Category: Supreme Court


FAN 58.1 (First Amendment News) Alan Morrison, “Williams-Yulee – The ruling with no real-world impact”

My friend Alan Morrison recently sent me a few short observations he had concerning the new ruling in Williams-Yulle v. Florida State Bar. I thought his comments might be of some interest to FAN readers.

Alan is the Lerner Family Associate Dean for Public Interest & Public Service at George Washington Law School and has argued twenty cases in the Supreme Court, including Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council (1976) in which he prevailed.  

* * * * *

This was a case that never should have happened. I say this for two reasons, both of which support the proposition that it will not have much impact in judicial elections.

Alan Morrison

Alan Morrison

First, one part of petitioner’s original state law defense was that she did not think that the ban on candidate solicitation applied because the Florida rule kicks in only when there are adverse candidates and the incumbent had not yet decided to run again.

Second, the ban only applied if the candidate “personally solicit[ed]” contributions, and most people would not think that a mass mailing and a posting on a website would fall under that ban, especially because the Florida solicitation Rule 4-7.18 (a)(1) expressly distinguishes in person from written communications.

Those “mistakes” are not legal excuses under the law. Nonetheless, they do show that this was not a test case because if one wanted a test case, no such defenses would have been raised. They also suggest that the Florida bar should have simply given petitioner a warning and never filed formal charges against her.

In terms of its real-world impact, the Florida law expressly allows a candidate’s committee to do what petitioner did here and much more. Thus, why would anyone who understands the breadth of the law try an end run? In other words, why take the risk that Ms. Williams-Yulee did when there is a much easier and far safer way to secure campaign cash? The more significant issue, and the one on which the majority of the amicus briefs supporting Florida focused, is whether direct in-person solicitation of contributions violated the First Amendment. Now that written mass mailings and websites from the candidate and not the committee can be proscribed, the in person solicitation ban is plainly constitutional, although one wonders if it would be applied to family members, law partners or college roommates – assuming that the Bar found out about such a case and were silly enough to bring it.

In short, Williams-Yulee is likely to be a one-off decision that will eliminate almost no solicitations that any real candidate, let alone a sitting judge, will want to make in any state with a rule like Florida’s. Thus, aside from not clearing petitioner’s reputation, the decision will not cut back on much in the way of either solicitation or other communication about judicial candidates, meaning that the practical damage to the First Amendment, if any, will be quite modest. Now everything will be funneled through a candidate’s committee, which everyone will understand is really just the judge or lawyer-candidate under an authorized cover.


The Legacy of Chief Justice Fortas

120px-Abe_fortas_hand_in_airThis is a new paper that I have forthcoming in Green Bag.  I’ve always wanted to publish something there, but until now I never had anything that would work (in other words, under 5,000 words and less than fifty footnotes).  Readers of CoOp will find the arguments familiar, as I’ve posted about them previously.

One point that I plan to elaborate further in my revisions is the thought that the extrajudicial or partisan scope of what the Justices could do shrank dramatically in the 1960s in part because the scope of their judicial authority increased.  More on that another time.


Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual: An Opportunity for the Supreme Court to Correct the Problems of ERISA Preemption

The U.S. Supreme Court has asked the Solicitor General whether the Court should grant certiorari in Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. If the Court hears Gobeille, the Court will confront an important choice for the future of preemption under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Gobeille can be decided incrementally, as an elaboration at the margins of the Court’s current ERISA preemption case law. However, Gobeille is also an opportunity for the Court to correct the fundamental problems of its current ERISA preemption jurisprudence. While incrementalism has its virtues, on balance, it would be better for the Court to use Gobeille to correct the basics of ERISA preemption.

The Court’s current ERISA preemption case law suffers from three fundamental shortcomings. First, unlike the lower courts and commentators, the Supreme Court has not acknowledged the tension between the Court’s seminal ERISA preemption decision in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. and its subsequent decision in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co. Second, per Travelers, the Court has read ERISA’s preemption clause, ERISA § 514(a), as nothing more than a codification of traditional, deferential preemption standards. This reading of § 514(a) is textually unpersuasive and renders ERISA §§ 514(b)(2)(A) and 514(b)(4) redundant. Section 514(a) is better read as establishing a presumption for preemption. Third, Travelers asserts that the presumption against ERISA preemption applies with particular force to state regulation of an area like health care “which historically has been a matter of local concern.” This judge-made rule also runs afoul of §§ 514(b)(2)(A) and 514(b)(4) which specifically exempt from ERISA preemption state banking, securities, insurance and criminal laws, but no other state laws.

