Category: General Law

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FAC 6 (First Amendment Conversations) The Law & Politics of Money: A Q & A with Professor Richard Hasen – Part II

This is Part II of my interview with Professor Richard Hasen concerning his new book Plutocrats United: Campaign Money, the Supreme Court, and the Distortion of American Elections (Yale University Press, 2016) (cloth: $32.50, 256 pp.). Part I of my first interview appears here.

 A hyperlinked list of previous FAC interviews can be found at the end of this Q&A.

First Amendment News (FAN 100) will return next Wednesday.

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Is Compromise Possible?

{99A7FD02-1A3C-40A1-888E-748696B03D3B}Img400Collins: “Any set of limits and rules” on campaign funding, you have written, “must be careful not to squelch too much political speech and competition.” To that end, in your book you propose a compromise:

“An individual or entity may contribute, spend from one’s own personal or general treasury, or both, no more $25,000 in each federal election on election-related express advocacy or electioneering communications supporting or opposing candidates for that election. Such limits shall not apply to the press, to political committees that solely spend contributions received from others, or to money contributed or spent in a voluntary government-created public finance program. An individual also cannot contribute and/or spend more than $500,000 total on all federal election activity in a two-year election cycle.”

In light of your “brief formula,” permit me to make a comment and then ask but three questions, the kind that would be raised time-and-again by election-law lawyers who make it their business to circumvent such rules:

Comment: Since you equate the spending of electoral monies with speech, your formula seems like another way of saying that the Government may dictate when a citizen may or may not speak during an election. Is that a fair statement? If so, how does it square with the command that “Congress shall make no law”?

  1. Would your proposed law apply to an “entity” that created 20 other entities, say non-profit corporations, and then gave them each $500,000 to be spent during a two-year federal election period? Presumably, the $500,000 cap would not bar this since it applies to an “individual.”
  1. Do “electioneering communications” as you understand those terms include books, including e-books?
  1. Would your proposed rule bar a Rupert Murdoch or George Soros from starting a “Save America” TV cable station, the purpose of which was to advance certain political candidates and causes? Presumably it would not bar this since your limits do “not apply to the ” True?

Hasen: I find the entire question whether “money is speech” to be an unhelpful way to think about the question. Money facilitates political speech, and we all agree that a law which would completely bar anyone from spending any money to support or oppose a candidate for office implicates the First Amendment.

Similarly, I find the use of the “Congress shall make no law” formulation also very unhelpful. Of course, it is no law abridging the freedom of speech, and we all agree that some laws which limit speech may be constitutional.

Consider, for example, a federal law that barred Canadian lawyer Benjamin Bluman from spending 50 cents at Kinkos to make flyers saying “Vote Obama” to distribute in Central Park. That’s a law some might say limits freedom of speech. Yet, as I quote in Plutocrats United, Floyd Abrams, Bradley Smith, and James Bopp (three leading First Amendment deregulationists) believe the federal ban on someone like Bluman spending a penny on election-related advertising is consistent with the First Amendment. I urge you to read the quotes on this point in the book, which show that, contrary to Citizens United, sometimes the identity of the speaker does matter for First Amendment purposes even to ardent opponents of regulation.

So let’s move beyond clichés about “no law” and “censorship” and “money is speech” and recognize that all of us believe that in certain circumstances the government has a compelling interest in limiting campaign spending. The question then is when and how.

  1. I should have stated this aspect of my proposal more clearly. We would need anti-circumvention rules that prevent the creation of shell corporations and other artificial entities for the purpose of getting around campaign limits.
  1. The term “electioneering communications” originates in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (more commonly known as McCain-Feingold), and it applies only to certain television and radio ads broadcast close to an election featuring a candidate for office. My proposal would extend to those, as well as to Internet based advertising which is like television and radio ads, not e-books. This question, for the uninitiated, echoes a question Justice Alito asked at the oral argument the first time the Court heard Citizens United v. FEC. Justice Alito asked if Congress had the power to “ban” books. I discuss this question (and the right answers) in detail in my book.
  1. Of course they could set up a TV station. Think of Rupert Murdoch owning FOX News or Sheldon Adelson recently buying the Las Vegas Review Journal. And these entities get the press exemption, so long as they are bona fide press. I offer tests for how to figure out what the press is, especially in the social media age, in my book. One example I give is NRA News, which started out as a way of pushing the boundary on what counts as press. In the end, NRA News became a bona fide press entity.

