Category: Civil Rights

11

Posner & Segall v. Scalia & Whelan

Many of you have probably already read Judge Posner and Eric Segall’s piece in the New York Times about Justice Scalia’s conception of the role of religion in regards to civil rights, particularly those of LGB Americans. Ed Whelan issued a response to the NYT piece here. I had not planned to blog about the discussion with too many deadlines today and tomorrow. However, my attempts to merely tweet a few thoughts escalated quickly:

Much like his tweet to me, Whelan’s attacks on Posner & Segall’s article are harsh and dismissive. Choice quotes include:

  •  “… just when I think that [Posner] can’t go any lower, he goes subterranean.”
  • “Posner resorts to the cheap debater’s trick of setting up and knocking down a bunch of straw men.”
  • “… no competent legal mind could fairly extract from Scalia’s dissent the proposition that Posner derives and attacks.”
  • “Posner’s observation is a smear and a distraction.”
  • “In sum: yet another contemptible performance by Posner.”

Given the things that Whelan wrote, I’m not sure whether Segall should be happy or upset about Whelan’s repeated omission of Segall’s name in describing the co-authored article.

My issue with Whelan’s piece, that I tweeted about, is that I don’t think he fairly represents Segall & Posner’s core argument (which is particularly notable when Whelan is calling them out for not “fairly present[ing] Scalia’s positions). Among Whelan’s several arguments, the one I find most problematic is:

In a recent speech, Scalia stated (according to this account) that “Saying that the Constitution requires [same-sex marriage], which is contrary to the religious beliefs of many of our citizens, I don’t know how you can get more extreme than that.” Posner somehow extracts from this statement the “suggestion that the Constitution cannot override the religious beliefs of many American citizens,” and charges that Scalia holds a “political ideal [that] verges on majoritarian theocracy.” What nonsense. Like many unscripted remarks, Scalia’s statement is (at least in isolation from its fuller context) not a model of clarity. But his phrase “contrary to the religious beliefs of many of our citizens” is susceptible to either or both of two sensible readings. First, Scalia might be referring to the many “serious questions about religious liberty” that the Chief Justice’s dissent (which Scalia joined) explains that Obergefell creates. Second, he may be objecting to the Obergefell majority’s position that citizens with religious beliefs about marriage are somehow disentitled to support laws that accord with the moral propositions that their beliefs inform. By contrast, there is nothing in Scalia’s long record that remotely supports the notion that he believes that “the Constitution cannot override the religious beliefs of many American citizens.” Posner’s claim to the contrary—which is the centerpiece of his op-ed (which is why it’s titled “Justice Scalia’s Majoritarian Theocracy”)—is scurrilous.

But Whelan does not include all of the evidence that Segall & Posner cite to support their claim. From the original article (and at this point I should note how annoying the NYT website is at preventing cutting and pasting of text; thanks Lexis):

In Lawrence v. Texas… Justice Scalia complained that: ”Today’s opinion is the product of a Court, which is the product of a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda, by which I mean the agenda promoted by some homosexual activists directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct…. Many Americans do not want persons who openly engage in homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their children’s schools, or as boarders in their home. They view this as protecting themselves and their families from a lifestyle that they believe to be immoral and destructive. The Court views it as ‘discrimination’ which it is the function of our judgments to deter. So imbued is the Court with the law profession’s anti-anti-homosexual culture, that it is seemingly unaware that the attitudes of that culture are not obviously ‘mainstream.”’

Justice Scalia made these remarks 12 years ago — and predicted in his dissent that the court would eventually rule that the Constitution protects the right to same-sex marriage. This June, Justice Scalia’s prediction came true in Obergefell v. Hodges. He has vented even more than his usual anger over this decision…. In a recent speech to law students at Georgetown, he argued that there is no principled basis for distinguishing child molesters from homosexuals, since both are minorities and, further, that the protection of minorities should be the responsibility of legislatures, not courts. After all, he remarked sarcastically, child abusers are also a ”deserving minority,” and added, ”nobody loves them.” Not content with throwing minorities under the bus, Justice Scalia has declared that Obergefell marks the end of democracy in the United States, stating in his dissent that ”a system of government that makes the People subordinate to a committee of nine unelected lawyers does not deserve to be called a democracy.”

