8. William M. Kunstler (advisory capacity in §1983 civil rights law suit)

* * * *

Attorneys on Appeal for Bruce’s Co-defendant, Howard L. Solomon (People v. Solomon)

  1. Bentley Kassal (bail and bond for arrest and pretrial matters in Cafe Au Go Go obscenity trial)
  2. Herbert Monte-Levy (pretrial matters in Cafe Au Go Go obscenity trial)
  3. Allen G. Schwartz (Cafe Au Go Go obscenity trial)
  4. William S. Miller (sentencing hearing in Cafe Au Go Go obscenity trial)
  5. William S. Miller (sentencing hearing in Cafe Au Go Go obscenity trial)
  6. William E. Hellerstein (appeal of Cafe Au Go Go conviction)
  7. Milton Adler (appeal of Cafe Au Go Go conviction)

FullSizeRender (1)

Posthumous Pardon Petition  re People v. Bruce (1964)

  1. Robert Corn-Revere (counsel for Petitioners Ronald Collins & David Skover)
Robert Corn-Revere (posthumous pardon)

Robert Corn-Revere (posthumous pardon)

* * * *  

 No to be overlooked are the nine club owners who were either persecuted or prosecuted in connection with Lenny Bruce’s performances in their clubs. See The Trials of Lenny Bruce, p. 456 (2002).

There is also the story of the judges who presided over Lenny Bruce’s obscenity trials. That is, however, another post for another day.  Besides, there were so many of them. See The Trials of Lenny Bruce, pp. 454-456 (2002).

→ And finally, there is the story of a relentless journalist who played a key role in the Lenny Bruce First Amendment story.  His name: Nat Hentoff.

0

The Great University Chicago Trio (Kalven, Rosenfield & Ming) & Their Defense of Lenny Bruce

IMG_4837

Behold People v. Lenny Bruce.  And note his three lawyers who handled the appeal of his obscenity conviction for his performance at the famed Gate of Horn nightclub in Chicago (December 1962):

Harry Kalven & Maurice Rosenfield

Harry Kalven & Maurice Rosenfield

Professor Kalven, the famed First Amendment scholar, had long been critical of the Court’s ruling in Roth v. United States (1957) and its progeny. He aired those reservations in his seminal 1960 Supreme Court Review article titled “The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity.” Thus his interest in People v. Bruce; it presented itself as a test case to reexamine Roth.

William R. Ming, Jr. (credit: U. Chi. archives)

William R. Ming, Jr. (credit: U. Chi. archives)

To help Kalven move from the theoretical to the practical, Kalven collaborated with Maurice Rosenfield and William Ming — two friends, highly reputable lawyers, and colleagues from their University of Chicago Law School days.

Rosenfield, who once co-authored an article with Kalven, was a partner in the law firm of Devoe, Shadur, Mikva, and Plotkin. He had represented Hugh Hefner in the mid-1950s and into the 1960s, and had likewise filed an amicus brief in Roth on behalf of the Authors League of America (Abe Fortas was also on that brief).

Ming was the first African American professor at the University of Chicago Law School. He had been one of Thurgood Marshall’s advisors and worked with Marshall on the Brown v. Board brief (his name was listed between Jack Greenberg and Constance Baker Motley).

There is, to be sure, more to the story, much more.* Suffice it to say that in the end, the trio prevailed when the Illinois Supreme Court ruled in Bruce’s favor.

* See Ronald Collins & David Skover, The Trials of Lenny Bruce (2002), pp. 175-182.

For more on the Chicago connection, see “Laughter & the First Amendment,” Chicago Humanities Festival (Geoffrey Stone, Ron Collins, Judge Diane Wood & Judge William Bauer — introduced by Burt Joseph) (Geof stone was at his comedic best).

0

FAN 118.1 (First Amendment News) Seasoned SCOTUS Appellate Lawyer Files Cert. Petition in “Public Official” Defamation Case

Here is what Tony Mauro once said of him: “Few lawyers — including the nine lawyers who wear robes to work — know the Supreme Court’s docket as well as” he does. “He is generally regarded,” observed Georgetown Law Professor Steven Goldblatt,  “as one of the best [Supreme Court lawyers] in the country.”