The Power of PACs? Read More

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FAC 6 (First Amendment Conversations) The Law & Politics of Money: A Q & A with Richard Hasen – Part I

Professor Richard Hasen

Professor Richard Hasen

Richard Hasen is the Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science at the University of California at Irvine. I am pleased to do FAC Q&A interview with him in connection with his new book:

Two of Professor Hasen’s previous books in this same area of study are:

  1. The Voting Wars: From Florida 2000 to the Next Election Meltdown (Yale University Press, 2013), and
  2. The Supreme Court and Election Law: Judging Equality from Baker v. Carr to Bush v. Gore (NYU Press 2003).

{99A7FD02-1A3C-40A1-888E-748696B03D3B}Img400He has been writing in this field for over two decades (see 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1311 (1993)). Today, Professor Hasen is one of as the nation’s leading authorities on election law and is the publisher of the much-noticed and highly regarded Election Law Blog. He is also the co-author of a leading election law casebook, author of a book on statutory interpretation, and author of numerous scholarly articles, including a review essay published in the Harvard Law Review.

* * * * 

Collins: Thank you Rick for agreeing to do this interview and congratulations on the publication of your latest book, which is getting quite a lot of favorable attention, including a four-part video interview on SCOTUSblog.

Hasen: Ron, let me thank you for the opportunity to answer your questions and engage in this dialogue. It is too rare these days for there to be serious discussion on these contentious First Amendment issues. Even among academics, much of what we read on blogs etc. is little more than talking points.

NB: A hyperlinked list of previous FAC interviews can be found at the end of this Q&A.

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Can the System be Fixed? / Need it Be?

UnknownCollins: Four years ago you wrote: “Fixing Washington’s money problems may have to await widespread scandal, and fixing its broader problems likely will have to await a societal shift that alleviates the partisanship currently gripping national politics.” Do you still hold to that?

Hasen: I do stand by this statement. Even though many voters—Democrats, Republicans, and independents—believe that the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC was wrong, and that more reasonable campaign finance laws are necessary, there is now a deep partisan divide on this issue among elites in Washington. More than ever, this is seen as a Democratic/Republican issue. As I argue in Plutocrats United, the John McCains of the Republican Party have gone silent on this issue, and the Mitch McConnells, who used to argue for no limits and full and instant disclosure, now argue even against effective disclosure.

I do expect that we will see continued attempts to improve campaign finance laws on the state and local levels, especially in those places with voter initiatives (which can bypass self-interested legislatures). Some of these laws may raise constitutional questions, which could lead a new progressive Supreme Court (if one arrives) to reconsider the First Amendment balancing in the campaign finance arena.

Collins: Does money translate to political power and advantage? Consider this news item (2-22-06) from the New York Times: “When Jeb Bush formally entered the presidential campaign in June, there was already more money behind him than every other Republican candidate combined. When he suspended his campaign on Saturday night in South Carolina, Mr. Bush had burned through the vast majority of that cash without winning a single state.” What do you make of this?

Hasen: I begin my book by urging progressives to reject facile campaign finance arguments such as “all politicians are corrupt” or money buys elections. A little while ago, I had a prebuttal to the Jeb Bush point in the Washington Post which pointed out that Money Can’t Buy Jeb Bush the White House, But It Still Skews Politics. I argued there:

“But this overly simplistic analysis misses the key role of money in contemporary American politics. In spite of the rhetoric of some campaign reformers, money doesn’t buy elections. Instead, it increases the odds of electoral victory and of getting one’s way on policies, tax breaks and government contracts. And the presidential race is the place we are least likely to see money’s effects. Looking to Congress and the states, though, we can see that the era of big money unleashed by the Supreme Court is hurtling us toward a plutocracy in which the people with the greatest economic power can wield great political power through campaign donations and lobbying….”

“And yet a single donor’s influence in presidential contests is tempered by other factors. With billions of dollars sloshing around on all sides, so much free media attention (especially to outlandish candidacies like Trump’s) and widespread public interest, mega-donors are only one part of a larger picture.”

“Money can matter more to the outcomes of congressional and state races because of relative scale. Millions of dollars spent in these contests can swamp the competition and help swing close elections, especially by influencing low-information voters. Merely the threat of such spending gets the attention of candidates, who worry about the next super PAC to line up against them.”

And there is more at stake here as I pointed out in my Washington Post piece:

“Even more significant, big money skews public policy in the direction of the wealthiest donors. In Illinois, a handful of the super-rich, including hedge-fund billionaire Kenneth C. Griffin, played a key role in getting Republican Bruce Rauner elected governor with an agenda to slash government spending, impose term limits and weaken employee unions. Hedge funds have used campaign to block a potential bankruptcy declaration by Puerto Rico that could help its people but hurt bondholders’ interests.”