The mischief caused by these three shortcomings manifests itself in Gobeille. Gobeille thus presents a problem and represents an opportunity. The Court could decide Gobeille as an incremental application of the Court’s existing ERISA preemption case law. Under this approach, the controlling issue for the high court to review will be the scope of “reporting” for ERISA preemption purposes. Notwithstanding the virtues of modest decision making, such judicial modesty in Gobeille will merely defer the Court’s confrontation with the fundamental problems of its ERISA preemption case law.

In a forthcoming article in the Cornell Law Review Online (available in draft on SSRN), I argue that it would be best for the Court to grant cert in Gobeille and use that decision to correct the underlying problems of ERISA preemption. Specifically, the Court should acknowledge the tension between Shaw and Travelers by reconsidering the statute afresh. As part of such reconsideration, the Court should construe ERISA § 514(a) as creating a presumption for preemption. Such a construction of § 514(a) respects the text of the statute without yielding to the potential indeterminacy of the statute’s broad language. Finally, the Court should jettison the notion that traditional areas of state law as defined by the Court are immune from ERISA’s more expansive than usual preemption and should instead acknowledge what the statute says: Per §§ 514(b)(2)(A) and 514(b)(4), the areas immunized from ERISA’s more stringent preemption are – and are only – state banking, securities, insurance, and criminal laws.

While the Court will understandably be tempted to decide Gobeille in a more modest fashion, there are situations which require fundamental reassessment of existing law. ERISA preemption is today such a situation and Gobeille would be a good vehicle for undertaking the necessary reassessment.


The Disposition of Justice Souter’s Papers

I have received a letter from Justice Souter stating that his papers (in the New Hampshire Historical Society) will be available on the 50th anniversary of his death.  In other words, probably not while any of us are alive.

UPDATE:  For those of you emailing me, he did say “death” and not “retirement.”


FAN 56 (First Amendment News) Floyd Abrams Signs Contract to do Third Book on Free Speech

Floyd Abrams

Floyd Abrams

If only he didn’t so much enjoy the lawyering life, Floyd Abrams might have been a law professor. For he surely savors publishing books and articles. Witness his Speaking Freely: Trials of the First Amendment (Penguin, 2006), followed by his Friend of the Court: On the Front Lines with the First Amendment (Yale University Press, 2013) — this in addition to numerous law review articles and op-eds (see here).

Now, only a little more than a year since his last book was published, Mr. Abrams has signed a contract to do yet another book on free speech. Its title: Why the First Amendment Matters. The book will be a part of the “Why X Matters” series published by Yale University Press. Other works in that series include Mark Tushnet’s Why the Constitution Matters (2011) and Louis Begley’s Why the Dreyfus Affair Matters (2010).

The work will be in the 30,000-40,000 words range with a submission date of November 15, 2015. Steve Wasserman is Abrams’ editor. Mr. Wasserman is the former editor of the Los Angeles Times Book Review and served as the editorial director of Times Books and publisher of Hill & Wang, an imprint of Farrar, Straus & Giroux. He is a past partner of the Kneerim & Williams Literary Agency and is currently the executive editor at large for Yale University Press (he specializes in trade publications).

The 78-year-old Abrams shows no signs of retiring anytime soon and continues to manage a full workload (and then some) as a practicing lawyer. That said, he still has a ways to go to top the publishing record of another First Amendment lawyer, Theodore Schroeder (1864-1953) — the co-founder of the Free Speech League (the precursor to the ACLU) and the author of several books on free speech.  To be fair, however, Schroeder was more of a writer and activist than a litigator, so he did not have to worry about the demands of being a full-time practitioner.

 See also Floyd Abrams, “Libert is Liberty” (March 16, 2015 speech at Temple University Law School)

Go here for a list of practicing lawyers who have written books on free speech.

 Forthcoming Event: Floyd Abrams Institute: Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference # 3 (Saturday, May 2, 2015 – 8:15 a.m. to Sunday, May 3, 2015 – 5:15 p.m.) (Mr. Abrams will be in attendance)

Hillary Clinton: ‘I would consider’ anti-Citizens United amendment

The movie that gave rise to the Citizens United case

The movie that gave rise to the Citizens United case

This from an MSNBC news report: “Taking questions from Facebook users at the social media giant’s California headquarters Monday evening, Clinton expressed some interest in the idea. ‘I would consider supporting an amendment among these lines that would prevent the abuse of our political system by excessive amounts of money if there is no other way to deal with the Citizen’s United decision,’ she said in response to a question on the measure.”

