Category: Religion


Can We Tolerate Tolerance?  

This is the third in a series of occasional short essays about free speech in America. Earlier installments can be found here and here.

We live in a tolerant society. Of course, that is an exaggeration. But when it comes to so many flashpoint issues – ranging from blasphemy to race-hate speech – we are far more tolerant than almost all other nations, so much so that we are routinely criticized for being too tolerant. It is our badge of honor . . . and dishonor.

Professor Mark Lilla

Professor Mark Lilla

Mindful of the events in France and Denmark earlier this year, I wonder: Will we continue to tolerate toleration if our world takes a terrible turn? My question has less to do with what is being tagged as the “terrorist’s veto” than with a more complex problem, and one therefore even more difficult to resolve. This problem occurred to me when I first read an eye-opening essay by Mark Lilla in the New York Review of Books, an essay entitled “France on Fire.” Here is a very brief excerpt:

“For the past quarter-century a political and intellectual culture war over the place of Islam in French society has been bubbling along, and every few years some event — a student wears a burka to school, riots erupt in a poor neighborhood, a mosque is attacked, the National Front wins a local election — renews hostilities.”

I want to extrapolate from that essay (at once insightful and provocative) in order to outline a phenomenon that may be hurling our way, a phenomenon related to toleration and dissident speech.

Before I do, however, let turn to the glorious side of the toleration equation by way of a well-known case, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943). Recall the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ flag-salute case, the one with that liberty-inspiring majority opinion by Justice Robert Jackson. In words that should be fixed in every lawmaker’s consciousness, Jackson declared: “Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.” The judgment in that case affirming First Amendment freedom is all the more amazing given that it was rendered in wartime and involved a religious sect that was then very much hated in various quarters of American society. (See Shawn Francis Peters, Judging Jehovah’s Witnesses: Religious Persecution and the Dawn of the Rights Revolution (2000).)

The (Hypothetical) Problem

Against that backdrop, imagine the following scenario. Assume that the editors of a respectable libertarian magazine elected to publish several satirical cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in order to make a First Amendment point and to take a stand against the “terrorist’s veto.” Assume thereafter that the Charlie Hebdo incident replayed itself in Cincinnati (the headquarters of my hypothetical magazine). Ten people who work for the magazine are murdered and two Muslim extremists take credit. Both of the terrorists are later killed in a shootout with police that also results in the deaths of two local police officers.

Here is where I begin to extrapolate from Professor Lilla’s essay. Now assume the following additional scenarios, replete with a few quotations from the Lilla essay”

  1. The Governor of Ohio calls for a moment of mourning with heads bowed on the day following the tragedy (say, the time is 11:00 a.m.);
  2. A “noticeable number” of Muslim public high school students in Cincinnati refuse, on religious and political grounds, to bow their heads;
  3. “And not only that. Some [tell] their teachers that the victims got what they deserved because no one should be allowed to mock the Prophet”;
  4. “Others celebrate the killers on social media, and circulate rumors that the entire crisis was manufactured by the government and/or Zionist agents”; and
  5. The parents (some of whom work for state and local governments) of some of these Muslim-American students speak openly (though not at work) to defend their children and endorse the positions they took.

Note that the Muslim-Americans in the above scenarios were otherwise peaceful and law abiding. And some Muslim-American leaders sought to counteract the messages of the violent extremists among them. That said, let me stir the pot a bit more with a few more scenarios and related questions:

  1. So far as government entities are involved, how far are we willing to go to accommodate (culturally, statutorily, and constitutionally) the religious views of the more observant and separatist Muslim-Americans who harbor what we would see as extreme views concerning homosexuality, female purity, and Jews and Israel?
  2. Finally, let me again from quote Professor Lilla to raise a final question: Some “students and their parents demand separate swimming hours or refuse to let their children go on school trips where the sexes might mix. . . . There are fathers who won’t shake hands with female teachers, or let their wives speak alone to male teachers. There are cases of children refusing to sing, or dance, or learn an instrument, or draw a face, or use a mathematical symbol that resembles a cross. The question of dress and social mixing has led to the abandonment of gym classes in many places. Children also feel emboldened to refuse to read authors or books that they find religiously unacceptable: Rousseau, Molière, and Madame Bovary. Certain subjects are taboo: evolution, sex ed, the Shoah. As one father told a teacher, ‘I forbid you to mention Jesus to my son.’” Does our commitment to religious freedom extend that far so as to accommodate the genuine religious views of those who hold them?

