Category: Corporate Law

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What Everyone Should Remember about Buffett’s Views on Executive Compensation

Intelligent and well-meaning as they are, critics of Warren Buffett’s decision to have Berkshire Hathaway abstain from voting as a shareholder of Coca-Cola on the latter’s executive pay proposal suffer from two problems.  Some, like Joe Nocera of the New York Timesseem to believe that, since Buffett is powerful and historically a strong vocal critic of executive compensation, he is obliged to cast Berkshire’s vote against it.  When he explained last weekend that directors may not always vote against proposals with which they disagreed others, including Vitaliy Katsenelson at the Institutional Investor, lamented that directors may not always stand up for what they believe.

These positions are a combination of misreading history and naïve. Buffett has always stressed that, as costly to shareholders as executive compensation may be, in raw amounts and in terms of conflicts of interest, they pale in comparison to the vastly larger costs to shareholders of other conflicts between executives and shareholders, especially on acquisitions.  No rational investor should believe that directors are unabashed devotees of the shareholder interest at every turn.  Here is an excerpt from remarks Buffett made as discussant at a Cardozo Law School conference I hosted in 1997, the themes of which he has repeated for two decades:

As a stockholder, I’m really only interested in the board accomplishing two ends. One is to get a first class manager and the second is to intervene in some way when even that first class manager will have interests that are contrary to the interests of the owners.

I think there are great difficulties in achieving both of those ends. I’ve been a director of, counting them up, seventeen publicly owned companies, not counting ones which we control (which probably shows a very dominant, masochistic gene) (laughter). But over that time I’ve wrestled with just these couple of problems and there may be processes that would improve them.

The first one: getting the first class manager. I have never seen in those seventeen cases – and I’m not aware of it in other cases – where a question of mediocrity or worse and the evaluation of change has been made in the presence of a chief executive. It just doesn’t happen. So, I think absolutely to have any chance of having that one solved, you have to have regular meetings of evaluation of chief executives, absent that chief executive. If they are rump meetings or something of the sort – if they’re not regularly scheduled – there is just too much tension created. Because a board may be a legal creation, but it’s a social animal. It is very difficult for a group of people without a very strong leader to all of a sudden, spontaneously decide that they’re going to hold some meetings elsewhere and discuss whether this person who may be a perfectly decent individual, really should be batting clean-up.

So, I think there should be a lot of emphasis on process in terms of evaluation of a CEO. I don’t know how you create a greater willingness on the part of directors to really bounce somebody that they would bounce if they owned 100% of the company or if their family was dependent on the income from the business and so on. I just have not seen it in corporate America.

If you get that first class chief executive – which is a top priority – he doesn’t have to be the best in the world, just a first class one. And I may agree with Jill to some extent – you may be able to turn a five into a five-and-a-half or something by having him consult with lots of other CEOs and get a lot of advice from the board. But my experience is that you don’t turn a five into an eight. I think you’re better off getting rid of the five and having him find something else to do in life and going out and acquiring an eight.

The second problem is: even a first class chief executive has some interests that are in conflict with the shareholders. One is his or her own compensation. The second one gets into the acquisition category. There are psychic benefits to an executive of running a bigger show or just having more action or whatever that can be in conflict with the shareholders, even though that executive may be first class in other respects. The nature of acquisitions is that they get to the board at a point where if you turn them down you are rejecting the chief executive, you are embarrassing him in front of his troops, you’re doing all kinds of things. So, it just doesn’t happen.

I have seen board after board approve deals that afterwards the board members say, “you know, I really didn’t think it was a very good idea but what could we do about it?” And there should be a better mechanism. But I’m not sure what it is. There should be a better mechanism, though, for a board to make those important decisions where a first class chief executive can have an absolutely different equation than the shareholders, weighing all of the personal economic and non-economic considerations. There should be a mechanism that enables the board to bring independent judgment on those in a way that doesn’t put the CEO in a position virtually where he or she has to resign or is embarrassed in front of the troops. And I would welcome any discussion on those matters.

The compensation question where the first class executive could be in conflict with the owners, I think it gets abused some but I don’t think that it amounts to that much when compared with the other two questions – getting the right one and also the question of acquisitions. I think it costs shareholders some money that’s unnecessary, and I think that a lot of the compensation schemes have been quite illogical, but I don’t think that they are overwhelming in terms of evaluation.

