Category: Immigration


YLJ Online Symposium: A Republic of Statutes


The Yale Law Journal Online has just published the final piece of a symposium devoted to William N. Eskridge, Jr. and John Ferejohn’s remarkable new book, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution. The book chronicles the development of constitutional principles derived not directly from the text of the Constitution itself but from the implementation of entrenched “superstatutes” by administrative and executive officials. The symposium essays examine both the broad contours of the theory advanced by Eskridge and Ferejohn as well as its application to particular fields of law, such as immigration, national security, and health care. Visit YLJ Online to read the full collection:


Randomization, Intake Systems, and Triage

Thanks to Jim and Cassandra for their carefully constructed study of the impact of an offer from the Harvard Legal Aid Bureau for representation before the Massachusetts Division of Unemployment Assistance, and to all of the participants in the symposium for their thoughtful contributions.  What Difference Representation? continues to provoke much thought, and as others have noted, will have a great impact on the access to justice debate.  I’d like to focus on the last question posed in the paper — where do we go from here? — and tie this in with questions about triage raised by Richard Zorza and questions about intake processes raised by Margaret Monsell.   The discussion below is informed by my experience as a legal service provider in the asylum system, a legal arena that the authors note is  strikingly different from the unemployment benefits appeals process described in the article.

My first point is that intake processes vary significantly between different service providers offering representation in similar and different areas of the law.  In my experience selecting cases for the asylum clinics at Georgetown and Yale, for example, we declined only cases that were frivolous, and at least some intake folks (yours truly included) preferred to select the more difficult cases, believing that high-quality student representation could make the most difference in these cases.  Surely other legal services providers select for the cases that are most likely to win, under different theories about the most effective use of resources.  WDR does not discuss which approach HLAB takes in normal practice (that is, outside the randomization study).  On page twenty, the study states that information on financial eligibility and “certain additional facts regarding the caller and the case”  are put to the vote of HLAB’s intake committee.  On what grounds does this committee vote to accept or reject a case?  In other words, does HLAB normally seek the hard cases, the more straightforward cases, some combination, or does it not take the merits into account at all?

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The Old Illegitimacy Part II: Facilitating Societal Discrimination

In a prior post, I demonstrated that the law makes explicit distinctions between marital and nonmarital children and denies the latter benefits automatically granted to its marital counterparts.  The harms resulting from the law’s continued distinctions on the basis of birth status are significant.  For example, these distinctions impair nonmarital children’s ability to acquire property and wealth.  While individuals often use part of their inheritance for a down payment on a home, to start a business, or to fund their own children’s education, nonmarital children are denied the same access to intergenerational wealth.

These legal distinctions may also stigmatize nonmarital children. Denying nonmarital children access to post-secondary educational support that is granted to marital children suggests that the former are less deserving of support.  It also signals that fathers’ responsibilities to their children differ depending on whether they are marital or nonmarital.  Denying U.S. citizenship to the children of unmarried fathers unless their fathers expressly agreed to support them similarly signals that nonmarital children are not automatically entitled to support.

These legal distinctions also facilitate societal discrimination by encouraging individuals (either intentionally or otherwise)  to make negative assumptions about unmarried parents and their children.  Many Americans (not just former Gov. Mike Huckabee) believe that it is wrong for unmarried persons to have children.  Seventy-one percent of participants in a recent Pew Research Center study indicated that the increase in nonmarital births is a “big problem” for society and 44% believe that it is always or almost always morally wrong for an unmarried woman to have a child.  Some people assume that unmarried mothers are sexually irresponsible and that their children will be burdens on the public purse.  They also expect nonmarital children to underachieve academically, economically, and socially.

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Rejecting Refugees

The New York Times today reports on my most recent co-authored empirical study of the U.S. asylum system, Rejecting Refugees: Homeland Security’s Administration of the One-Year Bar to Asylum, forthcoming in the William and Mary Law Review. As the title suggests, this article focuses on asylum law’s one-year filing deadline, which was created by the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). Scholars and practitioners have long expressed concern that refugees have been denied asylum due solely for failure to apply within a year of entry, and fear that the bar has had a significant impact on the U.S. asylum system. Our article is the first systematic empirical study of the effects of the deadline on asylum seekers and the asylum system.
We focus on decision-making by the Department of Homeland Security, which adjudicates most applications for asylum in the first instance. The findings are troubling. Most notably, it is likely that since the one-year bar came into effect, in April 1998, through June 2009, DHS rejected on the deadline more than 15,000 asylum applications (affecting more than 21,000 refugees) that would otherwise have been granted.
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The Insidious List

News recently broke that, in Salt Lake City, Utah, a group calling itself “Concerned Citizens of the United States” sent a memo to local newspapers, radio stations, television outlets, state law enforcement, immigration and DHS agents, and Utah legislators listing over 1,300 alleged “illegal immigrants” who the group believed should be “immediately deported.”  Next to each name appeared the person’s Social Security number, date of birth, address, and, at times, medical information, such as a pregnant woman’s due date.  The group claimed that it “observe[d] these individuals in our neighborhoods, driving on our streets, working in our stores, attending our schools, and entering our public welfare buildings.”  It continued: “We spen[t] the time and effort needed to gather information along with legal Mexican nationals who infiltrate thei social networks and help us obtain the necessary information we need to add them to our list.”  The group then stepped up the volume: “We see a direct relationship between these illegal aliens and the escalation of crime in our communities in the form of drug and alcohol abuse, theft, and domestic violence. . . . They need to go and now.”  The group signed off with this missive: “We will be listening and watching.”