Let me be clear: I do not mean to demean Muslim-Americans as a class, nor do I wish to be understood as saying the above scenarios mirror the sentiments of most Muslim-Americans . I trust they are not. Then again, I may disagree with some of them, and sometimes vigorously, on several of the issues flagged above. But I also believe in toleration, and the ever-present need to be sensitive to the plight of minorities of all ideological, political, and religious stripes.

So where does that leave us?

Testing Our Tolerance Read More


FAN 74 (First Amendment News) Summer thoughts on dissent

Before the summer runs its course, I thought I’d do a post on one of my favorite topics — dissent. So no news this week, just some thoughts on dissent — and some lists of books, and songs, and what have you.

Take dissent out of the cultural and constitutional equation and what remains is faint-hearted freedom. Dissent gives free speech its steel. One of the First Amendment’s greatest virtues is the protection of those messages we fear and/or loathe — those sent our way by insufferable Anti-Federalists, abolitionists, suffragists, unionists, anarchists, Communists, atheists, civil-rights activists, anti-war pacifists, gay-rights antagonists, Tea Party supporters, religious zealots, the politically incorrect, and even nihilists.

* * * *

William F. Buckley, Jr.

William F. Buckley, Jr.

Dissent. It is a word we all know. We use the word with regularity in any variety of contexts. Judges dissent against a court majority. Political activists dissent against the establishment. Religious protesters dissent against orthodoxy. Students dissent against an administration. Newspaper editorialists dissent against politicians. And employees dissent against management. The list goes on.

In these ways and others, America values dissent, or so it seems. We often tolerate, encourage, and protect dissent. It is part of our Madisonian heritage. Some preach it, some practice it, others safeguard it, and still others endure it even when they oppose its message. Dissent is a salient feature of our modern society. It is a cultural and constitutional given.

Over the ages, dissent has been championed for assorted reasons. Dissent, it might be said, promotes self-realization and autonomy. It enables individual self-expression without fear of societal repression. The liberty of self is meaningless if one must always conform to majority will. Freedom for the outsider allows a unique brand of self-identity and self-expression.

Dissent, it might be said, advances religious freedom. When people of faith are permitted to question prevailing beliefs, they stand to redefine the relationship between themselves and their Maker. This spirit of moderation extinguishes the fires of heresy.

Dissent, it might also be said, contributes to the marketplace of ideas. It does this by promoting competition among divergent viewpoints. The hope is that, in the battle of opinions, some form of truth will prevail over falsehood, and the struggle will produce a more enlightened citizenry.

(credit: Adam Zyglis / The Buffalo News)

(credit: Adam Zyglis / The Buffalo News)

Dissent, it might further be said, enables self-governance by civic participation. Such participation is a two-way street: it is the prerogative to agree or disagree with governmental action. When the governed rule, they must have the right to differ from their governors.

Dissent likewise checks governmental abuses of power. When the whistleblower exposes governmental corruption or malfeasance, political power then comes under public scrutiny. By raising citizen awareness, dissent might bring about institutional reforms.

Dissent might moreover cultivate a democratic culture of tolerance, where all views are suffered no matter how objectionable they may be. Democracy is diversity, and diversity of views is often born out of dissent. One measure of a thriving democracy is the extent to which it fosters vibrant dissent.

Finally, it might also be said that a culture of dissent secures a safe haven for the outsider. When individuals no longer fear censure simply for being different, they can give public voice to their private views. Thereby, dissenters are afforded a chance to expand the behavioral boundaries of their society.

