Category: Military Law


FAN 68 (First Amendment News) Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces to hear “true threats” case

The Court’s disposition of this case is certain to cause confusion and serious problems. Attorneys and judges need to know which mental state is required for conviction under 18 U. S. C. §875(c), an important criminal statute. This case squarely presents that issue, but the Court provides only a partial answer. The Court holds that the jury instructions in this case were defective because they required only negligence in conveying a threat. — Justice Samuel Alito, concurring & dissenting in part in Elonis v. U.S. 

UnknownThe Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (the highest military court) has just agreed to review a “true threats” case in United States v. Rapert (No. 15-0476/AR). The issue the five-member court will consider is “whether the finding of guilty .  . . for communicating a threat is legally insufficient because the comments are constitutionally protected and do not constitute a threat under the totality of circumstances and in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Elonis v. United States (2015).” 

As reported in CAAFLOG, there is no opinion in Rapert on the Army Court of Criminal Appeals’ website, which may be because that “court summarily affirmed the conviction.” Communicating a threat is an  Article 134 UCMJ, offense, which not only requires some misconduct (i.e., communicating a threat), but also that the conduct is either prejudicial to good order and discipline or service discrediting.

As  Zachary Spilman pointed out in his CAAFLOG post: “for [Eric L.] Rapert a footnote in a recent CAAF opinion looms large.” That opinion is United States v. Goings, 72 M.J. 202, 205 n.3 (C.A.A.F. 2013) and the pertinent language in a footnote in that case is:

From start to finish, the contested issue in the case was whether Appellant’s conduct met the terminal element of Article 134, UCMJ. Appellant argued that his conduct was insufficient to meet the terminal element, in part, because, in his view, his conduct would be constitutionally protected in a non-military setting. The trier of fact disagreed, and the ACCA concluded that the evidence was legally sufficient. What amounts to an argument that the Government has not put forth legally sufficient evidence to support an Article 134, UCMJ, conviction is fundamentally different from a constitutional argument that, in the military context, Appellant’s conduct is protected.

 (ht: Jeffrey Barnum)

Update on Elonis on remand to 3rd Circuit: According to Ronald H. Levine, who argued the Elonis case in the Third Circuit, “the Third Circuit has not yet acted other than to recall its original mandate. Whether it will vacate and remand to the district court or seek briefing per the concurrence of Justice Alito is unknown.”

Headline: “Lawmakers want Internet sites to flag ‘terrorist activity’ to law enforcement”

Screen Shot 2015-07-14 at 1.35.09 PMA story in the Washington Post by Ellen Nakashima reports that “[s]ocial media sites such as Twitter and YouTube would be required to report videos and other content posted by suspected terrorists to federal authorities under legislation approved this past week by the Senate Intelligence Committee. The measure, contained in the 2016 intelligence authorization, which still has to be voted on by the full Senate, is an effort to help intelligence and law enforcement officials detect threats from the Islamic State and other terrorist groups.”

“. . . It would not require companies to monitor their sites if they do not already do so, said a committee aide, who requested anonymity because the bill has not yet been filed. The measure applies to ‘electronic communication service providers,’ which includes e-mail services such as Google and Yahoo. . . .”

Senate Bill 1705: Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016: The relevant provision of the proposed measure is Section 603: Requirement to report terrorist activities and the unlawful distribution of information relating to explosives.

Subsection (a) of section 603 concerns the duty to report and provides:

Whoever, while engaged in providing an electronic communication service or a remote computing service to the public through a facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce, obtains actual knowledge of any terrorist activity, including the facts or circumstances described in subsection (c) shall, as soon as reasonably possible, provide to the appropriate authorities the facts or circumstances of the alleged terrorist activities.

Subsection (b) of section 603 provides:

The Attorney General shall determine the appropriate authorities under subsection (a).

Subsection (c) of section 603 concerns facts and circumstances and provides:

The facts or circumstances described in this subsection, include any facts or circumstances from which there is an apparent violation of section 842(p) of title 18, United States Code, that involves distribution of information relating to explosives, destructive devices, and weapons of mass destruction.

Subsection (d) of section 603 concerns privacy protection and provides:

Nothing in this section may be construed to require an electronic communication service provider or a remote computing service provider—

(1) to monitor any user, subscriber, or customer of that provider; or

(2) to monitor the content of any communication of any person described in paragraph (1).

