Category: Supreme Court

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FAN 74.1 (First Amendment News) First Amendment Salon goes to L.A. — Chemerinsky & Volokh discuss Roberts Court & First Amendment . . . & more!

It was a remarkable late-afternoon program yesterday as the First Amendment Salon went on the road for the first time with an event held at the Los Angeles office of Davis Wright Tremaine. There was a live video feed to DWT’s offices in New York City and Washington, D.C. Those participating in the Salon (the sixth) were UC Irvine Dean Erwin Chemerinsky and UCLA Law Professor Eugene Volokh with DWT lawyer Kelli Sager moderating the exchange between the two. The Salons are conducted in association with the law firm of Levine Sullivan Koch & Schulz and the Floyd Abrams Institute for Free Expression at Yale Law School. (Chemerinsky and Volokh are on the Salon’s advisory board). Lee Levine introduced the program. The topic of discussion for the 90-minute exchange, replete with questions from the audience, was “The Roberts Court and the First Amendment.”

Eugene Volokh, Erwin Chemerinsky & Kelli Sager

                        Eugene Volokh, Erwin Chemerinsky & Kelli Sager

The Chemerinsky-Volokh exchange was nuanced and esoteric yet always insightful, informative, and engaging. Ms.Sager ably navigated the discussion through a variety of topics including:

  • First Amendment law in the context of the government acting as sovereign vs the government acting in a managerial capacity
  • the reach of the government speech doctrine after Walker
  •  the future of “strict scrutiny” analysis after Williams-Yulee
  • whether in light of Williams-Yulee (and the idea that judicial elections are different) independent expenditures might be regulated notwithstanding the holding in Buckley
  • the impact of Reed on the “secondary effects” doctrine
  • the likelihood that the trio of Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan will be able to persuade a majority of the Court to abandon strict scrutiny in content-discrimination cases
  • whether in the Friedrichs case the Court will overrule Abood (reference was made to Catherine Fisk’s SCOTUSblog post “The Friedrichs petition should be dismissed“)
  • what important First Amendment issues are not before the Court but which need to be
  • whether the Court is likely to grant cert. in a “right to publicity” case (see Law360 Aug. 14, 2015 news story here)
  • and how the Court has yet to give any serious consideration, post Reno and Ashcroft, as to how the Internet impacts First Amendment law.
Judge Alex Kozinski

Judge Alex Kozinski

And there was more, much more, including a variety of questions from the audience consisting of First Amendment lawyers and law professors, journalists, and free-speech activists.

BTW: Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski was in the audience and asked the two professors to comment on the following statement: “The big threat to free speech in the next twenty years is from foreign countries” trying to enforce “right to be forgotten” laws against the likes of Google and ordering them to remove certain items from all of their posts in all nations, including the United States. “The right to be forgotten,” he added, “is just the first of what may be many laws that are more speech restrictive than those of the U.S., e.g. defamation, privacy, and moral rights.” [See Mike Masnick, “Google Disappears Techdirt Article About Right To Be Forgotten Due To Right To Be Forgotten Request,” Infowars.com, Aug. 25, 2015)]

Shout out to the fine folks at Davis Wright Tremaine for hosting the Los Angeles Salon.

The L.A. Salon event was video-recored and I hope to post a link to it soon.

Go here for video of fifth Salon: “Is the First Amendment Being Misused as a Deregulatory Tool?”  The exchange, held at the Abrams Institute at Yale Law School, was between Professors Jack Balkin and Martin Redish with Floyd Abrams moderating.

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Richard Nixon’s Oral Argument

203px-Richard_M._Nixon,_ca._1935_-_1982_-_NARA_-_530679The Oyez Project, run out of the Chicago-Kent Law School, is a terrific resource for Supreme Court scholars.  They have put online the audio of every oral argument going back to 1955, when the Court starting taping its arguments.  I’ve been listening to some old ones (mostly out of curiosity), and one that is weirdly compelling is Time, Inc. v. Hill, a 1967 false light case that is still used in casebooks.

Hill was Richard Nixon’s only oral argument before the Court, and he ended up losing (5-4).  I say “weirdly compelling” because it’s just fun to hear Nixon talking like an appellate advocate, going back-and-forth with Hugo Black, and so on.  Check it out if you can. Nixon starts at around the 51:00 minute mark (arguments were longer back then).

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FAN 71 (First Amendment News) Just Released: 2nd ed. of Cogan’s “The Complete Bill of Rights” — 30 New Pages on History of Press & Assembly Clauses

This book is an invaluable resource for constitutional scholars, teachers, litigators, and judges alike. It collects and collates the basic texts necessary for informed interpretation of the Bill of Rights and gives them to researchers in a compact, comprehensive, and reliable form that is wonderfully organized for both quick scanning and sustained critical analysis. It makes previously difficult research tasks easy and opens new lines of thinking at a glance.– Anthony G. Amsterdam (2015)

41lkMJ+mUtL._SX348_BO1,204,203,200_The second edition of Professor Neil Cogan’s monumental The Complete Bill of Rights: The Drafts, Debates, Sources, & Origins (Oxford University Press) has just been released. Get out your wallet, for this book is well worth the $185.00 list price. Really!