The logic of his position is that the Supreme Court should get out of the business of enforcing the Constitution altogether, for enforcing it overrides legislation, which is the product of elected officials, and hence of democracy….

We doubt that Justice Scalia would go that far, for he has repeatedly voted to strike down statutes that he believes violate the First Amendment and various federalism provisions of the Constitution, as well as affirmative action measures that he thinks are in conflict with the 14th Amendment.

But who knows? Maybe he’ll now cease voting to strike down statutes under any provision of the Constitution, as otherwise he might be thought of as one of those ”unelected lawyers” who so threaten our democracy. Not only an unelected lawyer, but — a patrician. For he said in his Obergefell dissent that ”to allow the policy question of same-sex marriage to be considered and resolved by a select, patrician, highly unrepresentative panel of nine is to violate a principle even more fundamental than no taxation without representation: no social transformation without representation.”

For a newspaper editorial (with its inherent length limitations), I think Segall and Posner have provided substantial context for to support the argument that Scalia’s remarks were not merely unclear and unscripted statements that are not indicative of his greater views. Had they been writing in another forum, they could have also cited other portions of Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence:

State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single one of these laws is called into question by today’s decision; the Court makes no effort to cabin the scope of its decision to exclude them from its holding…. What a massive disruption of the current social order, therefore, the overruling of Bowers entails. Not so the overruling of Roe, which would simply have restored the regime that existed for centuries before 1973, in which the permissibility of and restrictions upon abortion were determined legislatively State-by-State….

The Texas statute undeniably seeks to further the belief of its citizens that certain forms of sexual behavior are “immoral and unacceptable,” the same interest furthered by criminal laws against fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity….

The above quotes don’t even include Scalia’s strained argument that the Texas law was, for Equal Protection purposes, neutral because both gays/lesbians and heterosexuals were prohibited from homosexual conduct. Segall and Posner can point to other dissents and his continued positive references to the historically problematic Bowers opinion. Scalia’s continued invocation of examples like “child molesters” to justify morality-based restrictions on gay rights leads many to believe that his statement in his Lawrence dissent that “I have nothing against homosexuals, or any other group, promoting their agenda through normal democratic means” rings hollow. Contrast Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence with this quote from Justice Thomas’s brief dissent in the same case:

I write separately to note that the law before the Court today “is … uncommonly silly.” If I were a member of the Texas Legislature, I would vote to repeal [criminal sodomy laws]. Punishing someone for expressing his sexual preference through noncommercial consensual conduct with another adult does not appear to be a worthy way to expend valuable law enforcement resources.

I do not mean to say that Segall and Posner have made an ironclad case that Scalia supports some version of majoritarian theocracy (they even acknowledge that they “doubt that Justice Scalia would go that far” and cite contrary evidence). But their contention that Scalia is essentially appealing to religious majoritarianism in justifying the denial of civil rights to LGB Americans is a reasonable one and is based upon far more than one recent statement made by Scalia in a public forum.

0

Lawyers and Clients: The Absurd Reality for Indigent Clients Facing Execution

A Thought Experiment

Suppose that Facebook got sued for a privacy tort for hosting nonconsensual pornography and that Facebook’s lawyer told company executives that she did not intend to mount Facebook’s preferred response—a motion to dismiss on the grounds of Section 230 immunity. Executives explained to the lawyer that Section 230 of the federal Communications Decency Act is a knock out punch. An Internet intermediary can’t be held responsible for privacy-invading content created by a user. The lawyer, however, refused to listen to reason.

When Facebook tried to switch attorneys, its first lawyer told the court that Facebook should be forced to remain represented by that lawyer even though Facebook wanted a new one. In making that argument to the court, Facebook’s first lawyer told the court that she was doing a good job for Facebook and that her refusal to mount Facebook’s preferred defense was because Facebook had no Section 230 immunity. Facebook’s lawyer would not only be undermining her own client’s case, but would also be incorrectly representing the underlying issue to the court.

Facebook’s lawyer would be in flagrant violation of fiduciary duties to its client. Of course, clients with money can fire lawyers. Those lawyers certainly should not be permitted to undermine a client’s case in the course of trying to retain the representation—especially by inaccurately representing key features of a case. That sounds so obviously right: a contrary suggestion would surely be absurd.

