Category: Law Practice

Complicating the Narrative of Legal Automation

Richard Susskind has been predicting “the end of lawyers” for years, and has doubled down in a recent book coauthored with his son (The Future of the Professions). That book is so sweeping in its claims—that all professions are on a path to near-complete automation–that it should actually come as a bit of a relief for lawyers. If everyone’s doomed to redundancy, law can’t be a particularly bad career choice. To paraphrase Monty Python: nobody expects the singularity.

On the other hand, experts on the professions are offering some cautions about the Susskinds’ approach. Howard Gardner led off an excellent issue of Daedalus on the professions about ten years ago. He offers this verdict on the Susskinds’ perfunctory response to objections to their position:

In a section of their book called “Objections,” they list the principal reasons why others might take issue with their analyses, predictions, and celebratory mood. This list of counter-arguments to their critique includes the trustworthiness of professionals; the moral limits of unregulated markets; the value of craft; the importance of empathy and personal interactions; and the pleasure and pride derived from carrying out what they term ‘good work.’ With respect to each objection, the Susskinds give a crisp response.

I was disappointed with this list of objections, each followed by refutation. For example, countering the claim that one needs extensive training to become an expert, the Susskinds call for the reinstatement of apprentices, who can learn ‘on the job.’ But from multiple studies in cognitive science, we know that it takes approximately a decade to become an expert in any domain—and presumably that decade includes plenty of field expertise. Apprentices cannot magically replace well-trained experts. In another section, countering the claim that we need to work with human beings whom we can trust, they cite the example of the teaching done online via Khan Academy. But Khan Academy is the brainchild of a very gifted educator who in fact has earned the trust of many students and indeed of many teachers; it remains to be seen whether online learning à la Khan suffices to help individuals—either professionals or their clients—make ‘complex technical and ethical decisions under conditions of uncertainty.’ The Susskinds recognize that the makers and purveyors of apps may have selfish or even illegal goals in mind. But as they state, “We recognize that there are many online resources that promote and enable a wide range of offenses. We do not underestimate their impact of threat, but they stand beyond the reach of this book” (p. 233).

Whether or not one goes along with specific objections and refutations, another feature of the Susskinds’ presentation should give one pause. The future that they limn seems almost entirely an exercise in rational deduction and accordingly devoid of historical and cultural considerations.

Experts with a bit more historical perspective differ on the real likelihood of pervasive legal automation. Some put the risk to lawyers at under 4%. Even the highly cited study by Carl Frey and Michael Osborne (The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Automation) placed attorneys in the “low risk” category when it comes to replacement by software and robots. They suggest paralegals are in much more danger.

But empirical research by economist James Bessen has complicated even that assumption:“Since the late 1990s, electronic document discovery software for legal proceedings has grown into a billion dollar business doing work done by paralegals, but the number of paralegals has grown robustly.” Like MIT’s David Autor, Bessen calls automation a job creator, not a job destroyer. “The idea that automation kills jobs isn’t true historically,” Steve Lohr reports, and is still dubious. The real question is whether we reinforce policies designed to promote software and robotization that complements current workers’ skills, or slip into a regime of deskilling and substitution.

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Lawyers and Clients: The Absurd Reality for Indigent Clients Facing Execution

A Thought Experiment

Suppose that Facebook got sued for a privacy tort for hosting nonconsensual pornography and that Facebook’s lawyer told company executives that she did not intend to mount Facebook’s preferred response—a motion to dismiss on the grounds of Section 230 immunity. Executives explained to the lawyer that Section 230 of the federal Communications Decency Act is a knock out punch. An Internet intermediary can’t be held responsible for privacy-invading content created by a user. The lawyer, however, refused to listen to reason.

When Facebook tried to switch attorneys, its first lawyer told the court that Facebook should be forced to remain represented by that lawyer even though Facebook wanted a new one. In making that argument to the court, Facebook’s first lawyer told the court that she was doing a good job for Facebook and that her refusal to mount Facebook’s preferred defense was because Facebook had no Section 230 immunity. Facebook’s lawyer would not only be undermining her own client’s case, but would also be incorrectly representing the underlying issue to the court.

Facebook’s lawyer would be in flagrant violation of fiduciary duties to its client. Of course, clients with money can fire lawyers. Those lawyers certainly should not be permitted to undermine a client’s case in the course of trying to retain the representation—especially by inaccurately representing key features of a case. That sounds so obviously right: a contrary suggestion would surely be absurd.

