Category: Education

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UCLA Law Review Volume 60 Symposium: Volume 60, Issue 6 (September 2013) and Discourse

UCLA Law Review, Volume 60 Symposium

Twenty-First Century Litigation: Pathologies and Possibilities

A Symposium in Honor of Stephen Yeazell

 

Volume 60, Issue 6 (September 2013)
Articles

Complexity, the Generation of Legal Knowledge, and the Future of Litigation Ronald J. Allen 1384
Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers Professional Liability Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff 1412
When Courts Determine Fees in a System With a Loser Pays Norm: Fee Award Denials to Winning Plaintiffs and Defendants Theodore Eisenberg, Talia Fisher, and Issi Rosen-Zvi 1452
Symmetry and Class Action Litigation Alexandra D. Lahav 1494
Atomism, Holism, and the Judicial Assessment of Evidence Jennifer L. Mnookin 1524
Altering Attention in Adjudication Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich, and Chris Guthrie 1586
Wolves and Sheep, Predators and Scavengers, or Why I Left Civil Procedure (Not With a Bang, but a Whimper) D. Michael Risinger 1620
Gateways and Pathways in Civil Procedure Joanna C. Schwartz 1652
Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A Response to Twiqbal Apologists A. Benjamin Spencer 1710
Teaching Twombly and Iqbal: Elements Analysis and the Ghost of Charles Clark Clyde Spillenger 1740
Unspoken Truths and Misaligned Interests: Political Parties and the Two Cultures of Civil Litigation Stephen C. Yeazell 1752

 

 

Volume 61, Discourse

Discourse

Re-Re-Financing Civil Litigation: How Lawyer Lending Might Remake the American Litigation Landscape, Again Nora Freeman Engstrom 110
Of Groups, Class Actions, and Social Change: Reflections on From Medieval Group Litigation to the Modern Class Action Deborah R. Hensler 126
Procedure and Society: An Essay for Steve Yeazell William B. Rubenstein 136
What Evidence Scholars Can Learn From the Work of Stephen Yeazell: History, Rulemaking, and the Lawyer’s Fundamental Conflict David Alan Sklansky 150
Procedure, Substance, and Power: Collective Litigation and Arbitration Under the Labor Law Katherine V. W. Stone 164

Accelerated Learning in an Era of Decelerated Earning

There are two basic responses to an economy as depressed as ours. In a neoclassical paradigm, the central problem is that certain people have become too expensive.  They demand too much in wages, education, and health care.  Coddled by food stamps and subsidies, they refuse to take low-paying jobs. Wealthy owners and managers are the ultimate arbiters of value.  They can recognize valuable labor and will pay for it. If significant numbers of people remain unemployed, it’s because they have assigned too high a value to their own abilities.

The neoclassicals also have a theory of adjustment and positive change.  Once low-productivity workers realize the sobering truth of their own diminished value, the market for labor will clear.  Moreover, reduced wages won’t render them starved or homeless. For the neoclassicals, the decline of purchasing power of, say, the bottom 99% of the economy has a salutary, deflationary effect on the price of staples.  If the poor can’t afford bread, its price will decline.  Knock out the tax break for employer sponsored insurance, and health costs have nowhere to go but down.

Another school sees the commanding position of the wealthy as a problem to be solved, rather than the grounding framework of economic life.  In this, more Keynesian, paradigm, government ought to redistribute some income from rentiers at the top of the economy to those who presently cannot afford food, education, health care, and housing. The Keynesian recognizes the stickiness of certain prices, and how disruptive (indeed, deadly) the situation can become if, say, income falls much faster than food prices. Read More

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Special Kids, Special Parents, Special Education

My article Special Kids, Special Parents, Special Education will appear in the Michigan Journal of Law Reform early next year.  Here’s the abstract.  Next week, I’ll blog about why my proposal requiring schools (ie, a bureaucratic organization) to announce and commit to rules about matters that affect members of the public is such a controversial idea.

Many parents are raising children whose mental, physical, cognitive, emotional, or developmental issues diminish their capacity to be educated in the same ways as other children. Over six million of these children receive special education services under mandates of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, called the IDEA. Once largely excluded from public education, these children are now entitled to a “free appropriate public education” or FAPE. In this article, I argue that the promise of the IDEA cannot be realized unless more attention is paid to the child’s parents. Under the IDEA, as in life, the intermediary between the child and the educational system is the child’s parent. The law appears to empower parents to participate in the planning, execution and revision of the child’s individual educational plan. The experience of parents, however, is not often empowering, to the detriment of both child and parent. Instead, many parents confront school systems that do not support their competence or conserve their resources.