Absurd Reality for Indigent Clients Facing Execution

For a reason that is hard to fathom, this is precisely what is allowed to happen in criminal cases affecting indigent clients facing execution. Apparently – at least in the Fifth Circuit – the relationship between client principals and lawyer agents is different.

This week, in Roberson v. Stephens, the Supreme Court will consider whether the execution of Robert L. Roberson should proceed even though his lawyers seem to have prioritized their own reputational interests at the expense of their client. Over at Balkanization, my colleague Mark Graber has a careful explanation of how Mr. Roberson’s lawyers seem more preoccupied with their reputations than with resuscitating a Sixth Amendment claim that might save his life.

At issue in Roberson is a failure of legal agency involving the same death penalty lawyers that a palpably displeased Justice Sotomayor rebuked on the eve of their client Raphael Holiday’s November 18 execution. The lawyers refused to file a clemency petition and opposed Mr. Holiday’s attempts to find a lawyer who would follow his wishes and file it. Forced to go along with the Court’s refusal to stay the execution because the attorneys filed a last-minute clemency petition, Justice Sotomayor nevertheless issued a powerful statement criticizing the lawyers for their behavior and the lower courts for failing to police it. She explained that the law does not permit “condemned men and women to be abandoned by their counsel at the last moment . . . [y]et this is exactly what happened here.”

Here again, the same lawyers have seemingly refused to listen to their client, Mr. Roberson, because doing so might require one of them to expose himself to a finding that the forfeiture of the Sixth Amendment claim was his own fault.

As briefing submitted in support of Supreme Court review explains: “In both Roberson and Holiday, the Fifth Circuit permitted the same pattern of conduct: CJA counsel’s refusal to pursue relief on the client’s behalf, followed by counsel’s inaccurate representations to courts about the constraints on seeking such relief, concluding with legal opposition to the very client they were appointed to represent. At base, both Roberson and Holiday express the Fifth Circuit’s view that [the statutory right to counsel] affords courts discretion to saddle inmates facing execution with lawyers who are not functioning as agents of their clients.”

The assessment of the ethics experts in the case is unequivocal. Yale Professor Lawrence Fox is the former Chair of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, and the former Chair of the ABA Litigation Section. Professor Fox concluded “to a reasonable degree of a professional certainty that both lawyers are operating under profound conflicts of interest that prevent them from continuing the representation[.]” Charles Herring, a renown Texas ethics expert, explained: “James Volberding and Seth Kretzer have conflicts of interest that should prevent them from representing Mr. Roberson on the [Sixth Amendment issue in the case].”

I may not be a death penalty lawyer, but I know enough to understand that we should not be allowing attorneys to obstruct relief preferred by their own clients—particularly in cases where the attorneys seem to be engaged in obstruction as a means of protecting their own interests. If we would not allow counsel for Facebook to cling onto her job contrary to the interest of its client, we certainly should not do so in a case where the stakes are not just about money but about life and death.

 

9

Crisis of the Dissents Divided? — Disagreement among the Obergefell Four

imagesIn the various news feeds and pundit commentaries concerning the recent same-sex marriage case, the focus has been on the divide between the majority and dissenting opinions. Some side with the majority, others with the dissenters. Putting such differences aside for the moment, what is noteworthy is that while the Justices in the majority all spoke with one voice, the same was not true for the dissenters.

Though the judgment in Obergefell v. Hodges was 5-4, none of the four separate dissents garnered more than a total of three votes:

  • 3 votes: Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent — joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas
  • 3 votes: Justice Alito’s dissent — joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas
  • 2 votes: Justice Scalia’s dissent — joined by Justice Thomas
  • 2 votes: Justice Thomas’ dissent — joined by Justice Scalia

Notably, neither the Chief Justice nor Justice Alito signed onto any of the other dissents. Why?

The Scalia Dissent: Too confrontational?

UnknownWhile the Chief Justice and Justice Alito share many of the constitutional concerns stated by Justice Scalia (e.g., the need for judicial restraint, adherence to precedent, undermining the political process, and deference to the traditional roles of the states), they tend to be uneasy with the kind of in-your-face confrontational tone Justice Scalia employed in his unrestrained dissent.

