Category: General Law

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FAN 61.2 (First Amendment News) Cato’s Ilya Shapiro weighs in on Elonis

Ilya Shapiro

Ilya Shapiro

True to form, in Elonis v. United States the Supreme Court continued its unparalleled defense of free speech — this time in the social-media context. Also true to form, however, Chief Justice John Roberts put together a near-unanimous majority by shying away from hard questions and thus leaving little guidance to lower courts.

The case involved a statute that made it a federal crime to transmit in interstate commerce — the Internet counts — “any communication containing any threat . . . to injure the person of another.” Based on a bizarre series of Facebook posts styled largely on the lurid lyrical stylings of Eminem, Anthony Elonis was convicted under that law of threatening his wife, the police, an FBI agent, and a kindergarten class. Yet prosecutors didn’t prove that Elonis intended to threaten anyone or even understood his words as being threatening. All they showed was that the individuals in question felt threatened by the posts.

The Supreme Court correctly ruled that that’s not enough, that negligently throwing around violent rap lyrics shouldn’t get someone thrown in prison. As Roberts noted, the general rule is that a “guilty mind” — what lawyers call mens rea — is a necessary element of any crime.

But alas that’s as far as Roberts went: since the statute in question doesn’t specify the requisite state of mind, mere negligence isn’t enough. He did not say — the Court did not rule at all — whether an amended statute criminalizing negligent speech would pass First Amendment muster. This issue was the focus of Cato’s amicus brief, which was also signed onto by the ACLU, the Abrams Institute, the Center for Democracy & Technology, and the National Coalition Against Censorship. Indeed, as Justice Samuel Alito points out in partial dissent, the majority opinion doesn’t even say whether “reckless” Facebook posts come under the statute’s purvey (or whether that reading would in turn satisfy the First Amendment.

In short, I’m glad that amateur poet “Tone Dougie” (Elonis’s nom de rap) won’t be practicing his art in the hoosegow, but the Supreme Court’s minimalism has guaranteed this type of case — and maybe even this defendant — an encore. Particularly as social media and other new means of expression evolve, the Hustices need to do more than narrowly slice speech-chilling criminal laws.

Ilya Shapiro
Senior Fellow in Constitutional Studies
Cato Institute

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FAN 61.1 (First Amendment News) Court Decides Facebook “Threats” Case on Statutory Grounds

Anthony Elonis

Anthony Elonis

The Court just handed down in decision in Elonis v. United States, which had been argued on December 1, 2014. The Court ruled in favor of the Petitioner Elonis. The opinion is here.

The Vote: 8-1

Author of Majority opinion: Chief Justice Roberts

The Holding: The Court holds that the Third Circuit’s instruction requiring only negligence with respect to the communication of a threat is not sufficient to support a conviction under the federal law at issue in this case.” [Amy Howe, SCOTUSblog]

“The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” [From majority opinion]

Case decided on statutory grounds; First Amendment question not reached.

Dissenting Opinions: Justice Thomas dissents, and Justice Alito concurs in part and dissents in part.

Justice Alito: “The Court holds that the jury instructions in this case were defective because they required only negligence in conveying a threat. But the Court refuses to explain what type of intent was necessary. Did the jury need to find that Elonis had the purpose of conveying a true threat? Was it enough if he knew that his words conveyed such a threat? Would reckless- ness suffice? The Court declines to say. Attorneys and judges are left to guess.”

Justice Thomas: “Because the Court of Appeals properly applied the general-intent standard, and because the communications transmitted by Elonis were “true threats” unprotected by the First Amendment, I would affirm the judgment below.”

The Facts: Anthony Elonis was convicted of making threats against his estranged wife, and later against an FBI agent. In response to his wife leaving him and taking their two children, Elonis posted several things referring to her on his Facebook page. On it he wrote: “Revenge is a dish that is best served cold with a delicious side of psychological torture.” Consistent with that statement, he also wrote: “There’s one way to love ya, but a thousand ways to kill ya,/ And I’m not going to rest until your body is a mess,/ Soaked in blood and dying from all the little cuts./ Hurry up and die bitch.” (See here for additional statements.)

A jury found Elonis guilty and he was sentenced to 44 months in prison. In an opinion authored by Judge AnthonyScirica , the Third Circuit upheld his conviction.

