Category: Immigration

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UCLA Law Review Vol. 63, Issue 4

Volume 63, Issue 4 (May 2016)
Articles

Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson 810
Protecting Disfavored Minorities: Toward Institutional Realism Joy Milligan 894
Insider Trading and Market Structure Yesha Yadav 968

 

Comments

Defending Criminal(ized) “Aliens” After Padilla: Towards a More Holistic Public Immigration Defense in the Era of Crimmigration Andrés Dae Keun Kwon 1035
Public-Private Divide in Parker State-Action Immunity Sina Safvati 1110
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UCLA Law Review Vol. 63, Issue 3

Volume 63, Issue 3 (March 2016)
Articles

The System of Equitable Remedies Samuel L. Bray 530
Challenging the “Criminal Alien” Paradigm Angélica Cházaro 594
Plenary Power, Political Questions, and Sovereignty in Indian Affairs Michalyn Steele 666

 

Comments

Calibrating the Eighth Amendment: Graham, Miller, and the Right to Mental Healthcare in Juvenile Prison Sara McDermott 712
Mute and Moot: How Class Action Mootness Procedure Silences Inmates Michele C. Nielsen 760
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UCLA Law Review Vol. 63, Issue 1

Volume 63, Issue 1 (January 2016)
Articles

Navigating Paroline‘s Wake Isra Bhatty 2
Regional Federal Administration Dave Owen 58
Exhausting Patents Wentong Zheng 122

 

Comments

Post-Deportation Remedy and Windsor‘s Promise Kate Shoemaker 168
Forget Congress: Reforming Campaign Finance Through Mutually Assured Destruction Nick Warshaw 208
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The Citizenship Oath

When new American citizens are naturalized, they take the following oath:

I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I will bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform noncombatant service in the Armed Forces of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform work of national importance under civilian direction when required by the law; and that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; so help me God.

The first part of the oath strikes me as odd.  Someone who becomes a citizen is not, in fact, required to renounce their prior citizenship–there are lots of dual nationals who are naturalized American citizens.  The second part (about subjecting yourself to the draft or to a noncombatant role) is rather outdated.  And nothing in the oath refers to the actual duties of citizens (serving on juries, paying taxes, etc.)  Perhaps it’s time for a new oath.

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Take Care Tea Leaves

The most interesting aspect of the Court’s certiorari grant in the immigration case yesterday was its decision to add a Question Presented on the constitutionality of the President’s Executive Order.  It strikes me that this is an ominous development if you think that the Order should be upheld.

I think it’s very unlikely that the Court will reach the merits of the claim that the President is violating the Take Care Clause with his immigration/deportation policy.  (Though Justice Thomas might write a separate opinion about this).  But adding this question gives the Court room to execute Chief Justice Roberts’ bread-and-butter play–reading the relevant statutes to avoid a constitutional question by saying that the Order was not authorized by Congress.

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Can We Tolerate Tolerance?  

This is the third in a series of occasional short essays about free speech in America. Earlier installments can be found here and here.

We live in a tolerant society. Of course, that is an exaggeration. But when it comes to so many flashpoint issues – ranging from blasphemy to race-hate speech – we are far more tolerant than almost all other nations, so much so that we are routinely criticized for being too tolerant. It is our badge of honor . . . and dishonor.

Professor Mark Lilla

Professor Mark Lilla

Mindful of the events in France and Denmark earlier this year, I wonder: Will we continue to tolerate toleration if our world takes a terrible turn? My question has less to do with what is being tagged as the “terrorist’s veto” than with a more complex problem, and one therefore even more difficult to resolve. This problem occurred to me when I first read an eye-opening essay by Mark Lilla in the New York Review of Books, an essay entitled “France on Fire.” Here is a very brief excerpt:

“For the past quarter-century a political and intellectual culture war over the place of Islam in French society has been bubbling along, and every few years some event — a student wears a burka to school, riots erupt in a poor neighborhood, a mosque is attacked, the National Front wins a local election — renews hostilities.”

I want to extrapolate from that essay (at once insightful and provocative) in order to outline a phenomenon that may be hurling our way, a phenomenon related to toleration and dissident speech.

Before I do, however, let turn to the glorious side of the toleration equation by way of a well-known case, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943). Recall the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ flag-salute case, the one with that liberty-inspiring majority opinion by Justice Robert Jackson. In words that should be fixed in every lawmaker’s consciousness, Jackson declared: “Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.” The judgment in that case affirming First Amendment freedom is all the more amazing given that it was rendered in wartime and involved a religious sect that was then very much hated in various quarters of American society. (See Shawn Francis Peters, Judging Jehovah’s Witnesses: Religious Persecution and the Dawn of the Rights Revolution (2000).)

The (Hypothetical) Problem

Against that backdrop, imagine the following scenario. Assume that the editors of a respectable libertarian magazine elected to publish several satirical cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in order to make a First Amendment point and to take a stand against the “terrorist’s veto.” Assume thereafter that the Charlie Hebdo incident replayed itself in Cincinnati (the headquarters of my hypothetical magazine). Ten people who work for the magazine are murdered and two Muslim extremists take credit. Both of the terrorists are later killed in a shootout with police that also results in the deaths of two local police officers.

