Tagged: Election law

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FAN 68.1 (First Amendment News) Wisconsin high court strikes down campaign finance laws in Walker dispute

As reported in the New York Times: “The Wisconsin Supreme Court on Thursday ruled that a criminal investigation into coordination between conservative groups and Gov. Scott Walker’s 2012 campaign cannot continue. The decision of the court ends the specter of a criminal investigation as Mr. Walker pursues the Republican nomination for president. Mr. Walker, who has won three elections for governor over the last five years including a recall challenge in 2012, officially announced his bid on Monday.”

Today the Wisconsin Supreme Court handed down in ruling in Wisconsin v. Peterson, et alJustice Michael Gableman wrote the lead opinion. Justice David T. Prosser wrote a long concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Patience Drake Roggensack joined as to Sections IV and V of the opinion, and Justices Annette Kingsland Ziegler and Michael Gableman joined as to Section IV of the opinion. Justice Shirley Abrahamson wrote an opinion concurring and dissenting in part. Justice Patrick Crooks likewise wrote an opinion concurring and dissenting in part. All tolled the various opinions came to 634 paragraphs. (Justice Ann Walsh Bradley did not participate).

The case concerned charges that Governor Scott Walker’s campaign team violated certain campaign finance laws during the 2012 recall elections by working in conjunction with dark money groups.

In relevant part, the Court declared:

To be clear, this conclusion ends the John Doe investigation because the special prosecutor’s legal theory is unsupported in either reason or law.  Consequently, the investigation is closed.  Consistent with our decision and the order entered by Reserve Judge Peterson, we order that the special prosecutor and the district attorneys involved in this investigation must cease all activities related to the investigation, return all property seized in the investigation from any individual or organization, and permanently destroy all copies of information and other materials obtained through the investigation.  All Unnamed Movants are relieved of any duty to cooperate further with the investigation.

It also added:

Our lengthy discussion of these three cases can be distilled into a few simple, but important, points.  It is utterly clear that the special prosecutor has employed theories of law that do not exist in order to investigate citizens who were wholly innocent of any wrongdoing.   In other words, the special prosecutor was the instigator of a “perfect storm” of wrongs that was visited upon the innocent Unnamed Movants and those who dared to associate with them.  It is fortunate, indeed, for every other citizen of this great State who is interested in the protection of fundamental liberties that the special prosecutor chose as his targets innocent citizens who had both the will and the means to fight the unlimited resources of an unjust prosecution.  Further, these brave individuals played a crucial role in presenting this court with an opportunity to re-endorse its commitment to upholding the fundamental right of each and every citizen to engage in lawful political activity and to do so free from the fear of the tyrannical retribution of arbitrary or capricious governmental prosecution. Let one point be clear: our conclusion today ends this unconstitutional John Doe investigation.

Over at the Election Law Blog, Professor Richard Hasen noted:

Today’s lengthy and contentious 4-2 ruling dividing the Court on partisan/ideological lines, from the Wisconsin Supreme Court ending the so-called “John Doe” probe is significant for three reasons: (1) it removes a cloud from the Scott Walker presidential campaign; (2) it guts, perhaps for years, the effectiveness of the state of Wisconsin’s campaign finance laws, and (3) it reenforces conservative beliefs that they are the victims of frightening harassment, a belief which is likely to lead conservative judges to strike more campaign laws.  The case also raises significant questions about judicial recusal which go unanswered, and provide one of two potential bases to seek U.S. Supreme Court review in this case. Still, high court review seems unlikely.

Check with the Election Law Blog as Professor Hasen has additional substantive comments on the case.

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FAN 67 (First Amendment News) En Banc Unanimous Ruling from DC Circuit Upholds Federal Ban on Contributions by Federal Contractors

This is quite a big deal, especially in its unanimity. — Richard Hasen, Election Law Blog

Most difficult of all to accept is that the court of appeals saw nothing amiss with the law that allows corporate contractors, their officers, directors and shareholders to make contributions within the limits of the law, but denied these individual contractors a similar opportunity. — Alan Morrison, lead counsel for the Plaintiffs

On the bright side, contractors’ rights to speak independently, through SuperPACs and otherwise, are unaffected; while the court didn’t reach that issue, the government is clearly much less justified in regulating that space. Ilya Shapiro, co-counsel on amicus brief in support of the Plaintiffs.

Chief Judge Merrick Garland

Chief Judge Merrick Garland

“In a victory for good government, the en banc D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals today unanimously — and correctly — rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of the federal ban on campaign contributions by federal contractors. The ban applies to corporations, other entities and individuals who have federal contracts.” That is how Fred Wertheimer of Democracy 21 described yesterday’s ruling in Wagner v. Federal Election CommissionDemocracy 21 joined with the Campaign Legal Center and Public Citizen to file an amicus brief in the Wagner case supporting the constitutionality of the government contractor contribution ban. (See 52 U.S.C. § 30119(a)(1))

The 62-page opinion was written by Chief Judge Merrick Garland, and there were no separate opinions. The other jurists sitting on the case were Circuit Judges Karen Henderson, Judith Rogers, David Tatel, Janice Rogers Brown, Kavanaugh, Sri Srinivasan, Patricia Millett, Nina Pillard, and Robert Wilkins.

Here are some highlights from Chief Judge Garland’s opinion:

  1. Standard of Review: “We . . . proceed to examine whether, with respect to § 30119, the government has “‘demonstrate[d] a sufficiently important interest and employ[ed] means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.’”
  2. Historical backdrop: “historical pedigree is significant. As the Court said in Beaumont, ‘[j]udicial deference is particularly warranted where, as here, we deal with a congressional judgment that has remained essentially unchanged throughout a century of ‘careful legislative adjustment.’ [citation] Moreover, . . . the lineage of the statute makes clear that its objects are the legitimate and important purposes that the Commission claims they are.”
  3. Quid pro quo corruption: “Of course, we would not expect to find — and we cannot demand — continuing evidence of large-scale quid pro quo corruption or coercion involving federal contractor contributions because such contributions have been banned since 1940. . . . [Even so, the] FEC has assembled an impressive, if dismaying, account of pay-to-play contracting scandals, not only in the above states, but also in New Mexico, Hawaii, Ohio, California, and elsewhere. [W]e think that the evidence canvassed thus far suffices to show that, in government contracting, the risk of quid pro quo corruption and its appearance, and of interference with merit-based administration, has not dissipated. Taken together, the record offers every reason to believe that, if the dam barring contributions were broken, more money in exchange for contracts would flow through the same channels already on display.”
  4. Significant change in government contracting: “[P]erhaps the most relevant change in government contracting over the past several decades has been the enormous increase in the government’s reliance on contractors to do work previously performed by employees. . . . If anything, that shift has only strengthened the original rationales for the contractor contribution ban by increasing the number of potential targets of corruption and coercion — targets who do not have the merit system protections available to government employees.”
  5. Different rules for federal employers vs contractors: “Increased reliance on individual contractors — particularly retirees such as Brown and Miller — also raises a concern that some former federal employees may unwittingly violate § 30119 because they are unaware that they have become subject to a different set of restrictions as contractors. However, as FEC counsel advised the court, there is no criminal violation unless the individual knows his or her conduct violates the law.”
  6. Corporations vs individual contractors: “The plaintiffs also question whether there is sufficient evidence of corruption or coercion specifically with respect to individual contractors, as compared to those organized as corporations or other kinds of firms. It is true that most of the examples set forth [earlier in our opinion] above involve firms. We see no reason, however, to believe that the motivations for corruption and coercion exhibited in those examples are inapplicable in the case of individual contractors.”
  7. Two justifications: “Our historical review makes clear that the two Court-approved justifications for limitations on campaign activities — to protect against quid pro quo corruption and its appearance, and to protect merit-based public administration — were the justifications that lay behind the contractor contribution statute.”
  8. “Closely drawn” requirement: “[T]he point of the ‘closely drawn’ test is that “‘[e]ven a significant interference with protected rights of political association may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.’” [citation] And we conclude that the ban at issue here is permissible in the circumstances that we address in this opinion: a regulation that bars only campaign contributions and that is imposed only on government contractors. . . . We do not discount the possibility that Congress could have narrowed its aim even further, targeting only certain specific kinds of government contracting or doing so only during specific periods. But as the Court has made clear, ‘most problems arise in greater and lesser gradations, and the First Amendment does not confine a State to addressing evils in their most acute form.'”
  9. Underinclusiveness: “We conclude that the contractor contribution ban is not fatally underinclusive. There is no doubt that ‘the proffered state interest actually underlies the law,” and that it can “fairly be said” that the statute “advance[s] a[] genuinely substantial governmental interest.’ [citations] The plaintiffs may well be right that the ban would be even more effective if it swept in more potential contributors. But §30119 “aims squarely at the conduct most likely to undermine” the important interests that underlie it, and ‘[w]e will not punish [Congress] for leaving open more, rather than fewer, avenues of expression, especially when there is no indication that the selective restriction of speech reflects a pretextual motive.'”