Here is what Floyd Abrams said of the first edition: “For anyone interested in our Constitution, our history, or our political theory, this book is an intellectual treasure chest. It is more than legislative history. It is constitution-drafting in the raw — all the proposals and all the give-and-take (some of it disturbing) that resulted in the adoption of the Bill of Rights.” The historian Stanley Katz referred to it as “a major occasion in American publishing. . . . This is a triumph of careful and thoughtful scholarship. It is now one of the essential components of the the library of constitutionalism.” Though it is hard to imagine, Cogan’s second edition is even better and more triumphant!

 The second edition (1362 pp.) almost doubles the first edition (705 pp.) in length by adding, among other things, lengthy excerpts from the treatises and dictionaries familiar to judges and lawyers in the 1780s. (Note: the pages in the new edition are also longer and its margins are narrower.)

In the First Amendment section — other than in the religion clauses segments which total 146 pages — new materials were added to the Press Clause segment and to the Assembly Clause segment. The majority of the newly added materials in those areas appears in the Press Clause segment (five new entries: Bacon, Burn, Cunningham, Jacob, and Viner) and one new entry for the Assembly Clause segment (Burn). The new sources materials for those segments of second edition of The Complete Bill of Rights are listed below:

  1. Matthew Bacon, A New Abridgment of the Law (London (Savoy): E. & R. Nutt & R. Gosling, 1736) [NB: hyperlink is to a later edition]
  2. Richard Burn, Justice of the Peace & Parish Officer (London: Ho. Woodfall & W. Strahan, 10th ed., 1776) [NB: hyperlink is to a later edition]
  3. T. Cunningham, A New And Complete Law-Dictionary (London: Law Printers to the King, 1764, 1765) (Adams Library)
  4. Giles Jacob, The New-Law Dictionary (London (Savoy): Henry Lintot, 1743) (Adams Library) [NB: hyperlink is to an earlier edition]
  5. Charles Viner, A General Abridgment of Law and Equity (London, 1742) (Adams Library)

In the Press Clause segment, the 27 pages of new materials (pp.  182-208) consist of definitions and discussions of defamation:

  • What is it?
  • What amounts to a libel?
  • How much certainty is required?
  • Can statements made in court amount to defamation?
  • Who qualifies as a libeler?
  • What constitutes publishing?
  • What matters are for a judge or jury to decide?, and
  • What  punishment (civil and/or criminal), if any, is appropriate?

Beyond this, there is also an entry from Richard Burn’s treatise concerning religious and civil laws regulating swearing (pp. 206-208)

The new entry concerning the Assembly Clause (pp. 254-61) segment consists of seven pages (also from Richard Burn’s treatise). Those pages largely concern definitional and related questions, which are divided into the following six subcategories:

I.    “What is a riot, rout, or unlawful assembly”?

II.   “How the same may be restrained by a private person.” [re common law powers to suppress a riot]

III.  “How by a constable, or by other peace officer.” [re common law powers to suppress a riot]

IV.  “How by one justice.” [re statutory powers of a justice of the peace to restrain, arrest, chastise or punish.]

V.    “How by two justices.”  [re statutory powers of two or three justices of the peace to use “the power of the country” or that of the sheriff to enforce an order re a riot or unlawful assembly]

VI.  “How by a process out of chancery.” [re statutory powers of chancery court to inquire into the truth of any complaint brought by an aggrieved party].

Professor Neil Cogan

Professor Neil Cogan

Whatever one thinks of textualism and/or historicism, Professor Cogan has performed a great public service in bringing into sharper focus the historical backdrop of the Bill of Rights. In a 1993 letter to Cogan, the late Gerald Gunther tagged the first edition as a “very valuable book” and a “marvelous collection” of historical documents. (Cynthia Cotts, “A Dean’s Book on Bill of Rights Scores with Supremes, Scholar,” National Law Journal, Nov. 24, 1997). For those who knew Gerry Gunther, he was not one to offer exaggerated or unmerited praise. That said, he was too modest in his assessment of The Complete Bill of Rights. Then again, perhaps he knew better than most that superlatives may sometimes devalue the true worth of a great work. In that spirit, nothing much need be added other than this: The second edition of The Complete Bill of Rights is even more “valuable” than the first.    

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Formalities of Judicial Voting

I’ve started drafting my next book (on the Bill of Rights), and I’m not sure how that will change my blogging.  Maybe I will post less often, maybe my posts will focus on the Bill of Rights–we’ll see.

For now, though, I want to pose this question.  What must a Supreme Court Justice do to vote on some matter before the Court?  In other words, suppose a Justice is ill but still wants to participate.  Attending oral argument is not a requirement–there are many past instances of a Justice voting on cases based on listening to argument on tape.  What about attending the Court’s conference?  (Senators and Representatives must be physically present on the floor to vote).  I don’t think there is any such need–you could vote by memo.  Do you have to read the briefs?  No.

In the end, I think the answer is that a Justice’s vote counts so long as the other Justices think that it should count.  This would seem to be the precedent set by the way that the Court handled the aftermath of Justice William O. Douglas’s stroke at the end of his tenure.  For months Justice Douglas was clearly incapacitated, but he kept on trying to vote.  The other Justices eventually reached an understanding that they would never let his vote be decisive (until he resigned).

One further question–can Congress answer this question?  There is already a quorum requirement set by statute (6 Justices).  Can Congress go further and establish, for instance, that a Justice must attend oral argument to vote on an argued case?

