Category: Criminal Procedure

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Prosecuting Prosecutors for Perjury? 9th Circuit panel comes down hard on lying prosecutors issue

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Updated: 1-28-15: 2:10 PM, ET

Writing in the New York Observer, Sidney Powell began her column this way: “What will it take to produce honest and ethical conduct from our state and federal prosecutors? The Ninth Circuit has a suggestion. Perhaps a perjury prosecution will do it. In fact, that is exactly what should happen when prosecutors affirmatively lie. This case, Baca v. Adams, involves a clear violation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Napue, which holds that prosecutors cannot put on perjured testimony, much less lie themselves. Unfortunately, as I’ve documented elsewhere, it happens far too often, when it should never happen at all.” I urge readers to take a look at Sidney Powell’s column, which is both informative and powerful.

Even more so is the video of the exchange between Judges Alex Kozinski, Kim McLane Wardlaw, William Fletcher and  California Supervising Deputy Attorney General Kevin Vienna.

Early on in his opening remarks (16 minutes into video), Mr, Vienna stated: “A number of things happened that should have not happened, and we’re not here to defend them.” But he defend them he did, albeit guardedly. It was downhill from there. Things got even worse when Judge Kozinski and his colleagues weighed on the matter of prosecutorial perjury.

The clip is too extraordinary to quote — you really must see it. So, click on the video and watch how Mr. Vienna attempted to make the case for the State as the Judges dug deeper into the issue of proctorial perjury.

Over at Hercules and the Umpire, Judge Richard G. Kopf adds a few comments.

UPDATE: This from John Roemer writing in the Daily Journal (Jan. 27, 2015):

“Misconduct by Riverside County prosecutors has forced the reversal of a 1998 murder­for­hire conviction in a case that raised the ire of Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski and led to his demand that Attorney General Kamala D. Harris fix the situation.”

“Riverside County’s new district attorney, Mike Hestrin, said Monday in a media statement, ‘While we do not concede the prosecutorial misconduct was intentional or malicious … I am requesting that Mr. Baca’s murder case be returned to Riverside County to allow a retrial unmarred by even the appearance of impropriety or unfairness.'”

“. . . [Judge] Kozinski sought to pressure the state officials to resolve the case without having a federal court decide Baca’s appeal. ‘It will look terrible when we write it up and name names,’ he predicted.”

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Police Killing Unarmed Minority Men on Video with Impunity is not New

The grand jury’s decision to not indict a police officer in the death of Eric Garner despite video of the incident, in the wake of the failure to indict Darren Wilson, further illustrates the apparent immunity of police officers in cases where officers have killed ethnic minority Americans. The Garner case is a reminder that the interpretation of (crime) videos is filtered through pre-existing cultural lenses, but it also speaks to a more fundamental problem. The case provides more evidence that video has not been a panacea in addressing lethal violence by police officers, a fact which is relevant in discussing the likely efficacy of cop cams. I have posted other similar disturbing videos of lethal force being used against unarmed ethnic minority men (after the jump) wherein there has been no accountability in the criminal justice system for the officers involved.

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A Plea Bargaining Strike

I am seldom shocked these days, but the article in this week’s New Yorker about Kalief Browder is astonishing.  Browder is arrested for theft.  He does not receive bail.  He is imprisoned for three years on Rikers Island without trial.  Then the prosecutor dismisses the case (because the alleged victim moved to another country).  How this could go on without a successful Sixth Amendment claim is beyond me.  (Browder is now suing for damages).  The New York criminal justice system (at least in the City) should be deeply ashamed.

This leads me to ask a broader question about the constitutional guarantee of a “speedy trial.”  Nobody would be surprised to learn that trials are much less speedy now than they were in 1791 or 1868.  Some of that is unavoidable, but I wonder to what extent this constitutional right is ripe for rediscovery.  Consider that this is a right that protects defendants.  If the state cannot get its case together in a timely way, then the charges must be dismissed.  Moreover, if a state or local criminal justice system is underfunded such that trials cannot happen quickly, then the charges must be dismissed.  At least that could be how the Sixth Amendment is applied.  My sense, though, is that courts rarely find that a defendant’s speedy trial right is violated.  (I can tell a good story about the related right to a “public trial” from my clerking days, but I’ll save that for another post.)  An originalist could have a field day with this subject.

This brings me to my last thought.  People often complain about the use of plea bargaining and its abuses.  Imagine for a moment that there was a plea bargaining strike.  Under any reasonable interpretation of the Sixth Amendment, most of the striking defendants should go free.  Why?  Because the current criminal justice could not handle so many trials–the delays and backlog would be enormous.  That suggests the existence of a significant right/remedy gap.

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Cognitive Biases, the Legal Academy, and the Judiciary

It’s a pleasure to be here at Concurring Opinions.  I would like to thank Dan, Sarah, and Ron for inviting me.  During my visit, I hope to talk a bit about my core research areas of land use and local government law (including why you, who are statistically unlikely to be interested in either land use or local government law, should be interested), but also about other issues such as the current state of the legal academy and the legal profession, often using land use or local government law to examine these broader issues.