“We’re supposed to be in a post-earmark era, yet Congress’s recent must-pass omnibus bill to fund the government was full of special interest deals backed by big spenders. The New York Times reported that “as congressional leaders were hastily braiding together a tax and spending bill of more than 2,000 pages, lobbyists swooped in to add 54 words that temporarily preserved a loophole sought by the hotel, restaurant and gambling industries, along with billionaire Wall Street investors, that allowed them to put real estate in trusts and avoid taxes.” Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid supported the language, and the company of one of Reid’s top donors admitted to being among those “involved in the discussions with congressional staff members.”

The Crisis of Liberalism Divided

Collins: As you well know, the campaign finance controversy has divided the liberal civil liberties community. In that regard, I understand that your aim in Plutocrats “is to start a dialogue among progressives.” Even if that dialogue might point to some common ground “among progressives,” there are still conservative Americans. What, if anything, is there in Plutocrats United for conservatives?

Hasen: There is a conservative case for campaign finance reform. I would point readers to Richard Painter’s new book, Taxation Only with Representation (2016). Painter was President George W. Bush’s ethics czar. My book has a different purpose: it is to talk among progressives and moderates about what the real problems of money in politics are and how to fix them. I say that the main problem is a system in which we allow ever increasing economic inequality to be translated into political inequalities, which distort our elections and politics. I then advocate conducting the First Amendment balance by considering not only anti-corruption arguments, but also political equality arguments, on the government interests side.

(credit: AP Photo-- J. Scott Applewhite)

(credit: AP Photo– J. Scott Applewhite)

Collins: The death of Justice Antonin Scalia has placed the entire nomination and confirmation process in bold ideological relief – and you have commented on the that very point. Mindful of that, Vice President Joseph Biden has suggested that the President nominate a “centrist.” In that regard,

  1. would you consider someone like Justice Potter Stewart or Justice Lewis Powell to be such a “centrist,”
  2. and would you support such a nomination as a compromise of sorts?

Hasen:

  1. It is hard to evaluate how the equivalent of a Justice Stewart or Powell would decide things today. The fact is that on the current Supreme Court all of the conservatives have been appointed by Republican presidents and all the liberals by Democratic ones. It is not that these Justices are deciding cases to help their party. It is that they are chosen because of how they would be likely to vote given their jurisprudential commitments on issues each of the parties cares about the most. This is not how things were even a few years ago. So what would we mean by a “centrist” today? Some conservatives consider Justice Kennedy a centrist (or a vacillator). On election-related issues, Justice Kennedy was in the majority in both Citizens United and the 2013 Shelby County v. Holder case, striking down a key portion of the Voting Rights Act. So he is no centrist on issues I care about.
  2. No, I see the Supreme Court today as essentially a political institution and the battle over confirmation essentially a political one. Why should the Left include a compromise candidate, especially when there is no reason to believe the Right would do so? The compromise I support would be to eliminate life tenure, and to move to 18-year non-renewable terms. This would ensure orderly turnover and that over time the Court reflects more of the public’s views on these issues. It is an idea supported by strong conservatives such as the Federalist Society’s Steven Calabresi.
Professor Lawrence Lessig

Professor Lawrence Lessig

Collins: Professor Lawrence Lessig took issue with you for discounting corruption (see here) as a viable reason for squelching First Amendment rights in the context of campaign financing. He writes: “I have had the pleasure of reading [Professor Hasen’s] . . . Plutocrats United, a book that will certainly mark him as the dean of this field—I think that he has presented us with a false dichotomy. It is not either corruption or equality. It is both. Our current system for funding campaigns is corrupt, but it is corrupt precisely because it violates a certain kind of equality. The violation is not an equality of speech, but an equality of citizenship. . . . We should not, as scholars, be fighting about which flaw our Republic reveals — inequality or corruption. We should be united — let us say, not citizens or plutocrats, but scholars, united—in the view that our Republic is both unequal and corrupt.”

Is Lessig right? Is there some troublesome division in the progressive ranks here? Is this a case of Progressives Disunited?

Hasen: I love the “Progressive Disunited” label! (Isn’t that always true?) I don’t think there is a large gap between Larry and me anymore. We went back and forth on what the problem is with money in politics in law reviews and blog posts, and in the end I think what is left is primarily a semantic difference. There is much value for an activist to labeling reform in anticorruption terms. Larry is an activist and wants to harness voter anger on this issue. I’m not. But in the end, we both think that the problem is that those with the greatest economic power are able to translate that power into political power, by influencing both who is taken seriously as a candidate for election, and by influencing the public policy that our elected officials pursue.