Absurd Reality for Indigent Clients Facing Execution

For a reason that is hard to fathom, this is precisely what is allowed to happen in criminal cases affecting indigent clients facing execution. Apparently – at least in the Fifth Circuit – the relationship between client principals and lawyer agents is different.

This week, in Roberson v. Stephens, the Supreme Court will consider whether the execution of Robert L. Roberson should proceed even though his lawyers seem to have prioritized their own reputational interests at the expense of their client. Over at Balkanization, my colleague Mark Graber has a careful explanation of how Mr. Roberson’s lawyers seem more preoccupied with their reputations than with resuscitating a Sixth Amendment claim that might save his life.

At issue in Roberson is a failure of legal agency involving the same death penalty lawyers that a palpably displeased Justice Sotomayor rebuked on the eve of their client Raphael Holiday’s November 18 execution. The lawyers refused to file a clemency petition and opposed Mr. Holiday’s attempts to find a lawyer who would follow his wishes and file it. Forced to go along with the Court’s refusal to stay the execution because the attorneys filed a last-minute clemency petition, Justice Sotomayor nevertheless issued a powerful statement criticizing the lawyers for their behavior and the lower courts for failing to police it. She explained that the law does not permit “condemned men and women to be abandoned by their counsel at the last moment . . . [y]et this is exactly what happened here.”

Here again, the same lawyers have seemingly refused to listen to their client, Mr. Roberson, because doing so might require one of them to expose himself to a finding that the forfeiture of the Sixth Amendment claim was his own fault.

As briefing submitted in support of Supreme Court review explains: “In both Roberson and Holiday, the Fifth Circuit permitted the same pattern of conduct: CJA counsel’s refusal to pursue relief on the client’s behalf, followed by counsel’s inaccurate representations to courts about the constraints on seeking such relief, concluding with legal opposition to the very client they were appointed to represent. At base, both Roberson and Holiday express the Fifth Circuit’s view that [the statutory right to counsel] affords courts discretion to saddle inmates facing execution with lawyers who are not functioning as agents of their clients.”

The assessment of the ethics experts in the case is unequivocal. Yale Professor Lawrence Fox is the former Chair of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, and the former Chair of the ABA Litigation Section. Professor Fox concluded “to a reasonable degree of a professional certainty that both lawyers are operating under profound conflicts of interest that prevent them from continuing the representation[.]” Charles Herring, a renown Texas ethics expert, explained: “James Volberding and Seth Kretzer have conflicts of interest that should prevent them from representing Mr. Roberson on the [Sixth Amendment issue in the case].”

I may not be a death penalty lawyer, but I know enough to understand that we should not be allowing attorneys to obstruct relief preferred by their own clients—particularly in cases where the attorneys seem to be engaged in obstruction as a means of protecting their own interests. If we would not allow counsel for Facebook to cling onto her job contrary to the interest of its client, we certainly should not do so in a case where the stakes are not just about money but about life and death.

 

Four Futures of Legal Automation

BarbicanThere are many gloom-and-doom narratives about the legal profession. One of the most persistent is “automation apocalypse.” In this scenario, computers will study past filings, determine what patterns of words work best, and then—poof!—software will eat the lawyer’s world.

Conditioned to be preoccupied by worst-case scenarios, many attorneys have panicked about robo-practitioners on the horizon. Meanwhile, experts differ on the real likelihood of pervasive legal automation. Some put the risk to lawyers at under 4%; others claim legal practice is fundamentally routinizable. I’ve recently co-authored an essay that helps explain why such radical uncertainty prevails.

While futurists affect the certainties of physicists, visions of society always reflect contestable political aspirations. Those predicting doom for future lawyers usually harbor ideological commitments that are not that friendly to lawyers of the present. Displacing the threat to lawyers to machines (rather than, say, the decisionmakers who can give machines’ doings the legal effect of what was once done by qualified persons) is a way of not merely rationalizing, but also speeding up, the hoped-for demise of an adversary. Just like the debate over killer robots can draw attention away from the persons who design and deploy them, so too can current controversy over robo-lawyering distract from the more important political and social trends that make automated dispute resolution so tempting to managers and bureaucrats.