On Cognitive Biases

On that last note, Slate.com recently ran a great piece by Katy Waldman regarding how the human brain processes information, observing that people have a predilection to believe factual claims that we find easy to process.  Waldman synthesizes the results of several interesting studies, including one eye-opening study that identifies three persistent cognitive biases that humans possess.  As Waldman summarizes these biases: “First, we reflexively attribute people’s behavior to their character rather than their circumstances.” Second, “we learn more easily when knowledge is arranged hierarchically, so in a pinch we may be inclined to accept fixed status and gender roles.” And third, “we tend to assume that persisting and long-standing states are good and desirable, which stirs our faith in the status quo absent any kind of deep reflection.” The studygreen-lizard-1427838-s attributes these biases to the basic human need, rooted in the primitive recesses of our lizard brain (pictured), to manage uncertainty and risk.

While Waldman argues that there is some relationship between these biases and conservative political beliefs, what struck me about these findings is how well the biases describe judicial behavior.

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The U.S. Supreme Court’s 4th Amendment and Cell Phone Case and Its Implications for the Third Party Doctrine

Today, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a decision on two cases involving the police searching cell phones incident to arrest. The Court held 9-0 in an opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to search a cell phone even after a person is placed under arrest.

The two cases are Riley v. California and United States v. Wurie, and they are decided in the same opinion with the title Riley v. California. The Court must have chosen toname the case after Riley to make things hard for criminal procedure experts, as there is a famous Fourth Amendment case called Florida v. Riley, 488 U,S, 445 (1989), which will now create confusion whenever someone refers to the “Riley case.”

Fourth Amendment Warrants

As a general rule, the government must obtain a warrant before engaging in a search. A warrant is an authorization by an independent judge or magistrate that is given to law enforcement officials after they properly justify their reason for conducting the search. There must be probable cause to search — a reasonable belief that the search will turn up evidence of a crime. The warrant requirement is one of the key protections of privacy because it ensures that the police just can’t search on a whim or a hunch. They must have a justified basis to search, and that must be proven before an independent decisionmaker (the judge or magistrate).

The Search Incident to Arrest Exception

But there are dozens of exceptions where government officials don’t need a warrant to conduct a search. One of these exceptions is a search incident to arrest. This exception allows police officers to search property on or near a person who has been arrested. In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the Supreme Court held that the police could search the area near an arrestee’s immediate control. The rationale was that waiting to get a warrant might put police officers in danger in the event arrestees had hidden dangerous items hidden on them or that arrestees would have time to destroy evidence. In United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), the Court held that there doesn’t need to be identifiable danger in any specific case in order to justify searches incident to arrest. Police can just engage in such a search as a categorical rule.

What About Searching Cell Phones Incident to Arrest?

In today’s Riley case, the Court examined whether the police are allowed to search data on a cell phone incident to arrest without first obtaining a warrant. The Court held that cell phone searches should be treated differently from typical searches incident to arrest because cell phones contain so much data and present a greater invasion of privacy than more limited searches for physical objects: “Cell phones, however, place vast quantities of personal information literally in the hands of individuals. A search of the information on a cell phone bears little resemblance to the type of brief physical search considered in Robinson.”

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Surveillance, Capture, and the Endless Replay

Global opposition to surveillance may be coalescing around the NSA revelations. But the domestic fusion centers ought to be as big a story here in the US, because they exemplify politicized law enforcement. Consider, for instance, this recent story on the “threat” of “Buy Nothing Day:”

Fusion Centers and their personnel even conflate their anti-terrorism mission with a need for intelligence gathering on a possible consumer boycott during the holiday season. There are multiple documents from across the country referencing concerns about negative impacts on retail sales.

The Executive Director of the Intelligence Fusion Division, also the Joint Terrorism Task Force Director, for the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department circulated a 30-page report tracking the Occupy Movement in towns and cities across the country created by the trade association the International Council of Shopping Centers (ICSC).

Yes, police were briefed on the grave threat of fake shoppers bringing lots of products to the till and then pretending they’d forgotten their wallets. Perhaps the long game here is to detain members of the Church of Stop Shopping to force them to make Elves on the Shelf for $1 an hour.

More seriously: no one should be surprised by the classification of anti-consumerist activists as a threat, given what Danielle Keats Citron & I documented, and what the ACLU continues to report on. But we do need more surprising, more arresting, characterizations of this surveillance. Fortunately, social theory provides numerous models and metaphors to counter the ideology of “nothing to hide.”
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Intellectual Disability and Uncertainty in Hall v. Florida

I’ve been meaning to post about the Supreme Court’s decision last week in Hall v. Florida—the case in which the Court struck down as unconstitutional Florida’s law for determining whether an offender is intellectually disabled and thus cannot be executed. In its 2002 case of Atkins v. Virginia, the Court concluded that it is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment to execute a “mentally retarded” individual. (Thankfully, in Hall, the Court switched over to the term “intellectually disabled.” I’ll be using the terms interchangeably in this post.) In Atkins, the Court stated that it was leaving it up to individual legislatures to determine when a person is “mentally retarded”—in the Court’s words, it was “leav[ing] to the States the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon their execution of sentences.” Now, other states and the medical community generally agree with Florida that a defendant is intellectually disabled if he has (1) “significantly subaverage intellectual functioning,” (2) “deficits in adaptive functioning,” (3) and “onset of these deficits during the developmental period” (by age 18). The first prong—the one at issue in Hall—is ordinarily determined by a defendant’s IQ score. States have concluded that an IQ score that is 70 or lower meets the “significantly subaverage intellectual functioning” standard. The Hall case raises the issue as to whether uncertainty in obtained IQ scores (or confidence intervals) ought to be included in determining the defendant’s true IQ score for the purpose of this first prong of the intellectual disability test.