→ This FAN 6 Q&A will continue tomorrow with Part II.←  

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Previous First Amendment Conversations

FAC #1: Larry Tribe on Free Expression

FAC #2Bruce Johnson on Press Access to Prisons

FAC #3Martin Redish on Free Speech, the Roberts Court, & the Liberal Academy

FAC #4Steve Shiffrin, the Dissenter at the First Amendment Table

FAC #5Madison Unplugged: A Candid Q&A with Burt Neuborne about Law, Life & His Latest Book

Other Interviews 

  1. On Legal Scholarship: Questions for Judge Harry T. Edwards (Journal of Legal Education)
  2. The Complete Posner on Posner Series
  3. Unto the Breach: An interview with the all too candid Dean Erwin Chemerinsky
  4. Ask the author: Chief Judge Katzmann on statutory interpretation*
  5. Ask the author: Garrett Epps on clashing visions on the Court*
  6. Ask the author: Three decades of Court watching – a political scientist’s take on the Court*
  7. Ask the authors: Conflict in the Court — an inside look at New York Times v. Sullivan and its progeny*
  8. Ask the author: Floyd Abrams & his fighting faith*
  9. Ask the author: Marcia Coyle on the Roberts Court*
  10. Ask the author: Kathryn Watts on the workings of the Supreme Court*
  11. Ask the author: Alex Wohl on Tom and Ramsey Clark and the Constitution*
  12. Ask the author: Jeffrey Toobin on The Oath*

* Published on SCOTUSblog

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John Adams and the Vice-Presidency

Official_Presidential_portrait_of_John_Adams_(by_John_Trumbull,_circa_1792)In reading a new book on the First Congress, one compelling point that comes across is how people can shape institutions.  We think of George Washington and how much his example made the presidency  into a powerful institution. Same thing for Hamilton at the Treasury, Madison in the House of Representatives, and Jefferson at State.

What about the vice-presidency?  Well, the first VP was John Adams, and he irritated everybody.  (Especially with his strange campaign to give the President some sort of fancy title.)  This probably accounts for why Washington ignored him, which set the template for the vice-presidency until well into the 20th century.

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The Attention Merchants

I just wanted to note that Tim Wu (author of The Master Switch and widely credited with developing the idea of “net neutrality”) has a new book coming out this Fall entitled The Attention Merchants:  The Epic Scramble to Get Inside Our Heads.  It’s available for pre-order here.

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Neither Freedom Nor Equality

Be careful what you wish for – that’s the clear warning that Katherine Franke gives the reader in her new book, Wedlocked: The Perils of Marriage Equality. In the book, Franke offers a far-reaching and incisive critique of marriage, based on the ways in which marriage was both sought after and suffered through by two distinctly different populations: newly freed slaves after the Civil War and same-sex couples in the wake of marriage equality. Careful not to make direct comparisons between the two populations, Franke presents the experiences of both groups side by side and draws out similarities that are always striking and often surprising. The intertwining stories of these two groups provide a window into “what it means to elaborate a new conception of freedom and equality through a form of state licensure.” (p. 11)

Freedom and equality frame the discussion and serve as touchpoints for Franke as she details the unintended consequence of access to marriage for both populations. What becomes clear, as the book progresses, is that the elaboration of freedom and equality through marriage is quite different than the reality of obtaining freedom and equality through marriage. Franke’s first overarching theme – marriage is not freedom – comes through sharply in the wide-ranging stories she tells about couples, both then and now. Marriage does not and cannot equate with freedom because it is a form of state control. This is not news, but the way in which Franke adeptly draws out the myriad ways in which marriage is used as a mechanism for domestication and governance is compelling. But Franke does not stop there. She deepens this argument by describing the peculiar genius of marriage which is that, despite its being a freedom-constraining relationship, the promise of equality that it offers is sufficiently tantalizing to make the trade-off not only acceptable but even desirable. As she presses on the idea of equality in the context of marriage, however, Franke develops her second, twin theme – that marriage rights do not necessarily produce equality. Not only is freedom illusory; equality is not guaranteed.

Beginning with freedom, Franke presses on this concept throughout and skillfully underscores how marriage operates as a “tactic of governance” (p. 62) that is both plastic and persistent. One particular loss of freedom that concerns Franke derives from marriage being deployed by the State as a technology of power that regulates sexuality, erasing all forms of “fantasmatic curiosity.” (p. 115) The embrace and imposition of marriage on both populations has placed alternative sexualities in service of hetero- and now homonormative ideals. Franke regrets in particular with the gay community that, under the yoke of marriage, “we have lost for now the opportunity to explore the possibilities of a ‘lawless homosexuality.’” (p. 115) Marriage is (as I have explored elsewhere) deeply implicated as a part of the “civilizing process.” As such, marriage demands that sexuality be confined to be legitimized and that individuals discipline their internal, sexual drives. Consequently, relationships that tolerate alternate sexualities – such as bigamy, informal marriage, and multi-party relationships – have been penalized, and might be again, in the rush to ensconce marriage as the one legitimate container for sexual intimacy and activity.