Roy T. Englert, Jr.

Roy T. Englert, Jr.

His name: Roy T. Englert, Jr. That name is known among those seasoned few in the Supreme Court Bar. He has argued 21 cases before the Court, including United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (1989), a Freedom of Information Act case concerning privacy exemption. He won, this while he was Assistant to the Solicitor General.

Later, when he was at Mayer, Brown & Platt, he filed an amicus brief in United States v. Eichman (1990) (First Amendment challenge to Flag Protection Act of 1989)), this on behalf of Senator Joesph Biden, Jr. and in support of the Petitioner. There is, of course, more, much more.

One of Mr. Englert’s latest cert. filings is in Armstrong v. Thompson, submitted earlier this month. The issue in the case is whether all (or nearly all) law enforcement officers are “public officials” under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964). Here is how his cert. petition opens:

“This case presents a recurring First Amendment question: whether a garden-variety law enforcement officer, with little or no role in setting public policy, must establish ‘actual malice’ to recover for harm caused by tortious statements. A number of Circuits and state courts of last resort—where many issues relating to the First Amendment and defamation are decided—have held that every law enforcement officer is a ‘public official’ under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. Accordingly, those courts, including the court below, require each and every law enforcement officer to show ‘actual malice’ before recovering for any tort carried out through speech. In this case, despite an otherwise-error-free trial resulting in a jury verdict establishing that respondent had committed an established common-law tort, the court of appeals joined those courts and reversed on federal constitutional grounds after determining that Armstrong was a public official and that he had failed to prove ‘actual malice.'”

 Later, he argues that the “Court has . . . never determined how far down the government ranks the ‘actual malice’ standard applies. It has, however, unequivocally stated that not every public employee is a ‘public official.’ Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 119 n.8 (1979). And it has made clear that the category ought to be limited to ‘those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.’ Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966); accord Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (equating ‘public official’ with someone who has “accepted public office’).”

Furthermore, Mr. Englert maintains that a “number of state courts have taken heed and held that low-ranking law enforcement officers are not public officials for purposes of the First Amendment. Kiesau v. Bantz (Iowa 2004); McCusker v. Valley News (N.H. 1981); Tucker v. Kilgore (Ky. 1964). Nevertheless, until 2013, there was an ‘overwhelming and entirely one-sided’ consensus among federal courts of appeals (as well as a number of other state courts) that ‘police officers are public officials for defamation purposes’—regardless of rank or role—because ‘there is a strong societal interest in protecting expression that criticizes law enforcement officers.’ Young, 734 F.3d at 553-54 (Moore, J. dissenting). In 2013, the Sixth Circuit stated (albeit in dicta) that courts holding the ‘consensus’ view ‘have misinterpreted federal law on the issue.’ Id. at 549 (opinion of the court). . . .”

“Certain state courts,” he notes, “have developed their own idiosyncratic, fact-based inquiries into whether police officers are public officials. . . .”

“Finally, there are courts that have (correctly) determined that there is nothing talismanic about the designation of ‘law enforcement.’ These courts have applied to ‘law enforcement’ employees the same rule that they would to any other government employee.” . . . . “

In light ion the above, Mr. Englert urged the Justices to “establish a clear rule that low-level law officers are not ‘public officials.'”

Other counsel for the Petitioner are: Lanora C. Pettit and Peter B. Siegal.

The time for filing on a response is on or before September 6, 2016.

stairway-to-heaven-1319562-m-720x340
0

FAN 117 (First Amendment News) Center for Competitive Politics Prevails in Challenge to Utah Campaign Finance Law

Columnist George Will held them out as the go-to group when it comes to the First Amendment and campaign finance laws. The group: The Center for Competitive Politics. Consistent with that reputation, the Center has recently prevailed in a challenge it leveled against  a Utah campaign finance law (Utah Taxpayers Association v. Cox). Here are some excerpts from a press release from the Center:

Screen Shot 2016-07-19 at 9.39.24 PM

“In an agreement approved by a federal judge this afternoon, Utah agreed not to enforce a state campaign finance law that violated the First Amendment. The complex law required nonprofit advocacy groups to register with the state and publicly report their supporters’ private information, threatening donations to those organizations.”