It is easy to justify a decline in attorneys’ income or status by saying that software could easily do their work. It’s harder to explain why the many non-automatable aspects of current legal practice should be eliminated or uncompensated. That’s one reason why stale buzzwords like “disruption” crowd out serious reflection on the drivers of automation. A venture capitalist pushing robotic caregivers doesn’t want to kill investors’ buzz by reflecting on the economic forces promoting algorithmic selfhood. Similarly, #legaltech gurus know that a humane vision of legal automation, premised on software that increases quality and opportunities for professional judgment, isn’t an easy sell to investors keen on speed, scale, and speculation. Better instead to present lawyers as glorified elevator operators, replaceable with a sufficiently sophisticated user interface.

Our essay does not predict lawyers’ rise or fall. That may disappoint some readers. But our main point is to make the public conversation about the future of law a more open and honest one. Technology has shaped, and will continue to influence, legal practice. Yet its effect can be checked or channeled by law itself. Since different types of legal work are more or less susceptible to automation, and society can be more or less regulatory, we explore four potential future climates for the development of legal automation. We call them, in shorthand, Vestigial Legal Profession, Society of Control, Status Quo, and Second Great Compression. An abstract appears below.

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The Civilizing Effect of Legal Training

The cultural cognition project has a new article out on how motivated cognition interacts with professionalism:

This paper reports the results of a study on whether political predispositions influence judicial decisionmaking. The study was designed to overcome the two principal limitations on existing empirical studies that purport to find such an influence: the use of nonexperimental methods to assess the decisions of actual judges; and the failure to use actual judges in ideologically-biased-reasoning experiments. The study involved a sample of sitting judges (n = 253), who, like members of a general public sample (n = 800), were culturally polarized on climate change, marijuana legalization and other contested issues. When the study subjects were assigned to analyze statutory interpretation problems, however, only the responses of the general-public subjects and not those of the judges varied in patterns that reflected the subjects’ cultural values. The responses of a sample of lawyers (n = 217) were also uninfluenced by their cultural values; the responses of a sample of law students (n = 284), in contrast, displayed a level of cultural bias only modestly less pronounced than that observed in the general-public sample. Among the competing hypotheses tested in the study, the results most supported the position that professional judgment imparted by legal training and experience confers resistance to identity-protective cognition — a dynamic associated with politically biased information processing generally — but only for decisions that involve legal reasoning. The scholarly and practical implications of the findings are discussed.

Kahan and I have gone back and forth about how best to characterize the results of the study. He, modestly, seeks to constrain the inferences to the data and to a push back against the vulgar understanding of the judiciary as merely housing politicians in robes.  I think the study speaks to something larger still — the value of legal education & experience in producing situation sense, which enables lawyers and judges (and, to a lesser extent, law students) to agree on the results of legal outcomes notwithstanding their political and ideological priors. Such legal judgment is, after all, one of the practical skills that law school conveys, and which it ought to boast about.

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Buffett on Family Business: Beat the Third Generation Curse

warren buffettWarren Buffett is very good at spotting great family businesses. What does he look for? How can his filters help family businesses prosper?

For one, they can mitigate one of the greatest dangers: the third generation “curse.” This refers to how few family businesses survive beyond the third generation, let alone prosper.

An under-appreciated fact about Berkshire Hathaway, the conglomerate Buffett built: virtually all its family businesses boast second or third generation descendants who rival or outshine previous generations. That is rare among family businesses.

So while every family and business situation differs, Berkshire’s two dozen family companies are a good place to look for insight about multi-generational prosperity in the family business.

Studying Berkshire’s family businesses, I found that they are united by the following values. These values are important factors in their success, in the founding generation and subsequent ones.

Family business members, and their professional advisors, whether in law, accounting, or other fields, would do well to ponder these points.

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BOOK REVIEW: Linder & Levit, The Good Lawyer: Seeking Quality in the Practice of Law

happylawyer-levitReview of The Good Lawyer: Seeking Quality in the Practice of Law by Douglas O. Linder & Nancy Levit (Oxford University Press 2014)

Linder and Levit have – yet again – confronted some of the most challenging questions faced by lawyers who seek to find satisfaction in our careers. The Good Lawyer: Seeking Quality in the Practice of Law builds on the authors’ first book, The Happy Lawyer: Making a Good Life in the Law. One of the central questions posed in the first book—how do you become a happy lawyer—seems to be answered in part by the second book. Linder and Levit draw on numerous different disciplines that show a strong link between doing good work and being happy, between personal lives and professional roles.