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Citing Oral Argument Questions

I want to raise a question about the citation of statements made by Justices at oral argument.  This never used to happen, in part because such transcripts were either unavailable or imprecise.  In recent years, though, you see Supreme Court opinions that cite statements made by a Justice at argument.

My question is–what purpose is served by this?  Citing something a lawyer said at argument might be valuable.  If counsel takes a position there, that can be fairly treated as a position in the litigation even if it is not stated in the brief.  But a Justice asking a question or making a statement is not taking a position.  Why, then, have the Justices taken to citing other questions?

I may look into this further, as I find the issue of transparency (or lack thereof) about oral arguments and hand-down days fascinating.

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FAN 70 (First Amendment News) 10 Little known or long forgotten facts about the First Amendment

Since the news slows down in the summer, I thought I’d share some little known or long forgotten facts about the First Amendment. They concern everything from the text of the First Amendment / to Holmes and his 1919 opinions / to the first woman who argued a free-speech case in the Supreme Court / to Robert L. Carter’s ideas about freedom of association and his subsequent victory in NAACP v. Alabama / to the opinion Richard Posner wrote in NAACP v. Button / to the author of the famous line in Sullivan / to Ralph Nader and the origins of the modern commercial speech doctrine and more.

* * *  *

  1. Does any Justice (originalists, textualists, and others, living or dead) have any idea of what exactly the word abridge means as used in the First Amendment? To the best of my knowledge, no member of the Court (including Justices Hugo Black, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas) has ever devoted any serious ink to this definitional question. (see here for a discussion of the word).
  2. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes was not the first person to use the phrase clear and present danger in a legal context. As Professor Lucas Powe has observed, in “the summer of 1918, Benjamin W. Shaw, defending (unsuccessfully until appeal) an Espionage Act case, uttered the following during his closing argument to the jury”: Under all of the facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence in this case, how can it be said that he wilfully [sic] said and did the things alleged? How can the words used under the circumstances detailed in the evidence have the tendency to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent?” (John Fontana, 12 American State Trials 897, 932 (John D. Lawson, editor) (F.H. Thomas Book Co., 1920) (emphasis added), quoted in L. A. Powe, “Searching for the False Shout of ‘Fire,’” 19 Constitutional Commentary 345, 352, n. 61 (2002)
  3. Notwithstanding what the Court did in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), the holdings in Schenck v. United States (1919), Debs v. United States (1919) and Dennis v. United States (1951) have never been formally overruled.
  4. In his concurrence in Whitney v. California (1927), Justice Louis Brandeis flagged his substantive agreement with the majority’s judgment: “[In this case] there was other testimony which tended to establish the existence of a conspiracy, on the part of members of the International Workers of the World, to commit present serious crimes, and likewise to show that such a conspiracy would be furthered by the activity of the society of which Miss Whitney was a member. Under these circumstances, the judgment of the state court cannot be disturbed.” (emphasis added)
  5. The first woman to argue a free speech case (though not a First Amendment case) in the Supreme Court was Olive Rabe — the case was United States v. Schwimmer (1929). It was nearly 40 years before another woman represented a rights claimant in a free-speech case in the Supreme Court. The woman was Eleanor Holmes Norton, a woman of color; the case was Carroll v. President & Commissioners of Princess Anne (1968). As with Olive Rabe, few if any know or remember that Eleanor Holmes Norton, now a member of Congress, was the first woman to represent a rights claimant in the Supreme Court in a First Amendment free-expression case. (Collins & Hudson: “To the high court: Olive Rabe representing Rosika Schwimmer“).
  6. the young Robert L. Carter

    the young Robert L. Carter

    Robert L. Carter successfully argued NAACP v. Alabama (1958). In the NAACP’s brief and in the course of oral arguments (Jan. 15-16, 1958) Mr. Carter stated: “We contend that the order to require us to disclose the list of our members is a denial of our right — the right of a corporation and the right of its members — to free speech and freedom of association and is protected by the First Amendment.” Years earlier Mr. Carter wrote a post-graduate thesis on the First Amendment while at Columbia Law School, this after having received his J.D. from Howard University. (Collins & Chaltain, We Must not be Afraid to be Free)

    (See box below re Carter’s LLM thesis)

  7. Though Justice Brennan is formally credited with authoring NAACP v. Button (1963), the opinion was actually written by his law clerk Richard Posner. “That was one I did for Brennan,” Posner told Kenneth Durr in a 2011 interview.
  8. The famous prhrase, “debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” originated with Stephen R. Barnett, one of Justice Brennan’s law clerks in New York Times v. Sullivan (1964). (Stern & Wermiel, Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion)
  9. For decades before before Citizens United (2010), most of the appellate challenges to campaign finance laws were brought by liberals, liberal groups, or labor unions. (Collins & Skover, When Money Speaks (2014))
  10. The emergence of the modern commercial speech doctrine was made possible by Ralph Nader’s group, Public Citizen. Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council (1976) was successfully argued by Alan Morrison, who was then affiliated with Public Citizen. Earlier, Morrison had submitted an amicus brief to the same effect in Bigelow v. Virginia (1975).

The Three Freedoms

by Robert L. Carter

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Law in the Faculty of the School of Law, Columbia University.