Marriage also entails another, related, loss of freedom because it demands not only sexual but also social conditioning. Marriage is a public-facing relationship that requires that families look and act a certain way: a husband and wife, several children, a well-ordered household. Measured against these perfect families, Franke’s “fluid families” come up short and are penalized for their different-looking, non-traditional forms. Women bear a particular burden of regulation and correction, because the picture-perfect form of marriage is a hierarchical and gendered one. “Fluid families” are therefore disrupted and disciplined not only because of their expressive sexuality but also because they do not conform to gender-based hierarchy. In the context of freed slaves, “female-headed households, or even matrifocal families, in many slave communities were pointed to as evidence of the dysfunction, or even the pathology, of slave family life.” (p.81) Even current marriage laws, however, “take matrimony to be a legal relationship that is fundamentally structured by gender inequality.” (p. 209) Accordingly, Franke worries about the effects of marriage on same-sex couples and how it might transform previously gender-fluid relationships into gender-filled ones. Whether or not same-sex couples will change marriage or marriage will change them, encouraging same-sex couples to reinscribe conventional gender roles in their relationships, remains to be seen. The sociology is in the making. Nevertheless Franke’s warning to monitor the impulse to gender within marriage is apt, especially given power imbalances that result in many couples due to asymmetrical earnings in a marriage.

Finally, marriage represents an immediately relevant form of state intervention and loss of freedom because it imposes default rules about money, resources, and sharing. Marriage economics are, as Franke points out, intimately related to the gendered nature of marriage and marriage as a form of “private welfare.” (p. 90) Because of legal assumptions about the specialization of household labor and marriage as an economic partnership, divorce laws mandate forced sharing, absent private contracting. Same-sex couples are not always aware of these rules (not unlike their different-sex counterparts) and, furthermore, divorce courts don’t always know what to do when confronted with couples who might have been married sooner than they were, had they been allowed to do so. Franke’s story of Ruth and Beth underscores these problems and highlight the possibility of unjust enrichment. (p. 211) Equally likely, however, is the possibility that long-term same-sex couples who have been economic partners for years will be dealt with unfairly by courts refusing to recognize those years of partnership upon divorce. That is to say, while backdating to the beginning of the dating period is one option courts have when constituting the marital estate, they also have the option of not taking into account anything that happened previous to the marriage and thereby artificially circumscribing the assets available to distribute at divorce. Given the reluctance of courts to accord property claims to unmarried cohabitants – and the almost complete rejection by state legislatures of the ALI principles (p. 156) – this may be the more likely danger. Either way, Franke establishes through an abundance of examples that freedom has little relationship with marriage.

Having deconstructed the notion of freedom with respect to marriage – the freedom to marry is really an invitation to relinquish personal freedom to the State – Franke goes on to suggest that the promise of equality through marriage may also be illusory. Marriage inequality operates on several levels. For starters, the right to marry for same-sex couples does not necessitate the right to equal treatment by a legal and societal culture still hobbled by bias and discriminatory desire. One noteworthy thread that runs through the book is that bias has an afterlife – it does not just disappear but rather gets channeled into new outlets and finds new modes of appearance. In the case of marriage equality, inequality may appear in the guise of reinvigorated enforcement of adultery and bigamy law with respect to same-sex couples. (p. 151) Laws that have been on the books for decades, never invoked, may be animated anew because of reconstituted homophobia. Gay men and lesbians, Franke remarks, “have long been accustomed” (p. 152) to outdated laws being selectively applied in order to penalize gay sex. Marriage equality may not change this. This bias may also find other ways to get into court. With same-sex couples having and adopting children, as well as divorcing, bias could easily show up in family court. It is, in fact, simple to speculate about how discrimination and stereotypes might find their way into judicial determinations about property division, spousal maintenance, and child custody. This is a matter, in many respects, of cultural change lagging behind legal change on certain issues and in certain locations. Franke does not have the space, nor is it necessarily a part of her project, to take on the question of how to move cultural change forward, to full acceptance of same-sex relationships and sexuality. The necessity of doing so, however, remains.

