Category: Empirical Analysis of Law

1

The Civilizing Effect of Legal Training

The cultural cognition project has a new article out on how motivated cognition interacts with professionalism:

This paper reports the results of a study on whether political predispositions influence judicial decisionmaking. The study was designed to overcome the two principal limitations on existing empirical studies that purport to find such an influence: the use of nonexperimental methods to assess the decisions of actual judges; and the failure to use actual judges in ideologically-biased-reasoning experiments. The study involved a sample of sitting judges (n = 253), who, like members of a general public sample (n = 800), were culturally polarized on climate change, marijuana legalization and other contested issues. When the study subjects were assigned to analyze statutory interpretation problems, however, only the responses of the general-public subjects and not those of the judges varied in patterns that reflected the subjects’ cultural values. The responses of a sample of lawyers (n = 217) were also uninfluenced by their cultural values; the responses of a sample of law students (n = 284), in contrast, displayed a level of cultural bias only modestly less pronounced than that observed in the general-public sample. Among the competing hypotheses tested in the study, the results most supported the position that professional judgment imparted by legal training and experience confers resistance to identity-protective cognition — a dynamic associated with politically biased information processing generally — but only for decisions that involve legal reasoning. The scholarly and practical implications of the findings are discussed.

Kahan and I have gone back and forth about how best to characterize the results of the study. He, modestly, seeks to constrain the inferences to the data and to a push back against the vulgar understanding of the judiciary as merely housing politicians in robes.  I think the study speaks to something larger still — the value of legal education & experience in producing situation sense, which enables lawyers and judges (and, to a lesser extent, law students) to agree on the results of legal outcomes notwithstanding their political and ideological priors. Such legal judgment is, after all, one of the practical skills that law school conveys, and which it ought to boast about.

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The Significant Decline in Null Hypothesis Significance Testing?

The likelihood is higher that this portrait represents Bayes than it does me.

The likelihood is higher that this portrait represents Bayes than it does me.

(Cross-posted at Prawfs.)

Prompted by Dan Kahan, I’ve been thinking a great deal about whether null hypothesis significance testing (NHST, marked by p values) is a misleading approach to many empirical problems.  The basic argument against p-values (and in favor of robust descriptive statistics, including effect sizes and/or   Bayesian data analysis) is fairly intuitive, and can be found here and here and here and here.  In a working paper on situation sense, judging, and motivated cognition, Dan, I, and other co-authors explain a competing Bayesian approach:

In Bayesian hypothesis testing . . .  the probability of obtaining the the effect observed in the experiment is calculated for two or more competing hypotheses. The relative magnitude of those probabilities is the equivalent of a Bayesian “likelihood ratio.” For example, one might say that it would be 5—or 500 or 0.2 or 0.002, etc.—times as likely that one would observe the results generated by the experiment if one hypothesis is true than if a rival one actually one is.

Under Bayes’ Theorem, the likelihood ratio is not the “probability” of a hypothesis being true but rather he factor by which one should update one’s prior assessment of the probability of the truth of a hypothesis or proposition. In an experimental stetting, it can be treated as an index of the weight with which the evidence supports one hypotheses in relation to the another.

Under Bayes’ Theorem, the strength of new evidence (the likelihood ratio) is, of course, analytically independent of one’s prior assessment of the probability of the hypothesis in question. Because neither the validity nor the weight of our study results depends on holding any particular prior about the [question of interest] we report only the indicated likelihood ratios and leave it to readers to adjust their own beliefs accordingly.

To be frank, I’ve been resisting Dan’s hectoring entreaties arguments to abandon NHST.  One obvious reason is fear: I understand the virtues and vices of significance testing well.  It has provided me a convenient heuristic to know when I’ve “finished” the experimental part of my research, and am ready to write the over-promising introduction and under-delivering normative sections of the paper.  Moreover, p-values are widely used by courts (as Jason Bent is exploring).  Or to put it differently, I’m well aware that the least positive thing one can say about a legal argument is that it is novel.  Who wants to jump first into deep(er) waters?

At this year’s CELS, I didn’t see a single paper without p-values. So even if NHST is in decline, the barbarians are far from the capital.  But, given what’s happening in cognate disciplines, it might be time for law professors to get comfortable with a new way of evaluating empirical work.