“The agreement, known as a consent decree, was approved by U.S. District Court Judge Dale A. Kimball and settles a lawsuit filed on behalf of three Utah groups by attorneys at the Center for Competitive Politics, America’s largest nonprofit working to promote and defend First Amendment rights to freedom of political speech, assembly, and petition.”

Allen Dickerson, CCP Legal Director and the lead attorney in the lawsuit said, ‘This complicated law chilled speech and association protected by the First Amendment. By regulating speech about any public policy issue and groups with only trivial connections to elections, Utah failed to regulate with the care the Constitution demands. We appreciate the work done by Attorney General Sean Reyes’s office to settle this litigation and provide necessary guidance to all advocacy groups in Utah.'”

The plaintiffs were represented by Center for Competitive Politics’ Allen Dickerson and Staff Attorney Owen Yeates.

Here are a few excerpts from the consent decree:

“The State Defendants and their agents, officers, and employees agree not to enforce the law currently codified at Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-11-701 to -702, as modified to create a donor reporting regime by H.B. 43, because imposing such requirements on Plaintiffs for engaging in constitutionally protected political advocacy and political issues advocacy is unconstitutional unless those organizations are political action committees or political issues committees for which such advocacy is their major purpose. In particular, the State Defendants will not impose fines against corporations for failing to comply with the donor reporting regime unless those organizations are political action committees or political issues committees for which such advocacy is their major purpose; file or refer criminal charges against such corporations; or otherwise enforce the donor reporting regime unless those organizations are political action committees or political issues committees for which such advocacy is their major purpose.”

Colorado Petitions SCOTUS in Campaign Disclosure-Requirements Case

The case is Williams v. Coalition for Secular GovernmentThe issue in the case is whether Buckley v. Valeo’s “wholly without rationality” test apply to all dollar thresholds that trigger campaign finance disclosures, or are thresholds below some as- yet-undefined amount subject to heightened constitutional scrutiny?

In its cert. petition Colorado notes:

“To trigger campaign finance disclosure regulations, States rely on dollar thresholds ranging from zero to amounts in the thousands. Recognizing that setting a disclosure threshold is a policy decision entitled to deference, this Court held in Buckley v. Valeo that disclosure thresholds must be upheld unless they are “wholly without rationality.” 424 U.S. 1, 83 (1976). The Tenth Circuit, however, has rejected this test. In two decisions, it has held that Colorado’s disclosure threshold for “issue committees” is too low, although it declined to explain what number would be constitutional. Under that reasoning, even groups that spend $3,500 on campaign advocacy—a figure over ten times greater than the amount that triggers similar disclosure regulations in other States—are exempt from Colorado’s disclosure laws.”

Colorado urged the Court to grant review for the following reasons:

“I.  This Court’s review is necessary to resolve the circuit split over the standard of review for campaign finance triggering thresholds.”

“A. The Circuits are split three ways over Buckley’s ‘wholly without rationality’ test.”

“B. The outcome below conflicts with cases from the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, which uphold disclosure thresholds for issue committees ranging from $0 to $500.”

“II. The constitutional standards that govern campaign finance disclosure laws, particularly laws that apply in the ballot issue context, are exceptionally important in dozens of States.”

“III. Because it comes from the outlier circuit after a bench trial, this case is an excellent vehicle for resolving the confusion among the lower courts.”

Frederick Yarger, Solicitor Generall, counsel of record for Colorado.

The challenge to the Colorado law was brought by the Center for Competitive Policits.

The ACLU & Campaign Finance Laws: Marcia Coyle Interviews Outgoing Legal Director Steven Shapiro Read More

1

Graetz & Greenhouse on the Burger Court

Over at SCOTUSblog, I interviewed Michael J. Graetz and Linda A. Greenhouse in connection with their new book The Burger Court & the Rise of the Judicial Right (Simon & Schuster, 2016, pp. 450).