August 1, 1941

TRO Granted in Online Adult/Escort Advertising Case Read More

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FAN 69 (First Amendment News) Justice Alito discusses four First Amendment cases in Kristol interview — Free-Speech Jurisprudence Comes into Sharper Focus

“[I]f we lose focus on what is at the core of the free-speech protection by concentrating on . . . peripheral issues, I think, there’s a real danger that our free-speech cases will go off in a bad direction.” — Justice Samuel Alito

Recently, Justice Samuel Alito participated in a video-recoreded interview with Bill Kristol. In the “Conversations with Bill Kristol” program the Justice discussed his legal education and the workings of the Supreme Court. He also discussed four First Amendment free-expression cases: United States v. Stevens (2010), Snyder v. Phelps (2011), United States v. Alvarez (2012), and Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010).

Below are some excerpts I transcribed from the video-recorded interview in which Justice Alito discussed the First Amendment, this in response to questions posed to him by Mr. Kristol. I have added captions to the transcript and have edited it in places as well. (There is also a transcript of the entire interview  (login required) on the “Conversations with Bill Kristol website.)    

Following the exchange between the Justice and Mr. Kristol, I added some preliminary commentaries on what Justice Alito’s remarks may suggest about his larger First Amendment jurisprudence.  

Finally, I ended with some general information about Justice Alito and his free-speech jurisprudence.  

The Stevens Case

Justice Alito on "Conversations with Bill Kristol"

Justice Alito on “Conversations with Bill Kristol”

The Justice’s discussion of Stevens — the videoing of animal cruelty case — was largely descriptive. What concerned Justice Alito about the case the fact that it was “virtually impossible to find out who was [killing the animals that were being filmed]. The physical activity could be made illegal,” he noted. “[N]o one questions that . . . you could have a law against animal cruelty. Can you have a law that prohibits the creation of these videos without which the animal cruelty would not take place?”

Because of overbreadth problems, seven Justices voted to strike down the law on First Amendment grounds while Justice Alito felt otherwise and dissented.

The Phelps Case

Here, too, much of the discussion of Phelps — the military funerals protest case — was descriptive. What concerned the Justice was the fact that in “this particular case the . . .  [protesters] had placards that said horrible things about [the soldier being buried] . . . It was very distressing to the family members, who were in attendance.”

“So they were sued under a very well-established tort that goes back to the nineteenth century — the intentional infliction of severe emotional distress. And I thought that this tort constituted a reasonable exception to the First Amendment, but my colleagues disagreed about that.”

Bill Kristol

William Kristol

Mr. Kristol: “. . . What about the obvious sort of simple argument that . . . it is a slippery slope, that you cannot curtail speech? That is kind of the argument that the majority made, in one way or  the other, I would say.”

Justice Alito: “Well I think that some members of the majority — this is not based on inside information, this is what I get from reading the opinion — I think that there are those who would support the majority decision in both those cases for exactly that reason. So if we say, even in these outrageous situations, ‘we will not tolerate any abridgment of freedom of speech,’ then when something comes along that I would regard, and I think our cases would regard as really being at the core of the free-speech protection, these decisions provide a guarantee, or they provide a wall of proaction against a bad decision in those areas. If I really believed that to be the case, I might think it was an appropriate tradeoff. I don’t think that’s the case. I think that judges who are inclined to make a bad decision, an anti-free speech decision in a case involving core political speech, will find a way of getting around these little cases.”

The Alvarez Case

Justice Alito: “So what I think has been going on in those two cases and another one where I was in dissent, this time not by myself, in United States v. Alvarez, which had to do with the constitutionality of a statute passed by Congress called ‘The Stolen Valor Act,’ [which] prohibited a false claim of having received a military medal. . . .”

Mr. Kristol: “Which was happening a lot at the time.”

Justice Alito: “It was happening a lot. People were making up, you know, claiming to have won the Congressional Medal of Honor . . . “

Reflecting on StevensPhelps and Alvarez, Justice Alito stressed that “those cases involve a diversion, I think, of attention from the core, from what is most important about the guarantee of freedom of speech.”

He then developed that point as noted below.

Protecting Core Political Speech

Justice Alito: “I think freedom of speech protects and serves many purposes, but I believe, and I think the Court has said that at the core, whatever other purposes it may serve, it is vitally important for democratic self-government. If people cannot debate public issues, if they cannot debate the relative merits of political candidates, then democracy is basically impossible. So I think that is the core of the protection. These cases involving . . . depictions of animal cruelty, the protest at military funerals, [and] falsely claiming to have won the Congressional Medal of Honor don’t involve anything like that.”

“And if we lose focus on what is at the core of the free-speech protection by concentrating on these peripheral issues, I think, there’s a real danger that our free-speech cases will go off in a bad direction. In the cases that we’ve had that I think involve core free speech. . . the chief example that I would give from my time on the Court is the Citizens United case. . . . [N[ow that [case] came out five to four . . . . Citizens United, I think, is core political speech. It is a video about a candidate for the Presidency of the United States. If that’s not protected by First Amendment free speech, by the First Amendment free speech guarantee, I don’t know what is.”

“So on things that are at the core, the Court has been shakier than it has been on these things that are at the periphery.”

Mr. Kristol: “So the argument that protecting the periphery helps protect the core doesn’t seem to hold in this case.”

Justice Alito: “I don’t think it works.”

Mr. Kristol: “You also make the argument, as I recall, in at least one or two of those three dissents, you make more of a positive argument for the virtues, for the right, for . . . the ability of the community to draw certain boundaries around civility or civilized behavior almost, mostly in the case of the soldiers’ funerals or all of them really, the animal cruelty [and the] lying [case]. Those are all things a community would have a reasonable interest in discouraging, to say the least.”