This feels eerily familiar.  In 1997, an anti-abortion group set up a website called Nuremberg Files that revealed abortion providers’ home addresses, birth dates, Social Security numbers, and the names of their childrens’ schools.  The site listed abortion providers who had been wounded in grey and those who had been killed with their names struck in black.  To be sure, the “Concerned Citizens” memo neither threatened nor sought to incite violence as in the Nuremberg case.  Nonetheless, the memo took a hateful “us versus them” turn in suggesting that illegal aliens bear responsibility for increased drug abuse, crime, and domestic violence.  Akin to the Nuremberg Files case, the “Concerned Citizens” invaded the privacy interests of the listed individuals by giving publicity to their Social Security numbers.  While they declined to identify themselves, one imagines that they will be found and could face tort privacy claims.

Aside from its privacy implications, the list seems bent on intimidation, suggesting that the group inflitrated the alleged illegal aliens’ communities and would be “watching.”  Of course, the group could have provided tips to ICE and law enforcement — that would not be troubling.  But the group went so much further than that, sending the list of individuals’ personal information to media of all stripes.  This suggests an agenda to intimidate and bully.


UCLA Law Review Vol. 57, Issue 5 (June 2010)

Volume 57, Issue 5 (June 2010)


Introduction to the Symposium Issue: Sexuality and Gender Law: The Difference a Field Makes Nan D. Hunter 1129
Elusive Coalitions: Reconsidering the Politics of Gender and Sexuality Kathryn Abrams 1135
The Sex Discount Kim Shayo Buchanan 1149
What Feminists Have to Lose in Same-Sex Marriage Litigation Mary Ann Case 1199
Lawyering for Marriage Equality Scott L. Cummings Douglas NeJaime 1235
Sexual and Gender Variation in American Public Law: From Malignant to Benign to Productive William N. Eskridge, Jr. 1333
Sticky Intuitions and the Future of Sexual Orientation Discrimination Suzanne B. Goldberg 1375
The Dissident Citizen Sonia K. Katyal 1415
Raping Like a State Teemu Ruskola 1477
The Gay Tipping Point Kenji Yoshino 1537


Immigration Federalism: Red and Blue

In a previous post, I discussed some of the federalism implications of Arizona’s recent legislation concerning immigrants.  I noted that in immigration, as in other areas, it is difficult to define enclaves of exclusive state or exclusive federal jurisdiction.  Rather, contemporary federalism entails a dynamic interaction of state and federal authority.

If Arizona’s law constitutes an example of “red state” federalism, a recent announcement by New York’s Governor David Paterson illustrates the “blue state” version of immigration federalism. 

Under federal immigration law, conviction of certain state crimes constitutes grounds for deportation.  But, in many circumstances a subsequent state pardon removes the threat of deportation.  In what The New York Times termed “a major rebuke of federal immigration policy,” Governor Paterson created a panel to assist him in evaluating pardon requests from immigrants subject to deportation based on state convictions.  The Governor characterized some federal immigration laws as “embarrassingly and wrongly inflexible.”  “In New York,” Paterson explained, “we believe in renewal.”

So, now New York has joined Arizona in rebuking federal immigration policy, though from a very different perspective.

Even the United States Supreme Court has gotten into the immigration federalism act.  In Padilla v. Kentucky, decided in March, the Court held that defense counsel’s failure to advise a state criminal defendant that a guilty plea carries a risk of deportation constitutes ineffective assistance in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  In what will be one of Justice Stevens’ last majority opinions, he explained that as a matter of federal law, deportation is an “integral part” of the penalty for the state crime.

Padilla confirms the obvious: In immigration, state and federal law are closely intertwined.  What are we to make of this feature of our federal system?  If some are troubled by Arizona’s inhospitable voice, they might find solace in New York’s dulcet tones of “renewal.”  That counterpoint provides cold comfort to immigrants in Arizona, but then the United States Constitution provides some protection for all people throughout the country. 

Complicated? Yes, but simple would be superior only if we all agreed on the answers.  And we do not.  In the meantime, New York seeks to vindicate its immigrant heritage.


Red State Federalism

It is a great pleasure to be a guest blogger.  My current interests center around federalism.  My posts likely will as well.  Here goes.

Did a vision of progressive federalism die in the desert of Arizona?  No, but the recent (anti-)immigration legislation there reveals the Grand Canyon dividing the concept of federalism from particular policy outcomes.

