Category: History of Law


The Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Class Action Connection to the Chicago Olympic Bid

By this point, everyone probably knows that Chicago finished last among the finalists for the 2016 Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games. Truth be told, I am personally glad that Rio got the games, but civic pride had me hoping that we would come in second, rather than last. I certainly knew a few people who really wanted the games for our fair city, but most actual Chicagoans I talked to were neutral to negative about the whole enterprise, but quite fascinated by the possibility of being able to rent out their homes to tourists for exorbitant sums.

A less known aspect of the now failed bid was the connection between the bid and one of the landmark cases taught in most civil procedure, civil procedure, and complex litigation courses. A temporary 80,000 seat stadium was planned for the opening and closing ceremonies and certain track and field events including the finish of the marathon. The stadium was to have been constructed in Washington Park, a south side neighborhood just west of Hyde Park and the University of Chicago campus. The park would have been the site of massive improvements and some sort of smaller permanent facility would have survived the end of the Games.

The residential portion of Washington Park immediately to the south of the actual park was the site of one of the many ugly incidents in the early part of the 20th century as many Chicago neighborhoods sought to maintain segregated communities in the face of the tremendous expansion of the African-American population that came to Chicago seeking work. At one time, the Washington Park neighborhood was all white and subject to a racially restrictive covenant. In the depths of the depression, a white home owner sold to a middle class black family. The family endured harassment beyond description as angry mobs howled outside their home and the family faced daily threats and numerous incidents of vandalism and violence.

On the legal front, there were also attempts to enforce the racially restrictive covenants that were still lawful in the days before the Supreme Court’s 1948 decision in Shelley v. Kramer. But first, the white land owners had to establish that the covenant was enforceable as a matter of contract law. The covenant was to take effect only when 95% of the owners had executed it. An action in the Illinois courts held that the requisite percentage of owners had signed the covenant. Then certain white home owners sought to enforce the covenant against the new black owner arguing that he was bound by the results of the earlier state court litigation.

By now, you may have figured out that I am describing the landmark case of Hansberry v. Lee. In the United States Supreme Court, Justice Stone wrote on behalf of a unanimous court (three Justice concurring in the result). As my civ pro students can tell you, the case holds that Mr. Hansberry could not be enjoined from purchasing or living in his home as a result of the earlier litigation, since he had been neither a party in the earlier case nor adequately represented by either side in what had amounted to a class action under Illinois law. The case matters today for all manner of principles we explore at length in civil procedure, class action, and mass litigation courses, but it also stands as an important early landmark on the way to the later civil rights rulings of Shelley v. Kramer and eventually Brown v. Board of Education.

To better understand the personal issues at stake for the Hansberrys throughout this ordeal, we have the moving play A Raisin in the Sun by Lorraine Hansberry, who was a young child when her family moved into their new neighborhood. For a detailed and sensitive history of the underlying facts and the convoluted sets of litigation leading up to Justice Stone’s opinion, we are also fortunate to have Jay Tidmarsh’s chapter on the case in Civil Procedure Stories.

I would like to think that the Olympic Games would have done some good for Washington Park and all the surrounding neighborhoods that Mr. Hansberry and others suffered so greatly to integrate, but as a somewhat cynical Chicagoan I suspect that the burdens would have shared by the public at large and the benefits enjoyed by a privileged few. But if you’re ever in town, I hope you will consider visiting Washington Park and seeing where an important part of legal history took place and where a very different type of sporting history was nearly made this past week. If you get there in the next two weeks, there is even a pretty good circus on the site of where the Olympic Stadium would have been.


The Policy Arguments for and Against Driving on the Right Side of the Road

Generations of law professors have always insisted that there is some class of rules where the particular content of the law is less important than that we have some clear answer to a question. The paradigmatic example is a rule specifying which side of the road one ought to drive on. The decision, so the argument goes, is entirely arbitrary so long as we all pick a side.

Not so it would seem. Read More


Government Lawyers’ Ethical Obligations and the War on Terror

Both the New York Times and the Washington Post this week had stories on a forthcoming DOJ Report expected to slam several of the Bush Administration lawyers’ for ethical lapses in preparing various memos justifying questionable techniques in the War on Terror. Both articles also addressed calls for disbarring those lawyers, as well as for impeaching Jay Bybee, who is now a federal judge.

These stories stress the importance of government lawyers’ advisory role and start from the assumption that there is a sort of “truth” about what the law is on a particular matter. That need not mean that there is only one “right” answer, but it does mean that some answers are outside the realm of the plausible; that even within the plausible, the case for some answers is far weaker than for others; and that there are widely understood standards for what is “good lawyering,” including adequate research, factual investigation, consideration of opposing arguments, and sensitivity to the practical effects of government policy.