“Taking questions from Facebook users at the social media giant’s California headquarters Monday evening, Clinton expressed some interest in the idea. “I would consider supporting an amendment among these lines that would prevent the abuse of our political system by excessive amounts of money if there is no other way to deal with the Citizen’s United decision,” she said in response to a question on the measure.”

→ See also YouTube video clip here.

Garry Trudeau Takes Aim at Charlie Hebdo — Critics Fire Back  Read More


FAN 55 (First Amendment News) Another Sign Case Comes to the Court

The “necessity and wisdom of using eminent domain” are “matters of legitimate public debate.” — Justice John Paul Stevens, Kelo v. City of New London (2005)

Screen Shot 2015-04-06 at 11.17.08 PMThe Court currently has a sign case before it, one that was argued on January 12th. That case is Reed v. Town of Gilbert. Now it has another one just presented to it: Central Radio Co., Inc. v. City of NorfolkHere is how the petition opens:

“Central Radio placed a banner on the side of its building protesting government’s attempt to take the building by eminent domain. The City of Norfolk quickly cited Central Radio for violating the City’s sign code, despite not having enforced the code against any other political sign in at least a quarter-century. Although the sign code prohibited Central Radio’s protest banner, it exempts various other categories of signs from regulation. For example, Central Radio’s banner would have been allowed if, rather than protesting city policy, it depicted the city crest or flag.”

The two issues presented to the Court are:

  1. Does Norfolk’s mere assertion of a content-neutral justification or lack of discriminatory motive render its facially content-based sign code content neutral and justify the code’s differential treatment of Central Radio’s protest banner?
  2. Can government restrict a protest sign on private property simply because some passersby honk, wave, or yell in support of its message?

B y a 2-1 margin, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals answered both of those questions “yes” and thus denied the First Amendment claim. Judge Barbara M. Keenan wrote the majority opinion which was joined in by Judge G. Steven Agee with Judge Roger Gregory dissenting in part.

Among other things, in her majority opinion Judge Keenan observed: “It is undisputed here that the plaintiffs’ 375-square-foot banner would comport with the City’s sign code if the banner were reduced to a size of 60 square feet. We recently have deemed such an alternative to be adequate upon comparable facts.’ And also this: “Even assuming, without deciding, that the City’s past refusal to enforce strictly the sign code constituted evidence of discriminatory effect, dismissal of the plaintiffs’ selective enforcement claim was proper because there was insufficient evidence that the City was motivated by a discriminatory intent.”

Michael E. Bindas

Michael E. Bindas

Judge Gregory took exception to the majority’s content-discrimination analysis: “Why is it that the symbols and text of a government flag,” he argued, “do not affect aesthetics or traffic safety and escape regulation, whereas a picture of a flag does negatively affect these interests and must be subjected to size and location restrictions? I see no reason in such a distinction.” And also this: “This case implicates some of the most important values at the heart of our democracy: political speech challenging the government’s seizure of private property – exactly the kind of taking that our Fifth Amendment protects against. If a citizen cannot speak out against the king taking her land, I fear we abandon a core protection of our Constitution’s First Amendment. Here, Central Radio spoke out against the king and won.”

From Petitioner’s Brief

     This Court’s review is needed to resolve a longstanding, deep division among the courts of appeals over an important and recurring question of First Amendment law: whether a sign code that, on its face, draws content-based distinctions is nevertheless content-neutral simply because the government disclaims a censorial motive or proffers a content- neutral justification for the code. That question has confounded the lower courts ever since this Court’s sharply fractured decision in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego (1981), failed to yield an answer. As early as 1994, then-Judge Alito noted this confusion and the need for “the Supreme Court [to] provide[] further guidance.” Rappa v. New Castle Cnty. (3d Cir. 1994) (Alito, J., concurring). Then-Professor Kagan similarly observed that this issue is “calling for acknowledgment by the Court and an effort to devise a uniform approach.” Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of First Amendment Neutrality: R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Rust v. Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based Underinclusion, 1992 Sup. Ct. Rev. 29, 77 (1992).

     If this Court resolves this issue in Reed v. Town of Gilbert and does so in a way that calls into question the Ninth Circuit’s approach to assessing content neutrality – the same approach the Fourth Circuit followed in this case – then an order granting certiorari, vacating the Fourth Circuit’s decision, and remanding this case will be warranted. If, on the other hand, this Court does not resolve the issue in Reed, it should grant certiorari to resolve it now.