Justice Alito: “I think that’s true. And I think that’s appropriate in cases that don’t involve political speech. I would not make the same argument in a case . . . involving political speech. I thought all of them were cabined by specific rules, very reasonable rules. So in the animal cruelty case, I thought that was very similar to the rationale . . . against child pornography. Which is that you can’t produce child pornography without abusing a child and by stamping out child pornography, or trying to stamp out child pornography, you are attacking the underlying abuse – same thing [holds true] with these crush videos. You couldn’t stamp them out without preventing the creation and the circulation of the videos. . . . I think that kind of an argument is a dangerous argument when you’re talking about political speech. . . .”

The discussion ended with some brief additional comments about hate speech in Europe.

[ht: Tony Mauro]

Commentary Read More

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FAN 67 (First Amendment News) En Banc Unanimous Ruling from DC Circuit Upholds Federal Ban on Contributions by Federal Contractors

This is quite a big deal, especially in its unanimity. — Richard Hasen, Election Law Blog

Most difficult of all to accept is that the court of appeals saw nothing amiss with the law that allows corporate contractors, their officers, directors and shareholders to make contributions within the limits of the law, but denied these individual contractors a similar opportunity. — Alan Morrison, lead counsel for the Plaintiffs

On the bright side, contractors’ rights to speak independently, through SuperPACs and otherwise, are unaffected; while the court didn’t reach that issue, the government is clearly much less justified in regulating that space. Ilya Shapiro, co-counsel on amicus brief in support of the Plaintiffs.

Chief Judge Merrick Garland

Chief Judge Merrick Garland

“In a victory for good government, the en banc D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals today unanimously — and correctly — rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of the federal ban on campaign contributions by federal contractors. The ban applies to corporations, other entities and individuals who have federal contracts.” That is how Fred Wertheimer of Democracy 21 described yesterday’s ruling in Wagner v. Federal Election CommissionDemocracy 21 joined with the Campaign Legal Center and Public Citizen to file an amicus brief in the Wagner case supporting the constitutionality of the government contractor contribution ban. (See 52 U.S.C. § 30119(a)(1))

The 62-page opinion was written by Chief Judge Merrick Garland, and there were no separate opinions. The other jurists sitting on the case were Circuit Judges Karen Henderson, Judith Rogers, David Tatel, Janice Rogers Brown, Kavanaugh, Sri Srinivasan, Patricia Millett, Nina Pillard, and Robert Wilkins.

Here are some highlights from Chief Judge Garland’s opinion:

  1. Standard of Review: “We . . . proceed to examine whether, with respect to § 30119, the government has “‘demonstrate[d] a sufficiently important interest and employ[ed] means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.’”
  2. Historical backdrop: “historical pedigree is significant. As the Court said in Beaumont, ‘[j]udicial deference is particularly warranted where, as here, we deal with a congressional judgment that has remained essentially unchanged throughout a century of ‘careful legislative adjustment.’ [citation] Moreover, . . . the lineage of the statute makes clear that its objects are the legitimate and important purposes that the Commission claims they are.”
  3. Quid pro quo corruption: “Of course, we would not expect to find — and we cannot demand — continuing evidence of large-scale quid pro quo corruption or coercion involving federal contractor contributions because such contributions have been banned since 1940. . . . [Even so, the] FEC has assembled an impressive, if dismaying, account of pay-to-play contracting scandals, not only in the above states, but also in New Mexico, Hawaii, Ohio, California, and elsewhere. [W]e think that the evidence canvassed thus far suffices to show that, in government contracting, the risk of quid pro quo corruption and its appearance, and of interference with merit-based administration, has not dissipated. Taken together, the record offers every reason to believe that, if the dam barring contributions were broken, more money in exchange for contracts would flow through the same channels already on display.”
  4. Significant change in government contracting: “[P]erhaps the most relevant change in government contracting over the past several decades has been the enormous increase in the government’s reliance on contractors to do work previously performed by employees. . . . If anything, that shift has only strengthened the original rationales for the contractor contribution ban by increasing the number of potential targets of corruption and coercion — targets who do not have the merit system protections available to government employees.”
  5. Different rules for federal employers vs contractors: “Increased reliance on individual contractors — particularly retirees such as Brown and Miller — also raises a concern that some former federal employees may unwittingly violate § 30119 because they are unaware that they have become subject to a different set of restrictions as contractors. However, as FEC counsel advised the court, there is no criminal violation unless the individual knows his or her conduct violates the law.”
  6. Corporations vs individual contractors: “The plaintiffs also question whether there is sufficient evidence of corruption or coercion specifically with respect to individual contractors, as compared to those organized as corporations or other kinds of firms. It is true that most of the examples set forth [earlier in our opinion] above involve firms. We see no reason, however, to believe that the motivations for corruption and coercion exhibited in those examples are inapplicable in the case of individual contractors.”
  7. Two justifications: “Our historical review makes clear that the two Court-approved justifications for limitations on campaign activities — to protect against quid pro quo corruption and its appearance, and to protect merit-based public administration — were the justifications that lay behind the contractor contribution statute.”
  8. “Closely drawn” requirement: “[T]he point of the ‘closely drawn’ test is that “‘[e]ven a significant interference with protected rights of political association may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.’” [citation] And we conclude that the ban at issue here is permissible in the circumstances that we address in this opinion: a regulation that bars only campaign contributions and that is imposed only on government contractors. . . . We do not discount the possibility that Congress could have narrowed its aim even further, targeting only certain specific kinds of government contracting or doing so only during specific periods. But as the Court has made clear, ‘most problems arise in greater and lesser gradations, and the First Amendment does not confine a State to addressing evils in their most acute form.'”
  9. Underinclusiveness: “We conclude that the contractor contribution ban is not fatally underinclusive. There is no doubt that ‘the proffered state interest actually underlies the law,” and that it can “fairly be said” that the statute “advance[s] a[] genuinely substantial governmental interest.’ [citations] The plaintiffs may well be right that the ban would be even more effective if it swept in more potential contributors. But §30119 “aims squarely at the conduct most likely to undermine” the important interests that underlie it, and ‘[w]e will not punish [Congress] for leaving open more, rather than fewer, avenues of expression, especially when there is no indication that the selective restriction of speech reflects a pretextual motive.'”