51TZyeh9+hL._SX329_BO1,204,203,200_

Here is an excerpt:

Question: By the end of your book one gets the impression that Justice Powell – the “centrist” jurist – was both the great enabler of the Burger Court’s “counter-revolution,” on the one hand, and the great denier of that very charge, on the other hand. Is that true? What are your thoughts?       

Graetz & Greenhouse: You’re right – Powell’s role was very substantial, to a degree that surprised us. He commanded respect within the Court. His instincts were notably conservative: pro-business, pro-local and state discretion, ready to draw a line against recognizing new rights or handing new remedial powers to the federal courts. He also left a great set of papers (at Washington & Lee), making it easy to trace how often his deepest-held views prevailed and how those views, projected onto the pages of United States Reports, so often trace the story of the Burger Court.

stairway-to-heaven-1319562-m-720x340
0

FAN 114 (First Amendment News) 2015 Term: What Happened to the Big Cases? — Equally Divided or Cert. Denied

The big First Amendment news of the 2015 Term was the cases the Court declined to hear. But even in the one case the Justices actually decided (4-4 cases don’t count), they were of two minds. The result: no blockbuster opinion like last Term’s Reed  Town of Gilbert (2015).

The Court’s Schizophrenic Moment 

The only First Amendment expression case the Justices actually decided was a government employee case, Heffernan v. City of Paterson (7-2). But even there, Justice Stephen Breyer’s majority opinion was (if I may) rather schizophrenic. One the one hand, the Court ruled that “when an employer demotes an employee out of a desire to prevent the employee from engaging in protected political activity, the employee is entitled to challenge that unlawful action under the First Amendment and §1983 even if, as here, the employer’s actions are based on a factual mistake about the employee’s behavior.” On the other hand, the Court “assumed that Heffernan’s employer demoted him out of an improper motive. However, the lower courts should decide in the first instance whether respondents may have acted under a neutral policy prohibiting police officers from overt involvement in any political campaign and whether such a policy, if it exists, complies with constitutional standards.”

Thus while Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006) remains the main law in the area of government-employee speech, a little wind has been taken from its sails.

  Abood Lives On 

The central issue in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association was whether Abood v. Detroit Board of Education should be overruled and public-sector “agency shop” arrangements invalidated under the First Amendment. After oral arguments, it looked like Abood was headed for the dead-precedents dumpster. Ever since Harris v. Quinn (2014), the conservative bloc of the Court seemed to be gunning for Abood.

Justice consider the rhetorical question Justice Antonin Scalia posed to Michael Carvin, counsel for Petitions: “Is ­­ is it okay to force somebody to contribute to a cause that he does believe in?” The drift of his other questions and comments moved along that conceptual track.

But Fate intervened, Justice Scalia died, and that left the Court divided 4-4, which affirmed the ruling of the Ninth Circuit in favor of the unions. Much as Heffernan saved Garretti, Friedrichs saved Abood. The rehearing petition was also denied. (See also Town of Mocksville v. Hunter, below.)

Some Important Cases — Cert. Denied 

Some big First Amendment issues came before the Court this Term, but alas, all were ducked and thus delegated to the dustbin of forgotten cases.  Just consider the following areas of the law:

  • Right of Publicity: “Whether the First Amendment protects a speaker against a state-law right-of-publicity claim that challenges the realistic portrayal of a person in an expressive work.” Despite the splits in the circuits and the confusion in the lower courts, the Justices denied the petition in Electronic Arts, Inc. v. Davis Paul M. Smith was lead counsel for the Petitioner.
  • Deceptive & Misleading Ads: “Whether a finding by the FTC that a truthful advertisement nonetheless implies a misleading message to a minority of consumers, and therefore receives no First Amendment protection, must be reviewed de novo.” POM Wonderful, LLC v. FTC Tom Goldstein was lead counsel for the Petitioner.
  • Student Speech: “Whether and to what extent public schools, consistent with the First Amendment, may discipline students for their off-campus speech.” Bell v. Itawamba County School Board Wilbur Colom was lead counsel for the Petitioner.
  • Government Employee Speech: “Whether the First Amendment protects police officers who report misconduct in their ranks to a law enforcement agency for investigation.” Town of Mocksville v. Hunter→ Philip M. Van Hoy was lead counsel for the Petitioners.
  • Occupational Speech: “Whether restrictions on occupational speech are subject to First Amendment scrutiny, or only rational-basis review.” Hines v. Alldredge. Jeffrey Rowes was lead counsel for the Petitioner.
  • Public Forum: “(1) Whether the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) created a public forum by accepting for display on its property a wide array of controversial political and public-issue ads, including ads that address the same controversial subject matter as petitioners’ pro-Israel ad, and thus violated the First Amendment by rejecting petitioners’ ad based on its content; and (2) regardless of the nature of the forum, whether the MBTA’s rejection of petitioners’ advertisement based on an advertising guideline that prohibits ads considered by MBTA officials to be “demeaning and disparaging” was a viewpoint-based restriction of speech in violation of the First Amendment.” American Freedom Defense Initiative v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority→ Robert J. Muise was lead counsel for the Petitioners.
  • Charitable Fund Solicitations: “Whether a state official’s demand for all significant donors to a nonprofit organization, as a precondition to engaging in constitutionally-protected speech, constitutes a First Amendment injury; and whether the “exacting scrutiny” standard applied in compelled disclosure cases permits state officials to demand donor information based upon generalized “law enforcement” interests, without making any specific showing of need.” Center for Competitive Politics v. Harris. → Allen Dickerson was lead counsel for the Petitioner.
  • 4 Campaign Finance Cases: [1] “Whether Mississippi can, consistent with the First Amendment, prohibit a small informal group of friends and neighbors from spending more than $200 on pure speech about a ballot measure unless they become a political committee, adopt the formal structure required of a political committee, register with the state, and subject themselves to the full panoply of ongoing record-keeping, reporting, and other obligations that attend status as a political committee.” Justice v. Houseman Paul Avelar was lead counsel for Petitioners.
  • [2] Disclosure Requirements: “Does a state’s interest in “increas[ing] . . . information concerning those who support the candidates,” Buckley v. Valeo, permit it to condition a charity’s publication of a nonpartisan voter education guide, which lists all candidates equally and makes no endorsements, upon the immediate and public disclosure of the names and addresses of individuals making unrelated donations over the previous four years?”  Delaware Strong Families v. Denn (Justice Thomas dissented from the denial of cert. and issued an opinion, and Justice Alito would have granted the petition.  Allen Dickerson was lead counsel for the Petitioner.
  • [3] Whether Hawaii’s registration, recordkeeping, and and ongoing reporting requirements violate the First Amendment as interpreted in Citizens United v. FEC. Yamada v. Snipes James Bopp, Jr., was lead counsel for the Petitioners.
  • [4] “Whether the ban on political contributions by federal contractors in 52 U.S.C. § 30119, as applied to individuals such as petitioner and the other plaintiffs, is sufficiently tailored to meet the requirements of the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment and the First Amendment to the Constitution.” Miller v. Federal Election Commission. Alan Morrison was lead counsel for the Petitioner.

Free Speech & College Campuses Read More

0

FAN 113 (First Amendment News) “Abrams Court” Breaks with Tradition & Allows Cameras in Courtroom

 

June 15, 2016, Washington, D.C. It was a remarkable moment when the Abrams Court sat to hear the case of Pear v. United States. The two issues before the eight-member Court were:

1.) Does the All Writs Act empower a court to compel a third-party to design new software to provide the “reasonable technical assistance” contemplated by the Supreme Court in United States v. New York Telephone Company, 434 U.S. 159 (1977)?

2.) Does a court order requiring a technology company to develop software to overcome security measures and to authenticate the software to obtain access to private information violate the First Amendment?

Chief Justice Floyd Abrams

Chief Justice Floyd Abrams

Before oral arguments in the novel case began, however, Chief Justice Floyd Abrams (suited in his specially-designed robe) made the following announcement:

At the outset, I have an  announcement. As may be evident, this proceeding of this Court will be televised. This Court has long barred cameras from our courtroom  for publicly unstated and perhaps difficult to defend reasons.