The Issues: The two issues before the Supreme Court were:

  1. Whether, consistent with the First Amendment and Virginia v. Black, conviction of threatening another person under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) requires proof of the defendant’s subjective intent to threaten, as required by the Ninth Circuit and the supreme courts of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont; or whether it is enough to show that a “reasonable person” would regard the statement as threatening, as held by other federal courts of appeals and state courts of last resort; and
  2. whether, as a matter of statutory interpretation, conviction of threatening another person under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) requires proof of the defendant’s subjective intent to threaten.

The Lawyers

 John P. Elwood argued the case on behalf of the Petitioner Anthony Elonis.

 Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued on behalf of the government.

Amici Briefs

Fourteen amicus briefs were filed in the case.

 Amicus briefs in support of the Petitioner were filed by: the  American Civil Liberties Union, the Abrams Institute for Freedom of Expression, the Cato Institute, the Center for Democracy & Technology, and the National Coalition Against Censorship Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and Nine Media Organizations, the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression, and the Rutherford Institute, among others.

Amicus briefs in support of the Respondent were filed by the Anti-defamation League, Wisconsin and Seventeen Other States, the District Of Columbia, Guam, and the National District Attorneys Association, and the National Center for Victims of Crime, among others.

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The Integrity of Clayton Homes and the Politics of “Investigative Journalism”

The following is adapted from “Berkshire’s Blemishes,” a working paper delineating the costs, rather than the vaunted benefits, of Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway as a management model, including its commitment to integrity and its elements of subsidiary autonomy and corporate decentralization.   

aaaaaOn April 3, 2015, two purported journalists, Daniel Wagner and Mike Baker, reported an investigative piece challenging Clayton Homes, Berkshire Hathaway’s vertically integrated manufacturer and financier of manufactured housing. Writing in the Seattle Times a piece sponsored by the Center for Public Integrity, the writers alleged that Clayton’s  sales team channeled buyers into Clayton mortgages, that they were offered few or no alternative financing options, that terms were seductive (including low down payment requirements), that defaults and foreclosures were high and that collection practices were aggressive. One assertion the piece specifically highlighted: a significant portion of Clayton loans carried interest rates exceeding fifteen percent. The writers reported that “more than a dozen” customers offered complaints along with two former dealers who confirmed their legitimacy—notable numbers considering that Clayton sells and finances some 30,000 homes per year.

Clayton promptly issued a response disagreeing with every negative assertion in the piece. It stressed its policies of customer protection while acknowledging that, in a minority of cases such as the writers portrayed, customers facing periodic life challenges have difficulty repaying loans and may face foreclosure. The authors responded with a point-by-point rebuttal. At the Berkshire annual meeting five weeks later, Mr. Buffett also repudiated the piece and, again, one of the writers responded with continued skepticism.  Yet all the claims contradict everything Clayton Homes stands for, as I explained in both my book, Berkshire Beyond Buffett, and in a New York Times column ninety days before this piece—a column, incidentally, which the company cited in its response and which the writers dismissed in rebuttal because written by me, whom they called “a longtime Buffett acolyte.” (Notably, it also came out that one of the writers, Mr. Wagner, had an undisclosed conflict of interest: his sister is a lawyer representing plaintiffs in lawsuits against Clayton Homes.)

The real reasons behind the piece now seem to be more political than at first appears. At the time of the report, Congress had begun debating regulations applicable to manufactured housing loans. After the financial crisis of 2008, the Dodd-Frank Act added disclosure and timing requirements to such loans bearing high interest rates, which Congress has been considering repealing as onerous and costly—a House vote was set for mid-April.  Clayton and other industry leaders support repeal while some homeowner and consumer groups are opposed.  Although the original report did not mention these points, the writers added the theme in a story last week—linking their original assertions to Clayton’s incentives in the political debate and making it clear that they are on the other side of that debate, opposing repeal.   Thus it now appears as if the authors wrote a piece of political advocacy, not investigative journalism, and targeted Clayton for ulterior motives, not as neutral reporters of facts.   (Notably, once Mr. Wagner’s conflict of interest was revealed, bylines in the two subsequent pieces credit only Mr. Baker, with Mr. Wagner demoted from the byline to credit for additional reporting.)