The Good Lawyer emphasizes a set of qualities, skills, and attitudes shared by people the authors identify as “good lawyers.” As they note, lawyers who practice in different fields – intellectual property, securities fraud, employment discrimination – may need to develop distinct, and particularized, skills, but, regardless of their practice area, lawyers are proudest of themselves when they do meaningful work for clients about whom they care. Consequently, all lawyers, whether they work for private firms, the government, or in a public interest setting or as solo practitioners, can appreciate and use the particular attributes that Linder and Levit identify. Those attributes are addressed in nine of the book’s ten chapters, and they range from empathy to moral courage, cognitive skills, willpower, civility, honesty, and open-mindedness. As they explore the good lawyers’ attributes, the authors draw on behavioral economics, Tonglen Buddhism, cognitive psychology, and the law to support and explain their points.

While the book has some endnotes (under 30 pages, actually), it also has humor and even a checklist, although the checklist is primarily enumerated suggestions rather than a protocol. And it has lots of stories, which make the book even more of a joy to read. The stories provide context and drama. Linder and Levit visit courageous lawyers in the Jim Crow South, explore the psychodrama exercises Gerry Spence offers to trial lawyers at Thunderhead Ranch in Wyoming, introduce Lex Machina, a Stanford project to create a database that helps lawyers predict winning strategies, and probe the expert testimony in the trial of Sam Sheppard.

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More on the Law Clerk Hiring Process – An Interview with Federal Judge Robert Lasnik

This is the second installment of a series of interviews I am doing on judicial clerkships. The first interview was with Third Circuit Judge Thomas Ambro; that interview can be found here. In this interview the focus is on clerkships at the federal district court level.  

Judge Robert Lasnik with Justice Sandra Day O'Connor at the University of Washington Law School

Justice Sandra Day O’Connor with Judge Robert Lasnik at the U.S. Courthouse in Seattle

Robert S. Lasnik is a United States federal judge who sits on the District Court for the Western District of Washington State.

Born in 1951 in Staten Island, New York, Judge Lasnik attended Brandeis University (B.A., 1972) and then Northwestern University (M.S., journalism, 1973 & M.A. in education, 1974). Following that, he went on to the University of Washington School of Law where he received his J.D. in 1978.

Prior to his service on the Court, he was a deputy prosecutor in the King County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office (1978-1981) and then a senior deputy prosecutor (1981-1983), and later chief of staff in that office (1983-1990). Thereafter, he served as a Superior Court judge in King County (1990-1998).

President Bill Clinton nominated him to the Court on May 11, 1998.  He was confirmed unanimously by the United States Senate on October 21, 1998, and received his commission on October 22, 1998. He served as Chief Judge from 2004 to 2011. Chief Justice John Roberts appointed him to serve as a member of the Judicial Conference Executive Committee

 Some of Judge Lasnik’s more notable opinions include Browne v. Avvo, Inc. (2007) (“To the extent that their lawsuit [contesting lawyer rankings on a public website] has focused a spotlight on how ludicrous the rating of attorneys (and judges) has become, more power to them. To the extent that they seek to prevent the dissemination of opinions regarding attorneys and judges, however, the First Amendment precludes their cause of action”), and Video Software Dealers Association v. Maleng, et al (2004) (enjoining Washington State law prohibiting the sale of video games depicting violence against police officers). More recently, he authored Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon (2013), which the ACLU labeled as a “landmark case on indigent defense.”

Welcome, Judge Lasnik, to our corner of the blogosphere here at Concurring Opinions. It is an honor for us to have you contribute to this blog. 

Question: How many law clerks do you have, and how long are their terms?

Answer: I have one career law clerk who has been with me since my appointment in 1998, and a one-term law clerk whom I hire on a one-year basis. Occasionally, where there is mutual agreement by mid-year, I have extended the clerkship to a second year.

Question: Tell us a little bit about how the clerkship application process and how it works in your chambers. For example, when do you first start accepting applications, and up to what point do you stop considering them?

Answer: I start accepting applications in September, the year prior to the start of the clerkship. Interviews begin in January/February and are on-going until I fill the position.