On compensation, I can turn purple in meetings. But in the end, the big, dumb acquisitions are going to cost shareholders far, far more money than all of the other stuff.

 

 

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Buffett’s Evolution: From Stock-Picking Disciple of Ben Graham to Business-Building Devotee of Tom Murphy

While everyone knows that Warren Buffett modeled himself after Ben Graham for the stock picking that made Buffett famous in the latter 20th century, virtually no one knows a more important point for the 21st century: he has modeled himself after Tom Murphy in assembling a mighty conglomerate.   Murphy, a legendary executive with great skills in the field of acquisitions that resulted in the Capital Cities communications empire, engineered the 1985 $3.5 billion takeover by Capital Cities of ABC before selling it all to to Disney a decade later for $19 billion.  You did not hear that explicitly at Saturday’s Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting, but Warren mentioned it to me at brunch on Sunday and, when you think about it, it’s a point implicit deep in the meeting’s themes and many questions.

In fact, Berkshire mBBB COvereetings are wonderful for their predictability.   Few questions surprise informed participants and most seasoned observers can give the correct outlines of answers before hearing Buffett or vice chairman Charlie Munger speak. While exact issues vary year to year and the company and its leaders evolve, the core principles are few, simple, and unwavering.  The meetings reinforce the venerability and durability of Berkshire’s bedrock principles even as they drive important underlying shifts that accumulate over many years.  Three examples and their upshot illustrate, all of which I expand on in a new book due out later this year (pictured; pre-order here).

Permanence versus Size/Break Up. People since the 1980s have argued that as Berkshire grows, it gets more difficult to outperform. Buffett has always agreed that scale is an anchor. And it’s true that these critics have always been right that it gets harder but always wrong that it is impossible to outperform.   People for at least a decade have wondered whether it might be desirable to divide Berkshire’s 50+ direct subsidiaries into multiple corporations or spin-off some businesses.  The answer has always been and remains no.  Berkshire’s most fundamental principle is permanence, always has been, always will be. Divisions and divestitures are antithetical to that proposition.

Trust and Autonomy versus Internal Control. Every time there is a problem at a given subsidiary or with a given person—spotlighted at 2011’s meeting by subsidiary CEO David Sokol’s buying stock in Lubrizol before pitching it as an acquisition target—people want to know whether Berkshire gives its personnel too much autonomy. The answer is Berkshire is totally decentralized and always will be-another distinctive bedrock principle. The rationale has always been the same: yes, tight leashes and controls might help avoid this or that costly embarrassment but the gains from a trust-based culture of autonomy, while less visible, dwarf those costs.

Capital Allocation: Berkshire has always adopted the doubled-barreled approach to capital allocation, buying minority stakes in common stocks as well as entire subsidiaries (and subs of subs).  The significant change at Berkshire in the past two decades is moving from a mix of 80% stocks with 20% subsidiaries to the opposite, now 80% subsidiaries with 20% stocks.  That underscores the unnoticed change: in addition to Munger, Buffett’s most important model is not only Graham but Murphy, who built Capital Cities/ABC in the way that Buffett has consciously emulated in the recent building of Berkshire.

For me, this year’s meeting was a particularly joy because I’ve just completed the manuscript of my next book, Berkshire Beyond Buffett: The Enduring Value of Values (Columbia University Press, available October 2014). It articulates and consolidates these themes through a close and delightful look at its fifty-plus subsidiaries, based in part on interviews and surveys of many subsidiary CEOs and other Berkshire insiders and shareholders.   The draft jacket copy follows. Read More

The Care/Profit Tradeoff in Health Care

The tradeoff is an old theme here, and of continuing relevance.  Via Yves Smith, news of a settlement related to investors’ role in pushing for quick gains in a firm:

As Hospira was promising to address issues raised by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration following inspections, the plaintiffs said the company was “making the problems worse by gutting quality control efforts through cost cutting aimed at boosting short-term profitability.” The lawsuit said those cost-cutting moves stemmed from a March 2009 initiative called “Project Fuel” intended to increase shareholder value by eliminating underperforming . . . units and reducing its global workforce.

The goal of immediate maximization of “shareholder value” is increasingly under attack,  even by its ostensible masters.  Add “Project Fuel” to that fire.