While wrongful activity within a subsidiary of a decentralized corporation would reveal costs of such a model, given the political context of the purported exposé, that does not appear to be an implication in this case.   On the contrary, the political benefits of a piece attacking Clayton would be proportional to Clayton’s reputation for integrity—if even those reputable entrepreneurs sell or finance manufactured homes to troubled buyers, imagine what the rest of the industry looks like!  Had there been a real problem—whether dealers wrongly steering customers toward inferior loans or loan officers deceiving customers—there would be reason to consider the efficacy of Clayton’s vertically integrated structure—making, selling, financing and insuring manufactured homes operating as walled-off business silos.  Likewise, if Clayton’s formal response and Mr. Buffett’s oral comments had missed their mark, consideration should be given to changing Berkshire’s lean anti-bureaucratic model to add departments of political or public affairs at both the subsidiary and parent levels.  But no such costs appear to warrant such a revision.  (Indeed, it was Mr. Buffett who called out Mr. Wagner’s undisclosed conflict of interest, in an interview with the writers at the annual meeting—not a fact he likely dug out himself.)

Lawrence A. Cunningham, a professor at George Washington University,  has written numerous books on a wide range of subjects relating to business and law. 

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Are Robots and Algorithms Taking Over?

The past half-decade has seen an uptick in thoughtful and influential scholarship on the potential risks — particularly to privacy and civil liberties — of emerging technologies. Regular readers of this blog will not be surprised to find works by several Concurring Opinions bloggers on any list of must-read commentary on the legal, ethical, and political dimensions of new data-driven technologies. Technological progress (or regress, depending on your point of view) has become one of the dominant narratives of our time, and it’s good that critiques of its darker implications have slowly but inexorably entered our political discourse.  

Still, there’s a smallish subset of tech commentary and criticism that is, in my view, overwrought. These are critiques that, on their face, seem to have no particular target other than technology tout court. They often include alarmist headlines which are not supported in substance. They cite the marketing claims of technology vendors as statistics. Their true targets are generally people, or political ideologies, rather than technology — a critical fact which often remains buried in the work. Sue Halpern isn’t usually guilty of being a part of this subset (for example, Halpern’s work on the surveillance disclosures has been thoughtful and important) but her latest effort, on the pages of the Review, comes close. (Though, as I’ll explain, she gets a lot right as well).

The headline: How Robots and Algorithms Are Taking Over.

Screen Shot 2015-03-31 at 7.52.43 PM

Are robots and algorithms really taking over?  Will technological unemployment beget a new era of economic and social disorder? I’m skeptical.

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A Berkshire Opportunity Cost: Listed Family Firms

aaaaaThe following is adapted from “Berkshire’s Blemishes,” a working paper delineating the costs, rather than the vaunted benefits, of Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway as a management model.  

Warren Buffett loves family businesses whose owner-managers care more about their constituents than about profits, recognizing instead that customer care tends to translate into economic gain. Those entrepreneurs, in turn, love Berkshire Hathaway, Buffett’s company, because it offers intangible benefits such as managerial autonomy and a permanent home. When family businesses sell to Berkshire, they know they can still run them as they see fit and will not be sold if prospects falter: Berkshire has not sold a subsidiary in forty years and promises not to.

Buffett hates using Berkshire stock to pay for acquisitions, however, since few companies can match the time-tested premium currency Berkshire has come to represent. In fact, Berkshire’s worst acquisition was paid for in stock and Buffett still translates the cost into current values: $443 million paid in 1993, equivalent to more than $5 billion in Berkshire stock now. Preferring to pay cash, Berkshire is often able to acquire family businesses at a discount because selling shareholders value Berkshire culture. Buffett also hates auctions, plagued by frightful dangers like the winner’s curse, which can push bids well above value, rationally calculated.

Sensible as these tenets are, there is always an opportunity cost, in this case forsaking listed family firms–publicly traded companies controlled by a family. Unlike those owned solely by close-knit groups who all wish to sell to Berkshire, directors of listed family businesses owe duties to non-family shareholders when selling control. In most states, led by Delaware, they are duty-bound to get the best value for shareholders.  (The doctrine is known by famous cases illustrating it, including Revlon and Paramount v. QVC.)

In a stock deal where all holders share gains in future business value, directors could consider Berkshire’s special culture in valuing the transaction. But with cash, all such future value goes to Berkshire’s shareholders, not selling public stockholders, who would also gain nothing from the autonomy or permanence that family members prize in a sale to Berkshire. So directors resist an all cash sale at a discount and seek rival suitors at higher prices, even stimulating an auction to drive price up—repelling Berkshire’s interest.