Question: How much do you rely on OSCAR?

Answer: I post open positions on OSCAR. However, we do request hard copies of materials.

Question: Some district judges are now seeking law clerks with some experience as a practicing attorney. What do you think of that and is it something you either are now doing or plan to do?

Answer: I do require a year of experience either clerking in federal court or for a state’s highest court or practicing law. I find that having some real-world experience makes for better clerks and that the clerks also get more out of the year.

Question: How far in advance do you select your clerks? Some federal judges are now hiring two years in advance? What is your practice?

Answer: I hire the same year of the opening although occasionally, where I have two outstanding candidates, I will extend an offer for the next year to the one who comes in second. This has happened on two occasions and I’m so glad I got both outstanding clerks.

Question: About how many trials do you preside over in a calendar year?

Answer: I do approximately eight trials per year—half civil and half criminal.

Question: Do you have any idea of how many orders you issue in a year?

Answer: 2,039 civil orders, 206 criminal orders, and 194 miscellaneous for a total of 2,439. This covers the period from the June 2013 to June 2014.  Read More

[If] you read some fantasy, the magic is omnipresent. In Harry Potter the magic is omnipresent, a primarily magic universe. They got magic for everything there. Every time you turn around there’s a new magic thing that’s popping up. A magic hat or a magic sword or a spell to solve something. Because magic is so omnipresent, you don’t have to [resort] to mundane ways to…solve a murder mystery. “Who murdered Joe? Well we’ll just give him the truth spell and he’ll tell us who murdered Joe,” or “We’ll just cast this other spell and open the veil of time and we’ll be able to see who murdered Joe.” If those options exist then it’s very difficult to write a traditional John Grisham type novel or a detective novel or anything that depends on evidence and all that because there are all these magical ways of getting it.

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Lawyers in Westeros

An uncomfortable chair in a modern partner's office?

An uncomfortable chair in a modern partner’s office?

This is Part 2 of the interview I did with George R. R. Martin in  2007.  For background and part 1, click here.  For the audio file, click here.

 HOFFMAN: Are there lawyers in your books that are just in the wings off stage that haven’t yet appeared?

MARTIN: That’s an interesting question. I hadn’t really considered that until I started reading those links that you sent me. There are certainly laws but are there special classes of advocates who make their living by interpreting those laws? My inclination is probably not because the laws my books are administered by lords. In some ways it’s government as much for men than law. We like to say our government in the United States is a government of laws not men. In some ways the Seven Kingdoms I think is the reverse. There is basis of a law but also a lot depends on who is interpreting it and who is sitting in the Lord’s seat, who is sitting on the Iron Throne and how they settle these disputes.

HOFFMAN: Well those are ultimate questions but I think in two places one could have imagine lawyers and one of them again will be this church trial because there were church lawyers in the ecclesiastical church system there were lawyers who specialized in canon law. And the second one was at least twice I can think of in the books there’re trials by combat. And I don’t really know what the other alternative would be but I assume would be trial by jury – the path that Tyrion did not choose both times. And I was thinking —

MARTIN: Well he does choose in the first…in the second…second of his two trials, he is being tried – it’s not by jury – it’s by lord. There’s no jury of his peers, no twelve people that are randomly picked but there are three lords sitting on his case and hearing the evidence.

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The Law Clerk Hiring Process – An Interview with Federal Judge Thomas Ambro

Thomas Ambro is a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and sits in Wilmington, Delaware. He was confirmed by the Senate by a 96-2 vote and has served on the Third Circuit since 2000. Judge Ambro received both his undergraduate and law degrees from Georgetown University. He was a law clerk for former Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Daniel Herrmann (1975-1976). Thereafter, Judge Ambro was with the firm of Richards, Layton & Finger in Wilmington, Delaware, where he was known nationally in two areas—legal opinions in commercial transactions and bankruptcy. Judge Ambro is a former Chair of the Business Law Section of the ABA. He is also a member of the American Law Institute and the National Bankruptcy Conference.

Welcome, Judge Ambro, to our corner of the blogosphere here at Concurring Opinions. It is an honor for us to have you contribute to this blog.Unknown

Question: How many law clerks do you have, and how long are their terms?

Answer: I have four law clerks per term. Generally those who clerk with me serve only one term. Because of the timing of exceptional post-clerking job opportunities, a few clerks have served less than a full-year term. For scheduling reasons, some have served up to a few months longer.