Additional claim: The Court also addressed and rejected the Fifth Amendment equal protection arguments raised by the Plaintiffs.

→ Mootness: “The plaintiffs advise us that both Wagner and Brown have now completed their federal contracts and hence are once again free to make campaign contributions. Brown, at least, has already done so.  Accordingly, Wagner’s and Brown’s claims are moot,” which leaves Plaintiff Jan Miller, whose “contract is ongoing” and therefore “his constitutional claims . . . remain alive.”

→ Reliance on Williams-YuleeThe Chief Judge cited to Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar fifteen times — e.g., “But as the [Williams-Yulee] Court has made clear, ‘most problems arise in greater and lesser gradations, and the First Amendment does not confine a State to addressing evils in their most acute form.'”

The Lawyers & Amici

  • Alan B. Morrison argued the cause for plaintiffs. With him on the briefs was Arthur B. Spitzer
  • Ilya Shapiro and Allen J. Dickerson were on the brief for amici curiae Center for Competitive Politics, et al. in support of plaintiffs.
  • Kevin Deeley, Acting Associate General Counsel, Federal Election Commission, argued the cause for defendant. With him on the briefs were Harry J. Summers, Assistant General Counsel, and Holly J. Baker and Seth E. Nesin, Attorneys.
  • J. Gerald Hebert, Scott L. Nelson, Fred Wertheimer, and Donald J. Simon were on the brief for amici curiae Campaign Legal Center, et al. in support of defendant.

* * *  *

Alan Morrison

Alan Morrison

Liberal & libertarian lawyers challenge contractor law

Alan Morrison, a seasoned appellate advocate and law professor, is known as a liberal. In 1971, for example, he worked with Ralph Nader to cofound the Public Citizen Litigation Group, the litigation arm of the famed consumer advocacy organization. In that capacity, he was the lawyer who successfully argued Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council (1976), which recognized First Amendment protection for certain kinds of commercial speech (in that case for a non-profit corporate advocacy group).

In Wagner v. FEC he was co-counsel with Arthur B. Spitzer of the ACLU in challenging a little known section of the Federal Election Campaign Act that provided: “[A]ny person who is negotiating for, or performing under, a contract with the federal government is banned from making a contribution to a political party, committee, or candidate for federal office.” In their brief to the Court of Appeals  Morrison and Spitzer argued that the three plaintiffs were prevented from making their intended campaign contributions. “One of the plaintiffs,” they noted, “is a law professor who had a contract to do a study for the Administrative Conference of the United States; the other two are retired federal employees who continue to work for their former agency on a contract basis. Unlike every other U.S. citizen who does not have a federal contract, they are forbidden by [federal law] from making a contribution of even $1 to any federal candidate, political party, or political committee.” Such a law, Morrison and Spitzer maintained, violated both the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment and the First Amendment. A lower court denied those claims, whereupon review was sought in the court of appeals. Yesterday, their hopes were dashed by a 10-0 vote.

Kevin Deeley, Acting FEC Associate General Counsel

Kevin Deeley, Acting FEC Associate General Counsel

“We are disappointed,” Morrison e-mailed me, “in the result and in the failure of the Court to appreciate the unnecessarily broad reach of the total ban on individual contractors such as these plaintiffs from making any contributions in a federal election. We were surprised at the more than dozen favorable citations to McCutcheon v. FEC, a 2014 case in which another over-broad contribution law was struck down by the Supreme Court as not being closely drawn. Even more difficult to understand were the similar number of citations to the 5-4 ruling Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, in which the candidate for judicial office was only precluded from making personal solicitations for campaign funds, while retaining the full ability to raise money through a separate committee.  Most difficult of all to accept is that the court of appeals saw nothing amiss with the law that allows corporate contractors, their officers, directors and shareholders to make contributions within the limits of the law, but denied these individual contractors a similar opportunity.”

Morrison and Spitzer received some help by way of an amicus brief submitted on their clients’ behalf by the Center for Competitive Politics and the Cato Institute. “This case presents an unusual question,” wrote Allen Dickerson for the Center and Institute (Cato’s Ilya Shapiro was co-counsel on the brief.)  “While suits challenging limits on political contributions are familiar, the statute at issue here completely prohibits a broad group of private, individual citizens from making any contribution. Such sweeping prohibitions are seldom enacted, and courts have rarely assessed their constitutionality. Nevertheless, the limited pronouncements made by the Supreme Court on the subject suggest that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review in this instance” and that the appellants should, therefore, prevail.”  They did not.

Ilya Shapiro

Ilya Shapiro

Here is how Ilya Shapiro summed up his response to the Wagner decision: “This is a fascinating and fairly technical opinion, ultimately disappointing to those like me who supported the challenge but probably not one that will have repercussions beyond politically minded contractors. Nobody short of Justice Hugo Black has argued that the First Amendment is absolute — and while the D.C. Circuit rejected the subtle arguments made against the ban on contractor contributions, this is an argument over line-drawing rather than first principles. I still think that the ban is overbroad and that the government should have to prove that its targeted class of people is somehow too dangerous to be allowed to participate in the political process (and also that the ban applies only to that set of uniquely dangerous people). But the court disagreed — unanimously, which was the real surprise here and will alas lessen the Supreme Court’s appetite to hear the case. On the bright side, contractors’ rights to speak independently, through SuperPACs and otherwise, are unaffected; while the court didn’t reach that issue, the government is clearly much less justified in regulating that space.”