At that point the Chief Justice paused and smiled, and then continued:

Whatever the wisdom of that decision in the past, we see no reason to do so today and a powerful basis to allow cameras today. This is an important case, one in which there is great and deserved public interest. Allowing the public to see this branch of government in this public phase of its work is undoubtedly in the public interest and we serve that interest by opening this Court to far greater public scrutiny.

The Chief Justice next turned to counsel and admonished them:

I am confident that counsel will comport themselves appropriately and have no doubt that members of this Court will do so. 

With that the video-recorded moot court event hosted by the Newseum Institute began. Noted First Amendment lawyers Robert Corn-Revere and Ronald G. London represented Pear, and argued that the United States was asking the fictional company to create an entirely new function in providing access to an iPhone, thus creating new literary work — which would be protected by the First Amendment. (See Petitioners’ brief here)

Former assistant U.S. Attorney Joseph DeMarco, and co-counsel Jeffrey Barnum, a legal scholar and lawyer specializing in criminal and First Amendment law, argued the government does have the authority to compel companies to assist in a criminal investigation, and that there was no First Amendment protection for the kind of work the government was seeking — providing access only to a phone, not to the data it contained — for this single phone only.  (See Respondent’s’ brief here)

R.I. Governor Veteos “Revenge Porn” Bill

First Amendment lawyers and advocates have expressed concerns that htis particular bill is overbroad and vague, and, if enacted, will turn Rhode Island into an outlier on the protection of free speech. — Gov. Gina Raimondo

Gov. Gina Raimondo

Gov. Gina Raimondo

According to WPRI-12 News, “Gov. Gina Raimondo has issued the first veto of her tenure, rejecting a proposed ban on so-called ‘revenge porn’ as unconstitutional due to First Amendment concerns, her office announced Tuesday.”

“The bill, which cleared the General Assembly last week, was backed by Attorney General Peter Kilmartin. Supporters said it was designed to punish individuals who distribute sexually explicit material without the consent of everyone involved.”

“But watchdog groups including the American Civil Liberties Union and the New England First Amendment Coalition had urged Raimondo to veto the bill, describing it as unconstitutional, and in the end the governor agreed.”

We do not have to choose between protecting privacy rights and respecting the principles of free speech. The right course of action is . . . [to] craft a more carefully worded law that specifically addresses the problem of revenge porn, without implicating other types of constitutionally protected speech. — Gov. Gina Raimondo

Full Text of Governor Raymond’s veto message here.

8th Circuit Orders New Trial in Jesse Ventura Defamation Case

Here are the key facts as described in Chief Judge William Riely’s majority opinion in Ventura v. Kyle (8th Cir., June 13, 2016):

Jesse Ventura

Jesse Ventura

“Before his death, Chris Kyle was a sniper for a United States Navy Sea, Air and Land (SEAL) team. He authored the book American Sniper: The Autobiography of the Most Lethal Sniper in U.S. Military History (American Sniper). In the book, Kyle described punching a ‘celebrity’ referred to as ‘Scruff Face’ who was making offensive remarks about the SEALs at a gathering following the funeral of a SEAL killed in combat. In interviews about the book, Kyle revealed ‘Scruff Face’ was James Janos, better known as Jesse Ventura. Ventura, who was at the bar but denied a fight occurred, sued Kyle in this diversity action under Minnesota law for defamation, misappropriation, and unjust enrichment, alleging Kyle fabricated the incident. The jury found in favor of Ventura on the defamation claim, awarding $500,000 in damages, and found in Kyle’s favor on the misappropriation claim. Serving in its advisory role as to the equitable unjust-enrichment claim, the jury recommended an award of approximately $1.35 million, which the district court adopted. Kyle appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.”

The majority opinion (joined by Judge Bobby Shepherd) reversed the unjust-enrichment judgment and vacated and remanded the defamation judgment for a new trial.

Judge Lavenski Smith concurred in part and dissented in part: “I concur in the majority’s reversal of the unjust-enrichment judgment. However, I disagree with majority’s decision to vacate and remand the defamation judgment for a new trial because of references to insurance in trial testimony and closing argument.”