Question: Tell us a little bit how the clerkship application process works. For example, when do you first start accepting applications and up to what point do you stop considering them?

Answer: When the hiring protocols were in effect, I would receive applications from putative clerks via  OSCAR (Online System for Clerkship Application and Review) when those applications were released. All applications would be from persons who had completed at least their 2L year in law school. Because the hiring plan for federal law clerks has been discontinued, applications now come in randomly, and they are often from applicants in their 2L years.

I stop considering applications when the four law clerk positions for a term have been filled. Thereafter, the judicial assistant in our chambers alerts OSCAR of this fact.

I review the applications sent to me, whether online or in the mail. If I am interested in a particular application, I either wait for the letters for recommendation to come in (if they do not accompany the application) or begin calling the recommenders. Often an application is preceded by one or two recommenders alerting me of an applicant and inquiring whether I have a position available for the term to which the applicant is applying. In any event, if I remain interested, I call the applicant to set up a time to meet. For the four spots in a given term, it is uncommon that I would have more than a half dozen interviews with potential applicants.  In addition, the interviews with me and with my clerks are lengthy. Thus, it is rare if I do more than one interview of an applicant in a day.

Question: How much do you rely on OSCAR?

Answer: With the demise of the hiring plan, many applications come by mail. Thus, in a technical sense, I rely on OSCAR less than I did when the hiring plan was in effect. Nonetheless, I find OSCAR very helpful in every respect I can think.  In addition to saving reams of paper, it is both easy to use, highly efficient, and much appreciated.

Question: How far in advance do you select your clerks?  Some federal judges are now hiring two years in advance?  What is your current practice?

Answer:  Right now (March 2014) I have all positions filled for the 2014-’15 and the 2015-’16 terms.  I also have two clerks committed for the 2016-’17 term. My typical lead time for a clerk is two years. That may mean that a clerk will be at least a year removed from law school when she or he begins working in my chambers. That time is usually spent in another clerkship (almost always a District Court clerkship, though on two occasions it has been another Circuit Court clerkship), with a law firm, or sometimes both another clerkship and work in a law firm. Read More

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How Is Privacy Not a Class at all Law Schools?

Privacy law does not exist, but it should be taught at every law school. There is no one law of privacy. That is why I love teaching Information Privacy (Solove and Schwartz (Aspen) is the text I use). The class requires students to reengage with and apply torts, Constitutional law (First and Fourth Amendment at least), and statutory interpretation. It also lends itself to learning about sectoral approaches to regulation in health, finance, commerce, and education. Given that the idea and problems of privacy are everywhere, there are jobs in them thar hills. Yet, schools often see the course as a luxury or somehow part of IP. That is a mistake.

Schools should not pander to skills and job training demands, but sensitivity to areas of practice that have large needs is not pandering. Much of the skills, ready-to-practice rot comes from a small segment of the legal practice (i.e., big firms with huge profits who are not willing to pay for training their employees). That said, law schools tend to use the same playbook. For example, the rarified world of public corporation law is a standard part of business associations course materials. Yet according to the Economist, the number of public companies peaked at around 7,888 in 1997. Of course folks will say “Don’t teach to the bar.” Amen brothers and sisters, but why teach for a tiny portion of students in a core course? To be clear, I love teaching business associations and think it is useful, because agency and limited liability forms are so important. They are important, because being able to compare and contrast the forms for a client makes the attorney worth her pay. Grasping the beauty and nuances of the system unlocks the ability to be a true counselor. There are many, many businesses that are not, and may never become, public and that could benefit from having an attorney set up their project from the start. Privacy is similar. It reaches across many aspects of our lives and businesses.

Privacy issues come up in such a large range of practice that the course can allow one to address doctrinal mastery while also moving students beyond the silo approach of first year law. Seeing how property and trespass ideals reappear in criminal procedure, how assumption of risk permeates issues, and so on, shows students that the theories behind the law work in not so mysterious, but perhaps unstated ways. The arguments and counter-arguments come faster once you know the core idea at stake. That is the think-like-a-lawyer approach working well. It does not hurt that along the way students pick up knowledge of an area such as HIPPA or criminal procedure and technology that will make them a little more comfortable telling an employer or future client “Yes, I know that area and here’s how I’d approach it.”