Additional claim: The Court also addressed and rejected the Fifth Amendment equal protection arguments raised by the Plaintiffs.

→ Mootness: “The plaintiffs advise us that both Wagner and Brown have now completed their federal contracts and hence are once again free to make campaign contributions. Brown, at least, has already done so.  Accordingly, Wagner’s and Brown’s claims are moot,” which leaves Plaintiff Jan Miller, whose “contract is ongoing” and therefore “his constitutional claims . . . remain alive.”

→ Reliance on Williams-YuleeThe Chief Judge cited to Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar fifteen times — e.g., “But as the [Williams-Yulee] Court has made clear, ‘most problems arise in greater and lesser gradations, and the First Amendment does not confine a State to addressing evils in their most acute form.'”

The Lawyers & Amici

  • Alan B. Morrison argued the cause for plaintiffs. With him on the briefs was Arthur B. Spitzer
  • Ilya Shapiro and Allen J. Dickerson were on the brief for amici curiae Center for Competitive Politics, et al. in support of plaintiffs.
  • Kevin Deeley, Acting Associate General Counsel, Federal Election Commission, argued the cause for defendant. With him on the briefs were Harry J. Summers, Assistant General Counsel, and Holly J. Baker and Seth E. Nesin, Attorneys.
  • J. Gerald Hebert, Scott L. Nelson, Fred Wertheimer, and Donald J. Simon were on the brief for amici curiae Campaign Legal Center, et al. in support of defendant.

* * *  *

Alan Morrison

Alan Morrison

Liberal & libertarian lawyers challenge contractor law

Alan Morrison, a seasoned appellate advocate and law professor, is known as a liberal. In 1971, for example, he worked with Ralph Nader to cofound the Public Citizen Litigation Group, the litigation arm of the famed consumer advocacy organization. In that capacity, he was the lawyer who successfully argued Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council (1976), which recognized First Amendment protection for certain kinds of commercial speech (in that case for a non-profit corporate advocacy group).

In Wagner v. FEC he was co-counsel with Arthur B. Spitzer of the ACLU in challenging a little known section of the Federal Election Campaign Act that provided: “[A]ny person who is negotiating for, or performing under, a contract with the federal government is banned from making a contribution to a political party, committee, or candidate for federal office.” In their brief to the Court of Appeals  Morrison and Spitzer argued that the three plaintiffs were prevented from making their intended campaign contributions. “One of the plaintiffs,” they noted, “is a law professor who had a contract to do a study for the Administrative Conference of the United States; the other two are retired federal employees who continue to work for their former agency on a contract basis. Unlike every other U.S. citizen who does not have a federal contract, they are forbidden by [federal law] from making a contribution of even $1 to any federal candidate, political party, or political committee.” Such a law, Morrison and Spitzer maintained, violated both the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment and the First Amendment. A lower court denied those claims, whereupon review was sought in the court of appeals. Yesterday, their hopes were dashed by a 10-0 vote.

Kevin Deeley, Acting FEC Associate General Counsel

Kevin Deeley, Acting FEC Associate General Counsel

“We are disappointed,” Morrison e-mailed me, “in the result and in the failure of the Court to appreciate the unnecessarily broad reach of the total ban on individual contractors such as these plaintiffs from making any contributions in a federal election. We were surprised at the more than dozen favorable citations to McCutcheon v. FEC, a 2014 case in which another over-broad contribution law was struck down by the Supreme Court as not being closely drawn. Even more difficult to understand were the similar number of citations to the 5-4 ruling Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, in which the candidate for judicial office was only precluded from making personal solicitations for campaign funds, while retaining the full ability to raise money through a separate committee.  Most difficult of all to accept is that the court of appeals saw nothing amiss with the law that allows corporate contractors, their officers, directors and shareholders to make contributions within the limits of the law, but denied these individual contractors a similar opportunity.”

Morrison and Spitzer received some help by way of an amicus brief submitted on their clients’ behalf by the Center for Competitive Politics and the Cato Institute. “This case presents an unusual question,” wrote Allen Dickerson for the Center and Institute (Cato’s Ilya Shapiro was co-counsel on the brief.)  “While suits challenging limits on political contributions are familiar, the statute at issue here completely prohibits a broad group of private, individual citizens from making any contribution. Such sweeping prohibitions are seldom enacted, and courts have rarely assessed their constitutionality. Nevertheless, the limited pronouncements made by the Supreme Court on the subject suggest that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review in this instance” and that the appellants should, therefore, prevail.”  They did not.

