This summer as a follow up to The Security Constitution I am working on a paper about emergencies and federalism. I have spent the past week reading the three reports—one by the White House, one by a House Select Committee, and one by the Department of Homeland Security—on the federal government’s response to Hurricane Katrina.
Getting through the three reports is no easy task. Together, they number 996 pages. (You really have a problem if it takes 996 pages to describe it.) All three assume knowledge of the inner-workings of the federal bureaucracy. Large swaths of the White House Report in particular are bureaucratic babble with sentences like this: “The JFO co-locates the Principal Federal Official (PFO) and Federal Coordinating Officer in situations not involving multiple FCOs.” And this: “Strategic-level coordination and resolution of resource conflicts unresolved by the NRCC occurs at the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG), an interagency body housed at DHS headquarters.”
Still, the three Katrina reports, with varying degrees of candor, come to a single basic conclusion: the federal government botched it.