It is a tried-and-true canon of civility: Attempt to avoid confrontational terms or phrases such as “hubris,” “egotistic,” “mummeries,” and “silly extravagances.” By that creed of civility it is unnecessarily vituperative to equate another Justice’s reasoning with “mystical aphorisms of the fortune cookie” or “pop-philosophy” or to refer to that Justice’s opinion as “judicial Putsch” – even if the seriousness of the latter is “not of immense personal importance” to you.

The Thomas Dissent: Too cabined or too natural law focused?

UnknownThe Chief Justice and Justice Alito also did not sign onto Justice Thomas’ dissent. Why? Though it is more difficult to answer this question, one explanation is a possible disagreement over the contours of due process as Justice Thomas offered it up. That is, his conservative colleagues may have been uncomfortable with Thomas’ reliance on Blackstonian notions of due process – notions perhaps too cabined for their constitutional tastes. Consider in this regard Professor Michael Dorf’s observation over at SCOTUSblog: “To the extent that Justice Thomas would allow any substantive due process, it would be for the liberty of movement only, and failing that, for no more than negative liberties. Marriage, as state recognition, would not be a fundamental right for anyone.”

And then there is Justice Thomas’ invocation of natural law and natural rights. The debate over the use and relevance of natural law has been an ongoing one in conservative circles. On that score, Chief Justice Roberts’ former boss, William Rehnquist, once found himself in the crosshairs of controversy brought on by a defender of natural law. See Harry V. Jaffa, Storm over the Constitution (1999) and his Original Intent and the Framers of the Constitution: A Disputed Question (1994) and his article “Judicial Conscience and Natural Rights,” 11 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 219 (1987).

The Alito Dissent: Reservations about the “further decay” of marriage argument?

(drawing by Arthur Lien: courtartist.com)

(drawing by Arthur Lien: courtartist.com)

While there is much similarity between the Roberts and Alito dissents on matters such as due process, equal protection, and the specter of vilifying people of faith, both nonetheless declined to affirm the other’s dissent. What might explain the Chief Justice’s unwillingness?

Did he have some reservations about the following?: “the tie between marriage and procreation has frayed. Today, for instance, more than 40% of all children in this country are born to unmarried women. This development undoubtedly is both a cause and a result of changes in our society’s understanding of marriage. While, for many, the attributes of marriage in 21st-century America have changed, those States that do not want to recognize same-sex marriage have not yet given up on the traditional understanding. They worry that by officially abandoning the older understanding, they may contribute to marriage’s further decay.”

The Roberts Dissent: Too charitable?

(credit: WSJ)

(credit: WSJ)

If you believe (as Justice Alito seems to) that same-sex marriages may contribute to the “further decay” of marriage, then you are unlikely to be as generous of spirit as the Chief Justice was when he declared: “If you are among the many Americans — of whatever sexual orientation — who favor expanding same-sex marriage, by all means celebrate today’s decision. Celebrate the achievement of a desired goal. Celebrate the opportunity for a new expression of commitment to a partner. Celebrate the availability of new benefits. . . .” By the same normative token, Justice Alito is not one who would appear to be inclined to say: “Many people will rejoice at [today’s] decision, and I begrudge none their celebration.”

Or what about this Roberts’ statement?: “The opinion describes the ‘transcendent importance’ of marriage and repeatedly insists that petitioners do not seek to ‘demean,’ ‘devalue,’ ‘denigrate,’ or ‘disrespect’ the institution. . . . Nobody disputes those points.” Nobody?

Here, too, speculation is more the measure than certainty.

Crisis of the Dissents Divided?

However close my speculations are to the mark, one thing is certain: there was no unanimity of thought strong enough to convince the four dissenting Justices to lend all of their names to a single opinion. Despite their strong differences with the majority opinion, they, too, had reservations about one another’s views of law and life and how those differences should be expressed.

* * * * 

(credit: NYT)

(credit: NYT)

On a related point: What are we to make of the fact that none of the four liberal Justices who signed onto Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell found it necessary, or desirable, to write separate concurrences? The same was true with Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer in Romer v. Evans (1996) and Lawrence v. Texas (2003), and later with Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan in United States v. Windsor (2013).

One would think that these four Justices would push for a more protective conception of equal protection concerning discrimination against gays and lesbians. No? Then again, perhaps these four think the body of law tracing back to at least Romer will suffice.  And so far it has.