Ilya Shapiro

Ilya Shapiro

Here is how Ilya Shapiro summed up his response to the Wagner decision: “This is a fascinating and fairly technical opinion, ultimately disappointing to those like me who supported the challenge but probably not one that will have repercussions beyond politically minded contractors. Nobody short of Justice Hugo Black has argued that the First Amendment is absolute — and while the D.C. Circuit rejected the subtle arguments made against the ban on contractor contributions, this is an argument over line-drawing rather than first principles. I still think that the ban is overbroad and that the government should have to prove that its targeted class of people is somehow too dangerous to be allowed to participate in the political process (and also that the ban applies only to that set of uniquely dangerous people). But the court disagreed — unanimously, which was the real surprise here and will alas lessen the Supreme Court’s appetite to hear the case. On the bright side, contractors’ rights to speak independently, through SuperPACs and otherwise, are unaffected; while the court didn’t reach that issue, the government is clearly much less justified in regulating that space.”

The Ramifications of Wagner: 

Over at his own blog, Lyle Denniston thinks Wagner could have important legal/political ramifications on “two other potential campaign law controversies”:

  1. “The first of those possible changes has been under study by President Obama and his White House aides for some time: a plan to issue a presidential order to force business firms doing business with the federal government to disclose publicly all of their political activity.  Although contractors are banned from making direct political contributions to candidates or campaign organizations, they may channel money into politics in other ways.” [ See Daniel I. Weiner, Lawrence Norden & Brent Ferguson, “Requiring Government Contractors to Disclose Political Spending,” Brennan Center for Justice ]
  2. “The second possible revision was a study by the Internal Revenue Service — now suspended, perhaps for an indefinite period, because of political opposition — to revise the rules on eligibility fo tax-exempt status of private groups that are active in funding federal election campaigns. Current IRS rules allow many such groups to gain tax-exempt status on the theory that they are doing ‘charitable’ work. The IRS had draft plans to severely restrict that status for such groups.”

Professor David Skover, co-author of When Money Speaks: The McCutcheon Decision, Campaign Finance Laws, and the First Amendment (2014), had this to say about the Wagner ruling:

Considering the elimination of all issues involving independent expenditures, the ruling in this case is not surprising. Despite some obvious differences between the Hatch Act and the law challenged here, a First Amendment victory would have put into question the continuing viability of the Hatch Act and Letter Carriers, and that the Circuit Court judges were clearly unwilling to do.

See also: Charles Tiefer, “Today’s Wagner Decision Encourages an Obama Order on Campaign Contributions by Federal Contractors,” Forbes, July 7, 2015

Newseum Releases 2015 State of the First Amendment Report Read More

0

FAN 65.1 (First Amendment News) Court vacates & remands three 1-A cases

When it issued its orders list today, the Supreme Court did the following:

  1. In Berger v. American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina it granted the petition for certiorari; the judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for further consideration in light of Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans (2015).
  2. In Thayer v. City of Worcester the petition certiorari was granted; the judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit for further consideration in light of Reed v. Town of Gilbert (2015), and
  3. In Central Radio Co., Inc. v. City of Norfolk the petition certiorari was granted;the judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for further consideration in light of Reed v. Town of Gilbert (2015).

The Court’s 2014-2015 Free Expression Docket

[last updated: 6-29-15 — what remains on the docket will either be resolved at “clean up” conference this Term or dealt with in late September when the Court has a “long conference.”]

Cases Decided 

  1. Elonis v. United States (argue: 12-1-14 / decided: June 1, 2015) (8-1 per Roberts) (statutory-based ruling)
  2. Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar (argued: Jan. 20, 2015 / decided: April 29, 2015) (5-4 per Roberts)
  3. Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans (argued 3-23-15 / decided 6-18-15) (5-4 per Breyer)
  4. Reed v. Town of Gilbert (argued 1-12-15 / decided 6-18-15) (9-0 per Thomas)

Pending Petitions*

  1. Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, et al. (4-27-15: The Court asked the Calif. AG to respond to the petition)
  2. Center for Competitive Politics v. Harris (emergency application for injunction pending Cert.)

Review Denied*

  1. Walker-McGill v. Stuart
  2. O’Keefe v. Chisholm
  3. King v. Christie
  4. Apel v. United States 
  5. Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified School District
  6. The Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Education of the City of New York 
  7. Arneson v. 281 Care Committee
  8. Kagan v. City of New Orleans
  9. ProtectMarriage.com-Yes on 8 v. Bowen
  10. Clayton v. Niska
  11. Pregnancy Care Center of New York v. City of New York 
  12. City of Indianapolis, Indiana v. Annex Books, Inc.
  13. Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc. v. United States 
  14. Mehanna v. United States
  15. Stop This Insanity Inc Employee Leadership Fund et al  v. Federal Election Commission
  16. Vermont Right to Life Committee, et al v. Sorrell

Though these lists are not comprehensive, I try to track as many cases as possible. If you know of a cert. petition that is not on these lists, kindly inform me and I will post it.   

9

Crisis of the Dissents Divided? — Disagreement among the Obergefell Four

imagesIn the various news feeds and pundit commentaries concerning the recent same-sex marriage case, the focus has been on the divide between the majority and dissenting opinions. Some side with the majority, others with the dissenters. Putting such differences aside for the moment, what is noteworthy is that while the Justices in the majority all spoke with one voice, the same was not true for the dissenters.