 

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Liquidity and Control at Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway

Warren Buffett’s ownership of Berkshire Hathaway is skewed heavily towards commanding greater voting power rather than a larger slice of the economic interest. He values control more than liquidity and is delighted to have shareholders who prefer liquidity to control to stake their money accordingly.   It is interesting to see the corporate governance tools used to create this structure and precisely how the voting power and economic interests are determined. 

Berkshire Hathaway, like many other corporations, has multiple classes of stock with different economic and voting rights. Berkshire’s Class A has 10,000 times the voting power as its Class B and 1,500 times the economic interest.  All shares are eligible to vote on most shareholder voting matters and there are no further distinctions as to economic rights, such as dividends or liquidation payments. Market prices generally reflect the economic rather than the voting ratio: the Class A shares recently traded at $170,000 per share while the Class B trade at $113 (very close to 1500-to-1).

Many stockholders, including Buffett, own some Class A and some Class B, in part because they exercised the right to convert A to B to give gifts and otherwise manage estate planning.   It is easy to see what portion Buffett or another shareholder has of each Class, simply his number of shares of a Class divided by all shares of that Class. Buffett, for example, owns about forty percent of Berkshire’s Class A shares and a small number of the Class B.

It is more important to know what percentage of the aggregate voting power and economic interest any given shareholder’s stake represents.  So: what percentage of the aggregate voting power and economic interest does Buffett command?  For Berkshire, the answer can be computed using the following formula that reflects the relative weight of the A compared to the B in votes and payouts:

 

Voting Power    =

Number of A Shares Owned + Number of B Shares Owned / 10,000

Total A Shares Outstanding + Total B Shares Outstanding / 10,000

Economic Interest =

Number of A Shares Owned + Number of B Shares Owned / 1,500

Total A Shares Outstanding + Total B Shares Outstanding / 1,500

 

Applied to Buffett (using the most recent proxy statement figures for share information):

 

          Buffett’s Voting Power =

    350,000 + 3,525,623 / 10,000      

892,657 + 1,126,012,136 / 10,000

= 34.9%

 

Buffett’s Economic Interest =

      350,000 + 3,525,623 / 1,500

892,657 + 1,126,012,136 / 1,500

= 21.4%

 

Conversion charts can be created to show the voting power and economic interest of given levels of A and B share ownership.  The following assume the same figures stated above, which can change from time to time as Class A shares are converted into Class B shares or other capital shuffles occur.

 

Class A Power

Shares % ofClass VotingPower EconomicInterest
  250  – 0.04 0.02
  500 .056 0.05 0.03
1000 .112 0.1 0.06
2000 .224 0.2 0.12
3000 .336 0.3 0.18
4000 .448 0.4 0.24
5000 .550 0.5 0.30
6000 .662 0.6 0.36
7000 .784 0.7 0.42
8000 .892 0.8 0.48
9000 1.00 0.9 0.54
10,000 1.12 1.0 0.60
15,000 1.68 1.5 0.91
30,000 3.36 3.0 1.82

                                                                                                 Class B Power

(shares in millions)

Shares % ofClass VotingPower EconomicInterest
  1 0.1 0.04 0.01
  5 0.4 0.20 0.05
10 0.9 0.42 0.1
20 1.8 0.82 0.2
30 2.7 1.22 0.3
40 3.6 1.62 0.4
50 4.4 2.02 0.5
60 5.3 2.42 0.6
70 6.2 2.84 0.7
80 7.1 3.24 0.8

 

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Of Wolfs, Wall Street, Art, and Poser Populists

I was not planning on seeing The Wolf of Wall Street but may have to after reading an op-ed by Christina McDowell, the daughter of Tom Prousalis who was a lawyer in the pump and dump schemes portrayed in the movie. She makes the argument that the film and especially the film makers, Scorsese, DiCaprio, and Winters, have glorified these tactics:

So here’s the deal. You people are dangerous. Your film is a reckless attempt at continuing to pretend that these sorts of schemes are entertaining, even as the country is reeling from yet another round of Wall Street scandals. We want to get lost in what? These phony financiers’ fun sexcapades and coke binges? Come on, we know the truth. This kind of behavior brought America to its knees.