There are also other inequalities engendered by the push for equality. In fact, the larger problem with marriage “equality” may be that it creates inequalities within and between various communities. This is a major point in the book and one that weaves together the stories of the gay and African-American communities in the contemporary landscape. In short, the problem with the move to gain rights through marriage, thereby making marriage the standard by which other relationships are “both made legible and assigned value” (p. 112), is that it renders other relationships different and lesser. As Franke argues, “winning the right to marry should not result in making non-traditional families … even more vulnerable for their failure to take a nuclear form.” (p. 111) Perhaps one of the most damaging aspects of this bias “offloading” is that it penalizes and further stigmatizes African-Americans because of the high prevalence of non-normative families in African-American communities. (p. 61) The promise of equality is, consequently, tempered by competing claims to relationship legitimacy and the continuing legacy of racism.

Freedom is not free and equality is not equal. Looking at the possible losses rather than gains in freedom and equality that result from obtaining the right to marry, one is left to wonder two things. Why do we need marriage? And, if we do need marriage for certain purposes, how can and should we manage the technology of marriage so that it serves as a mechanism for enabling freedom and equality?

An answer to the first question is that we don’t need marriage for everything. Consequently, one way to reduce marriage governance is to stop provisioning goods and resources through marriage to the extent that we currently do. There are indisputably good instrumental and practical reasons to marry, given the structure of our current system. As Windsor winningly demonstrated, it is manifestly unfair to ask same-sex couple to be taxed when different-sex couples are not. And, on the flip side, if many different-sex couples count financial planning among the reasons for marriage, why shouldn’t same-sex couples do the same? The thousand-plus benefits that the government provisions through marriage constitute an extremely compelling reason to get married. This has led to a phenomenon of many same-sex couples “holding their noses” and getting married.

This argument, however, does not justify marriage on the merits. There is nothing inherent to marriage that makes it the right or only way to provision benefits. In fact, the answer to the benefits question may be to have the State provision them outside of marriage. Franke does not explore how else we, collectively, might choose to provision benefits or the responsibility of the State to do so in a more equality driven manner. She does, however, nod at the question of redistribution when she suggests that all “married queers” think about what it means to enjoy economic advantage through marriage and reshape their behavior accordingly. (p. 235) Actions like these will help decrease the marriage privilege and smooth out differences among the various types of intimate relationships. This will also prevent couples from being channeled into marriage without any real desire for it.

Another answer is that we need marriage for certain people because, for these couples, the substance of marriage is compelling. Marriage, for some, is a positive good. Consequently, a second strategy – compatible with the first – is to commit to making marriage more equal for those who choose to be in it for affirmative substantive reasons. Franke rightly critiques the fact that “marriage has been recharged as the most august holding environment for the elaboration of one’s mature and authentic self.” (p. 61) Trying to find the charm and charisma of marriage, however, it may be that marriage is deeply appealing because it is a site for making and maintaining a unique connection with another person. The modern ideal of companionate marriage reinforces this ideal and demonstrates how marriage is more than money. Marriage provides a way for individuals to commit to one another, offer continuing support, and receive both love and encouragement. Marriage is of course not required for this type of relationship to develop and flourish. Marriage does, however, serve a signaling function and provide a legal framework for resource sharing and caretaking of multiple kinds.

For these people, marriage is an unalterable part of the social landscape. For them, Franke offers valuable suggestions in her “Call to Action For Married Queers,” including asking spouses to monitor their economic privilege, be aware of gender, and resist offloading bias on other, various non-normative groups. The notion alone of queering marriage is a project worth pursuing in an attempt to help further change the nature of marriage. In this vein, one additional suggestion for Franke’s Call to Action is for married queers – and unmarried ones as well – to open and protect robust critical, queer spaces both inside and outside of marriage. Franke’s message about preserving queer spaces in the context of sexuality is equally important in the political context. Part of keeping marriage equality in play and in question is curating spaces of play and resistance – critical spaces in which divergent practices and personae can be explored. Franke laments that the push to marriage has foreclosed many of these spaces in the gay community. These spaces, however, can be perpetually reinvented through critical inquiry and activity, and they will be the sites of cultural as well as legal resistance.

Ultimately, Wedlocked deftly deconstructs the notions of both freedom and equality with respect to marriage. What remains is to think through how to counter marriage primacy, change marriage internally, and keep open the space for critical play.

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FAN 99.3 (First Amendment News) Court Denies Review in Off-Campus Speech Case

Today the Court denied review in Bell v. Itawamba County School Board. The issue in the case was whether and to what extent a public high school, consistent with the First Amendment, may discipline students for their off-campus speech. In a divided en banc ruling, the Fifth Circuit denied the First Amendment claim.