Here is where I begin to extrapolate from Professor Lilla’s essay. Now assume the following additional scenarios, replete with a few quotations from the Lilla essay”

  1. The Governor of Ohio calls for a moment of mourning with heads bowed on the day following the tragedy (say, the time is 11:00 a.m.);
  2. A “noticeable number” of Muslim public high school students in Cincinnati refuse, on religious and political grounds, to bow their heads;
  3. “And not only that. Some [tell] their teachers that the victims got what they deserved because no one should be allowed to mock the Prophet”;
  4. “Others celebrate the killers on social media, and circulate rumors that the entire crisis was manufactured by the government and/or Zionist agents”; and
  5. The parents (some of whom work for state and local governments) of some of these Muslim-American students speak openly (though not at work) to defend their children and endorse the positions they took.

Note that the Muslim-Americans in the above scenarios were otherwise peaceful and law abiding. And some Muslim-American leaders sought to counteract the messages of the violent extremists among them. That said, let me stir the pot a bit more with a few more scenarios and related questions:

  1. So far as government entities are involved, how far are we willing to go to accommodate (culturally, statutorily, and constitutionally) the religious views of the more observant and separatist Muslim-Americans who harbor what we would see as extreme views concerning homosexuality, female purity, and Jews and Israel?
  2. Finally, let me again from quote Professor Lilla to raise a final question: Some “students and their parents demand separate swimming hours or refuse to let their children go on school trips where the sexes might mix. . . . There are fathers who won’t shake hands with female teachers, or let their wives speak alone to male teachers. There are cases of children refusing to sing, or dance, or learn an instrument, or draw a face, or use a mathematical symbol that resembles a cross. The question of dress and social mixing has led to the abandonment of gym classes in many places. Children also feel emboldened to refuse to read authors or books that they find religiously unacceptable: Rousseau, Molière, and Madame Bovary. Certain subjects are taboo: evolution, sex ed, the Shoah. As one father told a teacher, ‘I forbid you to mention Jesus to my son.’” Does our commitment to religious freedom extend that far so as to accommodate the genuine religious views of those who hold them?

Let me be clear: I do not mean to demean Muslim-Americans as a class, nor do I wish to be understood as saying the above scenarios mirror the sentiments of most Muslim-Americans . I trust they are not. Then again, I may disagree with some of them, and sometimes vigorously, on several of the issues flagged above. But I also believe in toleration, and the ever-present need to be sensitive to the plight of minorities of all ideological, political, and religious stripes.

So where does that leave us?

Testing Our Tolerance Read More

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UCLA Law Review Vol. 62, Issue 3

Volume 62, Issue 3 (March 2015)
Articles

Fixing Public Sector Finances: The Accounting and Reporting Lever James Naughton & Holger Spamann 572
Less Enforcement, More Compliance: Rethinking Unauthorized Migration Emily Ryo 622
Decriminalization, Police Authority, and Routine Traffic Stops Jordan Blair Woods 672

 

Comments

Not Whether Machines Think, But Whether Men Do Jane Stack 760
Fighting for a Place Called Home: Litigation Strategies for Challenging Gentrification Hannah Weinstein 794
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The President’s Executive Order on Immigration

I want to discuss the way in which critics of the President’s Executive Order are making their case, as I think at least one of the arguments raises a genuine dilemma that I keep coming back to in my recent research. Here are some ways of thinking about why what the President did is wrong (if you believe that):

1.  He does not have the statutory authority to issue the order.

Presumably, a slew of lawsuits will be filed on this question.  I have no idea what the answer is, but that will get sorted out by the courts.

2.  He does have the legal authority to act, but doing so is a political mistake.

Maybe, but that will also be proven with time.  If a Republican wins the White House in 2016 (0r in some future election assuming that no new statute is passed), then the order could be reversed.

3.  He does have the legal authority to act, but he should not use that authority because the only legitimate way to do what he did is through legislation.

This is an argument that folks like David Brooks seem to be making, and I find this much more interesting.  Why should this only be done through legislation?  Because executive action in this respect is unprecedented?  Because major policy changes should always be done via statute?

The reason I ask is that I do think that there are “legal but unconstitutional” actions, and I’ve talked about them in prior posts.  (A simple example is when presidential electors in a state decide to vote for someone other than the person who won that state.  They can do that, but the voters would throw a fit.)  I think that this situation arises, though, only when there is extensive precedent against exercising a legal power (basically, a sort of desuetude) or there is a powerful norm that makes the legal action suspect.

Is there a norm that says presidents should not undertake “major” changes via executive orders that are lawful?  I’m not sure.  President Truman’s Executive Order desegregating the armed forces was a very big deal, but that was not done via statute.  Affirmative action at the federal level is, to a large extent, based only on executive orders.  There may be more examples.  Do they cover the immigration case?

 

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UCLA Law Review Vol. 61, Issue 5

Volume 61, Issue 5 (June 2014)
Articles

Opinions First—Argument Afterwards Daniel J. Bussel 1194
How the California Supreme Court Actually Works: A Reply to Professor Bussel Goodwin Liu 1246
The Best of All Possible Worlds? A Rejoinder to Justice Liu Daniel J. Bussel 1270
Deprivative Recognition Erez Aloni 1276
Immigration Detention as Punishment César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández 1346
Toward a Theory of Equitable Federated Regionalism in Public Education Erika K. Wilson 1416
The Dark Side of the First Amendment Steven H. Shiffrin 1480

 

Comments

Misdiagnosing the Impact of Neuroimages in the Courtroom So Yeon Choe 1502
Under the (Territorial) Sea: Reforming U.S. Mining Law for Earth’s Final Frontier James D. Friedland 1548