And yet you’re glorifying it — you who call yourselves liberals. You were honored for career excellence and for your cultural influence by the Kennedy Center, Marty. You drive a Honda hybrid, Leo. Did you think about the cultural message you’d be sending when you decided to make this film? You have successfully aligned yourself with an accomplished criminal, a guy who still hasn’t made full restitution to his victims, exacerbating our national obsession with wealth and status and glorifying greed and psychopathic behavior. And don’t even get me started on the incomprehensible way in which your film degrades women, the misogynistic, ass-backwards message you endorse to younger generations of men.

On the one hand, I think McDowell is suggesting that these “liberal” film makers are what I like to call poser populists; lots of lip service to certain ideals but not much beyond that. Maybe that is so. Some artists and writers were horrible in private life but wrote works that capture and celebrate humanity. Do we stop reading them? No. When the opposite is true, however, we may indeed pass up the work. On the other hand, there is the film by itself. Is it that bad?

With McDowell’s critique, I find I may have to see the blasted thing to determine whether it is as lacking substance as it seems. The trailers made the film seem pretty much as McDowell describes. And I happen to find the Scorsese and DiCaprio combo flat film-making. But these images and perspectives of how to conduct one’s life come up in both business associations and professional responsibility. While I believe people should make what they wish for film, T.V., books, etc., if those works become popular, I find I want to know them so I can counter-punch the message or give some context to what students see. Thus I agree with McDowell that creators can exercise judgment in what they make, but once the thing is done, blast it all, I may have to dive in if I want to say “Not for me” and back it up with why.

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Executives Say the Funniest Things

The now week-old expose of disarray in the front-office of the Seattle Mariners contains many great tidbits.  From the discussions of nitpicking the fonts in a powerpoint deck, to the puffery about sabermetrics, it suggests that baseball teams’ front-offices look very much like the rest of corporate america.  And here’s the anecdote to prove it:

“[Team manager Eric] Wedge described how, starting in 2011, [team President Chuck] Armstrong would visit his office and gravely say things like: ‘Howard [Lincoln, the Mariner’s CEO] sent me down here and … we’ve got to win.’

Wedge would shrug in agreement, telling him he wanted to win every night. But he’s like, ‘No, we’ve really got to win. We’ve got to go 5-2 on this trip. We’ve got to win tonight.’”

We’ve really got to win.  Most of the time, it’s more or less optional! Needless to say, in a universe where success is determined by quarterly returns and flexible GAAP accounting, this is exactly the kind of direction that leads to cooking the books.  Sadly for the Mariners, their success was harder to manufacture.

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Individuals & Teams, Carrots & Sticks

I promised Victor Fleisher to return to his reflections on team production. Vic raised the issue of team production and the challenge of monitoring individual performance. In Talent Wants to Be Free I discuss some of these challenges in the connection to my argument that much of what firms try to achieve through restrictive covenants could be achieved through positive incentives:

“Stock options, bonuses, and profit-sharing programs induce loyalty and identification with the company without the negative effects of over-surveillance or over-restriction. Performance-based rewards increase employees’ stake in the company and increase their commitment to the success of the firm. These rewards (and the employee’s personal investment in the firm that is generated by them) can also motivate workers to monitor their co-workers. We now have evidence that companies that use such bonus structures and pay employees stock options outperform comparable companies .”

 But I also warn:

 “[W]hile stock options and bonuses reward hard work, these pay structures also present challenges. Measuring employee performance in innovative settings is a difficult task. One of the risks is that compensation schemes may inadvertently emphasize observable over unobservable outputs. Another risk is that when collaborative efforts are crucial, differential pay based on individual contribution will be counterproductive and impede teamwork, as workers will want to shine individually. Individual compensation incentives might lead employees to hoard information, divert their efforts from the team, and reduce team output. In other words, performance-based pay in some settings risks creating perverse incentives, driving individuals to spend too much time on solo inventions and not enough time collaborating. Even more worrisome is the fear that employees competing for bonus awards will have incentives to actively sabotage one another’s efforts.

A related potential pitfall of providing bonuses for performance and innovative activities is the creation of jealousy and a perception of unfairness among employees. Employees, as all of us do in most aspects of our lives, tend to overestimate their own abilities and efforts. When a select few employees are rewarded unevenly in a large workplace setting, employers risk demoralizing others. Such unintended consequences will vary in corporate and industry cultures across time and place, but they may explain why many companies decide to operate under wage compression structures with relatively narrow variance between their employees’ paychecks. For all of these concerns, the highly innovative software company Atlassian recently replaced individual performance bonuses with higher salaries, an organizational bonus, and stock options, believing that too much of a focus on immediate individual rewards depleted team effort.