The Ramifications of Wagner: 

Over at his own blog, Lyle Denniston thinks Wagner could have important legal/political ramifications on “two other potential campaign law controversies”:

  1. “The first of those possible changes has been under study by President Obama and his White House aides for some time: a plan to issue a presidential order to force business firms doing business with the federal government to disclose publicly all of their political activity.  Although contractors are banned from making direct political contributions to candidates or campaign organizations, they may channel money into politics in other ways.” [ See Daniel I. Weiner, Lawrence Norden & Brent Ferguson, “Requiring Government Contractors to Disclose Political Spending,” Brennan Center for Justice ]
  2. “The second possible revision was a study by the Internal Revenue Service — now suspended, perhaps for an indefinite period, because of political opposition — to revise the rules on eligibility fo tax-exempt status of private groups that are active in funding federal election campaigns. Current IRS rules allow many such groups to gain tax-exempt status on the theory that they are doing ‘charitable’ work. The IRS had draft plans to severely restrict that status for such groups.”

Professor David Skover, co-author of When Money Speaks: The McCutcheon Decision, Campaign Finance Laws, and the First Amendment (2014), had this to say about the Wagner ruling:

Considering the elimination of all issues involving independent expenditures, the ruling in this case is not surprising. Despite some obvious differences between the Hatch Act and the law challenged here, a First Amendment victory would have put into question the continuing viability of the Hatch Act and Letter Carriers, and that the Circuit Court judges were clearly unwilling to do.

See also: Charles Tiefer, “Today’s Wagner Decision Encourages an Obama Order on Campaign Contributions by Federal Contractors,” Forbes, July 7, 2015

Newseum Releases 2015 State of the First Amendment Report Read More

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FAC 5 (First Amendment Conversations) Madison Unplugged: A Candid Q&A with Burt Neuborne about Law, Life & His Latest Book  

I have spent a lifetime fighting for a very broad First Amendment, keeping the government out of the First Amendment. But I have also said that there is a terrible price that one pays for that. — Burt  Neuborne, “The Open Mind” with Richard D. Heffner, January 16, 1997

He is not a pause-button sort of guy / he is not one to vanish into the void / he is not a fellow you forget / and he is never one to forsake a debate or turn down a chance to raise a rebellious lance. He is animated / calibrated / cultivated / complicated / and always opinionated. He is Bill Brennan on overdrive . . . and then some!

Yes, he is Burt Neuborne, the Norman Dorsen Professor of Civil Liberties at New York University Law School. And he has a new book (Madison’s Music: On Reading the First Amendment), about which I will soon say more — but first a few biographical notes, if only to set the stage for the Madisonian music to come.

* * * *

Young Neuborne, HLS 1962

Young Neuborne, HLS 1962

After graduating from Cornell University in 1961, Neuborne studied constitutional law at Harvard under Albert Sacks and had Henry Hart for federal courts. He took a seminar in English Legal History from Samuel Thorne. His Harvard Law School classmates included Michael BoudinStephen BreyerBert Rein, and Patricia Schroeder. Given his interests in the law at that time, it seemed that young Burt Neuborne was destined to be either a public-interest lawyer or a professor. As it turned out, he became both, but it didn’t start out that way.

Had Fortuna not intervened, Neuborne might have continued to be an estate-planning lawyer for the well-heeled of the Eastern corridor. That, at least, is how things looked a half-century or so ago for the young Harvard graduate: “I went to Wall Street for three years after graduation, at a small blue chip firm, Casey, Lane & Mittendorf. [From 1964-1967] I specialized in estate planning for the ultra-rich.” That brand of life-in-the-law was not, however, meant to be his calling. His life-change was the child of chance: “My big break came when a lawyer for the NYCLU transferred into my Army Reserve unit. When a job opened up at NYCLU, I went for it, although my father-in-law almost killed me.” Thankfully, his father-in-law’s homicidal tendencies abated, and with that twist of fate Burt Neuborne’s career traveled along a far different track, one in civil liberties law.

Thus did things begin. And when they did he quickly found himself working in the shadow of some of the ACLU’s brightest lights: “In those days,” he told Joseph Berger, “the NYCLU and ACLU were both located in a building in the Flatiron district honeycombed with left-wing organizations. Aryeh Neier was the NYCLU director. Ira Glasser was associate director. Ruth Bader Ginsburg was a director of the ACLU’s women’s rights project. ‘By the second day I knew this was what I was going to do,’ said Neuborne.” Between 1967 and 1973, Neuborne first worked as staff counsel for the NYCLU and thereafter as the ACLU’s assistant legal director. Later, he served as the National Legal Director of the ACLU from 1981-86.

“I verge on the obsessive,” he once said. How very true.

Burt Neuborne is a scholar / activist / teacher / author / litigator / and one-time actor . . . and rather hyper and quite self-motivated. He has done much and is committed to doing yet more. The Bronx-born lawyer has argued several Supreme Court cases, including Clark v. Community ore for Creative Non-Violence (1984) (the case of the homeless who wanted to sleep in Lafayette Park to protest their plight). Though he lost in the High Court (7-2), earlier he managed to win the Clark case by a 6-5 en banc vote in the DC Circuit, with then Judge Ruth Ginsburg casting the swing vote (though she found “the case close and difficult”).

Neuborne was the founding Legal Director of the Brennan Center, which he oversaw from 1995-2007. Much of  its focus, then and now, relates to efforts to reinforce American democracy and secure campaign finance reform. During the late 1990s, Neuborne authored Building a Better Democracy: Reflections on Money, Politics and Free Speech (Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, 1999). Consistent with that, the Center has pursued a constitutional course (see, e.g., here, herehere and here) in tune with what Neuborne argued in Nixon v. Shrink (2000) when he opposed the First Amendment claim raised in that campaign finance case. To the same effect, he filed amicus briefs in opposition to those of the ACLU in the following cases:

More recently, he filed an amicus brief in Williams-Yulee v. Florida State Bar on behalf of himself and three other “past leaders of the ACLU” — this time he was on the winning side thanks to Chief Justice John Roberts’ unexpected vote. And Neuborne has debated Floyd Abrams on the pages of The Nation (2011), this on the topic of the legitimacy of Citizens United. (See also here for  video of Intelligence Squared debate with Floyd Abrams and Nadine Strossen).

* * *  *

Screen Shot 2015-03-08 at 10.30.38 PMFebruary 17, 2015 – 6:00 p.m, New York University Law School, Vanderbilt Hall: It was one of the high points in his long and diverse career. It was the Inaugural Lecture of the Norman Dorsen Professorship in Civil Liberties, and the all-smiling Burt Neuborne was the one to give that lecture named after his long-time friend (video here). In the course of that distinguished lecture, Neuborne admitted: “I have to confess . . . , I signed the [ACLU] brief in Buckley v. Valeo” (1976). Before anyone had a chance to gasp, however, he changed gears and branded his earlier action as a mistake. And then with his characteristic bravado, he added: “Today we live under an imperial seven-word free speech clause that redoubles its deregulatory efforts long after it has lost sight of its Madisonian goals.”

There is, of course, more to the First Amendment story of this man who has been a force in our free-speech world and will likely continue to be one. But my biographical sketch ends here, save for one more comment.