Whatever the objections to dissent, it is valued for all these reasons and others.  (source: Collins & Skover, On Dissent: Its Meaning in America)

Unknown rebel in front of tank in Tiananmen Square (credit: The Mirror, UK)

Unknown rebel in front of tank in Tiananmen Square (credit: The Mirror, UK)

Books of and on Dissent 

  1. Pierre Berton, editor, Voices from the Sixties: Twenty-Two Views of a Revolutionary Decade (1966)
  2. William F. Buckley, Jr., God and Man at Yale: The Superstitions of “Academic Freedom” (1951)
  3. Stokely Carmichael & Charles Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America (1976)
  4. Stephen Carter, The Dissent of the Governed (1998)
  5. Nancy Chang, Silencing Political Dissent (2002)
  6. Collins & Skover, On Dissent: Its Meaning in America (2013)
  7. Dinesh D’Souza, Letters to a Young Conservative (2005)
  8. William O. Douglas, Points of Rebellion (1969)
  9. Christopher Fairman, Fuck: Word Taboo and Protecting our First Amendment Liberties (2009)
  10. Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (1963)
  11.  Amin Ghaziani, The Dividends of Dissent: How Conflict and Culture Work in Lesbian and Gay Marches on Washington (2008)
  12. Christopher Hitchens, God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (2009)
  13. Andrew Hsiao & Audrea Lim, editors, The Verso Book of Dissent: From Spartacus to the Shoe-Thrower of Baghdad (2010)
  14.  Eugene Dennis

                   Eugene Dennis

    Martin Luther King, Letter From a Birmingham Jail (1963) (full text here)

  15. Anthony Lewis, Freedom for the Thought That We Hate: A Biography of the First Amendment (2007)
  16. Robert W.T. Martin, Government by Dissent: Protest, Resistance, and Radical Democratic Thought in the Early American Republic (2013)
  17. Kate Millett, Sexual Politics (1970)
  18. Jack Newfield, editor, American Rebels (2003)
  19. The Port Huron Statement: The Visionary Call of the 1960s Revolution (1962, 2005)
  20. Michael Ratner & Margaret Ratner Kunstler, Hell No: Your Right to Dissent in 21st-century America (2011)
  21. Charles Reich, The Greening of America (1964)
  22. Austin Sarat, editor, Dissent in Dangerous Times (2005)
  23. Steven Shiffrin, Dissent, Injustice, and the Meanings of America (2010)
  24. Herbert Storing, editor, The Complete Anti-Federalist (1981)
  25. Cass Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent (2003)
  26. Henry David Thoreau, Jeffrey S. Cramer, editor, Essays (2013)
  27. Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (1991)
  28. Ralph Young, Dissent: The History of an American Idea (2015)
  29. Howard Zinn, Declarations of Independence: Cross-Examining American Ideology (1990)

51CmbungqBL._SX327_BO1,204,203,200_Forthcoming Books on Dissent

  1. Melvin Urofsky, Dissent and the Supreme Court: Its Role in the Court’s History and the Nation’s Constitutional Dialogue (Pantheon, October 13, 2015)
  2. Stephen D. Solomon, Revolutionary Dissent: How the Founding Generation Created the Freedom of Speech (St. Martin’s Press (April 26, 2016)
  3. Thomas Grace, Kent State: Death and Dissent in the Long Sixties (University of Massachusetts Press, January 14, 2016)
  4. Maria Rovisco & Jonathan Corpus Ong, editors, Taking the Square: Mediated Dissent and Occupations of Public Space (Rowman & Littfield, April 2016)
  5. Wendy B. Scott & Linda S. Greene, I Dissent!: The Dissenting Opinions of Justice Thurgood Marshall (Carolina Academic Press, March 11, 2016)
  6. Thomas Grace, Kent State: Death and Dissent in the Long Sixties (University of Massachusetts Press, January 14, 2016)

* * * *

 [I]f there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought — not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate. — Holmes, dissenting in United States v. Schwimmer (1929)

Editorial_cartoon_depicting_Charles_Darwin_as_an_ape_(1871)Books of and on Religious Dissent