An example can be drawn from Berkshire’s 2003 acquisition of Clayton Homes, a publicly traded family business bought for a modest (seven percent) premium to market. Many Clayton shareholders objected; one, Cerberus Capital Management, told Clayton it wanted the chance to make a competing bid; another sued. The result was a six-month delay in getting to a shareholder vote, which narrowly approved the Berkshire deal. Many Clayton shareholders were disappointed, but Cerberus opted not to outbid Berkshire, and the court dismissed the lawsuit.

The scenario remains unattractive to Berkshire, however, given the risk of litigation, delay and rival bids. After all, courts might require directors to take affirmative steps, presenting the risk of an auction, which in itself suffices to deter Berkshire from bidding in the first place. The upshot: the publicly traded family business is outside Berkshire’s acquisition model, amounting to an opportunity cost for what would otherwise be a sweet spot. On balance, it is probably a price worth paying, but it’s useful to know the price.

Lawrence A. Cunningham, a professor at George Washington University,  has written numerous books on a wide range of subjects relating to business and law. 

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FAC 5 (First Amendment Conversations) Madison Unplugged: A Candid Q&A with Burt Neuborne about Law, Life & His Latest Book  

I have spent a lifetime fighting for a very broad First Amendment, keeping the government out of the First Amendment. But I have also said that there is a terrible price that one pays for that. — Burt  Neuborne, “The Open Mind” with Richard D. Heffner, January 16, 1997

He is not a pause-button sort of guy / he is not one to vanish into the void / he is not a fellow you forget / and he is never one to forsake a debate or turn down a chance to raise a rebellious lance. He is animated / calibrated / cultivated / complicated / and always opinionated. He is Bill Brennan on overdrive . . . and then some!

Yes, he is Burt Neuborne, the Norman Dorsen Professor of Civil Liberties at New York University Law School. And he has a new book (Madison’s Music: On Reading the First Amendment), about which I will soon say more — but first a few biographical notes, if only to set the stage for the Madisonian music to come.

* * * *

Young Neuborne, HLS 1962

Young Neuborne, HLS 1962

After graduating from Cornell University in 1961, Neuborne studied constitutional law at Harvard under Albert Sacks and had Henry Hart for federal courts. He took a seminar in English Legal History from Samuel Thorne. His Harvard Law School classmates included Michael BoudinStephen BreyerBert Rein, and Patricia Schroeder. Given his interests in the law at that time, it seemed that young Burt Neuborne was destined to be either a public-interest lawyer or a professor. As it turned out, he became both, but it didn’t start out that way.

Had Fortuna not intervened, Neuborne might have continued to be an estate-planning lawyer for the well-heeled of the Eastern corridor. That, at least, is how things looked a half-century or so ago for the young Harvard graduate: “I went to Wall Street for three years after graduation, at a small blue chip firm, Casey, Lane & Mittendorf. [From 1964-1967] I specialized in estate planning for the ultra-rich.” That brand of life-in-the-law was not, however, meant to be his calling. His life-change was the child of chance: “My big break came when a lawyer for the NYCLU transferred into my Army Reserve unit. When a job opened up at NYCLU, I went for it, although my father-in-law almost killed me.” Thankfully, his father-in-law’s homicidal tendencies abated, and with that twist of fate Burt Neuborne’s career traveled along a far different track, one in civil liberties law.

Thus did things begin. And when they did he quickly found himself working in the shadow of some of the ACLU’s brightest lights: “In those days,” he told Joseph Berger, “the NYCLU and ACLU were both located in a building in the Flatiron district honeycombed with left-wing organizations. Aryeh Neier was the NYCLU director. Ira Glasser was associate director. Ruth Bader Ginsburg was a director of the ACLU’s women’s rights project. ‘By the second day I knew this was what I was going to do,’ said Neuborne.” Between 1967 and 1973, Neuborne first worked as staff counsel for the NYCLU and thereafter as the ACLU’s assistant legal director. Later, he served as the National Legal Director of the ACLU from 1981-86.

“I verge on the obsessive,” he once said. How very true.