In a 6-3 decision, the Hall Court concluded that Florida’s approach—of finding that an obtained IQ score greater than 70 may be determinative of the fact that the defendant is not intellectually disabled—is unconstitutional. In reaching this conclusion, the Court took a detour from its ordinary Eighth Amendment analysis, focusing heavily on the opinions of professional organizations. As in prior opinions, the Court was loose with the numbers in the state-counting aspect of its Eighth Amendment analysis, concluding that a “significant majority of States” have adopted procedures contrary to Florida’s approach. The dissent explains that, of the death penalty states, nine have adopted an approach similar to Florida, nine have not addressed the issue, and twelve take the approach that the Court finds to be constitutionally required. It is difficult to find a national consensus in these numbers. In finding a consensus, though, the majority includes the eighteen states that have abolished capital punishment. Whether to include non-death-penalty states in this calculus is an issue that the Justices have debated before. But the Court’s approach to finding a consensus in this case is especially interesting because of the metric it uses in doing so. Instead of looking at the number of states that have categorically prohibited a punishment—such as tallying the number of states that have banned executing the “mentally retarded,” the “insane,” or juveniles—the Court is counting the number of states that take into account standard errors of measurement (SEMs) in determining whether a defendant is intellectually disabled. This metric accounts for the uncertainty inherent in obtained IQ scores and provides a range in which it’s likely the defendant’s true IQ score falls based upon his obtained score. In examining this metric, the Court frames the question as whether it is unconstitutional for a state to not take into account SEMs in determining whether a defendant is intellectually disabled. But is it really this procedural matter that’s at issue here? Or do we instead care about whether individuals who actually have true IQ scores of 70 or below are being executed? For example, if a state were to conclude that a defendant is intellectually disabled if he has an obtained IQ score of 90 or below, and if the test used in the state has a SEM of 2.5—suggesting that it is quite unlikely that a defendant scoring above 90 on an IQ test would have a true IQ score of 70 or below—would it be unconstitutional for that state’s courts not to take into account the SEM in determining whether a defendant is intellectually disabled? The dissent suggests that another way to probe the uncertainty is to admit multiple obtained IQ scores—a practice the Florida procedures in question allowed. While multiple obtained IQ scores are relevant to determining the reliability of the obtained scores, using this evidence, alone, means working with a fairly small sample size. In Hall, the defendant submitted nine obtained IQ scores, and two were excluded by the sentencing court.

The Court’s decision in this case continues to chip away at the death penalty, albeit quite slowly. The majority’s departure from its traditional Eighth Amendment framework for analysis—a step that is far from new for the Court—injects further uncertainty into the limits on punishments under the Constitution. The Court’s willingness to think more deeply about the methodologies, math, and science underlying some of its decisions, though, furthers the understanding that the meaning of the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments is evolving. Unfortunately, uncertainty remains about how the Court gathers information about these complicated aspects of law and fact, and how adept the Court is at understanding and employing these concepts.

There is much more that could be said about the Hall case, the Eighth Amendment, and judges’ uses of science and technology, but it has come time for me to sign off of Concurring Opinions for now. Thanks again to the Co-Op gang for asking me to visit, and I look forward to the next time!

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UCLA Law Review Vol. 61, Issue 4

Volume 61, Issue 4 (May 2014)
Articles

Expressive Enforcement Avlana Eisenberg 858
Insider Trading as Private Corruption Sung Hui Kim 928
Marriage Equality and Postracialism Russell K. Robinson 1010

 

Comments

Fast and Furious, or Slow and Steady? The Flow of Guns From the United States to Mexico Jessica A. Eby 1082
Parole Denial Habeas Corpus Petitions: Why the California Supreme Court Needs to Provide More Clarity on the Scope of Judicial Review Charlie Sarosy 1134

 

 

 

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The Long Arm of US Law Enforcement

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The front page of today’s NY Times reports on yesterday’s arrest of the notorious drug lord Joaquín Guzmán Loera, aka “El Chapo.” Although the raid was carried out by Mexican forces, the Times reports that they were “aided by information from the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, immigration and customs officials and the United States Marshalls Service . . . .”  It is unclear whether Guzmán will be extradited to the United States.

The raid brings back memories of when the US took a more direct route to capturing fugitives in Mexico: the 1990 capture and transfer to the United States of Humberto Álvarez-Machaín by Mexican nationals at the behest of the US Government. Read More