  1. Margaret H. Bacon, The Quiet Rebels: The Story of the Quakers in America (1969)
  2. John M. Barry, Roger Williams and the Creation of the American Soul (2012)
  3. Nicholas P. Miller, The Religious Roots of the First Amendment: Dissenting Protestants and the Separation of Church and State (2012)
  4. William Lee Miller, The First Liberty, Expanded and Updated: The First Liberty: America’s Foundation in Religious Freedom (2003)
  5. Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality (2010)
  6. Shawn Francis Peters, Judging Jehovah’s Witnesses: Religious Persecution and the Dawn of the Rights Revolution (2000)
  7. John Ragosta, Wellspring of Liberty: How Virginia’s Religious Dissenters Helped Win the American Revolution & Secured Religious Liberty (2010)
  8. Stephen Stein, Communities of Dissent: A History of Alternative Religions in America (2003)
  9. Roger Williams, The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution for Cause of Conscience (1644)
  10. John Winthrop, A Short History of the Rise, Reign, and Ruin of the Antinomians, Familists, and Libertines (1644)
Bob Dylan & Joan Baez (credit: SVA Picture Collection)

Bob Dylan & Joan Baez (credit: SVA Picture Collection)

Songs of Dissent (YouTube clips)

  1. Tracy Chapman, Talkin’ bout a Revolution
  2. Sam Cooke, A Change is Gonna Come
  3. Crosby, Stills, Nash and Young, Ohio
  4. Bob Dylan, Masters of War
  5. Dylan, The Lonesome Death of Hattie Carroll
  6. Dylan, The Times They Are A-Changin
  7. Peter Gabriel, Biko
  8. Marvin Gay, What’s Goin On?
  9. Woody Guthrie, This Land is Your Land
  10. Billie Holiday, Strange Fruit
  11. Macklemore & Ryan Lewis (feat. Mary Lambert), Same Love 
  12. Barry McGuire, Eve of Destruction (Reply: Barry Sadler, Ballad of the Green Berets)
  13. N.W.A., Fuk Da The Police
  14. Phil Ochs, I Ain’t Marching Anymore
  15. The Plastic Ono Band, Give Peace a Chance
  16. Public Enemy, Fight the Power
  17. Nina Simome

             Nina Simone

    Rage Against the Machine, Killing in the Name

  18. Pete Seeger sings Woody Guthrie Deportee
  19. Seeger, We Shall Overcome
  20. Nina Simone, Mississippi Goddam
  21. Todd Snider, Ballad of the Kingsmen 
  22. Buffalo Springfield, For What It’s Worth
  23. Buffy St Marie, Universal Soldier
  24. U2, Sunday Bloody Sunday
  25. Suzanne Vega, Luka
  26. The Wailers, Get Up, Stand Up

Last Scheduled FAN #73: “D.C. Circuit strikes down SEC “conflict minerals” rule by 2-1 margin

Next Scheduled FAN #75: September 2, 2015


“Agents of Hope”

A few random thoughts inspired by Rabbi Suzanne Singer’s “Judaism & Hope” sermon.

It cannot be denied: To live is to hope – that somehow, against all odds, evil will not triumph; that somehow, in the face of heartless bigotry, hatred will not prevail; and that somehow needless suffering (despite the toll of human misery) will abate.  To hope for a better plight is as vital to the human spirit as white blood cells are to the human body.

But what is this hope, and how is it to be realized, if at all?

Hope is struggle. It is more than a child’s naive wish, and it is quite different from an optimist’s blind faith in a benign future. It is a commitment to change – a change for a better world. It is active rather than passive; it seeks to move the world rather than wait to be moved by it. Seize the day, push the rock!

Hope trades in chance . . . in the chance that at a particular pinpoint in time life may get better. Thus our hope must be humble and patient; we must understand that the future may not come in time to save us. Hence our hope must be sober-minded; it must not be unduly romantic; it must not trade in the intoxicating promises of panacea.

Hope is a process; it is that spirit within us that struggles on and on in the face of discouraging prospects depressing enough to turn a man to stone. And why engage in such seemingly Sisyphean acts? Because to live is to struggle, not thoughtlessly, but with a commitment to justice and kindness and all other things that improve the human condition. Struggle gives fiber to hope.

Heed his words: I do not give the human race more than one chance in a thousand, but I would be less than a man if I did not act on that chance. So wrote Albert Camus, the Resistance fighter who in the darkest of moments did not lose hope in the cause of humankind to be better than it was at a time when malice and barbarity seemed unconquerable. By hope’s standards, had evil prevailed, Camus’ hope would not have been any less genuine or important. For what counted most was the struggle, the will to improve the plight of so many millions uprooted from the soil that gives life meaning.