I propose three significant reforms to the special education system that, I argue, better serve the needs of parents while improving the chances that children in need of special education will receive it. The three reforms are: 1) requiring schools to help parents be in touch with each other, 2) requiring school systems to commit to common special educational plans through a public process, and 3) adopting universal design pedagogies in general education when practicable. While the most expensive of the three proposals is the preference universal design pedagogies, the most controversial is requiring school systems to commit to common special educational plans for similarly-situated children. If the proposal were adopted, every child with the same problem would be provided with the same educational plan. The individualized plan now mandated would be provided only where a child’s situation is an uncommon one.

None of the proposed reforms is cost-free. I conclude by demonstrating that the costs of parent-oriented reforms are justified for reasons of pragmatism, to comply with congressional expectations, and to achieve social justice for parents with special needs children as compared with other parents and with each other.

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Diabetic Kids, All Kids, and School Nurses

Much to the relief of many parents whose children have diabetes, the California Supreme Court ruled recently in American Nurses Ass’n v. Torlakson that insulin shots can be administered by school personnel who volunteer and get trained for the job. School nurses, the court ruled, are not required under state law. That’s a good thing for the kids who attend the 95% of California public schools that have no fulltime school nurse. It’s good for their parents as well, since some schools were telling parents to come to school to give their kids their shots, something most employed parents had difficulty doing without upsetting their employers.

But to say, as the American Diabetes Association does, that the decision should make parents of diabetic kids feel confident that their child is in good hands at school is a bit of an overstatement. Whether they can get a routine shot of insulin isn’t the only health issue that kids with diabetes face during the school day. Some will face emergency health issues specific to diabetes, including hypoglycemia and hyperglycemia. Sometimes, it may take someone with medical training to know whether a shot should be administered at all or if it’s time to do something else, such as calling the ambulance. Diabetic kids also face health issues that other kids face. Like other kids, they fall off of climbing equipment and run into each other, and they may need to be assessed for concussions. Like other kids, they may get too hot when their team is practicing in hot weather, and someone with training will know best whether to get emergency medical care.  Like other kids, they may get sick at school and need to be assessed for whether they need an hour on a couch or a call to a parent. Just as important, someone needs to figure out if it’s time to sound the alert about a communicable disease at the school.

The California legislature apparently decided that school nurses aren’t necessary because of the expense. And indeed it may be difficult to justify spending money on nurses when paying for teachers sometimes seems like a luxury. But what the parents of those California kids with diabetes know, as does the American Diabetes Association, is that a nurse is a better and safer alternative for the kids than a volunteer staff member, even one who is trained. Looking carefully at the diabetic kids, further, helps us understand that school nurses are a very good idea for all of the kids, not just those with chronic conditions. This happens a lot when a person has a disability – solving that person’s problem can improve the lives of others. (Think about curb cuts for wheelchairs the next time you’re pushing a stroller or pulling a piece of luggage on wheels.) All parents, not only those with diabetic kids, need to have confidence that someone at the child’s school is capable of paying attention to serious medical issues. It’s a good issue for parents to join together to solve.

 

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Special Kids, Special Parents

First, many thanks to my exceptional and delightful colleague, Danny Citron, for inviting me to blog on Concurring Opinions. My blogging goal is to get you to focus on how law and policy could attend to the needs of family caregivers of special needs children. “Four in ten adults in the U.S. are caring for an adult or child with significant health issues,” according to a new Pew Research Center study. One would think that this large and growing population of family caregivers would command some attention. If they refused to do the job, after all, millions of frail elderly people, permanently-disabled veterans, and chronically-ill and disabled children could be left with nobody to meet their physical, emotional or medical needs. Social welfare organizations and institutions would be overrun, and social provision expenditures would skyrocket.

Refusing to do the job is not an option for many family caregivers, of course, for thousands of reasons, including love, duty and generosity of spirit. But many pay a price in terms of physical health, social isolation, and economic security. In my work about families raising children with special needs, I argue that we need to find ways to spread the costs so that they do not continue to fall almost exclusively on family members who step up.

Here are three examples of law and policy being blind (or at least astigmatic) to the impact of care-giving on these parents. First, when a child’s parents divorce or separate, family law entitles the parent who lives with the child to child support and, in some unusual situations, alimony. Child support is calculated on the basis of the child’s needs, and alimony is determined based on what the payee needs. Both assume that, ordinarily, both of the child’s parents will be economically productive. Where the parent’s special care-giving responsibilities interfere with that parent earning a living, however, child support and alimony are not usually adjusted–there’s no “chalimony.” Second, the public benefits system picks up very little of slack for parents when special care-giving responsibilities interfere with the parent’s earning capacity. Worse yet, since the mid-1990s, states became subject to increasingly stringent requirements in federal law about tying public benefits to the efforts of recipients to get and hold employment. A different route is not unimaginable: in 2009, a stipend was enacted for family caregivers of veterans left permanently disabled during their service in recent wars. Nothing similar, however, exists for parents. Third, if a child’s special needs affect his or her ability to benefit from school, federal law has guaranteed since the mid-1970s that the child will nonetheless be provided with a “free and appropriate public education.” The statute is not blind to the child’s caregivers; in fact, it gives parents specific rights in terms of participating in planning the child’s educational program. What it does not do, however, is make sure that parents can exercise their rights in ways that make sense if their lives are over-stressed because they are caring for special needs children.