The Court’s 2015-2016 First Amendment Docket

Cases Decided

** Shapiro v. McManus (9-0 per Scalia, J., Dec. 8, 2015: decided on non-First Amendment grounds) (the central issue in the case relates to whether a three-judge court is or is not required when a pleading fails to state a claim, this in the context of a First Amendment challenge to the 2011 reapportionment of congressional districts) (from Petitioners’ merits brief: “Because petitioners’ First Amendment claim is not obviously frivolous, this Court should vacate the judgments of the lower courts and remand the case with instructions to refer this entire action to a district court of three judges.”) (See Rick Hasen’s commentary here)

Review Granted

  1. Heffernan v. City of Paterson (cert. petition,  amicus brief) (see blog post here)
  2. Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, et al. (all briefs here) (Lyle Denniston commentary)

Oral Arguments Schedule 

  1. January 11, 2016:  Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, et al. (transcript here)
  2. January 19, 2016:  Heffernan v. City of Paterson (see Howard Wasserman SCOTUSblog commentary here)(transcript here)

Review Denied

  1. Bell v. Itawamba County School Board (see also Adam Liptak story re amicus brief)
  2. Town of Mocksville v. Hunter
  3. Miller v. Federal Election Commission
  4. Sun-Times Media, LLC v. Dahlstrom
  5. Rubin v. Padilla
  6. Hines v. Alldredge
  7. Yamada v. Snipes
  8. Center for Competitive Politics v. Harris
  9. Building Industry Association of Washington v. Utter (amicus brief)

Pending Petitions*

  1. Justice v. Hosemann 
  2. Cressman v. Thompson
  3. POM Wonderful, LLC v. FTC (Cato amicus brief) (D.C. Circuit opinion)
  4. Electronic Arts, Inc. v. Davis
  5. American Freedom Defense Initiative v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (relisted)

First Amendment Related Case

  • Stackhouse v. Colorado (issue: Whether a criminal defendant’s inadvertent failure to object to courtroom closure is an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right” that affirmatively waives his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, or is instead a forfeiture, which does not wholly foreclose appellate review?)  (see Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press amicus brief raising First Amendment related claims)

Freedom of Information Case

 The Court’s next Conference is on March 4, 2016.

Though these lists are not comprehensive, I try to track as many cases as possible. If you know of a cert. petition that is not on these lists, kindly inform me and I will post it.

2

What Exactly Are Pledged Delegates?

Donald_Trump_August_19_2015In discussions of how a brokered convention might work for the GOP presidential nomination, a standard analysis goes like this:  On the first ballot, delegates must vote for the candidate to which they are pledged based on whatever allocation formula was used in their state.  On any subsequent ballot, they can are free to vote for anyone.

Here’s my question:  What happens if someone does not vote for who they’re supposed to on the first ballot?  Is there any sanction?  Does the vote not count?  I think the answer to both is no.  There actually is no such thing as pledged delegates–there is just social pressure and sanctions, just as there is for presidential electors who think about voting for “somebody else.”

I only bring this up because it could matter if Donald Trump gets over 50% of the delegates heading into the convention by only a small margin.  (Say, he has ten more than he needs.)  Those ten could be persuaded to change, though there is the obvious problem that this would lead Trump and his supporters to scream bloody murder about cheating.

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FAN 99.2 (First Amendment News) Trump on Libel Law & Freedom of the Press

Mr. Trum speaking at Texas rally

Mr. Trum speaking at Texas rally

Yesterday, Donald Trump spoke at a rally in Fort Worth, Texas. According to Politico, in the course of that rally he took aim at the New York Times and the Washington Post — those “dishonest” publications.  He then elaborated on what he planned to do to change the law of libel:

“One of the things I’m going to do if I win, and I hope we do and we’re certainly leading. I’m going to open up our libel laws so when they write purposely negative and horrible and false articles, we can sue them and win lots of money. We’re going to open up those libel laws. So when The New York Times writes a hit piece which is a total disgrace or when The Washington Post, which is there for other reasons, writes a hit piece, we can sue them and win money instead of having no chance of winning because they’re totally protected.” (video clip here)

* * *

From FAN 78 (Sept. 23, 2015):

Alan Garten, executive vice president & general counsel to The Trump Organization

Alan Garten, executive vice president & general counsel to The Trump Organization

Presidential candidate Donald Trump’s lawyer, Alan G. Garten, is helping his boss retaliate against the Club for Growth’s TV ads attacking Mr. Trump’s record on taxes. According to a New York Times story, Mr. Garten “sent a two-page letter to the group’s president, David McIntosh, accusing it of trying to damage Mr. Trump’s reputation by lying about his policies. The threat of litigation comes a week after the group started a $1 million advertising campaign that paints Mr. Trump as a disingenuous politician who intends to impose a huge tax increase if elected president.”