Bottom line: Make of Burt Neuborne what you will — admire him or abhor him — but don’t ignore him, for his roller-coaster-of-a-life-ride has yet to run its daring and twisting course.

_____________________

See here re SCOTUSblog six-part video interview series with Neuborne.

→ See here for curriculum vitae

                           → SeeJustice Sotomayor joins in discussion of Burt Neuborne’s New Book,”                                                      First Amendment News/Concurring Opinions,  March 25, 2015

_____________________

The First Amendment is about making democracy work. — Burt Neuborne (Oct. 2014)

Question: The cover of your book has a photo of an 1816 painting of James Madison by John Vanderlyn (1775-Unknown1852). The image on your book, however, cuts off the top of Madison’s face so that his eyes are hidden. When you first saw a mockup of the jacket, did that fact catch your eye? If so, what did (or now, what do) you make of it?

Neuborne: I liked the veiled and somewhat mysterious image. It reinforces my sense of how difficult it is to recapture the past.

Question: In many ways, Madison’s Music: On Reading the First Amendment (New York University Press, 2015, 272 pp.) is unconventional, starting with its touching full-page dedication to your Father (“Odysseus the Tailor”) / to the poetic cast of the first chapter with a nod to Wallace Stevens / to the textual analysis that informs your theoretical arguments concerning democratic government / to the various historical and conceptual narratives that both challenged and inspired Madison / to the book’s ending which comes full circle with poetic nuance.

Why did you elect to approach your subject with literary and artistic flare rather than by way of a more traditional approach? Read More

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FAN 59 (First Amendment News) Williams-Yulee — The Ruling Few Expected . . . & the One Few Will Remember

Now everything will be funneled through a candidate’s committee, which everyone will understand is really just the judge or lawyer-candidate under an authorized cover. —Alan Morrison (May 4, 2015)

Let’s begin with the numbers: Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar  is the

  • thirty-eighth free expression opinion rendered by the Roberts Court;
  • the eighth case during the Chief Justice’s tenure involving elections and campaign funding;
  •  the ninth five-four split in a Roberts Court free expression case;
  • the sixth five-four split in a campaign-finance case; and
  • the first of four First Amendment free expression cases the Court has agreed to review this Term.

Two more facts:

  • Williams-Yulee is the thirteenth majority (plurality re Part II) opinion by the Chief Justice — he has authored more majority opinions in the First Amendment free speech area than anyone else. Justices Anthony Kennedy and Antonin Scalia are next in line with five each.
  • Finally, it bears noting that this is the second time the Chief Justice Roberts has found a compelling state interest sufficient to trump a First Amendment claim. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (2010).

Okay, enough with the numbers.

Question: Just how important is the Chief’ Justice Roberts’ Williams-Yulee opinion?

Answer: Not very, for the most part, that is. Here is why I say so — aided by some of the insights offered by my friends and colleagues who participated in the SCOTUSblog symposium (see listing below) on Williams-Yulee. I also offer a few related observations.

Seven ways to think about Williams-Yulee  . . . & then forget about it: 

  1. The Good for One Time Only Holding: Yes, John Roberts jumped ship in a First Amendment case and broke ranks with the “tenacious trio” (Scalia, Thomas, and Alito). But don’t count on that happening again unless you believe in the GOD of SUPREME COURT MIRACLES. And don’t expect strict scrutiny to be so relaxed in future First Amendment cases. By the same token, don’t assume that a majority will settle for such a wide fit when it comes to applying the narrowly tailored doctrine in any other First Amendment free expression cases (national security, government employee speech, and student speech excepted).
  2. Limited to the Facts of this Case Only: For all the ink spent on safeguarding public confidence in the integrity of elections, know this: Williams-Yulee is likely to confined to the particular facts of the case — and not a comma beyond it. With that in mind, consider the fact that this was a case of a judicial candidate personally soliciting campaign funds. It was not a case of a  PAC or a corporation or a wealthy donor doing likewise in order to support that same judicial candidate. Or even hosting a fundraising event for such a judicial candidate, replete with that candidate present.  Nor was it a case of a judicial candidate making campaign promises as to how he or she would rule in a general class of cases.
  3.  A New Holding that Bows to an Old One: The rule of Republican Party of Minnesota v. White (2002) — the case that James Bopp, Jr., successfully argued and the one in which Justice Scalia wrote for the majority — will likely continue to be the First Amendment mainstay in most, if not all, other judicial election cases.
  4. The Judicial Elections Exception to the First Amendment: As evidenced by what it did in United States v. Stevens (2010) and in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association (2011), the Roberts Court has sometimes clung to the notion that speech is at least presumptively protected unless it falls into some category of historically unprotected expression. On that very point, Justice Scalia’s dissent (joined by Justice Thomas) took issue with the majority opinion: “Our cases hold that speech enjoys the full protection of the First Amendment unless a widespread and longstanding tradition ratifies its regulation. (citation omitted). No such tradition looms here.” As Ilya Shapiro pointed out, we now have a new exception to the First Amendment, which brings the number to 44 exceptions depending on how you count them.
  5. The Reinvigoration of Disclosure Requirements: One ongoing question in the campaign-finance First Amendment arena is the extent to which the Roberts Court will uphold various disclosure requirements. On this important point, Justice Kennedy (writing for himself alone) noted: “Indeed, disclosure requirements offer a powerful, speech-enhancing method of deterring corruption – one that does not impose limits on how and when people can speak. He then added: “‘Public disclosure also promotes transparency and accountability in the electoral process to an extent other measures cannot.’ Based on disclosures the voters can decide, among other matters, whether the public is well served by an elected judiciary; how each candidate defines appropriate campaign conduct (which may speak volumes about his or her judicial demeanor); and what persons and groups support or oppose a particular candidate.” Question: Will all this praise of disclosure requirements be confined to the narrow facts of Williams-Yulee? Stay tuned!
  6. More Free-Speech Protections Under State Constitutions? It is one of the cornerstones of federalism: A state Court may rely on its own constitution to provide greater rights than those guaranteed under the Federal Constitution, provided it does not violate any federal laws. By that constitutional measure, assume that, say, Arizona had a law identical to the one sustained in Williams-Yulee. Assume furthermore that the state high court in considering the constitutionality of that law under its state constitution concluded that the law was not narrowly tailored and thus struck it down. Assuming that the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine were satisfied, a state court might well take its analytical cue from the dissenters in Williams-Yulee (much as liberal state court judges once took their cue from the dissenting opinions of Justices Brennan and Marshall during the Burger and Rehnquist Court eras).
  7. Does it All Come Down to Recusals and Due Process Challenges? Given the problems that arise when judges run for election, it may be that the only road to fairness, consistent with the demands of the free speech provisions of the federal and state constitutions, are stronger recusal rules and a fortified version of the due process claim sustained in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. (2009).  In this regard, it is important to note, as the Caperton majority did, that the objective standards of  due process do not require proof of actual bias.