As my work continues, I’m looking for additional examples of law and policy that attend to the needs of family caregivers for special needs children, and to those that don’t. If you can suggest a new avenue of research, please let me know.

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Brian Tamanaha’s Straw Men (Part 2): Who’s Cherry Picking?

(Reposted from Brian Leiter’s Law School Reports)

BT Claim 2:  Using more years of data would reduce the earnings premium

BT Quote: There is no doubt that including 1992 to 1995 in their study would measurabley reduce the ‘earnings premium.'” 

Response:  Using more years of historical data is as likely to increase the earnings premium as to reduce it

We have doubts about the effect of more data, even if Professor Tamanaha does not.

Without seeing data that would enable us to calculate earnings premiums, we can’t know for sure if introducing more years of comparable data would increase our estimates of the earnings premium or reduce it.

The issue is not simply the state of the legal market or entry level legal hiring—we must also consider how our control group of bachelor’s degree holders (who appear to be similar to the law degree holders but for the law degree) were doing.   To measure the value of a law degree, we must measure earnings premiums, not absolute earnings levels.

As a commenter on Tamanaha’s blog helpfully points out:

“I think you make far too much of the exclusion of the period from 1992-1995. Entry-level employment was similar to 1995-98 (as indicated by table 2 on page 9).

But this does not necessarily mean that the earnings premium was the same or lower. One cannot form conclusions about all JD holders based solely on entry-level employment numbers. As S&M’s data suggests, the earnings premium tends to be larger during recessions and their immediate aftermath and the U.S. economy only began an economic recovery in late 1992.

Lastly, even if you are right about the earnings premium from 1992-1995, what about 1987-91 when the legal economy appeared to be quite strong (as illustrated by the same chart referenced above)? Your suggestion to look at a twenty year period excludes this time frame even though it might offset the diminution in the earnings premium that would allegedly occur if S&M considered 1992-95.”

There is nothing magical about 1992.  If good quality data were available, why not go back to the 1980s or beyond?   Stephen Diamond and others make this point.

The 1980s are generally believed to be a boom time in the legal market.  Assuming for the sake of the argument that law degree earnings premiums are pro-cyclical (we are not sure if they are), inclusion of more historical data going back past 1992 is just as likely to increase our earnings premium as to reduce it.  Older data might suggest an upward trend in education earnings premiums, which could mean that our assumption of flat earnigns premiums may be too conservative. Leaving aside the data quality and continuity issues we discussed before (which led us to pick 1996 as our start year), there is no objective reason to stop in the early 1990s instead of going back further to the 1980s.

Our sample from 1996 to 2011 includes both good times and bad for law graduates and for the overall economy, and in every part of the cycle, law graduates appear to earn substantially more than similar individuals with only bachelor’s degrees.

 

Cycles

 

This might be as good a place as any to affirm that we certainly did not pick 1996 for any nefarious purpose.  Having worked with the SIPP before and being aware of the change in design, we chose 1996 purely because of the benefits we described here.  Once again, should Professor Tamanaha or any other group wish to use the publicly available SIPP data to extend the series farther back, we’ll be interested to see the results.

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Brian Tamanaha’s Straw Men (Part 1): Why we used SIPP data from 1996 to 2011

(Reposted from Brian Leiter’s Law School Reports)

 

BT Claim:  We could have used more historical data without introducing continuity and other methodological problems

BT quote:  “Although SIPP was redesigned in 1996, there are surveys for 1993 and 1992, which allow continuity . . .”

Response:  Using more historical data from SIPP would likely have introduced continuity and other methodological problems

SIPP does indeed go back farther than 1996.  We chose that date because it was the beginning of an updated and revitalized SIPP that continues to this day.  SIPP was substantially redesigned in 1996 to increase sample size and improve data quality.  Combining different versions of SIPP could have introduced methodological problems.  That doesn’t mean one could not do it in the future, but it might raise as many questions as it would answer.

Had we used earlier data, it could be difficult to know to what extent changes to our earnings premiums estimates were caused by changes in the real world, and to what extent they were artifacts caused by changes to the SIPP methodology.

Because SIPP has developed and improved over time, the more recent data is more reliable than older historical data.  All else being equal, a larger sample size and more years of data are preferable.  However, data quality issues suggest focusing on more recent data.