The moral: Hope is a prayer that may go unanswered in one’s lifetime, but it is an act of the highest human order. In its noblest form, it touches that something buried deep within us that denounces evil and affirms goodness. If hope dies today, it does so in the belief that it will inspire yet more hope for tomorrow, which alas, may usher in the springtime of a new season of humanity.

As an aspiration worthy of our shared respect, hope must be something other than a commitment to greed. To be sure, one can hope to become a billionaire and dedicate herself to that quest, and to do so for no more than the sake of pride and pleasure. But the hope of which I speak is not the hope of avarice. It deals not in the wheel of roulette.

If hope is to be a virtue, it must be virtuous; it must speak to the best in each of us. Take, for example, the woman who amasses a fortune with the hope of rebuilding a temple leveled by a terrorist’s bomb or with the hope of sponsoring a group to repair the limbs of wounded soldiers – that kind of hope converts money into humanity.

There is a line in Rabbi Singer’s sermon that touched a nerve in me; it is this: Hope, not out of victory and success, but hope out of defeat and despair. We turn to hope because we cannot abide despair; our psyches simply cannot endure the hopeless specter of a Nietzschean nightmare cast eternally. By that measure, there is something therapeutic in hope, and that something helps us go on with our lives. Hope is an antidote to the melancholy that can rob one of the will to live.

To echo Rabbi Jonathan Sachs’s words: To be a Jew is to be an agent of hope in a world seriously threatened by despair. How heartening those words! To that end, may the agents of hope help to remake our world, repair our hearts, repel our fears, and rekindle that spark within us that longs for light. Or to draw from Simone Weil, “there is only one fault: incapacity to feed upon light . . . .”


FAN 53.1 (First Amendment News) U. Maryland Law to Host Conference: “The Impact of the First Amendment on American Business”

e5eb96fc377fcf9f7e18eb56d245dca1The 2015 Symposium (March 27th), “The Impact of the First Amendment on American Businesses,” will facilitate a discussion on the effects and consequences of First Amendment jurisprudence on businesses. The symposium will specifically cover the areas of commercial speech, religious exemptions for businesses, and rights of businesses to use technology appropriately. This event will be located at University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, and is open to anyone interested in attending, including students, lawyers, and scholars.

Welcome and Introductory Remarks
Dean Donald TobinUniversity of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law

Keynote Speaker 1
Travis LeBlanc, Federal Communications Commission

Panel 1: First Amendment and Commercial Speech Relating to Health

Jane Bambauer, University of Arizona School of Law
Adam Candeub, Michigan State University College of Law
Stephanie Greene, Boston College & Greene LLP
Kathleen Hoke, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law
Wendy Wagner, University of Texas at Austin School of Law

Panel 2: First Amendment and Technology

Hillary Greene,  University of Connecticut School of Law
James Grimmelmann, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law
Glenn Kaleta, Microsoft Corporation
Renee Knake, Michigan State University College of Law
Neil Richards, Washington University School of Law
Felix Wu, Yeshiva University Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law

Panel 3: Religious Exemptions for Corporations

Caroline Corbin, University of Miami School of Law
Michelle Harner, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law
Louise Melling, American Civil Liberties Union
Jennifer Taub, Vermont Law School
Nelson Tebbe, Brooklyn Law School

Keynote Speaker 2

Tamara PietyUniversity of Tulsa School of Law

Closing Remarks

Danielle CitronUniversity of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law

For additional information, please contact Joella Roland, Executive Symposium & Manuscripts Editor, via email at

ht: Neil Richards 


Photographic License to Discriminate?

The loosening of restrictions on same-sex marriage over the last decade has been accompanied by the refusal of persons opposed to such unions to participate in them in any way. Naturally, the law requires no one to show up and cheer at a same-sex wedding or commitment ceremony, but what if a county clerk did not want to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples or a health care worker refused to perform the necessary blood tests? Obviously, some objections to marriage will intrude on a couple’s ability to marry more than others.