1

Race, Love, and Promise

Sheena and Tiara Yates

Martha Ertman’s wonderful new book, Love’s Promises: How Formal and Informal Contracts Shape All Kinds of Families, is a must read for anyone concerned about families or law. Ertman’s core argument is that “contracts and deals” can play a critical role in “helping people create and sustain families.” In advancing this claim, the book – which reads like a good novel even as it maps the complex, shifting landscape of modern family law – primarily relies on Ertman’s own, very compelling story of love and parenthood. Along the way, however, it also communicates the stories of other “Plan B” families, those that Ertman describes as being formed in “uncommon” ways. In doing so, it clears important space for lawyers and non-lawyers alike to consider the experiences of all families. 

Ertman persuasively makes the case that formal and informal “exchanges . . . [already] define family life” in a host of ways, and that greater reliance on such contracts could support the formation and functioning of Plan B families, as well as their more “common,” Plan A, counterparts. As a family law professor,I am deeply sympathetic to this view.  Even more, like so many others, my personal life is comprised of a patchwork of formal and informal contracts. On one hand there is my almost twelve-year legal marriage and the enforceable post-adoption contact agreement — something Ertman would call a “PACA” — that provides for annual visitation with my younger son’s birth mother. Then, on the other hand, sit the unenforceable, but nevertheless important “deals” that I have made with family members. These include the parenting norms that my spouse and I follow in raising our two children, and the mutual vows that we made before family and friends – such as “to love your body as it ages” and “to support you in the pursuit of your dreams.” These promises both help to define and affirm the contours of our loving commitment as a couple and a family.

Nevertheless, I often found myself seeking more from the story that Love’s Promises tells about the place of contract in family life. Like the students I teach, I have some nagging questions about how well contract can work for those who, for example, lack the money to hire a lawyer to draft or defend their cohabitation agreements, or who, because of past experience with the legal system, might never think about contract as a potentially liberating force in their lives. Moreover, I wanted a more complex narrative about the operation of race and contract in the family context than the book attempts to communicate.

To be clear, Love’s Promises does not ignore the subject of race. Indeed, Ertman deserves high marks for examining topics such as Whites’ exclusion of Blacks from marriage during slavery; the forced sterilization of African American women; and the concerns about transracial adoption articulated by organizations such as the National Association of Black Social Workers in the 1970s in crafting her vision of what the rules concerning contract and love should be. But, as important as this past history is, what I most craved was deeper engagement with what increased reliance on contract would mean for issues of race and family in the future.

Laws pertaining to family have historically structured families, but also race – how it is defined, understood, and experienced — in very consequential ways. Think, for example, about antimiscegenation laws that helped to give content to the very idea of race, determining who would be regarded as black or white, slave or free. I am thus very skeptical about the notion that, without more, we can expect that a norm which encourages greater reliance on agreements — especially those that would be more than mere “deals” and thus enforceable in court – will always have an equality-enhancing effect. A newspaper article that I recently read about the efforts of a black, lesbian couple (their picture appears at the outset of this post) to expand their family helps to explain why.

Sheena and Tiara Yates, fell in love and, after their 2011 New Jersey commitment ceremony, decided that they wanted a child. They successfully had one child and later tried to become parents again. As they had the first time around, Sheena and Tiara, who legally married in 2014, used in-home insemination to conceive. To formalize their family unit and intentions, they also entered into a written contract with the known donor whose sperm they utilized. Their agreement contemplated the donor’s relinquishment of all parental rights in the new baby, something designed to permit Sheena and Tiara to parent the child they’d longed for as a unit of two.

Despite the contract, the donor subsequently brought a custody suit to challenge the agreement’s terms and, at least preliminarily, succeeded in doing so. In a decision that the Yateses are now appealing, a judge granted him parental visitation rights. In cases involving insemination, New Jersey, where Sheena and Tiara reside with their family, courts will only recognize a non-biological parent’s rights if the insemination process was carried out by a physician. Although Sheena and Tiara, according to news sources, met with a doctor and were prescribed prenatal vitamins, the actual insemination process was performed at their home, without medical assistance. Significantly, this is the second custody suit that the Yateses have had to defend. The donor for their oldest child challenged the agreement that they had with him on similar grounds and now has visitation rights with that child as well.