The articles also assume that government lawyers as advisors have an obligation to tell their client things he or she might not care to know, to act as the government’s conscience, and to be attentive to history and constitutional values as much as case law precedent. I agree with these assumptions and write only to direct the reader to two new books with much to say about these matters — books worthy of careful study and debate by all who are interested, but particularly by those who are or hope to be government lawyers serving in advisory roles. Those books are Peter M. Shane’s Madison’s Nightmare: How Executive Power Threatens American Democracy and Jefferson H. Powell’s Constitutional Conscience: The Moral Dimension of Judicial Decision. My post today will be brief and focus on Shane’s book. A future post will focus on Powell’s book.

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Lawrence Friedman and the History of Privacy

I recently uploaded to SSRN a short review essay of Lawrence Friedman’s “Guarding Life’s Dark Secrets: Legal and Social Controls over Reputation, Propriety and Privacy (Stanford 2007).  No book is perfect, but this one is probably the best book on the history of privacy law that I have read.

Here’s the abstract of my review:

A short review essay of Lawrence Friedman’s “Guarding Life’s Dark Secrets: Legal and Social Controls over Reputation, Propriety, and Privacy” (Stanford Press 2007). The essay argues that Friedman tells a nuanced and compelling story of the rise and fall of the “Victorian Compromise,” a series of interlocking legal doctrines protecting the reputations of elites around the turn of the twentieth century. “Dark Secrets” undeniably advances our understanding of both the genesis of privacy law and the relationships between law and culture in the Gilded Age. As a work of legal history, it is an instant classic – a must-read for anyone interested in privacy law. But although Dark Secrets is first-rate legal history, it is less successful in its latter chapters when Friedman shifts his focus from the past to the present. The limits of Friedman’s social criticism raise important questions about the ability of history alone to provide answers to social problems in our modern, networked information society.


The Forgotten Man

A book that is getting a lot of attention these days is “The Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression” by Amity Shlaes. Shlaes argues that FDR’s policies prolonged the economic downtown (or at least did not help). Now that we are in another severe recession, her book is being invoked by those who oppose to President Obama’s interventionist measures (such as economic stimulus) as evidence that the New Deal was a failure.

Let’s assume for purposes of discussion that Shlaes is right about the economics. Is that the end of the matter? I don’t think so. The next question is whether activist government was necessary to prevent something worse from happening. I’m not talking about a dictatorship. I’m simply referring to a political movement in favor of even more interventionist or redistributive policies that would have gained traction because the government was not doing enough.

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John Bingham


After I finish my book on Populist and Progressive era constitutionalism, my next book will be a biography of John Bingham (1815-1900), the principal drafter of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment. It’s a bit daunting, as I’ve never written a biography before and much of the relevant material is scattered around the country. Nevertheless, given his importance (Hugo Black called Bingham the “James Madison of the Fourteenth Amendment”), he really deserves a full-fledged biography (not to mention an HBO miniseries, if anyone wants to buy the rights from me). There was one written by Erving Beauregard about twenty years ago, but it is pretty obscure and was based on an inaccurate view of Bingham’s role that dates back to Charles Fairman’s flawed scholarship in the 1940s.

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John Hope Franklin 1915-2009

I wanted to note the passing of John Hope Franklin, the great historian of the African-American experience in this country, who passed away last week. Professor Franklin was part of Thurgood Marshall’s team during the Brown litigation, and his 1947 book “From Slavery to Freedom: A History of American-Americans” is still considered a classic in the field.

I had the pleasure of meeting Professor Franklin three years ago when I was doing research at the FDR Library in Hyde Park. The reading room there is rather small and only a few people were there when he came walking in with a librarian who blurted out, “Hey, everybody! It’s John Hope Franklin.” We all went over to chat and he couldn’t have been more gracious, asking me about my work in detail. (He did seem a tad disappointed when I told him I was a lawyer rather than a historian, but that passed quickly.) I was struck by his approach because I’d seen an interview with him not long before where he explained that as a young man he met W.E.B. Dubois, who was pretty nasty and dismissive towards him — a lowly graduate student. He made sure not to treat others that way.

John Hope Franklin led an exemplary life as a scholar and a citizen. We can all aspire to that standard, but it’ll be hard to match.


Law and Tradition (herein of Iowa, Coke, Hale, and Selden)

Coke.jpgIn the Iowa Supreme Court’s opinion declaring traditional marriage unconstitutional, the justices dealt with the claim that the law was justified because it protected the integrity of the tradition of heterosexual marriage. The opinion states:

A specific tradition sought to be maintained cannot be an important governmental objective for equal protection purposes, however, when the tradition is nothing more than the historical classification currently expressed in the statute being challenged. When a certain tradition is used as both the governmental objective and the classification to further that objective, the equal protection analysis is transformed into the circular question of whether the classification accomplishes the governmental objective, which objective is to maintain the classification.

As presented by the Court (and for all I know as presented by the attorneys defending the law), the argument sounds circular and absurd. As a technical matter the court was applying intermediate scrutiny, but as presented by the Court the appeal to tradition would seem to fail even a rational basis test.