 Counsel for Petitioner: Michael E. Bindas

→ Randy Barnett, “Can a city suppress speech protesting eminent domain?,” Volokh Conspiracy, April 2, 2015

 Press Conference re filing of lawsuit (May 10, 2012) (YouTube)

Howard Kurtz on “Intolerance” Read More


FAN 54 (First Amendment News) Fourth Circuit Skeptical of Local Panhandling Law . . . Issue Before SCOTUS in Another Case

Robert S. Reynolds (credit: Richmond Times-Dispatch)

Robert Reynolds (credit: Richmond Times-Dispatch)

Somehow this one slipped by me. Thanks to Joseph P. Rapisarda, Jr. (the county attorney in the case), however, I now know of it and of Chief Judge William Traxler’s opinion in Reynolds v. Middleton (4th Cir., Feb. 24, 2015).

The case involves a homeless man (Robert S. Reynolds) who begged for money in Henrico County, Virginia. (A panhandling First Amendment case is currently pending before the Supreme Court: Thayer v. City of WorcesterThe petition was distributed for Conference of January 9, 2015.)

In a world where commercial speech is the coin of the realm, Mr. Reynolds looked to the First Amendment to aid the cause of his life-sustaining speech. To that end, he challenged a newly enacted local ordinance, which provides:

Sec. 22-195. Distributing handbills, soliciting contributions or selling merchandise or services in highway.

(a) It shall be unlawful for any person while in the highway to:

(1) Distribute handbills, leaflets, bulletins, literature, advertisements or similar material to the drivers of motor vehicles or passengers therein on highways located within the county.

(2) Solicit contributions of any nature from the drivers of motor vehicles or passengers therein on highways located within the county.

(3) Sell or attempt to sell merchandise or services to the drivers of motor vehicles or passengers therein on highways located within in the county.

(b) For purposes of this section, the term “highway” means the entire width of a road or street that is improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel and the shoulder, the median, and the area between the travel lane and the back of the curb.

Brian Burgess

Brian Burgess

At first he was unsuccessful; his case was dismissed by a federal judge. Thanks to the appellate work of Brian Timothy Burgess (a former Sotomayor law clerk) and the ACLU, Reynolds did rather well in the Fourth Circuit (see CBS video clip). Here are a few excerpts from Chief Judge Traxler’s opinion:

  1. There is no question that panhandling and solicitation of charitable contributions are protected speech. See Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 553 (4th Cir. 2013). There is likewise no question that public streets and medians qualify as “traditional public forum[s].” Id. at 555; see Warren v. Fairfax Cnty, 196 F.3d 186, 196 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (“Median strips, like sidewalks, are integral parts of the public thoroughfares that constitute the traditional public fora.”).
  2. The government’s power to regulate speech in a traditional public forum is “limited, though not foreclosed.” Clatterbuck, 708 F.3d at 555. Content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations of speech in traditional public forums are subject to intermediate scrutiny — that is, the restrictions must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.” Id.; see Ross v. Early, 746 F.3d 546, 552-53 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 183 (2014). A content-neutral regulation is narrowly tailored if it does not “burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.” McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2535 (2014)
  3. In our view . . . the Supreme Court’s recent decision in McCullen v. Coakley clarifies what is necessary to carry the government’s burden of proof under intermediate scrutiny. McCullen involved a First Amendment challenge to a Massachusetts buffer-zone statute that prohibited standing on a “public way or sidewalk within 35 feet of an entrance or driveway” of an abortion clinic. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2525. After a bench trial on stipulated facts, the district court upheld the statute, and the First Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court applied intermediate scrutiny — the same standard we apply in this case — and reversed.
  4. We draw several lessons from the Court’s decision in McCullen. First, the Court’s discussion of whether the statute furthered an important governmental interest confirms that the existence of a governmental interest may be established by reference to case law. Second, the Court’s flat declaration that “[t]he buffer zones clearly serve these interests” indicates that objective evidence is not always required to show that a speech restriction furthers the government’s interests. Finally, the Court’s rejection of the Commonwealth’s narrow-tailoring arguments makes it clear that intermediate scrutiny does indeed require the government to present actual evidence supporting its assertion that a speech restriction does not burden substantially more speech than necessary; argument unsupported by the evidence will not suffice to carry the government’s burden.

