For the most part, Danielle Citron’s work on cyber harassment has me convinced. Both of her essential points—that online harassment of women is a serious problem, and that it can and should be countered using extant categories of civil rights (and other bodies of) law—seem exactly right. Because I basically agree with Citron’s core thesis, I am going use my posts in this symposium to focus on several ancillary points that are raised by this important work.
This post examines Citron’s invocation of law’s expressive dimension. In a point introduced in Cyber Civil Rights and amplified in Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, Citron argues that one of the values of situating cyber gender harassment within a civil rights agenda is that it will efface the perception that the harm inflicted by online harassment is trivial.
This optimistic vision of law’s power to shape social norms possesses intuitive appeal, but it tells only half the story about law’s expressive value. Below the fold, I discuss in more detail an alternative account of how law interacts with social norms that complicates (though does not necessarily contradict) Citron’s thesis.