Still, despite these risks, for many businesses the carrots of performance-based pay and profit sharing schemes have effectively replaced the sticks of controls. But there is a catch! Cleverly, sticks can be disguised as carrots. The infamous “golden handcuffs”- stock options and deferred compensation with punitive early exit trigger – can operate as de facto restrictive contracts….”

 All this is in line with what Vic is saying about the advantages of organizational forms that encourage longer term attachment. But the fundamental point is that stickiness (or what Vic refers to as soft control) is already quite strong through the firm form itself, along with status quo biases, risk aversion, and search lags. The stickiness has benefits but it also has heavy costs when it is compounded and infused with legal threats.

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A Time for Action: The Double Gain of Freer Regions and the Double Speak about Talent Droughts

As Catherine Fisk and Danielle Citron point out in their thoughtful reviews here and here, the wisdom of freeing talent must go beyond private firm level decisions; beyond the message to corporations about what the benefits of talent mobility, beyond what Frank Pasquale’s smartly spun as “reversing Machiavelli’s famous prescription, Lobel advises the Princes of modern business that it is better to be loved than feared.” To get to an optimal equilibrium of knowledge exchanges and mobility, smart policy is needed and policymakers must to pay attention to research. Both Fisk and Citron raise questions about the likelihood that we will see reforms anytime soon. As Fisk points out — and as her important historical work has skillfully shown, and more recently, as we witness developments in several states including Michigan, Texas and Georgia as well as (again as Fisk and Citron point out) in certain aspects of the pending Restatement of Employment — the movement of law and policy has actually been toward more human capital controls rather than less. This is perhaps unsurprising to many of us. Like with the copyright extension act which was the product of heavyweight lobbying, these shifts were supported by strong interest groups. What is perhaps different with the talent wars is the robust evidence that suggests that everyone, corporations large and small, new and old, can gain from loosening controls. Citron points to an irony that I too have been quite troubled by: the current buzz is about the intense need for talent, the talent drought, the shortage in STEM graduates. As Citron describes, the art and science of recruitment is all the rage. But while we debate reforms in schooling and reforms in immigration policies, we largely neglect to consider a reality of much deadweight loss of through talent controls.

The good news is that not only in Massachusetts, where the governor has just expressed his support in reforming state law to narrow the use of  non-competes, but also in other state legislatures , courts and agencies, we see a greater willingness to think seriously about positive reforms. At the state level, the jurisdictional variations points to the double gain of regions that void or at least strongly narrow the use of non-competes. California for example gains twice: first by encouraging more human capital flow intra-regionally and second, by its willingness to give refuge to employees who have signed non-competes elsewhere. In other words, the positive effects stem not only from having the right policies of setting talent free but also from its comparative advantage vis-à-vis more controlling states. This brain gain effect has been shown empirically: areas that enforce strong post-employment controls have higher rates of departure of inventors to other regions. States that weakly enforce non-competes are on the receiving side of the cream of the crop. One can only hope that legislature and business leaders will take these findings very seriously.

At the federal level, in a novel approach to antitrust the federal government recently took up the investigation of anti-competitive practices between high-tech giants that had agreed not to poach one another’s employee. This in fact relates to Shubha Gosh’s questions about defining competition and the meaning of free and open labor markets. And it is a good moment to pause about the extent to which we encourage secrecy in both private and public organizations. It is a moment in which the spiraling scandals of economic espionage by governments coupled with leaks and demand for more transparency require us to think hard. In this context, Citron is right to raise the question of government 2.0 – for individuals to be committed and motivated to contribute to innovation, they need some assurances that their contributions will not be entirely appropriated by concentrated interests.

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Talent Wants to Be In Control

Many thanks to Deven and Orly for organizing this online symposium and for letting me join in.  Talent Wants to Be Free is a real tour de force: original and engaging, thoughtful and thought-provoking.  Orly is likely the only person who could have written this book, as it deftly combines research from a variety of academic literatures to make novel observations while at the same time remaining understandable and even approachable.  As other participants have mentioned, I do hope it gets read by policymakers and thought leaders who are contemplating how to bring more innovation to their city, state, or country.  Given the burgeoning interest in entrepreneurship (see, e.g., this program on St. Louis), the book should find a place on many bookshelves.