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UCLA Law Review Vol. 62, Issue 3

Volume 62, Issue 3 (March 2015)
Articles

Fixing Public Sector Finances: The Accounting and Reporting Lever James Naughton & Holger Spamann 572
Less Enforcement, More Compliance: Rethinking Unauthorized Migration Emily Ryo 622
Decriminalization, Police Authority, and Routine Traffic Stops Jordan Blair Woods 672

 

Comments

Not Whether Machines Think, But Whether Men Do Jane Stack 760
Fighting for a Place Called Home: Litigation Strategies for Challenging Gentrification Hannah Weinstein 794
5

Child Safety, Part III

How might tort law respond, if at all, to the preferences of parents and the general population to invest about twice as much in child safety as adult safety? (see this post for a summary of the data, and this post for a discussion of whether those preferences are normatively defensible).

Here’s my take, which you can read more about here:

Because the studies that I’m drawing from concern the allocation of safety-related resources, they have their most direct implications when we view tort law as (at least partially) a means to make people safer by deterring risky behavior. Those studies create two main implications, one for levels of care and one for damages.

Under a deterrence rationale, the standard of care in tort law reflects what we want potential tortfeasors to invest in accident prevention. The investment patterns from my first post in this series suggest that, at least as a prima facie matter, people want potential tortfeasors to invest twice as many resources in preventing accidents when children are the primary potential victims, even when both children and adults are equally vulnerable.  And if my second post in this series is right, we have reasons to respect those preferences. So when children are among the foreseeable class of victims, courts should require a heightened level of care. Although courts appear to respond to a child’s increased vulnerability to harms—they blindly run out into the street to reach ice cream trucks, for example—I have not found evidence that courts have picked up on the extra value that we appear to place on child safety. I’ve also looked at practitioner treatises, and so far I cannot find any mention that courts or juries are more likely to find a defendant negligent if the victim was a child. So, as a prima facie matter, there are reasons to question whether judges and juries are applying a sufficiently stringent level of care in cases involving children.

To motivate potential tortfeasors to take a heightened level of care for children, damages for child victims should be about twice as high as damages for adult victims. Currently, tort damages tend to exhibit child discounts or mild child premiums. This should not be a surprise. We ask juries to set damages in particular ways that constrain their discretion. For wrongful death, we generally ask them to set damages by looking at the economic contributions that the decedent would have made to her relatives. This puts a very small value on dead children, and results in child discounts even after we add non-economic damages. For permanent injuries, some back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that juries tend to award children 20-25 percent more than adults. This is approximately what we would expect if juries were awarding damages based on the number of years that a victim will have to live with her injuries, and then discounting those future yearly payouts to arrive at a single lump sum.   But that child premium is significantly lower than the 2 to 1 ratio that a deterrence-oriented tort system might strive for. So, as a prima facie matter, there are reasons to question whether damages for child victims are high enough to generate the amount of deterrence that people appear to desire.

Of course, there is much more to say.

A fuller deterrence analysis would require examining a host of additional factors, such as whether regulatory agencies or market forces or the threat of criminal liability already provide extra protection for children, whether risk compensation or substitution effects operate differently for the adult and child populations, the differences between contractual settings like medical malpractice and stranger cases, how to handle “hidden-child” cases (which would be partially analogous to thin-skull cases), etc. I invite readers to offer their thoughts on these issues. But as a first cut, there are reasons to think that tort law does not offer the desired mix of protection for adults and children.

We could also ask what civil recourse and corrective justice accounts of tort law might contribute to the discussion. But I will leave that for another day.

Any resemblance to current members of the SELS council is purely coincidental.
Any resemblance to current members of the SELS council is purely coincidental.
5

“Mighty In Their Day:” Reflections on the 9th Annual Empirical Legal Studies Conference

In Tolkein’s legendarium, the 9 rings of power were given to mortal men as a means of their corruption.

“Those who used the Nine Rings became mighty in their day, kings, sorcerers, and warriors of old. They obtained glory and great wealth, yet it turned to their undoing. They had, as it seemed, unending life, yet life became unendurable to them. They could walk, if they would, unseen by all eyes in this world beneath the sun, and they could see things in worlds invisible to mortal men; but too often they beheld only the phantoms and delusions of Sauron. And one by one, sooner or later, according to their native strength and to the good or evil of their wills in the beginning, they fell under the thraldom of the ring that they bore and of the domination of the One which was Sauron’s. And they became forever invisible save to him that wore the Ruling Ring, and they entered into the realm of shadows. The Nazgûl were they, the Ringwraiths, the Úlairi, the Enemy’s most terrible servants; darkness went with them, and they cried with the voices of death. — The Silmarillion, Of the Rings of Power and the Third Age, 346.