Here are some excerpts from Mr. Garten’s September 21, 2015 letter:

“Simply stated, your attack ad is not only completely disingenious, but replete with outright lies, false, defamatory and destructive statements and downright fabrications, which you fully know to be untrue, thereby exposing you and your so-called ‘club’ to liability for damages and other tortious harm. For example, while your Attack Ad blatantly misrepresents to the public that Mr. Trump ‘supports higher taxes,’ nothing could be further from the truth. To be clear, Mr. Trump’s tax plan, which is scheduled to be released later this wek, supports a lowering of taxes. . . .”

“In the interest of avoiding what will certainly be a costly litigation process, we are prepared to offer you the one-time opportunity to rectify this matter by providing us with your prompt written assusrances that (i) you have stopped running the Attack Ads; and (ii) you will not generate or disseminate any misleading or inaccurate information or make any factually baseless accusations you know to be untrue with respect to my client at any point in the future. In the event, however, we do not promptly receive these assurances, please be advised that we will commence a multi-million dollar lawsuit against you personally and your organization for your false and defamatory statements and the damage you have intentionally caused to my client’s interests as well as pursue all other remedies available to us at law or in equity. [ ¶ ] Please be guided accordingly.” [Video of Club for Growth ad here.]

* * *

Eugene Volokh, “Donald Trump says he’ll ‘open up libel laws’,The Volokh Conspiracy (Feb. 26, 2016)

Matea Gold, “Bush PAC attorney to Trump counsel: You may want to try learning election law,” Washington Post (Dec. 9, 2015)

FAN 78: “Alan Garten, Trump’s Lawyer, Threatens ‘Multi-million dollar’ Lawsuit for Attack Ads Against His Client” (Sept. 23, 2015)

Abrams & Collins, “Confronting Trump — An American Debate Censorship Cannot Stop” (Dec. 18, 2015)

0

FAN 99.1 (First Amendment News) Scholars in the Sun — Free Speech Dialogue in the Desert

It was a glorious day for First Amendment scholars in the sun. The two-day event, titled “Speech Holes: A workshop on Free Speech Theory,” was hosted by the University of Arizona Law School. The event was the brainchild of Professors Derek and Jane Bambauer — and what a remarkable event it was, replete with a wide-range of good-spirited give-and-take views on an array of First Amendment topics.

Sabino Canyon Park, AZ

Sabino Canyon Park, AZ.  Top, Left to Right: Toni Massaro,Roy SpeceJack BalkinRon CollinsDavid SkoverDerek BambauerMargot KaminskiSeth Kremer // Bottom, Left to Right: Chris RobertsonJane BambauerHelen Norton, & Genevieve Lankier

4

Papachristou and Vagrancy

Justice_William_O_DouglasI just finished Risa Goluboff’s tour de force on the campaign to reform vagrancy law, and one of the many terrific insights in her book is that Justice Douglas’s opinion for the Court string down vagrancy statutes as unconstitutional in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville crystallized the spirit of the 1960s in a way that few other opinions do.  I hadn’t thought about Papachristou after reading it in law school, but Risa’s article a couple of years ago that discussed the connection between that case and Roe v. Wade got my attention.  On her broader claim about the decision, consider some passages from the opinion:

Walkers and strollers and wanderers may be going to or coming from a burglary. Loafers or loiterers may be “casing” a place for a holdup. Letting one’s wife support him is an intra-family matter, and normally of no concern to the police. Yet it may, of course, be the setting for numerous crimes.

The difficulty is that these activities are historically part of the amenities of life as we have known them. They are not mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights. These unwritten amenities have been, in part, responsible for giving our people the feeling of independence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity. These amenities have dignified the right of dissent, and have honored the right to be nonconformists and the right to defy submissiveness. They have encouraged lives of high spirits, rather than hushed, suffocating silence.

Or this one:

Those generally implicated by the imprecise terms of the ordinance — poor people, nonconformists, dissenters, idlers — may be required to comport themselves according to the lifestyle deemed appropriate by the Jacksonville police and the courts. Where, as here, there are no standards governing the exercise of the discretion granted by the ordinance, the scheme permits and encourages an arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law. It furnishes a convenient tool for “harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure.” Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 310 U. S. 97-98. It results in a regime in which the poor and the unpopular are permitted to “stand on a public sidewalk . . . only at the whim of any police officer.” Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U. S. 87, 382 U. S. 90. Under this ordinance,

“[I]f some carefree type of fellow is satisfied to work just so much, and no more, as will pay for one square meal, some wine, and a flophouse daily, but a court thinks this kind of living subhuman, the fellow can be forced to raise his sights or go to jail as a vagrant.” Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on the Punishment of Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police Officers, and the Like, 3 Crim.L.Bull. 205, 226 (1967).