Is this the book to separate the legal issues of “autonomous artificial agents” from the more controversial questions of whether code or silicon can function as “people”? The one that can stick to the practical issues of contract formation, tort liability and the like, without blurring the boundaries between legal personhood and personhood in a fuller sense?
I think this was the intention of the authors (C&W). And I certainly agree with other participants in the forum that they’ve done a wonderful job of identifying and analyzing many key legal and philosophical issues in this field; no doubt the book will be framing the debate about autonomous artificial “agents” (AAAs) for years to come. But the style of C&Ws’ argument and the philosophical positions they take may make it hard to warm up to some of their analysis and recommendations unless you’re happy to take a rather expansive view of the capabilities of artificial intelligence — such as imputing a moral consciousness to programs and robots. And even if you’re happy to do so, what about everyone else? I’ll explain below the fold.