In the wake of a conservative resurgence in national politics, some commentators (including this one) noted the progressive potential of federalism.  We cited examples of “blue state federalism,” in which states stepped into the breach left by federal inaction and provided innovative solutions for problems ranging from climate change to predatory lending, from gay rights to health care.  Here, and elsewhere, I argued that a key to understanding the achievements of the states was to abandon outdated notions of distinct and non-overlapping realms of state and federal prerogative (bye bye dual federalism).  Climate change was not really a federal issue or really a state issue.  Rather, federalism provided an opportunity for both the states and the federal government to address pressing concerns.  Federalism functioned through the dynamic overlap and interaction of state and federal authority.  Or so I argued in my book, Polyphonic Federalism: Toward the Protection of Fundamental Rights.

But where does this leave Arizona?  Or for that matter, the lawsuits filed by numerous state attorneys general against federal health care legislation.  Are these examples of illegitimate state meddling in federal matters or ongoing expressions of dynamic or (as I term it) polyphonic federalism?  The answer is yes.

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Illegal Immigration and Fugitive Slaves

One way of thinking about the new Arizona statute on illegal immigration is through a comparison with the debate over state regulation of fugitive slaves during the antebellum period.  Now before the angry comments start pouring in, I’m not saying that people who favor more border security are like slaveowners or that those who are here illegally are like slaves.  What I mean is that in both cases there was a controversial issue that turned on whether there should be exclusive federal authority or a diverse set of state policies.

The Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution was implemented initially by the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.  By the 1830s, though, a number of free states passed laws that made it a crime to catch or aid in the capture of fugitive slaves.  Other free states insisted on certain procedural protections for those alleged to be fugitives, otherwise free African-Americans would be subject to what amounted to legalized kidnapping.

In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court held that these state statutes were invalid because the Fugitive Slave Clause (even though it was not in Article One, Section 8) gave the federal government exclusive power over the subject.  In other words, states could not legislate at all on this topic — either to help or hinder slave captures.  Chief Justice Taney concurred but argued that state laws that furthered the federal policy by giving aid to slave catchers were not unconstitutional.  One could view the Court’s position as a compromise that attempted to take the entire topic off of the topic even though it was probably inconsistent with preemption principles.  Moreover, in practice slave catchers in the North could not operate well without the protection of state law or the aid of state officials.  (Indeed, Prigg contained language similar to the modern Supreme Court’s anticommandeering doctrine.)

Now we have a similar issue.  States like Arizona want to crack down on illegal immigration.  Others want to be sanctuaries for them and refuse to cooperate with deportations.  One solution to this would be to say that all state regulation of the subject is barred.  That is not neutral with respect to outcomes, but it would channel all reform efforts to Washington.  Or courts could say that only state laws that assist immigration policy as set by Congress is permissible.  Of course, that would require someone to determine what that policy is.  The major problem in immigration policy, it seems to me, is that the country is uncertain what it wants.  Is illegal immigration a harm or a benefit?  Should we be deporting people or giving them amnesty? Thus, courts that go with something other than “states can’t regulate this at all” might have a hard time reasoning their way to a conclusion.


A Well-Founded Fear of School?

Tuesday’s Washington Post discusses an intriguing asylum case: an immigration judge in Memphis granted asylum to a German couple who fled their homeland to avoid its mandatory schooling policy.  Uwe Romeike, along with his wife and five chilren, are evangelical Christians who had decided to homeschool their children both because they believed the public school curriculum to be “against Christian values” and because their children faced violence, bullying, and peer pressure in public schools.  The Romeikes took their children out of school in their home state of Baden-Wuerttemberg in 2006, and paid fines of approximately $10,000 over 2 years for doing so.  That state constitution requires that children attend public or private schools; parents who refuse to comply can face fines or even jail time, or in severe cases, Germany’s highest appellate court ruled that social service officials could remove children from their parents.

There are so many interesting angles to the decision that it’s hard to know where to start.  Some might question whether the ability to choose how to school one’s child is a fundamental human right that should be protected by asylum law.  The German consul for the Southeast U.S. noted that “German parents have a wide range of educational options for their children.”  Should the Romeikes be sent back to Germany on the assumption that they could find a religious school that provided instruction acceptable to their value system?  Under U.S. asylum law, if internal relocation is an option to avoid persecution, applicants must move within their own country to find safety before coming to the United States.  The Romeikes had the option not only of relocating within Germany but also, as citizens of the European Union, of living and working in any member state (some of which allow home schooling and others of which surely offer affordable education that accords with evangelical religious values).

The involvement of the German consul also raises questions about the appropriateness of immigration court as a messenger in foreign affairs.  Romeike’s lawyer said that he took on the case in part because he hoped to influence public opinion in Germany, while the consul defended the law as a policy decision that “ensures a high standard of learning for all children.”  Should our immigration courts be questioning the policy judgments of solidly democratic nations with robust and procedurally fair legal systems?  Asylum has for many years been used as a political tool, for better or for worse, but this seems one step too far.  In any case, I’m interested in readers’ thoughts — are the Romeikes modern-day pilgrims, or is this just another misguided decision by our dysfunctional immigration courts?