A Different View of Williams-Yulee

As with anything in the First Amendment world, others have a different take on Williams-Yulee and see it as significant and even a a sign of things to come: “Roberts’ authorship of the decision was pivotal, and not just because he is chief justice. Roberts has overseen a trend during his tenure toward loosening restrictions on campaign speech and money on First Amendment grounds,” is how Tony Mauro saw it. And as Professor Rick Hasen told Mauro: ““This is a huge win for those who support reasonable limits on judicial elections, and getting [Chief Justice John] Roberts on this side of the issue is surprising, welcome, and momentous.”

Contributors to SCOTUSblog symposium on Williams-Yulee

  1. Ronald Collins, “Foreword: Are elected state judges now ‘above the political fray’?
  2. Floyd Abrams, “When strict scrutiny ceased to be strict
  3. Jessica Ring Amunson, “A rare case indeed
  4. Lawrence Baum, “The Justices’ premises about judicial elections
  5. Robert Corn-Revere, “For Judges Only
  6. Robert D. Durham, “Yes, it can hurt just to ask
  7. Joseph Grodin, “The distinctive character of judging
  8. Ilya Shapiro, “The judicial-elections exception to the First Amendment
  9. Matthew Streb, “Much ado about nothing?
  10. Josh Wheeler, ““Seem familiar?” and other random musings on Williams-Yulee

See also, Alan Morrison, “Williams-Yulee – The ruling with no real-world impact,” Concurring Opinions, May 4, 2015

Pamela Geller — Free Speech’s Controversial Defender

Screen Shot 2015-05-05 at 8.22.45 AM

 

She is an articulate defender of free speech / she is a political firebrand / she is an unabashed self-protmoter and media persona / she is a fearless blogger / she is the co-author of The Omama Administration’s War on America (2010) / she is the president of the American Freedom Defense Initiative / she actively  leads various “violent jihads” campaigns  / and she is one of the co-founders of Stop Islamization of Nations. Read More

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FAN 58.1 (First Amendment News) Alan Morrison, “Williams-Yulee – The ruling with no real-world impact”

My friend Alan Morrison recently sent me a few short observations he had concerning the new ruling in Williams-Yulle v. Florida State Bar. I thought his comments might be of some interest to FAN readers.

Alan is the Lerner Family Associate Dean for Public Interest & Public Service at George Washington Law School and has argued twenty cases in the Supreme Court, including Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council (1976) in which he prevailed.  

* * * * *

This was a case that never should have happened. I say this for two reasons, both of which support the proposition that it will not have much impact in judicial elections.

Alan Morrison

Alan Morrison

First, one part of petitioner’s original state law defense was that she did not think that the ban on candidate solicitation applied because the Florida rule kicks in only when there are adverse candidates and the incumbent had not yet decided to run again.

Second, the ban only applied if the candidate “personally solicit[ed]” contributions, and most people would not think that a mass mailing and a posting on a website would fall under that ban, especially because the Florida solicitation Rule 4-7.18 (a)(1) expressly distinguishes in person from written communications.

Those “mistakes” are not legal excuses under the law. Nonetheless, they do show that this was not a test case because if one wanted a test case, no such defenses would have been raised. They also suggest that the Florida bar should have simply given petitioner a warning and never filed formal charges against her.

In terms of its real-world impact, the Florida law expressly allows a candidate’s committee to do what petitioner did here and much more. Thus, why would anyone who understands the breadth of the law try an end run? In other words, why take the risk that Ms. Williams-Yulee did when there is a much easier and far safer way to secure campaign cash? The more significant issue, and the one on which the majority of the amicus briefs supporting Florida focused, is whether direct in-person solicitation of contributions violated the First Amendment. Now that written mass mailings and websites from the candidate and not the committee can be proscribed, the in person solicitation ban is plainly constitutional, although one wonders if it would be applied to family members, law partners or college roommates – assuming that the Bar found out about such a case and were silly enough to bring it.

In short, Williams-Yulee is likely to be a one-off decision that will eliminate almost no solicitations that any real candidate, let alone a sitting judge, will want to make in any state with a rule like Florida’s. Thus, aside from not clearing petitioner’s reputation, the decision will not cut back on much in the way of either solicitation or other communication about judicial candidates, meaning that the practical damage to the First Amendment, if any, will be quite modest. Now everything will be funneled through a candidate’s committee, which everyone will understand is really just the judge or lawyer-candidate under an authorized cover.

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FAN 46 (First Amendment News) The Campaign Against Campaign Finance Laws — Another Law Struck Down

James Bopp. Jr.

James Bopp. Jr.

There seems to be no stopping James Bopp, Jr. in his constitutional campaign to set aside any variety of campaign finance laws. He has been described as “the lawyer on a crusade to topple all limits on the role of money in politics.”

True? Well, just consider the fact that Mr. Bopp is the lawyer who first brought both the Citizens United case and then the McCutcheon case. And he successfully argued Randall v. Sorrell (2006) and Republican Party of Minnesota v. White (2002) in the Supreme Court, among other cases. Not surprisingly, he filed an amicus brief in the Williams-Yulee v. Florida State Bar case, which is awaiting a ruling from the High Court. Most recently, he just filed a cert petition in ProtectMarriage.com-Yes on 8 v. Bowen, a First Amendment challenge to a Calfiornia campaign-finance disclosure law.

And there’s more — Bopp’s latest’s victory came in a judgment rendered by Federal District Court Judge Charles N. Clevert of the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The case is Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. et al v. Barland, which was handed down on January 30, 2015 (See WRTL press release here.)

 Here are a few excerpts from Judge Clevert’s order (footnotes omitted):

  1. “Wisconsin bans corporations such as WRTL from making disbursements. The court grants declaratory judgment and permanently enjoins Defendants from administering or civilly enforcing Wisconsin’s corporate-disbursement ban against any person, or criminally investigating or prosecuting (or referring for investigation or prosecution) any person under this ban, because the ban is facially unconstitutional.”
  2. “. . . Because they turn on what influences elections, Wisconsin’s statutory political-purposes definition and Wisconsin’s regulatory political-committee definition are unconstitutionally vague under Buckley v. Valeo. Therefore, to resolve this vagueness ‘[a]s applied to political speakers other than candidates, their campaign committees, and political parties, the [statutory political- purposes and regulatory political-committee] definitions are limited to express advocacy and its functional equivalent as those terms were explained in Buckley’ and FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. As applied to such speakers, this law reaches no further than ‘express advocacy and its functional equivalent as those terms were explained in Buckley’ and WRTL-II. The court therefore grants declaratory judgment and permanently enjoins Defendants from administering or civilly enforcing Wisconsin’s statutory political- purposes definition and Wisconsin’s regulatory political-committee definition against any person, or criminally investigating or prosecuting (or referring for investigation or prosecution) any person under this law . . . .”
  3. “. . . The court . . . grants declaratory judgment and permanently enjoins Defendants from administering or civilly enforcing the statutory committee-or-political-committee definition, GAB 1.28, and GAB 1.91 against any person, or criminally investigating or prosecuting (or referring for investigation or prosecution) under these laws any person . . .”
  4. “. . . The court holds that Wisconsin’s regulatory attribution and disclaimer requirements are overbroad as applied to radio speech of thirty seconds or fewer. The court grants declaratory judgment and permanently enjoins Defendants from administering or civilly enforcing these requirements . . .”