The key to understanding which objections are legal and which are not does not only lie in guarantees of religious freedom. Everyone is free to harbor religious or philosophical opposition to same-gender couples and to shout that message from the rooftops, as long as they do not create a nuisance in doing so. It is in jurisdictions that have enacted prohibitions on sexual orientation discrimination in public accommodations where those who peddle their wares in the public marketplace are not allowed to reject customers for being gay. In such jurisdictions, religious opponents to same-sex unions have every right to voice their objections in church and to teach their children that it is wrong to be gay. If these opponents open up shop in the local marketplace, however, they are required to leave their biases at home.

New Mexico has such a law. Elaine Huguenin is a talented photographer who makes a good living recording important moments in the lives of the people of Albuquerque. In 2006 she decided to refuse the request of a lesbian couple that she be the photographer at their commitment ceremony. When sued, Huguenin, obviously aware that her religious freedom argument would have no traction under decades-old Supreme Court precedent, came up with the novel argument that if she were required to photograph the ceremony, she would be forced to celebrate it and to express that she is accepting of same-sex marriage. This is a story that Huguenin did not want to tell.

Huguenin’s argument sounds as if it was lifted from the Supreme Court’s Boy Scouts of America v. Dale decision. But since her “expressive policy” is merely to make money with her camera, she gave the argument a twist. She insisted that artists, since they create protected speech, must be free to choose what customers they will serve and will not.

While I have no reason to doubt that Huguenin is an artist of the highest caliber with a special flair for photographic storytelling, I fail to see how her status elevates her above someone who merely hires herself out to record an event. I am certain there have been many occasions when the contract between Huguenin and her customers has constrained her to adhere to provisions about how and when, to what degree and in what format they want their stories told. But the question here is not whether Huguenin can refuse to sign a contract whose provisions offend her artistic sensibilities. The question is whether she can refuse her services because the customers are gay. In Huguenin’s case, at least, an argument for carving out an exception in the law for artists is not likely to carry the day.

Furthermore, the law in this case simply does not force Huguenin to make art in a way not of her choosing or to utter a statement that is against her religion. First, it is a given that Huguenin will tell the story of an event in her own way. She is, after all, the one behind the camera. Second, as someone hired to take pictures at the event, she participates primarily as an observer who has some interaction with the major players when she stages certain photographs. More important than the fact that she is not truly there to celebrate is the fact that her hired presence in no way implies an expression that she believes in the goodness of the proceedings.

If Huguenin wants to turn a profit in the economic environment the State of New Mexico provides her, the citizens of that state have declared that there are certain business decisions she may not make. The good news for those who want to discriminate nonetheless is that relatively few jurisdictions in this country have public accommodations laws that forbid sexual orientation discrimination. Right next door to New Mexico, Arizona has such laws only at the local level in Tucson and Phoenix. There is also a paucity of public accommodations protections in neighboring Texas and Oklahoma. It should thus be relatively easy for Huguenin to find her way to a place where she is truly free to marry her business practices with her religious convictions.


Shuffling Constitutional Cards

You cannot bring an as-applied challenge to a general law that burdens your free exercise of religion.  This is the holding of Employment Division v. Smith (or at least the basic holding–there are some qualifications).  Suppose I instead bring a free speech claim on behalf of my desire to say a prayer or do something religious.  You can make an as-applied challenge to a general law on free speech grounds.  How should a court address this sort of claim?

I ask because the New Mexico wedding photographers who were found liable for violating the state’s non-discrimination law because they refused to shoot a same-sex commitment ceremony made both claims (free exercise and free speech) in state court.  In their certiorari petition, though, they are only making a free speech claim.  Can these claims be separated? In other words, if the motivation is religious, then shouldn’t Smith apply?  If not, isn’t it pretty easy to circumvent Smith? And doesn’t the distinction between free speech and free exercise require courts to make sensitive judgments about what constitutes a genuine religious claim?



“The Divine Institution of Marriage”: An Overview of LDS Involvement in the Proposition 8 Campaign

I’ve just posted to SSRN my article in the forthcoming St. John’s Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development. This article is part of the recent Symposium on Same-Sex Marriage at St. John’s.

My article is largely descriptive, setting out in some detail the LDS (Mormon) church’s actions and statements relating to Proposition 8. It chronicles a significant amount of factual material that has not been discussed at all in the existing legal literature. It may be especially relevant to people who have an interest in Proposition 8, same-sex marriage issues, gay rights issues generally, or LDS church issues generally. Full abstract follows past the jump: Read More


Vouchers ascendant?