The fate of those holding one of the Nine struck me as a useful starting off point for my review of the Ninth Empirical Legal Studies Conference. [For previous installments in my CELS recap series, see CELS III,IV, V, and VI, VII, VIII.1, VIII.2]  The ring-of-power story is apt for several reasons.  ELS is waxing — we’ve obtained “glory and great [relative] wealth,” yet our methods are often described as inscrutable, as we see “things in worlds invisible to mortal men.” One well-known law blogger and sci-fi geek repeatedly has claimed that we behold only Sauron.  Ultimately, there’s a fairly decent argument, based on this year’s conference, that our thraldom — to machine learning — is nigh.  But putting aside the obvious parallels between the world’s leading legal empiricists and Angmar, the witch-king, there’s a far more pressing reason to use the 9 rings as a hook. Multiple sources told me that they found last year’s two-part recap to be “boring” or at best “workmanlike,” asking for more “made-up anecdotes” to spice it up.  So, off we go to Berkeley.

To start, let’s acknowledge the obvious. The West Coast is terribly distant from the home schools of most of the conference’s attendees. (I can’t prove that with data, but I thought this was exactly the kind of unsourced gossip that my readers wanted to see here.)  That was especially true for roughly 200 attendees from the Max Planck institute & the entire faculty of every Israeli law school.  The weather rendered the long trip tolerable, but only just.  Why not bend to reason and just hold a future conference in Germany or in Tel Aviv? Certainly, the conference is now decidedly more international in scope than it was only a few years back.  Was this the result of a maturing discipline, rapidly falling domestic travel budgets, or some unknown missing variable?  Other than the location, which they couldn’t help and probably were proud of, as West Coasters tend to be, the organizers (Anne Joseph O’Connell and Eric Talley) were magnificent and deserve credit for pulling off an enormous project without a hitch.

I arrived in time for both plenaries the first day. In a session on The Future of Big Data and Social Science, I learned that it’s much easier to do social science research when pesky IRBs don’t stand in your way. Though, given recent events, maybe IRBs only get in your way if you bother to tell them you are working on manipulating the political process with your purloined state seals.  In Evidence on Income and Wealth Inequality, Emannuel Saez pitched the utility of very high marginal tax rates as the (only?) solution to persistent and rising inequality. When pushed to articulate whether and how inequality was a social evil, he not surprisingly responded with a market-based argument: i.e., his co-author’s book sales demonstrated the issue’s political salience, and, consequently, the question’s irrelevance.  I thought this was a rather chippy answer, though at the end you have to give it to him.  It may be the least read popular book of the last fifty years, but that’s a ways better than the least read unpopular book!

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Evolving Contract Schemas

A Meeting of the Minds

A Meeting of the Minds?

With co-authors, I’ve been working on a series of experimental papers about contract law that appear to be converging on a theme: what individuals think “contract” means has purchase in the real-world, and that contractual schema is evolving.

A schema is nothing more than a mental model – a framework – to help us organize and process information. A contract schema is the set of background assumptions that we fill in when we think about a legally operative bargain. For those of us who grew up in a largely off-line world, our contract schema involve “doing the paperwork,” “getting it in writing,” and “signing on the dotted line.” (See this article for details). Indeed although most contracts law professors make fun of the metaphor of the meeting of the minds, it captures a real heuristic for a certain segment of society. That so even though form contracts have been part of modern life since the 50s, and almost none of us ever actually negotiate contracts that could end up in court. Indeed, when I started teaching in 2004, students routinely would say “she signed it, she must be bound to it,” even in cases like Specht.  Since this mental model is quite a ways from the reality of online contract, consumers may think they are in contracts when they aren’t, and visa versa.

But what happens when contracts widely explored in pop culture – and presented to you in your formative years – were never signed, never reduced to writing, never negotiated.  The cheerios arbitration debacle, facebook’s demystified terms, your cellphone contract, your cable company’s impossible-to-escape relationship.  What happens when every time you think “contract,” you don’t call up the mental image of a “signature on vellum” but instead “loki on steroids.”  And when companies, realizing this, increasingly pushed “no contract” plans that were actually contracts, just without penalty clauses attached.