To anyone with a familiarity with the history of the common law, the notion that the appeal to tradition is circular or vacuous is striking. The classical common law theorists of the seventeenth century – Coke, Hale, and Selden – thought that tradition was the primary justification for the law’s authority. Independent of the particular issue of same-sex marriage, the Iowa Supreme Court’s opinion shows how far our legal thinking has traveled.

It is, of course, always easy to dismiss the strange thoughts of the past as so much benighted nonsense, and to look at the seventeenth century appeal to tradition as a bit of rhetorical clap trap and nothing more. Certainly, there was more than a little bit of fiction in the appeal to immemorial custom. The appeal to tradition, however, was not without its reasons.

There are, it seems to me, at least three reasons for adhering to tradition because it is tradition.

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Government Competence During Recessions

An often raised objection to President Obama’s economic policy (or its natural extensions) is that the government is ill-suited to run private firms. I want to raise two counter-arguments that I think diminishes the force of that claim, and which I haven’t seen elsewhere: (1) government workers are smarter during severe recessions; and (2) we know more than we used to about what makes non-profit governance work.

1. Government Eats Brains During Severe Downturns

Because it is familiar, consider the market for legal jobs. A year ago, or two, top law students would be trading present income for the possibility of future income & (difficult to quantify) life satisfaction if they took a job with a government agency instead of a large private firm. That calculation being uncertain, many argued that government jobs were disproportionately filled by individuals seeking to increase the power and prestige of the State, i.e., that they weren’t maximizing wealth. Today, that calculation looks different. Students have to consider the likelihood that the firm will rescind their offers, either before they start work or after. (Odds helpfully summarized here.) So, assume that a student has an offer from (say) Ditto Dot, LLP, with a starting salary of $150K, and she determines that the likelihood that the firm will honor its offer is 50%. The student’s expected salary, obviously, is 75K. A DOJ job (taken after a clerkship) pays in that zone, and there is zero chance that the job will disappear. Since the likelihood that some of these firms will honor their offers appears to be significantly lower than 50%, the DOJ now “pays more” than large parts of the private sector. (Incidentally: another argument against increased federal judicial pay.) Thus, the competition for government jobs should be much more fierce today than it was last year, and will be severe in the Fall hiring season. The result ought to be better qualified government lawyers at all levels.

This same dynamic will be in play in other government departments, including the Treasury & the Fed. During very severe recessions, Washington will be a tremendous talent magnet. Thus, though it is true that the government will never be as nimble as a private firm, our views about its relative level of competence may be unduly influenced by its performance during the times of plenty that we’ve had over the last two generations. Better employees should lead to better government work.

2. Non-profit organizations can work well

At the same time, I think that the claim that the profit motive is necessary to drive effectively governed institutions also needs a bit of rethinking. Universities and other complex non-profits thrive because of internal cultures of performance, driven by strong leaders. Nonetheless, they can be incredibly effective, at making money (consider the success of Yale’s endowment), at inculcating loyalty, at being stable, etc. The literature on non-profit governance is just beginning to influence the legal academy, but appears to offer some promising ideas about how to structure a non-profit so that it can function well absent traditional market pressures. The government, though not a non-profit technically, ends up looking something like it in terms of how its employees are governed and rewarded. We might draw on the lessons of the NP literature in thinking about how to organize the new public-private firms that we’ve seized – at least for the brief period of time that we will be running them.


The Bard of the Financial Crisis

shakespeare.jpgOver the weekend, I re-read A Merchant of Venice, and I was struck by the fact that Shakespeare manages to include in the play virtually every element of the current financial crisis. Scene one begins with a discussion of risk assessment, and Antonio’s belief that he has managed to tame the vagaries of commercial fate through diversification. Asked by Salarino if he “Is sad to think upon his merchandise” (I.i.40), Antonio responds:

Believe me, no. I thank my fortune for it

My ventures are not in one bottom trusted,

Nor to one place; nor is my whole estate

Upon the fortune of this present year.

Therefore my merchandise makes me not sad. (I.i.41-45)

Having ignored the problem of fat tails and black swans, Antonio decides to engage in a bit of dodgy finance. He borrows in the wholesale market from Shylock under terms that appear favorable, but have a huge downside in the unlikely event of his default. Antonio, of course, is unconcerned. From his point of view he is getting cheap money by taking on what seems like an extremely remote risk. He then takes these borrowed funds and uses them to make what can only be described as a no doc, subprime loan. Bassiano wants money for a speculative venture — the wooing “In Belmont [of] a lady richly left” (I.i.161) — and Antonio agrees, in effect renting out his credit rating:

Try what my credit in Venice can do;

That shall be racked even to the uttermost

To furnish thee to Belmont to fair Portia.

Go presently inquire, and so will I,

Where money is; and I no question make

To have it of my trust or for my sake. (I.i.180-185)

Shylock, for his part, does not approve of the loose monetary policy in Venice, which he rightly blames on wild lending practices, such as Antonio’s loans:

How like a fawning publican he looks.

I hate him for he is a Christian;

But more, for what is low simplicity,

He lends out money gratis and brings down

The rate of usance here with us in Venice. (I.iii.38-42)

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