The Chief Judge concluded his opinion as follows:

Although we have concluded that the County’s evidence failed to establish that the Amended Ordinance was narrowly tailored, we believe the proper course is to vacate and remand. Our analysis in this case was driven by the Supreme Court’s decision in McCullen, which was issued after the district court’s ruling in this case. As we have explained, McCullen clarified the law governing the evidentiary showing required of a governmental entity seeking to uphold a speech restriction under intermediate scrutiny. Because the parties did not have McCullen’s guidance at the time they prepared their cross — motions for summary judgment, we believe the County should have an opportunity to gather and present evidence sufficient to satisfy McCullen’s standard. Accordingly, we hereby vacate the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the County and remand for further factual development and additional proceedings as may be required (footnote omitted).

Note: Since “the Henrico ordinance has not been invalidated,” said Burgess, “panhandlers still could be criminally charged.”

See A. Barton Hinkle, “There’s No Begging Exception to the First Amendment,”, March 4, 2015

 See Arizona Senate Debates Panhandling Bill,” NAZToday, March 25, 2015 (YouTube video)

See also Sara Rankin, “A Homeless Bill of Rights,” Seton Hall Law Review (forthcoming, 2015).  

Balkin & Redish Discuss Commercial Speech at First Amendment Salon Read More


FAN 53 (First Amendment News) Justice Sotomayor joins in discussion of Burt Neuborne’s New Book (“Madison’s Music”)

[My colleague Anthony Kennedy’s] approach to [the First Amendment], unlike some of my other colleagues,  is born on a very, very, almost fanatical belief that . . . the essence of democracy is no regulation of speech. Justice Sonia Sotomayor (March 13, 2015)

How could the pie get much sweeter? I mean, who among us is so fortunate as to have a sitting Supreme Court Justice travel to discuss a book we have just published?

Answer: Professor Burt Neuborne.

It is as rare as it is true — on March 13, 2015 Justice Sonia Sotomayor ventured to New York University Law School to join with Dean Trevor Morrison to discuss (for one hour or so) Neuborne’s Madison’s Music: On Reading the First Amendment (The New Press, 2015).  

Burt Neuborne, left, Sonia Sotomayor, & Trevor Morrison

Professor Burt Neuborne, left, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, & Dean Trevor Morrison

As it turned out, the pie did get sweeter when Justice Sotomayor first praised and then commented  on  Madison’s Music: “It’s a fun book for someone who’s not immersed in the law,” she said. “It’s so well written that I heard Burt’s voice in my head as I was reading it. I consider that the highest of compliments to an author.”

Later she asked: “You say that the focus of the First Amendment is democracy. You invite your thesis as a different way of interpreting the Constitution. So who decides what promotes democracy? People disagree about it all the time. How do you define democracy? Is it something like one person, one vote? What are its structures?”

Neuborne: “I’m sort of shocked that you asked that, because it’s clear that I define it,” he said jokingly, to audience laughter. “But Sotomayor prevailed with the wry rejoinder, ‘No, no, no, you forget, I do,’ “prompting an eruption of mirth and applause.”

“I don’t know what will be the final denouement of a judicial discussion about whether unlimited campaign spending is the best way to have a good democracy or a bad democracy,” Neuborne added. “But I would rather have judges asking that question among themselves than pretending to decide the case by deciding what seven words mean — ‘Congress shall make no law abridging speech’ — and having it be sort of automatic, without even thinking about the consequences for democracy.”

When Neuborne took issue with the Roberts Court’s campaign finance line of cases, Justice Sotomayor asked: “How does a Madisonian judge strike on balance [when it comes to those] laws?” To which Neuborne replied: “Great question.” He then proceeded to discuss cases going back to Buckley v. Valeo (1976) and up to the Court’s latest rulings in this area. He took pointed exception to the Court’s “narrow, bribery, quid quo pro definition of corruption.”

Speaking in a very animated way, Neuborne was equally critical of the Court’s notion (one that “I genuinely . . . don’t understand”) that “contributions can create a risk of corruption because you give the money directly to a candidate, but the unlimited spending of money, without coordination with the candidate, doesn’t create a risk of corruption . . . .” He thought that citizens and judges alike need to ask themselves: “What kind of democracy are we trying to protect here?”

Returning more directly to his answer to Justice Sotomayor’s question, Neuborne remarked: “Everybody’s political power should be equal in a democracy, and money shouldn’t corrupt that idea. . . . I think if they adopted a Madisonian reading of the First Amendment  we would change campaign financing regulation overnight.”

Neuborne on Justice Anthony Kennedy

[Justice Kennedy is] the most important First Amendment Judge that has ever sat on the Supreme Court. . . . 