* * *  *

“This is the latest salvo in a series of cases and controversies arising out of Wisconsin’s campaign finance law,” said election law expert Professor Richard Hasen. “It remains to be seen what the Seventh Circuit will do with this case, and ultimately how the Supreme Court might resolve some of these issues regarding coordination and political committee status.”

→ Mr. Bopp has also argued the following campaign finance cases in the Supreme Court:

  1. FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life (2007)
  2. Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC (2006)
  3. FEC v. Beaumont (2003)

Paul Smith Speaks @ Syracuse on Right of Publicity

The Institute for the Study of the Judiciary, Politics, and the Media at Syracuse University hosted an event recently at which noted First Amendment lawyer Paul M. Smith spoke. The title of his remarks was: “Squaring the Right of Publicity with the First Amendment.”

Mr. Smith speaking at Syracuse University.

Mr. Smith speaking at Syracuse University.

Mr. Smith’s discussion of the tort of the right of publicity and how it intersects with the First Amendment’s was thoughtful and nuanced as was his analysis of the various cases in this area (from that of the one settled by Paris Hilton to the unsuccessful one brought by Manuel Noriega).

Here is a small excerpt: “I think the problem is that this transformative test cannot be the operative test. Ultimately, it doesn’t make any sense.  It doesn’t draw the right lines. You have things that ought to be protected being unprotected and vice versa. To take a more recent example, the movie “Selma” is one in which Martin Luther King is portrayed as accuaretly as the film makers knew how to do it [RC: Smith noted the controversy re LBJ]. . . . Under the transformative test, if his heirs brought a claim, there would clearly be no way to argue that it was transformative. That would seem to be actionable. . . . Under the transformative test, they would clearly win. This suggests that this cannot be the right way to think about it. . . . “

The full video of Mr. Smith’s remarks is available here.

See also amicus brief in Davis v. Electronic Arts, Inc. (9th Cir.) filed by 27 Intellectual Property and Constitutional Law Professors in Support of Defendant-Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc. Professors Eugene Volokh and Jennifer Rothman, attorneys for amici curiae. 

See below under “New Scholarly Articles” re right of publicity article by Professor Rebecca Tushnet (“In their eagerness to reward celebrities for the power of their ‘images,’ and to prevent other people from exploiting those images, courts have allowed the right of publicity to distort the First Amendment.”)

More Campus Speech Codes come under FIRE  Read More

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FAN 44.1 (First Amendment News) — Professor William Van Alstyne weighs in on Citizens United

UnknownIn yesterday’s FAN column I posted the comments of thirteen noted First Amendment lawyers and scholars concerning their views of Citizens United, this on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the case. One of those who read that column was Professor William Van Alstyne, Perkins Professor of Law, Emeritus, Duke Law School and currently emeritus at the William and Mary School of Law.

As many know, Professor Van Alstyne’s writings on constitutional law and First Amendment have been widely cited by judges and scholars alike. In the free speech area his numerous works include The American First Amendment in the Twenty-First Century (with Kurt Lash, 5th ed., 2014) and his Interpretations of the First Amendment (1990). His scholarly articles in this field include: “Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in the Supreme Court of the United States: An Unhurried Historical Review,” Law & Contemporary Problems (1990), “First Amendment Limitations on Recovery from the Press — An Extended Comment on the Anderson Solution,” William & Mary L. Rev. (1983), “First Amendment and the Suppression of Warmongering Propoganda in the United States,” Law & Contemporary Problems (1966), and “The Judicial Trend Toward Student Academic Freedom,” University of Florida L. Rev(1967).

Though unsolicited, I was happy to receive Professor Van Alstyne’s comments on Citizens United; those comments are set out below:  

Professor Nadine Strossen’s comments assuredly had by far the more straightforward, compelling and convincing observations re the First Amendment importance and consistency of Citizens United than many  earnest but mistaken critics of the case. No doubt there will continue to be lamentations regarding Citizens United, but it is also correct that there has been no seismic (or even significant) adverse consequences from the Court’s well-articulated explanation of its First Amendment explanation in the case.

Indeed, from a sobering review of the case and of all that one might well consider in thinking about our distinguished First Amendment (the oldest and also the strongest in the entire world), I believe that many (perhaps even most) who favor the opposite outcome will eventually come to regret their support for upholding a government’s dictate restricting what citizens may spend of their own funds to convey their view of a law or of a candidate.

“Levelling down” in this fashion was devastatingly dealt with decades ago by Kurt Vonnegut (a staunch defender of civil liberties) in his five-page wonderful short story, “Harrison Bergeron.” I commend it to the premature, immature, and First Amendment misguided critics of Citizens United.  I hope that some, at least, will take a few moments to read the opinion before joining in the polemics of those who are (like all us in one or another particular way) sometimes unable to see the very special importance of our very special First Amendment. Why? Because they view law from the mote of an obscuring political zeal, blissfully unaware of  a deadly hurricane virtually blotting out the azure blue of freedom’s sky.

2010 State of the Union Address
2010 State of the Union Address
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FAN 44 (First Amendment News) Citizens United: it was 5 years ago today — 13 First Amendment lawyers & scholars offer differing views

“With all due deference to separation of powers, last week the Supreme Court reversed a century of law that, I believe, will open the floodgates for special interests, including foreign corporations, to spend without limit in our elections,” [President Obama] said of the Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission decision, which allowed corporations to donate to political candidates. Justice Samuel Alito then shook his head and whispered, “not true.” — Tessa Berenson, Time (2015)

On this day five years ago the Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, handed down its decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (transcripts here and here & audio file — argument and re-argumament —  here).

As you will see, the comments below span a wide rhetorical range. On the one hand, some view Citizens United as “one of the worst decisions in the history of the United States Supreme Court” (Geof Stone), while others argue that the Court in Citizens United “reaffirmed and applied core First Amendment principles” (Joel Gora). See below for the full spectrum of views.   

Speaking of money and speech, the Court now has before it a First Amendment challenge to a panhandling law — Thayer v. City of Worcester (distributed for Conference of Jan. 9, 2015).

Before proceeding to the comments, I thought it might be useful to provide a few hyperlinked historical facts about the case. 

The documentary that prompted the litigation

Hillary: The Movie

The Petitioner

The Lawyer for the Petitioner in the District Court

Three-Judge District Court per curiam opinion here

The Lawyers who argued the case in the Supreme Court 

  1. Theodore B. Olson (argued the cause for the Appellant)
  2. Floyd Abrams (on behalf of Senator Mitch McConnell, as amicus curiae, in support of the Appellant)
  3. Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy S.G., Department of Justice, argued the cause for the Appellee)
  4. Elena Kagan (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, reargued the cause for the Appellee)
  5. Seth P. Waxman (on behalf of Senators John McCain et al. as amici curiae in support of the Appellee)

Five Years Later — Lawyers & Scholars Offer Comments 

Floyd Abrams: “Academics, it seems fair to say, are overwhelmingly critical of the Citizens United ruling. If they were irate about  Buckley v. Valeo (1976) — formerly their consensus choice as the worst Supreme Court ruling since Dred Scott (1856) — they are apoplectic about Citizens United.  At the core of the both rulings is the now familiar proposition first uttered by the Supreme Court in Buckley  and repeated with approval in Citizens United that “the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.” If one accepts that notion, as I do, the ruling in Citizens United follows naturally and a documentary-like movie that castigated Hillary Clinton when she last sought the presidency must be protected by the First Amendment. If one does not, one naturally enough can join the four Citizens United dissenters in concluding that it is constitutional to impose criminal penalties for the airing of that film on television. For me, that was not a difficult choice five years ago and it is not one today.”