Burt Neuborne is a scholar / activist / teacher / author / litigator / and one-time actor . . . and rather hyper and quite self-motivated. He has done much and is committed to doing yet more. The Bronx-born lawyer has argued several Supreme Court cases, including Clark v. Community ore for Creative Non-Violence (1984) (the case of the homeless who wanted to sleep in Lafayette Park to protest their plight). Though he lost in the High Court (7-2), earlier he managed to win the Clark case by a 6-5 en banc vote in the DC Circuit, with then Judge Ruth Ginsburg casting the swing vote (though she found “the case close and difficult”).

Neuborne was the founding Legal Director of the Brennan Center, which he oversaw from 1995-2007. Much of  its focus, then and now, relates to efforts to reinforce American democracy and secure campaign finance reform. During the late 1990s, Neuborne authored Building a Better Democracy: Reflections on Money, Politics and Free Speech (Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, 1999). Consistent with that, the Center has pursued a constitutional course (see, e.g., here, herehere and here) in tune with what Neuborne argued in Nixon v. Shrink (2000) when he opposed the First Amendment claim raised in that campaign finance case. To the same effect, he filed amicus briefs in opposition to those of the ACLU in the following cases:

More recently, he filed an amicus brief in Williams-Yulee v. Florida State Bar on behalf of himself and three other “past leaders of the ACLU” — this time he was on the winning side thanks to Chief Justice John Roberts’ unexpected vote. And Neuborne has debated Floyd Abrams on the pages of The Nation (2011), this on the topic of the legitimacy of Citizens United. (See also here for  video of Intelligence Squared debate with Floyd Abrams and Nadine Strossen).

* * *  *

Screen Shot 2015-03-08 at 10.30.38 PMFebruary 17, 2015 – 6:00 p.m, New York University Law School, Vanderbilt Hall: It was one of the high points in his long and diverse career. It was the Inaugural Lecture of the Norman Dorsen Professorship in Civil Liberties, and the all-smiling Burt Neuborne was the one to give that lecture named after his long-time friend (video here). In the course of that distinguished lecture, Neuborne admitted: “I have to confess . . . , I signed the [ACLU] brief in Buckley v. Valeo” (1976). Before anyone had a chance to gasp, however, he changed gears and branded his earlier action as a mistake. And then with his characteristic bravado, he added: “Today we live under an imperial seven-word free speech clause that redoubles its deregulatory efforts long after it has lost sight of its Madisonian goals.”

There is, of course, more to the First Amendment story of this man who has been a force in our free-speech world and will likely continue to be one. But my biographical sketch ends here, save for one more comment.

Bottom line: Make of Burt Neuborne what you will — admire him or abhor him — but don’t ignore him, for his roller-coaster-of-a-life-ride has yet to run its daring and twisting course.

_____________________

See here re SCOTUSblog six-part video interview series with Neuborne.

→ See here for curriculum vitae

                           → SeeJustice Sotomayor joins in discussion of Burt Neuborne’s New Book,”                                                      First Amendment News/Concurring Opinions,  March 25, 2015

_____________________

The First Amendment is about making democracy work. — Burt Neuborne (Oct. 2014)

Question: The cover of your book has a photo of an 1816 painting of James Madison by John Vanderlyn (1775-Unknown1852). The image on your book, however, cuts off the top of Madison’s face so that his eyes are hidden. When you first saw a mockup of the jacket, did that fact catch your eye? If so, what did (or now, what do) you make of it?

Neuborne: I liked the veiled and somewhat mysterious image. It reinforces my sense of how difficult it is to recapture the past.

Question: In many ways, Madison’s Music: On Reading the First Amendment (New York University Press, 2015, 272 pp.) is unconventional, starting with its touching full-page dedication to your Father (“Odysseus the Tailor”) / to the poetic cast of the first chapter with a nod to Wallace Stevens / to the textual analysis that informs your theoretical arguments concerning democratic government / to the various historical and conceptual narratives that both challenged and inspired Madison / to the book’s ending which comes full circle with poetic nuance.

Why did you elect to approach your subject with literary and artistic flare rather than by way of a more traditional approach? Read More

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On Memorial Day — Judge Richard Kopf Remembers Holmes

UnknownOver at Hercules and the Umpire Judge Richard Kopf remembers — and it is fitting that he does — one of our greatest soldiers, a man who sacrificed much and in the face of it all saw many a dear friend fall.

Make of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., what you will. If you are so disposed, paint him a nihilist, or a fatalist,  a self-serving capitalist, or a defender of eugenicists, or any other derogatory ist label you care to pin on him. Still, his star glows.