→ Floyd Abrams joined by Susan Buckley and Merriam Mikhail filed an amicus brief on behalf of 33 media companies and organizations contesting the award. In it, the trio of lawyers advanced two main arguments:

  1. The Common Law Does Not Recognize and the Constitution Does Not Permit an Award of a Book’s Profits as a Remedy for Defamation, and
  2. The Award of Profits from American Sniper is Tantamount to an Award of Punitive Damages, Damages that Are Not Permitted Against the Estate

Court Dismisses Challenge to Met Depictions of Paintings of Jesus Read More

stairway-to-heaven-1319562-m-720x340
0

FAN 112 (First Amendment News) Is First Amendment “almost entirely without content”? Yes, writes Mark Tushnet

Over at Balkanization, Harvard Law Professor Mark Tushnet has some provocative things to say about the rule of law and the First Amendment. His post came in response to a New York Times story by Adam Liptak entitled “Donald Trump Could Threaten U.S. Rule of Law, Scholars Say.

Here is what Professor Tushnet wrote:

Professor Mark Tushnet

Professor Mark Tushnet

“I feel compelled to note that — except for blatantly strategic reasons that I actually wouldn’t find compelling — I almost certainly wouldn’t endorse the view that Trump shows contempt for the rule of law and the First Amendment — not because I agree with his views, of course, but because ‘the rule of law’ and ‘the First Amendment’ are almost entirely without content, so that I don’t know how someone could show contempt to ‘them’ — if there’s no there there, I can’t see how you could be contemptuous of ‘it.'”

Then, by way of a parenthetical comment, he added:

“Of course the claim that there’s no there there is backed up by a fairly complicated argument not worth developing here — an important component is that a reasonably well-socialized lawyer can mutter words showing that any proposition asserted to show contempt for the rule of law is actually consistent with the rule of law properly understood, and that those words are indistinguishable in principle from other words uncontroversially regarded as professionally respectable.”

Over at The Volokh Conspiracy, George Mason University Professor David Bernstein took exception: “I think that Donald Trump does show contempt for the rule of law and the First Amendment, which I believe have plenty of ‘content.’ In Trump’s case, I don’t think it’s a rejection of the concept of the rule of law as much as complete, willful ignorance of the principles underlying our legal system.”

Invitation: Given Professor Tushnet’s comment that his is a “fairly complicated argument not worth developing here,” I invite him to say a few more words about what he meant, and I will happily post them.

Elementary School Bans Trump Cap

Logan Autry

Logan Autry

Powers-Ginsburg Elementary School has barred Logan Autry, a nine-year student, from wearing a Donald Trump cap to school. As reported by  Sontaya Rose for ABC News, young Autry said: “The vice principal came up to me and told me to take my hat off because it brings negative attention from other students. And I said no a few times and then the principal told me again and I still said no and refused.”

“For three days straight,” wrote Rose, “the third grader wore the hat to class. But each day, more and more classmates began confronting him at recess. ‘I still want to keep my hat. It’s not the hat that draws attention, it’s just my personality that the other children do not like,’ said Autry.”

“Autry recently moved to Fresno from the foothills, he loves politics and American history. ‘He knows more than I do. He knows more about this election than I know, it’s kind of embarrassing. You know, like are you smarter than a third grader kinda thing. But he is just very adamant about his beliefs and his rights. He wants to be a politician that’s his goal,’ said Angela Hoffknecht, Logan’s guardian. . . .”

FIRE Podcast Interviews with Glenn Greenwald & David Baugh

Over at FIRE, the “So to Speak” podcast interviews continue. The first interview in the series was with Glenn Greenwald. Recall, Greenwald is best known as one of the journalists who coordinated the 2013 National Security Agency revelations made by whistleblower Edward Snowden.

The second podcast interview was with David Baugh, who was the ACLU lawyer who represented the petitioner in  Virginia v. Black(2003) — the cross-burning case.

Nico Perrino, Director of Communications for FIRE, conducted the interviews.

New Book on Free Speech & “Conservative Libertarianism”  Read More