Federal Judges Get Free Book

At the outset of his remarks Professor Neuborne thanked his publisher, The New Press, “a non-profit press that remembers the responsibility of a truly free press in placing new and challenging ideas before the public, and who has helped in making the book available both to every federal judge and in donating the books outside [here today] for you.” 

There is much more, about democracy, free speech, substantive due process, the Second, Third, and Ninth Amendments, media corporations, partisan gerrymandering, and the rule of unelected judges. See video of the event here.

I will be doing a Q&A with Professor Neuborne concerning his new book, the First Amendment, and other things that matter to those in the First Amendment community (divided as it is).

On Corporations: Point – Counterpoint 

 Adam Liptak, “First Amendment, ‘Patron Saint’ of Protesters, Is Embraced by Corporations,” NYT, March 23, 2015

Damon Root, “The New York Times, a Corporation, Worries That the First Amendment Is Now ‘Embraced by Corporations,'”, March 24, 2015

Amanda Shanor

Amanda Shanor

“Adam Smith’s First Amendment” — DC Circuit Comes Under Fire

That is the title of a new essay by Robert Post and Amanda Shanor, one that appears in the Harvard Law Review Forum. What troubles the authors is the “recent and aggressive expansion of commercial speech doctrine,” one that they argue has resulted in a “striking turn in our constitutional order.”

The essay was prompted by a decision by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in a case named Edwards v. District of Columbia (2014). (Ms Shanor, a Yale PhD in law candidate and a Yale Law School graduate, is a former law clerk to Judges Judith Rogers (2012-2013) and to Cornelia T.L. Pillard (2013-2014) of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.) Read More


FAN 52.1 (First Amendment News) Court denies review in false political ads law case

This morning the Court released its latest order list. The Court denied cert in Arneson v. 281 Care Committee (see state’s cert. petition here). The Minnesota law challenged in the case provides:

A person is guilty of a gross misdemeanor who intentionally participates in the preparation, dissemination, or broadcast of paid political advertising or campaign material . . . with respect to the effect of a ballot question, that is designed or tends to . . . promote or defeat a ballot question, that is false, and that the person knows is false or communicates to others with reckless disregard of whether it is false.

Applying a strict scrutiny standard of review, the Eight Circuit ruled that the law was not narrowly tailored to comply with First Amendment requirements, though the Eight Circuit panel also ruled that the state attorney general was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.

 Tomorrow the Supreme Court will issue opinions in argued cases (see listing below) and may do so again on Wednesday.

℘ ℘ ℘

The next great First Amendment battleground, it turns out, is on the back of your car. — Adam Liptak (2009)

UnknownThis morning at 10:00 a.m. ET the Court is hearing oral arguments in the Texas license plate case, Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. The case was argued by R. James George Jr. on behalf of the Respondent and by the state’s Solicitor General, Scott A. Keller. Some of the more notable amicus briefs were filed by:

See here re an earlier post re license plate cases breakdown of cases and sampling of scholarly literature.


Review Granted

  1. Elonis v. United States (argued on 12-1-14)
  2. Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar (argued 1-20-15)
  3. Reed v. Town of Gilbert (argued on 1-12-15)
  4. Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans (license plate case) (argued 3-23-15)

Pending Petitions

  1. Berger v. American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina (license plate case)
  2. Thayer v. City of Worcester
  3. The Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Education of the City of New York (see Becket Fund amicus brief of Michael McConnell)
  4. Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified School District (re Mary Beth Tinker amicus brief)
  5. Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, et al.
  6. Apel v. United States (Erwin Chemerinsky, counsel of record)

Review Denied

  1. Arneson v. 281 Care Committee
  2. on 8 v. Bowen
  3. Kagan v. City of New Orleans
  4. Clayton v. Niska
  5. Pregnancy Care Center of New York v. City of New York 
  6. City of Indianapolis, Indiana v. Annex Books, Inc.
  7. Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc. v. United States 
  8. Mehanna v. United States
  9. Stop This Insanity Inc Employee Leadership Fund et al  v. Federal Election Commission
  10. Vermont Right to Life Committee, et al v. Sorrell

Petitions for Rehearing in the Supreme Court

It occurred to me today that someone could write a terrific article on petitions for rehearing in the Supreme Court.  Although rarely granted, these motions do represent a useful contemporary source of criticism of the Court’s judgment in a case.  I’m not sure how often these motions are filed (and they are not easily accessible), but wouldn’t you be curious to see one from Brown v. Board of Education (if there is one), Roe v. Wade, or other Supreme Court classics?