Since I’m starting in the midst of an already heady discussion, I wanted to build on what Shuba and Vic mentioned about the theory of the firm, as well as Orly’s response.  I argue in a forthcoming paper that our notion of “employment” is completely connected to our idea of the economic firm: you can’t have employees without an employer, and the employer is a firm.  Why do we have these mechanisms for joint production?  The short answer, I think, is that we need firms to facilitate joint production.  There’s only so much we can do on our own, and once we start working together we need legal and economic structures to manage that collaboration.  Shuba and Vic both discuss how the theory of the firm literature might provide an antithesis to Orly’s thesis in terms of the benefits of organized team structures that, to some extent, constrain individual workers. Orly’s response agrees that firms play a useful role, but she argues that much of the existing theory-of-the-firm literature depends on the “orthodox” model of employer protectionism.  However, I think both sides are missing an important aspect of the issue: namely, the governance of firms.

In both academic and popular literature, employers/firms/corporations are characterized as large, faceless institutions that act autonomously in their own self-interest.  But firms are just collections of individuals with various economic and legal relationships who are acting together in the context of a legal entity.  In other words, employers are people too — not individual persons, but groups of people.  Do some of the restrictions we are talking about look less onerous if we think of employers as groups of people?  Let’s take, for example, the work-for-hire doctrine.  Does that doctrine look less punitive if five people create a firm to work together on a collection of projects, and they jointly agree to share their intellectual property rights with one another?  If one of the five breaks the deal and takes off with the rights to a key component of the research, the work-for-hire doctrine looks like it’s pro-employee — at least, for the four other employees involved.  Although Orly’s Evan Brown example (pp. 141-44) looks like blatant opportunism by a large corporation, in other instances employees as a whole may end up better off if one of their number can’t defect to the detriment of the joint enterprise.

Read More

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Input Knowledge, Output Information, and the Irony of Under the Radar Expansion of IP

Peter Lee’s thoughtful review of Talent Wants to Be Free goes straight to the heart of the issues. Peter describes a “central irony about information” – so many aspects of our knowledge cannot lend themselves to traditional monopolization through patents and copyright that their appropriation is done under the radar,  through the more dispersed and covert regimes of talent wars rather than the more visible IP wars. We’ve always understood intellectual property law as a bargain: through patents and copyright, we allow monopolization of information for a limited time as a means to the end of encouraging progress in science and art. We understand the costs however and we strive as a society to draw the scope of these exclusive rights very carefully. and deliberately. We have heated public debates about the optimal delineation of patents, and we are witnessing new legislative reforms and significant numbers of recent SCOTUS cases addressing these tradeoffs. But patents are only a sliver of all the information that is needed to sustain innovative industries and creative ventures. Without much debate, the monopolization of knowledge has expanded far beyond the bargain struck in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.  Through contractual and regulatory law, human capital – people themselves – their skills and tacit knowledge, their social connections and professional ties, and their creative capacities and inventive potential are all the subject to market attempts, aided by public enforcement, of monopolization. Peter refers to these as tacit versus codified knowledge; I think about inputs, human inventive powers versus outputs – the more tangible iterations of intangible assets – the traditional core IP, which qualifies patentability to items reduced to practice (rather than abstraction) and copyrightable art to expressions (rather than ideas). Cognitive property versus intellectual property, if you will.

Lee is absolutely correct that university tech transfer and its challenges and often discontent is highly revealing in this context of drawing fences around ideas and knowledge. Lee writes “in subtle ways, Orly’s work thus offers a cogent exposition of the limits of patent law and formal technology transfer.” Lee’s recent work on tech transfer Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, California Law Review 2012 is a must read. Lee shows that “effective technology transfer often involves long-term personal relationships rather than discrete market exchanges. In particular, it explores the significant role of tacit, uncodified knowledge in effectively exploiting patented academic inventions. Markets, patents, and licenses are ill-suited to transferring such tacit knowledge, leading licensees to seek direct relationships with academic inventors themselves.” And Lee’s article also uses the lens of the theory of the firm, the subject of the exchanges here, to illuminate the role of organizational integration in transferring university technologies to the private sector. I think that in both of our works, trade secrets are an elephant in the room. And I hope we continue to think more about how can trade secrets, which have been called the step child of intellectual property, be better analyzed and defined.