The ACLU’s Gabe Rottman said that the Senate “committee had secretly inserted a provision in a spending bill that would require social media companies to report posts about “any terrorist activity” to the government. The bill is hopelessly vague on what that means. That’s because it goes far beyond a reporting requirement for wrongful conduct—terrorist activity—and will invariably result in the reporting of speech about terrorism—including by activists and other peaceful people with forceful opinions.”

“In practice, he added, “were this to become law, websites will likely do a couple of things”:

  1. “First, they will overcorrect and start taking down content wholesale. They will monitor posts for keywords like ISIS or “don’t tread on me” (a libertarian slogan that some identify with white supremacist and anti-government ideology) and pull them. That will chill an enormous amount of online debate . . .”
  2. “Second, and perhaps worse, companies—faced with the proposal’s utter lack of guidance on what the law requires them to report—will apply it inconsistently. . . .”

(ht: Emma Llansó, Free Expression Project: See also Ms. Llansó’s “Intel Authorization Bill Would Turn Online Service Providers into Law Enforcement Watchdogs,”) 

10th Circuit rejects compelled speech & compelled silence claims in Little Sisters Case

Yesterday a majority of the judges of a Tenth Circuit three-judge panel rejected the compelled speech and compelled silence claims, among others, raised by the Appellants in Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell. Judge Scott Matheson, Jr. wrote for the majority (joined by Judge Monroe G. McKay) with Judge Bobby R. Baldock writing in dissent, but on RFRA grounds.

“Plaintiffs, wrote Matheson, “contend the accommodation scheme violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment . . .  by compelling them both to speak and remain silent . . . . . First, they argue that requiring them to sign and deliver the Form or the notification to HHS constitutes compelled speech. Second, they argue that prohibiting them from influencing their TPAs’ provision of contraceptive coverage compels them to be silent. Both arguments fail.”

“To the extent such a claim requires government interference with the plaintiff’s own message, . . . . the regulations do not require an organization seeking an accommodation to engage in speech it finds objectionable or would not otherwise express. The only act the accommodation scheme requires is for religious non-profit organizations with group health plans to sign and deliver the Form or notification expressing their religious objection to providing contraceptive coverage. . . .”

“We further reject the claim that the accommodation scheme compels Plaintiffs’ silence. Like the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, we note Plaintiffs have made only general claims objecting to the non-interference regulation and have failed to indicate how it precludes speech in which they wish to engage. . . . After the issuance of the interim final rule repealing the non-interference regulation, we do not believe this question is before us. We agree with the Government and the D.C. Circuit that the repeal of the non-interference rule renders Plaintiffs’ claims regarding compelled silence moot.”

llya Shapiro & Ira Glasser on Redskins trademark flap Read More


UCLA Law Review Vol. 62, Issue 3

Volume 62, Issue 3 (March 2015)

Fixing Public Sector Finances: The Accounting and Reporting Lever James Naughton & Holger Spamann 572
Less Enforcement, More Compliance: Rethinking Unauthorized Migration Emily Ryo 622
Decriminalization, Police Authority, and Routine Traffic Stops Jordan Blair Woods 672



Not Whether Machines Think, But Whether Men Do Jane Stack 760
Fighting for a Place Called Home: Litigation Strategies for Challenging Gentrification Hannah Weinstein 794

UCLA Law Review Vol. 62, Issue 2

Volume 62, Issue 2 (February 2015)

Judging Opportunity Lost: Assessing the Viability of Race-Based Affirmative Action After Fisher v. University of Texas Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Angela Onwuachi-Willig 272
Enforcing Rights Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer 306
Milliken, Meredith, and Metropolitan Segregation Myron Orfield 364



David’s Sling: How to Give Copyright Owners a Practical Way to Pursue Small Claims Jeffrey Bils 464
Nonserious Marijuana Offenses and Noncitizens: Uncounseled Pleas and Disproportionate Consequences Jordan Cunnings 510

UCLA Law Review Vol. 62, Issue 1

Volume 62, Issue 1 (January 2015)