The heartening (and unanimous) decision by the Indiana Supreme Court on Tuesday to uphold that state’s school-voucher program further undermines a dominant but false narrative in the academy, to the effect that school vouchers are a distraction with little serious political support. The opinion is notable for several reasons, and I expect to post again about some of them. Here I note only two. First, the Indiana program makes enormous numbers of children voucher-eligible. Second, the Indiana court’s analysis makes some interesting and important moves with respect to both its constitution’s religion and education clauses.

Read More


“Mutual Adjustment” as (merely) congruence delayed

I am delighted by and grateful for the opportunity to participate in the Concurring Opinions symposium on Jim and Linda’s engaging, important, and challenging new book, Ordered Liberty.  And, the contributions so far have managed the tough task of enriching what was already the very welcome opportunity to read and think about the book.

I have — like Linda and Jim, though I’m sure not with their success — tried to think and write about “civil society” and “seedbeds of virtue” (here), about the tension and even conflicts between liberty and equality (here), and about the moral and legal rights of parents to direct and control — within some limits — the education of their children (here). Ordered Liberty has given me a needed opportunity to re-visit and re-think some of what I’ve said and thought, and I’m sure that process will continue.

At the end of the day, and at the end of the book, I suppose there’s no avoiding the fact that I continue to have doubts about “constitutional liberalism” as Jim and Linda present and defend it; I continue to think that the Constitution is best regarded primarily, and more prosaically, as a mechanism for (limited-purpose and limited-reach) lawmaking, the operation of which is constrained by “negative” rights-protections; I think that the claims of families, associations, and churches to remain out-of-sync with current political majorities, or with liberalism more generally, are even stronger than Jim and Linda acknowledge; and I think that those scholars who “are preoccupied with the limited institutional capacities of courts” are, well, probably right to be so.  But, it probably does not add much to this symposium simply to report my hard-headedness or general reservations.

So, a more focused thought on a particular part of the book:  In Chapter 6 (“Conflicts between Liberty and Equality”), Linda and Jim use four familiar cases (Roberts, Dale, Bob Jones, and Christian Legal Society) to “illustrate the struggles between the formative projects of civil society and government and between competing visions of diversity and pluralism.”  Fair enough — these case do indeed illustrate these struggles.  But, at the end of the chapter, and at the end of book, I didn’t feel like I had been given or had found what I thought was promised, i.e., “a framework for resolving clashes of rights so as to promote ordered liberty and equality citizenship for all.”  That is, despite the use of the term “mutual adjustment”, it did not appear to me that what was presented in the concluding pages and paragraphs of the chapter was so much a “framework” for resolving the described clashes through pluralism-appreciating “adjustment” as it was a declaration that the ultimate and to-be-desired resolution of these clashes in favor of the “liberal” position will often be facilitated by “prudential” “interim” strategies like religious exemptions.  To be told by the liberal-constitutional state that — not to worry — it is willing to go slow in bringing dissenting or just different associations into congruence will not, I imagine, be very comforting to those who wonder why that state assumes it has the legitimate authority to insist on congruence now or later.


Papal Domain Names

The upcoming election and (nearly) unprecedented abdication of Pope Benedict XVI raises several fascinating questions.  What if he changes his mind next week?  Can he withdraw his resignation? What do you call an ex-Pope?  Pope Emeritus?  Your Former Holiness?  It’s also worth noting that Benedict changed the rule on papal elections to require a 2/3 majority in the conclave.  John Paul II had instituted a rule that would (after a certain number of ballots) permit less than 2/3 of the eligible cardinals to elect a Pope.

From a trademark angle, a papal election means another free-for-all on possible papal domain names.  Last time around, somebody grabbed up every address that could be used if you assumed that the new Pope would pick a name that was chosen before.  He then donated Benedict XVI’s name to the Vatican–apparently he just wanted to keep the names out of the hands of a critic of Catholicism.  Perhaps the same guy is doing that now.  Nothing stops you from getting in on this gold rush though, unless the new Pope crosses us up and pick an entirely new name.