Perhaps citizens born after 1980 will have dramatically different attitudes toward contract than those born before. If that’s true, we’ll increasingly find cohort effects in contracting behavior online, as lay intuitions about how to respond to “contract” increasingly turn on the age of the promisee. For those coming of age offline, “click to agree” calls up memories of signature, and consequently infuses bargains with personal honor; for those born digital, “click to agree” means “nothing good is about to happen to me.” Those attitudes toward contract will play out in behavior – in likelihood to breach, to shirk, and to behave opportunistically.

At some point we expect to have direct evidence worth sharing in support of this argument! For now, I thought start discussion by fast forwarding fifteen years, when many judges born in the digital age will have assumed the bench. What changes in contract doctrine follow from changes in contract’s schema? Then again, will there be any contract cases left to decide, or will they all been sucked into arbitration’s black hole?

 

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UCLA Law Review Vol. 61, Issue 5

Volume 61, Issue 5 (June 2014)
Articles

Opinions First—Argument Afterwards Daniel J. Bussel 1194
How the California Supreme Court Actually Works: A Reply to Professor Bussel Goodwin Liu 1246
The Best of All Possible Worlds? A Rejoinder to Justice Liu Daniel J. Bussel 1270
Deprivative Recognition Erez Aloni 1276
Immigration Detention as Punishment César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández 1346
Toward a Theory of Equitable Federated Regionalism in Public Education Erika K. Wilson 1416
The Dark Side of the First Amendment Steven H. Shiffrin 1480

 

Comments

Misdiagnosing the Impact of Neuroimages in the Courtroom So Yeon Choe 1502
Under the (Territorial) Sea: Reforming U.S. Mining Law for Earth’s Final Frontier James D. Friedland 1548

 

 

 

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UCLA Law Review Vol. 61, Issue 4

Volume 61, Issue 4 (May 2014)
Articles

Expressive Enforcement Avlana Eisenberg 858
Insider Trading as Private Corruption Sung Hui Kim 928
Marriage Equality and Postracialism Russell K. Robinson 1010

 

Comments

Fast and Furious, or Slow and Steady? The Flow of Guns From the United States to Mexico Jessica A. Eby 1082
Parole Denial Habeas Corpus Petitions: Why the California Supreme Court Needs to Provide More Clarity on the Scope of Judicial Review Charlie Sarosy 1134

 

 

 

Why did our subjects sometimes behave like 19th century legal formalists, and other times like realists from the Wisconsin School of relational contract theory?

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Intuitions About Contract Formation

Tess Wilkinson-Ryan and I have a new paper up on SSRN, titled Intuitions About Contract Formation.  In the great Redyip tradition, I thought I’d blog about it. From the abstract:

Legally, much depends on the moment that a negotiation becomes a deal.  Unlike torts or civil procedure or any area of public law, the laws of  promissory exchange only apply to parties who have manifested their assent to be bound. Even so, the moral norms of exchange and promise are quite firmly  entrenched and more broadly applicable than just legal contracts. Norms of promise-keeping and reciprocity, interpersonal courtesy, community reputation—these kinds of intangible goods have real effects on contract behavior. For this reason it is especially surprising that intuitions about formation have gotten so little attention from legal and behavioral scholars. This paper offers five new empirical studies of commonsense approaches to contract formation. The first section of this Article surveys intuitions about what the law of formation is. In a world in which the vast majority of contracts are signed without the advice of counsel, most people have to draw inferences based on their background knowledge and beliefs. It turns out that the colloquial understanding of contract formation is about the formalization of an agreement rather than actual assent.

In the second part of the Article, we tease out the intuitive relationship between formation and obligation. The law of contracts is very clear that  parties’ obligations to one another turn entirely on whether or not they have mutually manifested assent to be bound. And, in fact, we find that behavioral results suggest that legal (or legalistic) formation does enhance commitment to a deal irrespective of its power to impose sanctions; it seems that the law has freestanding normative force. However, we also find that the subjective sense of obligation is not as black or white as the law would predict. Parties are influenced by the natural, informal obligations to one another that build over the course of a transaction, increasing their commitment to the partnership in stages rather than all at once at the moment of formation.