Intellectual Property Law Solutions to Tax Avoidance Andrew Blair-Stanek 2
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation Erwin Chemerinsky, Jolene Forman, Allen Hopper & Sam Kamin 74
Offshoring the Army: Migrant Workers and the U.S. Military Darryl Li 124



Inmates’ Need for Federally Funded Lawyers: How the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Casey, and Iqbal Combine With Implicit Bias to Eviscerate Inmate Civil Rights Tasha Hill 176
Proportional Voting Through the Elections Clause: Protecting Voting Rights Post-Shelby County Conner Johnston 236




The Technocracy Prepares for War

MilitarismMany have blamed American militarism on George W. Bush. Whether cast as cowboy, crusader, or dupe of the Angler, the ex-president was a convenient scapegoat. By 2008, voters felt comforted that neither the technocrat Obama nor the veteran McCain would recapitulate the tragedy of Iraq. And yet here we are, five years later, with both men uniting behind another “intervention.”

With the Bush bogeyman gone, the new war drive raises deep questions about the US political system. The Syria proposal is so at odds with what the American people want, what the world appears to want, and what even many of its intended beneficiaries want, that the question arises: what does the Administration know that we don’t? What gives them confidence that the US can accomplish its “three missions” in Syria? Andrew Bacevich puts the question plainly:

If you think back to 1980, and just sort of tick off the number of military enterprises that we have been engaged in that part of the world, large and small, you know, Beirut, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia — and on and on, and ask yourself, ‘What have we got done? What have we achieved? Is the region becoming more stable? Is it becoming more democratic? Are we enhancing America’s standing in the eyes of the people of the Islamic world?’ ‘The answers are, ‘No, no, and no.’ So why, Mr. President, do you think that initiating yet another war in this protracted enterprise is going to produce a different outcome?

The other “big story” of the summer helps explain the hubris. If you had access to an intelligence apparatus as pervasive and expert as NSA/DIA/CIA/NGA et al., would you think you were missing anything? The lesson of history is that conflict is unpredictable, and can quickly spin out of control. But the dream of mass surveillance is mastery and control. Precrime, prewar, all manner of incipient evils: with enough anticipatory knowledge all can eventually be modulated away and conquered.
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Money Laundries

I was recently reading a Money Laundering Threat Assessment (from 2005), and the following lines came up on p. 49:

[T]he trust laws of some jurisdictions have aided money launderers in their use of trusts to conceal identity and to perpetrate fraud. In certain jurisdictions, such as the Cook Islands, Nevis, and Niue, the trust laws no longer require the names of the settlor and the beneficiaries to be placed in the trust deed, permit settlors to retain control over the trust, and allow trusts to be revocable and of unlimited duration.

My question is: why is this even called a trust? Shouldn’t it bear some other name? At least Liechtenstein has the decency to call its creepy money-hiding methods “Anstalts.”

The larger consequences here are terrifying. The wealth defense industry has created an environment where all manner of swindlers, thieves, and terrorists can hide ill-gotten gains. As a forthcoming University of Pennsylvania piece by Shima Baradaran, Michael Findley, Daniel Nelson, and J.C. Sharman puts it:

On the whole, forming an anonymous shell company is as easy as ever, despite increased regulations following 9/11. The results are disconcerting and demonstrate that we are much too far from a world that is safe from terror.

I nevertheless expect that most of the centomillionaire and billionaire class will continue to fight efforts to crack down on shell companies and trusts, and will find ample “help” to argue their case. Perhaps someone will even pen an ode to financial privacy. Meanwhile, we have no idea what taxes may be due from trillions of dollars in offshore wealth, or to what purposes it is directed.

Expect to hear many more stories on this issue. The stakes could not be higher. As Liu Xiaobo has stated, corruption is the “officialization of the criminal and the criminalization of the official.” Persisting even in a world of brutal want and austerity-induced suffering, tax havenry epitomizes that sinister merger.

Do Corporations Enjoy a 2nd Amendment Right to Drones?

An emerging, “solutionist” narrative about drones goes something like this:

Yes, we should be very worried about government misuse of drones at home and abroad. But the answer is not to ban, or even blame, the technology itself. Rather, we need to spread the technology among more people. Worried that the government will spy on you? Get your own drones to watch the watchers. Fearful of malevolent drones? Develop your own protective force. The answer is more technology, not regulation of particular technologies.