Though the judgment in Obergefell v. Hodges was 5-4, none of the four separate dissents garnered more than a total of three votes:

  • 3 votes: Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent — joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas
  • 3 votes: Justice Alito’s dissent — joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas
  • 2 votes: Justice Scalia’s dissent — joined by Justice Thomas
  • 2 votes: Justice Thomas’ dissent — joined by Justice Scalia

Notably, neither the Chief Justice nor Justice Alito signed onto any of the other dissents. Why?

The Scalia Dissent: Too confrontational?

UnknownWhile the Chief Justice and Justice Alito share many of the constitutional concerns stated by Justice Scalia (e.g., the need for judicial restraint, adherence to precedent, undermining the political process, and deference to the traditional roles of the states), they tend to be uneasy with the kind of in-your-face confrontational tone Justice Scalia employed in his unrestrained dissent.

It is a tried-and-true canon of civility: Attempt to avoid confrontational terms or phrases such as “hubris,” “egotistic,” “mummeries,” and “silly extravagances.” By that creed of civility it is unnecessarily vituperative to equate another Justice’s reasoning with “mystical aphorisms of the fortune cookie” or “pop-philosophy” or to refer to that Justice’s opinion as “judicial Putsch” – even if the seriousness of the latter is “not of immense personal importance” to you.

The Thomas Dissent: Too cabined or too natural law focused?

UnknownThe Chief Justice and Justice Alito also did not sign onto Justice Thomas’ dissent. Why? Though it is more difficult to answer this question, one explanation is a possible disagreement over the contours of due process as Justice Thomas offered it up. That is, his conservative colleagues may have been uncomfortable with Thomas’ reliance on Blackstonian notions of due process – notions perhaps too cabined for their constitutional tastes. Consider in this regard Professor Michael Dorf’s observation over at SCOTUSblog: “To the extent that Justice Thomas would allow any substantive due process, it would be for the liberty of movement only, and failing that, for no more than negative liberties. Marriage, as state recognition, would not be a fundamental right for anyone.”

And then there is Justice Thomas’ invocation of natural law and natural rights. The debate over the use and relevance of natural law has been an ongoing one in conservative circles. On that score, Chief Justice Roberts’ former boss, William Rehnquist, once found himself in the crosshairs of controversy brought on by a defender of natural law. See Harry V. Jaffa, Storm over the Constitution (1999) and his Original Intent and the Framers of the Constitution: A Disputed Question (1994) and his article “Judicial Conscience and Natural Rights,” 11 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 219 (1987).

The Alito Dissent: Reservations about the “further decay” of marriage argument?

(drawing by Arthur Lien: courtartist.com)

(drawing by Arthur Lien: courtartist.com)

While there is much similarity between the Roberts and Alito dissents on matters such as due process, equal protection, and the specter of vilifying people of faith, both nonetheless declined to affirm the other’s dissent. What might explain the Chief Justice’s unwillingness?

Did he have some reservations about the following?: “the tie between marriage and procreation has frayed. Today, for instance, more than 40% of all children in this country are born to unmarried women. This development undoubtedly is both a cause and a result of changes in our society’s understanding of marriage. While, for many, the attributes of marriage in 21st-century America have changed, those States that do not want to recognize same-sex marriage have not yet given up on the traditional understanding. They worry that by officially abandoning the older understanding, they may contribute to marriage’s further decay.”

The Roberts Dissent: Too charitable?

(credit: WSJ)

(credit: WSJ)

If you believe (as Justice Alito seems to) that same-sex marriages may contribute to the “further decay” of marriage, then you are unlikely to be as generous of spirit as the Chief Justice was when he declared: “If you are among the many Americans — of whatever sexual orientation — who favor expanding same-sex marriage, by all means celebrate today’s decision. Celebrate the achievement of a desired goal. Celebrate the opportunity for a new expression of commitment to a partner. Celebrate the availability of new benefits. . . .” By the same normative token, Justice Alito is not one who would appear to be inclined to say: “Many people will rejoice at [today’s] decision, and I begrudge none their celebration.”

Or what about this Roberts’ statement?: “The opinion describes the ‘transcendent importance’ of marriage and repeatedly insists that petitioners do not seek to ‘demean,’ ‘devalue,’ ‘denigrate,’ or ‘disrespect’ the institution. . . . Nobody disputes those points.” Nobody?

Here, too, speculation is more the measure than certainty.

Crisis of the Dissents Divided?

However close my speculations are to the mark, one thing is certain: there was no unanimity of thought strong enough to convince the four dissenting Justices to lend all of their names to a single opinion. Despite their strong differences with the majority opinion, they, too, had reservations about one another’s views of law and life and how those differences should be expressed.

* * * * 

(credit: NYT)

(credit: NYT)

On a related point: What are we to make of the fact that none of the four liberal Justices who signed onto Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell found it necessary, or desirable, to write separate concurrences? The same was true with Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer in Romer v. Evans (1996) and Lawrence v. Texas (2003), and later with Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan in United States v. Windsor (2013).

One would think that these four Justices would push for a more protective conception of equal protection concerning discrimination against gays and lesbians. No? Then again, perhaps these four think the body of law tracing back to at least Romer will suffice.  And so far it has.