But of this it cannot be denied: He fought honorably to defend the Union in its time of great need; he rallied forward when others feared to do so; and when it was done (all the bloody battles and lost lives) he remembered the fighting faith of those who struggled, of those Harvard men and others who journeyed into the dark of an eternal night. And he always remembered Memorial Day (see his “The Soldier’s Faith” speech) and tried to teach the young the value of honor in service to our country.

Thanks to Judge Kopf for reminding us to remember Holmes and all who followed him in serving honorably.

To first lieutenant, lieutenant colonel, and captain Holmes on this Memorial Day. Remember!

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Why Do We Have Bicameralism?

A key structural feature of Article One is bicameralism.  Why is Congress set up in this way?  There are many possible answers.  First, Congress was modeled on Parliament, which had two chambers–Lords and Commons.  Second, splitting Congress into two parts allowed the Framers to reach a compromise on the issue of representation (one house directly elected and one for states).  Third, dividing Congress was a way of creating an internal check on the legislative branch.

Let’s think about this last reason for a moment.  Why should Congress be internally divided while the Executive Branch and the Supreme Court are not?  Madison’s answer to this (in Federalist #51) was that Congress was the most powerful branch, so an internal check was essential.  Did this mean that as divided Congress was now coequal to the other branches?  Of course not.  A division just made it less likely that Congress would exercise its superior power.  The upshot being that bicameralism is further evidence that the three branches are not coequal.

As Orin pointed out in a comment to my prior post, though, it is far from clear what consequence should follow from the observation that the branches are not coequal.  I hope to elaborate on that in a post next week.  In the meantime, Happy Memorial Day Weekend!

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Why empowering consumers won’t (by itself) stop privacy breaches

Thanks to CoOp for inviting me to guest blog once again. As with my other academic contributions, the views expressed here are my own and don’t necessarily reflect those of my employers past or present.

buyer-bewareWho bears the costs of privacy breaches? It’s challenging enough to articulate the nature of privacy harms, let alone determine how the resulting costs should be allocated. Yet the question of “who pays” is an important, unavoidable, and in my view undertheorized one. The current default seems to be something akin to caveat emptor: consumers of services — both individually as data subjects and collectively as taxpayers — bear most of the risks, costs, and burdens of privacy breaches. This default is reflected, for example, in legal rules that place high burdens on consumers seeking legal redress in the wake of enterprise data breaches and liability caps for violations of privacy rules.

Ironically, the “consumer pays” default may also (unwittingly) be reinforced in well-meaning attempts to empower consumers. This has been one of the unintended consequences of decades of advocacy aiming to strengthen notice and consent requirements. These efforts take it for granted that data subjects are best-positioned to make effective data privacy and security decisions, and thus reinforce the idea that data subjects should bear the ultimate costs of failures to do so. (After all, they consented to the use!). And while notice and consent are still the centerpiece of every regulator’s data privacy toolbox, there’s reason to doubt that empowering consumers to make more informed and granular privacy decisions will reduce the incidence or the costs of privacy breaches.

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ROUNDUP: Law and Humanities 05.20.15

LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE IN LEGAL EDUCATION

The Spring 2015 issue of the New Mexico Law Review is devoted to the TV show Breaking Bad. Here’s a link to the issue’s intriguing contents, which includes such articles as Max Minzer’s Breaking Bad in the Classroom, Elizabeth N. Jones’ The Good and (Breaking) Bad of Deceptive Police Practices, and Jennifer W. Reynolds’ Breaking BATNAS: Negotiation Lessons From Walter White. The Wall Street Journal took note here; law and pop culture seems to have gone decidedly media mainstream.

 

LAW AND LITERATURE IN THE COURTROOM

On May 11, Supreme Court Justice Ruth Ginsburg presided over the competency trial of Don Quixote at Washington, D.C.’s Shakespeare Theatre Company’s Sidney Harman Hall. Assisting her were her colleague Justice Stephen Breyer and Chief Judge Merrick Garland and Judge Patricia Millett of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and Judge Amy Berman Jackson of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.  Tony Mauro of the Blog of Legal Times provides coverage here.

The Quixote case is the latest in a series of law and humanities-inspired moot courts, beginning in 1994, that the Bard Association of the Shakespeare Theatre Company has hosted.  More here.

 

 

 

 

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