I’d like to believe that’s true, if only because technology develops so quickly, and government seems paralyzed by comparison. But I think it’s a naive position. It manages to understate both the threats posed by drones, and the governance challenges they precipitate.
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Schneier Calls Out Papers on How Terroristist Groups End

Bruce Schneier noted some research by Rand about How Terrorist Groups End. The abstract

Abstract: How do terrorist groups end? The evidence since 1968 indicates that terrorist groups rarely cease to exist as a result of winning or losing a military campaign. Rather, most groups end because of operations carried out by local police or intelligence agencies or because they join the political process. This suggests that the United States should pursue a counterterrorism strategy against al Qa’ida that emphasizes policing and intelligence gathering rather than a “war on terrorism” approach that relies heavily on military force.

likely rings true to many who question the use of drones etc. (The comments on Bruce’s page get into some of this point).

To me the fact that RAND put the paper out is interesting. I can never tell whether RAND or what RAND is about. It would seem that claims that RAND is only going to support the government’s goals might be challenged here. Also Bruce calls out the work of Max Abrahms who in 2008 and 2011 addressed these ideas as well. I urge you read the 2008 post and here is the 2011 abstract

The basic narrative of bargaining theory predicts that, all else equal, anarchy favors concessions to challengers who demonstrate the will and ability to escalate against defenders. For this reason, post-9/11 political science research explained terrorism as rational strategic behavior for non-state challengers to induce government compliance given their constraints. Over the past decade, however, empirical research has consistently found that neither escalating to terrorism nor with terrorism helps non-state actors to achieve their demands. In fact, escalating to terrorism or with terrorism increases the odds that target countries will dig in their political heels, depriving the nonstate challengers of their given preferences. These empirical findings across disciplines, methodologies, as well as salient global events raise important research questions, with implications for counterterrorism strategy.

Bruce was cool enough to include a link to the paper.


Stanford Law Review Online: Pulling the Plug on the Virtual Jury

Stanford Law Review

The Stanford Law Review Online has just published a Note by Nicolas L. Martinez entitled Pulling the Plug on the Virtual Jury. Martinez takes issue with Judge William Young’s proposal that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed be tried via videoconference from Guantanamo Bay by a jury sitting in New York:

Most people probably figured that the debate over where to try alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (“KSM”) had ended. Indeed, it has been well over a year since Congress forced Attorney General Eric Holder to reluctantly announce that KSM’s prosecution would be referred to the Department of Defense for trial before a Guantanamo military commission. But a provocative proposal put forth recently by Judge William G. Young of the District of Massachusetts has revitalized one of the most contentious legal debates of the post-9/11 era. In a nutshell, Judge Young proposes that an Article III court try KSM at Guantanamo, but with one major twist: the jury would remain in New York City.

He concludes:

Perhaps unwilling to refight the battles of two years ago, Congress has shown no inclination to retreat from its apparent view that KSM may only be tried by a military commission at Guantanamo. As a result, following through on Judge Young’s plan, which could be viewed as an attempt to circumvent the will of Congress, might lead some legislators to harden their stance on civilian trials for alleged terrorists and propose even more disagreeable legislation to that end. This is not to say that creative solutions aimed at fortifying the rule of law in a post-9/11 world should be held hostage to the proclivities of intransigent voting blocs in Congress. Quite the opposite, in fact. But the likely political ramifications of Judge Young’s proposal cannot be ignored, especially in an election year when few members of Congress may be willing to spend their political capital defending the need to hold KSM’s trial in federal court.

Even though Judge Young’s provocative suggestion should not be adopted in its current form, he has moved the conversation in the right direction. Continuing to think imaginatively about ways to preserve our rule of law tradition from external threats is immensely important, particularly in the context of national security crises. For it is when the rule of law can be so easily discarded that it must be most doggedly defended.

Read the full article, Pulling the Plug on the Virtual Jury at the Stanford Law Review Online.


Stanford Law Review Online: The Privacy Paradox 2012 Symposium Issue

Stanford Law Review

Our 2012 Symposium Issue, The Privacy Paradox: Privacy and Its Conflicting Values, is now available online:


The text of Chief Judge Alex Kozinski’s keynote is forthcoming.