See here re brief filed by Mr. Abrams in Citizens United; see also his “Citizens United and Its Critics,” Yale L.J. Online (2010)

Mr. Jan W. Baran

Mr. Jan W. Baran

Jan W. Baran: “The Court was correct to protect political speech by all citizens and groups, including corporations and unions. Current so-called reform efforts, including proposals to amend the Constitution, prove that the First Amendment is all that stands between political freedom and government control of speech. Contrary to President Obama’s dire predictions, corporations are not distorting political debate and foreign money (which is illegal) has not flooded campaigns. It is the Obama re-election committee that became the first campaign to raise and spend $1 billion.  So much for campaign money distorting the system.”

 See here re brief filed by Mr. Baran in Citizens United.

Robert Corn-Revere: “Citizens United is like a political Rorschach Test. But when divorced from its many critics’ policy preferences, it is a pretty straightforward First Amendment case that concludes there are constitutional difficulties with making political speech a federal crime.  And, along the way, the Court reached a number of important (and usually overlooked) constitutional findings. One key conclusion is that “[w]e must decline to draw, and then redraw, constitutional lines based on the particular media or technology used to disseminate political speech from a particular speaker.” The Court observed that “[t]he Framers may have been unaware of certain types of speakers or forms of communication, but that does not mean that those speakers and media are entitled to less First Amendment protection than those types of speakers and media that provided the means of communicating political ideas when the Bill of Rights was adopted.” This fundamental constitutional principle is increasingly important as we witness seismic changes in the global media environment. And it is just one of several important pillars of the case.”

Number of articles about Citizens United in the 27 months following the decision 

New York Times         1100

Washington Post        327

USA Today                  220

Wall Street Journal    195

 This count includes columns and opinion pieces but not blog posts.

 Source: Douglas Spencer & Abby Wood, Indiana L. J. (2014)

Allen Dickerson: “Citizens United has become a symbol onto which politicians and commentators project their own hopes, agendas, and insecurities. But cutting through the rhetoric, the case asked a simple question: on what principled basis could the government ban a nonprofit’s documentary while permitting corporate newspaper endorsements? The Court, correctly, said ‘none.’ Nevertheless, legislatures and regulators continue to draw distinctions between different types of speech, and different types of speakers, and the result is a level of bureaucratic complexity average Americans cannot hope to navigate. Five years after Citizens United showed us our error, burdened by a national debate that yields more heat than light, we continue to avoid the difficult task of reforming that troubling approach to political engagement.”

Professor Joel Gora

Professor Joel Gora

Joel Gora: “The Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision was a landmark of political freedom. By striking down government bans on political speech by labor unions, corporations and non-profit organizations, the Court reaffirmed and applied core First Amendment principles. These include the concepts that protecting political speech against government censorship is at the core of the First Amendment’s mission, that the government cannot be empowered to decide which people or groups can speak about government and politics, what they can say, or how much they can say, and that democracy requires as much information as possible from diverse and antagonistic sources.”

“Embodying these principles, the Citizens United decision has had a number of salutary consequences. It has provided doctrinal support for further easing of campaign finance limits on political speech and association.  Second, the rejection of such limits has turned attention properly to more positive efforts to address our admitted campaign finance system difficulties. Finally, although the predicted tsunami of corporate spending “drowning our democracy” never materialized, the Court’s decision has helped spark an increase in overall political funding which has helped make our elections more competitive and the electorate better informed. All in all, I submit, a good day’s work for political freedom and democracy.”

 See here re brief coauthored by Professor Gora in Citizens United.

Richard Hasen: “After five years, it has become clear that Citizens United is only part of the problem. If the Court reversed it tomorrow (something I am not expecting), we would still have Super PACs funded by very wealthy individuals, loads of undisclosed money coming through 501(c)(4)’s and other organizations, and an increased ability for those with economic power to transform it into political power. It is time to rethink first principles — which is my current book project. Stay tuned.”

→ See Professor Hasen’s Legislation, Statutory Interpretation, and Election Law (ch. 13, 2014) re his comments on Citizens United

Forthcoming Book

Elizabeth Price Foley, Defending Citizens United: How Campaign Finance Laws Restrict Free Speech (Praeger, Oct. 31, 2015)

Alan Morrison: “The fight with the Court over Citizens United should not be over whether corporations have rights to make political expenditures, but whether the Court’s ruling in Buckley v. Valeo (1976) that there can be no limits on independent expenditures and that there are no constitutional or other values that can even be considered in assessing that ruling. Here are some examples.  The pre-Buckley decision in United States v. O’Brien (1968), recognized that the right to political protest could be overcome by the Government’s interest in enforcing its selective service laws. In Burson v. Freeman (1992), the Court upheld a law prohibiting the core political activities of soliciting votes and distributing of campaign materials within 100 feet of a polling place.  And cases like Ward v. Rock Against Racism (1989), would surely support an ordinance that banned sound trucks from blaring at more than 100 decibels at midnight.  Post Citizens United, the Court summarily upheld the law that bans all contributions and independent expenditures solely because the plaintiffs were neither U.S. citizens nor permanent resident aliens.  Bluman v. FEC (2012). (See also here.)”

 See here re brief coauthored by Mr. Morrison in Citizens United.

Professor Tamara Piety

Professor Tamara Piety

Tamara Piety: “Citizens United legitimated the notion that corporations (and capital) are embattled, “disfavored” speakers entitled to the special solicitude of the courts’ counter-majoritarian power, as if they were a discrete and insular minority which lacked access to the political process, rather than a force that is very nearly constituent of it. It relies on an implied (and specious) syllogism: if discrimination against people is bad, and corporations are people, then “discriminating” between corporations and natural persons, or between types of corporations, is likewise bad. This reasoning animates Hobby Lobby (2014) and is echoed in Sorrell v. IMS Health (2011), with “marketing” standing in for “corporation” and “speech” for “people.” This line of argument has destabilized much corporate and regulatory law.  For its proponents, Citizens United has been fabulously successful; but that success has come at some political cost. Citizens United has tarnished the Court’s public image. It seems likely that the decision will be cut back, but how and from which direction is difficult to predict.”

→ See Professor Piety’s Brandishing the First Amendment (2012) re her comments on Citizens United

Ilya Shapiro: “Citizens United is one of the most misunderstood high-profile cases ever and it’s both more and less important than you might think. It’s more important because it revealed the unworkability of our current system of campaign regulation. It’s less important because it doesn’t stand for half of what many people say it does. By removing limits on independent associational speech—spending on political advertising by people unconnected to candidates and parties—it weakened the government’s control of who can speak, how much, and on what subject. That’s a good thing. After all, people don’t lose their rights when they get together, whether it be in unions, non-profit advocacy groups, private clubs, for-profit enterprises, or any other form.”