If older data were included, it probably would have been appropriate to weight more recent and higher quality data more heavily than older and lower quality data.  We would likely also have had to make adjustments for differences that might have been caused by changes in survey methodology.  Such adjustments would inevitably have been controversial.

Because the sample size increased dramatically after 1996, including a few years of pre 1996 data would not provide as much new data or have the potential to change our estimates by nearly as much as Professor Tamanaha believes.  There are also gaps in SIPP data from the 1980s because of insufficient funding.

These issues and the 1996 changes are explained at length in the Survey of Income and Program Participation User’s Guide.

Changes to the new 1996 version of SIPP include:

Roughly doubling the sample size

This improves the precision of estimates and shrinks standard errors

Lengthening the panels from 3 years to 4 years

This reduces the severity of the regression to the median problem

Introducing computer assisted interviewing to improve data collection and reduce errors or the need to impute for missing data

Introducing oversampling of low income neighborhoods
This mitigates response bias issues we previously discussed, which are most likely to affect the bottom of the distribution
New income topcoding procedures were instituted with the 1996 Panel
This will affect both means and various points in the distribution
Topcoding is done on a monthly or quarterly basis, and can therefore undercount end of year bonuses, even for those who are not extremely high income year-round

Most government surveys topcode income data—that is, there is a maximum income that they will report.  This is done to protect the privacy of high-income individuals who could more easily be identified from ostensibly confidential survey data if their incomes were revealed.

Because law graduates tend to have higher incomes than bachelor’s, topcoding introduces downward bias to earnings premiums estimates. Midstream changes to topcoding procedures can change this bias and create problems with respect to consistency and continuity.

Without going into more detail, the topcoding procedure that began in 1996 appears to be an improvement over the earlier topcoding procedure.

These are only a subset of the problems extending the SIPP data back past 1996 would have introduced.  For us, the costs of backfilling data appear to outweigh the benefits.  If other parties wish to pursue that course, we’ll be interested in what they find, just as we hope others were interested in our findings.

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Brian Tamanaha’s Straw Men (Overview)

(Cross posted from Brian Leiter’s Law School Reports)

Brian Tamanaha previously told Inside Higher Education that our research only looked at average earnings premiums and did not consider the low end of the distribution.  Dylan Matthews at the Washington Post reported that Professor Tamanaha’s description of our research was “false”. 

In his latest post, Professor Tamanaha combines interesting critiques with some not very interesting errors and claims that are not supported by data.   Responding to his blog post is a little tricky as his ongoing edits rendered it something of a moving target.  While we’re happy with improvements, a PDF of the version to which we are responding is available here just so we all know what page we’re on.

Stephen Diamond explains why Tamanaha apparently changed his post: Ted Seto and Eric Rasmusen expressed concerns about Tamanaha’s use of ad hominem attacks.

Some of Tamanaha’s new errors are surprising, because they come after an email exchange with him in which we addressed them.  For example, Tamanaha’s description of our approach to ability sorting constitutes a gross misreading of our research.  Tamanaha also references the wrong chart for earnings premium trends and misinterprets confidence intervals.  And his description of our present value calculations is way off the mark.

Here are some quick bullet point responses, with details below in subsequent posts:

  • Forecasting and Backfilling
    • Using more historical data from SIPP would likely have introduced continuity and other methodological problems
    • Using more years of data is as likely to increase the historical earnings premium as to reduce it
    • If pre-1996 historical data finds lower earnings premiums, that may suggest a long term upward trend and could mean that our estimates of flat future earnings premiums are too conservative and the premium estimates should be higher
    • The earnings premium in the future is just as likely to be higher as it is to be lower than it was in 1996-2011
    • In the future, the earnings premium would have to be lower by **85 percent** for an investment in law school to destroy economic value at the median
  • Data sufficiency
    • 16 years of data is more than is used in similar studies to establish a baseline.  This includes studies Tamanaha cited and praised in his book.
    • Our data includes both peaks and troughs in the cycle.  Across the cycle, law graduates earn substantially more than bachelor’s.
  • Tamanaha’s errors and misreading
    • We control for ability sorting and selection using extensive controls for socio-economic, academic, and demographic characteristics
    • This substantially reduces our earnings premium estimates
    • Any lingering ability sorting and selection is likely offset by response bias in SIPP, topcoding, and other problems that cut in the opposite direction
    • Tamanaha references the wrong chart for earnings premium trends and misinterprets confidence intervals
    • Tamanaha is confused about present value, opportunity cost, and discounting
    • Our in-school earnings are based on data, but, in any event, “correcting” to zero would not meaningfully change our conclusions
  • Tamanaha’s best line
    • “Let me also confirm that [Simkovic & McIntyre’s] study is far more sophisticated than my admittedly crude efforts.”