To set the paper up a bit, Tess and I had previously found that when subjects are told they are in legally binding contracts, they lower their guard against exploitation & treat contracting parties like partners.  This raised a question that Intuitions tries to answer:  what are subjects’ naive views about formation?  We show that they differ systematically from the operative doctrinal rules, which creates a window for exploitation — when consumers believe themselves to be in contracts but aren’t. For example, individuals think that payment is contract, not agreement.  In one experiment, for example, we asked:

“Peter is ordering new custom speakers from Audionuts, a mail-order sound system retailer. Peter calls the company and speaks at length to a customer service representative, hashing out the details of his order, which include speakers for his main media unit (TV and stereo system) as well as his portable devices (phone and iPad). Peter and the customer service representative arrive at a final product specification, including a price and delivery date. Peter gives the rep his credit card number, and the charge is immediately posted to his account. Eight days later, Peter receives his speakers in the mail. Inside the box is a piece of paper headed “Terms and Conditions.” The Terms and Conditions sheet includes information about the duration of the warranty (90 days), the dispute resolution process (mandatory arbitration) and the return policy (return within 14 days for full refund for any reason). The Terms and Conditions sheet states at the bottom, “If you do not agree to these terms and conditions, please return the product within 14 days for a full refund.” Peter uses the speakers with no problems for two months.”

graph2

Note: payment & acceptance without return dominate over the oral agreement, or reading terms.  (Other experiments replicate this finding on payment, and expand it to signature.)

At the same time, we find that, in the absence of information about law or legal rules, individuals tend to begin to act like partners significantly earlier than the moment where they’ve concluded a deal.  Indeed, a mere offer appears to motivate feelings of reciprocity by the offeree. Why did our subjects sometimes behave like 19th century legal formalists, and other times like realists from the Wisconsin School of relational contract theory? Our tentative conclusion is that subjects themselves draw a distinction between legal and moral obligations. They view their legal obligations as heavily dependent on formal manifestation of assent via signature. But their moral obligations are attendant to both legal formalism and also to more fine-grained moral norms. This is an interesting case in which we see some evidence of a legal context, contract, in which moral norms are not entirely determined by legal norms. But when subjects are told that they are in a contract, in a sense it makes it so.

 

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The Dualities of Freedom and Innovation

What a rollercoaster week of incredibly thoughtful reviews of Talent Wants to Be Free! I am deeply grateful to all the participants of the symposium.  In The Age of Mass Mobility: Freedom and Insecurity, Anupam Chander, continuing Frank Pasquale’s and Matt Bodie’s questions about worker freedom and market power, asks whether Talent Wants to Be Free overly celebrates individualism, perhaps at the expense of a shared commitment to collective production, innovation, and equality. Deven Desai in What Sort of Innovation? asks about the kinds of investments and knowledge that are likely to be encouraged through private markets versus. And in Free Labor, Free Organizations,Competition and a Sports Analogy Shubha Ghosh reminds us that to create true freedom in markets we need to look closely at competition policy and antitrust law. These question about freedom/controls; individualism/collectivity; private/public are coming from left and right. And rightly so. These are fundamental tensions in the greater project of human progress and Talent Wants to Be Free strives to shows how certain dualities are pervasive and unresolvable. As Brett suggested, that’s where we need to be in the real world. From an innovation perspective, I describe in the book how “each of us holds competing ideas about the essence of innovation and conflicting views about the drive behind artistic and inventive work. The classic (no doubt romantic) image of invention is that of exogenous shocks, radical breakthroughs, and sweeping discoveries that revolutionize all that was before. The lone inventor is understood to be driven by a thirst for knowledge and a unique capacity to find what no one has seen before. But the solitude in the romantic image of the lone inventor or artist also leads to an image of the insignificance of place, environment, and ties…”.  Chapter 6 ends with the following visual:

 

Dualities of Innovation:

Individual / Collaborative

Radical/Incremental

Accidental /Deliberate

Global /Local

Passion / Profit

Art/Science

Exclusive/Shared

Inscribed/Tacit

 

And yet, the book takes on the contrarian title Talent Wants to Be Free! We are at a moment in history in which the pendulum has shifted too far. We have too much, not too little, controls over information, mobility and knowledge. We uncover this imbalance through the combination of a broad range of methodologies: historical, empirical, experimental, comparitive, theoretical, and normative. These are exciting times for innovation research and as I hope to convince the readers of Talent, insights from all disciplines are contributing to these debates.