 See here re brief coauthored by Mr. Shapiro in Citizens United; see also his op-ed “Citizens United Misunderstood, USA Today, Jan. 20, 2015

Professor Geoffrey Stone

Professor Geoffrey Stone

Geoffrey Stone: “Citizens United may well turn out to be one of the worst decisions in the history of the United States Supreme Court. As Oliver Wendell Holmes recognized almost a century ago, the American political system depends upon the reasonable functioning of the “marketplace of ideas.” It has always been clear that that “marketplace” is imperfect. But until now, it was generally able to reflect the views of the majority of the American people. With its decision in Citizens United, the Supreme Court has unleashed forces that seriously threaten to corrupt and distort that “marketplace” in ways that stand the First Amendment on its head and endanger the future of American democracy.”

See Professor Stone’s article “Citizens United & Conservative Judicial Activism,” U. Ill. L. Rev. (2012)

Nadine Strossen: “From President Obama,  in his  State of the Union Address the following week, to major media outlets, the vast majority of Citizens United’s critics misstate its holdings. Almost never mentioned are the crucial facts that it protects the rights of non-profit corporations and unions to spend their own money on their own messages; too often asserted is the falsehood that it permits wealthy for-profit corporations (or anyone, for that matter) to make unlimited contributions to candidates’ campaigns.”

See here re Professor Strossen’s comments on Citizens United

Fred Wertheimer: “The ideologically driven Citizens United decision has left the nation’s campaign finance and political system in shambles. It is one of the worst Supreme Court decisions ever made. The Court ignored the country’s history, its own jurisprudence and the need to protect America’s system of representative government against corruption – a need recognized by the Founding Fathers. Citizens United will not stand the test of time. It will end up in the dustbin of history.”

 See here re brief coauthored by Mr. Wertheimer in Citizens United.

Larry Tribe on Citizens United

Forthcoming: The working title is “Dividing Citizens United: The Case v. The Controversy.” The piece will appear in Constitutional Commentary.

Adam Winkler: “Citizens United is one of the most controversial Supreme Court decisions in a generation. Yet the decision is widely misunderstood by the public. From Occupy Wall Street to the White House, Citizens United has inspired critics who insist that corporations are not people. Yet the Supreme Court did not rely on corporate personhood in Citizens United. Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion never refers to corporations as people and nothing in the reasoning of the opinion turns on personhood. Justice Kennedy instead insists corporations are “associations of citizens” whose rights derive from the natural people who make up the firm. This is a problematic formulation that hides the corporation and allows the Court to avoid asking hard questions about what rights corporations as such should have. Justice Kennedy’s approach equates a business corporation with a voluntary membership organization like the NAACP, both equally entitled to assert the rights of its members.”

“Corporations are people under corporate law. That was their original purpose. And corporations must have some constitutional rights, such as the right to property and due process. Yet they shouldn’t have all the same rights as people, such as the right to vote or hold office. Constitutional doctrine would be improved if instead of hiding the corporation, we recognized that corporations are indeed people — and then asked which rights these corporate people ought to have.”

See here re Professor Winkler’s “Three Misconceptions in Citizens United

__________________

Event: Citizens United v. FEC after Five Years Read More

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FAN 43.1 (First Amendment News) Two Upcoming Events on First Amendment & Elections

This week there will be two events in Washington, D.C. concerning elections and the First Amendment. One is on the Williams-Yule judicial elections case, and the other is on the Citizens United case.

Speaking of Citizens United, my FAN post for this Wednesday will be devoted to the case, this on the occasion of its fifth anniversary. Among other things, the post will contain comments on the case from noted First Amendment scholars and lawyers.  

Heritage to host event on judicial campaign solicitation case

Tomorrow the Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C. will host an event titled “Judicial Elections and the First Amendment — Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar.” (The Williams-Yulee case will be argued tomorrow.)

The event will feature:

Hans A. von Spakovsky,  a Senior Legal Fellow at Heritage, will host and moderate the event.

Here is a description of the upcoming event:

On January 20, the U.S. Supreme Court will be hearing oral arguments in Lanell Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar. At issue is whether a ban on solicitation of campaign donations by judicial candidates in state elections in Florida violates the First Amendment rights of the candidates. Does Florida have a compelling interest in imposing such a ban to preserve the appearance of impartiality of its judges? Is it necessary to ensure judicial independence and maintain public confidence in the judicial system? Does this ban on solicitation violate the First Amendment rights of candidates to engage in political speech and political activity? Does the soliciting of campaign donations involve core political speech? In a post-argument briefing, two First Amendment experts who filed amicus briefs in the case, along with the former Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court, will discuss these issues as well as the oral arguments conducted that morning before the Supreme Court. Moderating the panel will be a former FEC commissioner.

→ For more information, go here.

 __________________

Event: Citizens United v. FEC after Five Years

This coming Wednesday the Center for Competitive Politics is sponsoring a conference on Citizens United.

LocationCato Institute


Agenda

9:00 AM: The Story Behind the Lawsuit

  • Michael Boos, General Counsel, Citizens United
Interviewer: TBA

9:20 AM: The Impact on Parties in the age of Citizens United: Are changes needed?

  • Joel Gora, Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School
  • Neil Reiff, Founding partner, Sandler Reiff Lamb Rosenstein & Birkenstock, P.C.
  • Peter J. Wallison, Arthur F. Burns Fellow, American Enterprise Institute

10:20 AM: Should liberals support Citizens United?

Interviewer:
 Stuart Taylor, Jr.Author, freelance writer and a Brookings Institution nonresident senior fellow

  • Ira Glasser, former Executive Director, ACLU
  • Gabe Rottman, legislative counsel, ACLU
  • Wendy Kaminer, Author, lawyer, social critic and contributing editor of The Atlantic

11:20 AM: Beyond Citizens United: the future of campaign finance jurisprudence

  • Bobby R. Burchfield, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery LLP
  • Richard H. Pildes, Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional Law, New York University School of Law
  • Bradley A. Smith, Chairman and Founder, Center for Competitive Politics, Judge John T. Copenhaver Visiting Endowed Chair of Law at the West Virginia University, former FEC Chairman
Interviewer:
  • Matea GoldThe Washington Post
Posner
8

The Complete Posner on Posner Series

The Posner on Posner series began on November 24, 2014 and ended with the Afterword on January 5, 2015. Below is a hyperlinked list of all the posts.

 Table of Contents

  1. The Maverick – A Biographical Sketch of Judge Richard Posner: Part I
  1. The Maverick – A Biographical Sketch of Judge Richard Posner: Part II, The Will to Greatness
  1. The Man Behind the Robes — A Q & A with Richard Posner
  1. The Judge & Company – Questions for Judge Posner from Judges, Law Professors & a Journalist
  1. On Legal Education & Legal Scholarship — More questions for Judge Posner
  1. On Free Expression & the First Amendment — More questions for Judge Posner
  1. On Privacy, Free Speech, & Related Matters – Richard Posner vs David Cole & Others
  1. On Judicial Reputation: More questions for Judge Posner
  1. Posner on Same-Sex Marriage – Then & Now
  1. Posner on Case Workloads & Making Judges Work Harder
  1. The Promethean Posner – An Interview with the Judge’s Biographer
  1. Afterword: Posner at 75 – “It’s My Job”

→ Forthcoming: Richard Posner (Oxford University Press, Spring, 2015) by William Domnarski.