Race, gender, and class intersect in troubling ways in the Yates case. Admittedly, it is not contract per se that produces the potential inequality. In fact, Sheena and Tiara clearly saw contract as an important tool in growing their family. But they entered into the donor contracts described within in a particular context, one in which the medical and legal costs that attend physician-assisted fertility treatments generally remain out of reach for low and even some middle-income families, a group in which African Americans — perhaps LGBTQ Blacks most of all — are disproportionately represented. It is not hard to imagine that health care costs figured into their decision to inseminate at home or, for that matter, to use a known donor rather than an anonymous donor affiliated with a sperm bank. Add to this the potential effects of other factors, such as fact that, given past history, many African Americans mistrust doctors and medical facilities, a phenomenon that Kimani Paul-Emile discusses in her work. All of this troubles the story of contract’s ability to advance the aspirations of all families equally.

Significantly, my lament is not simply that Love’s Promises passes up an opportunity to discuss how the realities of race and structural inequality in this country might diminish the power of contract for African Americans and other groups of color in the family context. Ertman’s book also misses a chance to say something about the particular advantages that contract could offer such groups. Despite my earlier argument, my sense is that there may be some places where contract could be very effectively deployed to disrupt the effects of racial stigma and inequality, especially if paired with other tools.

Consider the example of nonmarital black families, especially those with children. Today, African Americans are the most unmarried group in the country. While the U.S. has seen declines in marriage among all groups, they have been steepest among Blacks. Interestingly, African Americans place a higher value on marriage than many other groups. Studies suggest, however, that considerations regarding financial security and other related issues may prevent them from seeing marriage as a viable option for organizing their lives. In a recent law review article in the Hastings Law Journal, I make the argument that, instead of investing in marriage promotion programs that too often ignore the structural racial inequality (e.g., poverty, school drop out rates, housing and food insecurity, and high incarceration rates) that often creates a barrier to marriage, we should work to honor and better support nonmarital black families where they stand.

When it comes to cohabiting couples, Ertman concludes that they “should be recognized as an ‘us’ in relation to one another through property-sharing rules,” such those proposed by the American Law Institute. She stops short, however, of saying that cohabitants should “be treated as an ‘us’ when it comes to institutions outside the relationship, like the IRS and the Social Security Administration.” As Ertman notes in addressing proposals advanced by other law professors, a focus on cohabitants alone won’t do much for African America, a community in which black “women . . . are three times more likely than white women never to live with an intimate partner and more likely than white women to center their lives among extended kin.” But contract might be a more effective tool if extended to nonmarital families with children, whether the parents reside together or not. This might be especially true if combined with changes in tax policy and the structure of benefits that Ertman is less comfortable making in the absence of marriage.

For reasons already articulated, I do not think that adults in poor, nonmarital black families will or should run out to find lawyers who can draft binding contracts for them. But I can still imagine a world in which a contract-based norm works to destigmatize such families by making it plain that they have structures and “deals” like many others, not just the “tangle of pathology” described in the Moynihan Report issued fifty years ago.   In such a world, even informal contracts could assist the adults in “fragile” families in negotiating the many challenges that they face and serve to reduce conflict. Further, such agreements, to the extent that they help reveal the precise terms of the negotiations in which such families already engage, might uncover the reasons that fragile black families seem to be able to navigate co-parenting better than their counterparts. They might also disrupt stereotypes about the contributions that fathers, in particular, make to such families. Despite the racialized trope of the “dead beat” dad, studies show that nonmarital African American fathers tend to be more involved with their children than nonmarital White fathers, and regularly contribute diapers and other goods as a way of providing support, even when dramatically reduced job opportunities make money scarce.

Love’s Promises helps us see the current realities of both “Plan A” and “Plan B” families, and to imagine what the future could and should be as a normative matter. I’m very grateful to Martha, the symposium organizers, and my fellow participants for helping me to think even more about the possibilities of contract in the family law context, especially where families of color are concerned. On this day, especially, when the U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed that LGBT couples are “Plan A” families in the eyes of the Constitution, I only hope that Ertman decides to write another book that builds on the important foundation that she has set.

 

1

Looking Back — Francis Biddle, Censorship & the “Biddle List”

War threatens all civil rights. Francis Biddle, December 15, 1941

I was reading Sam Walker’s Today in Civil Liberties History (a daily historical calendar — quite good!) when I came upon this entry for today, circa April 14, 1942:

Attorney General Biddle OKs Censoring Father Coughlin’s Social Justice Magazine

“In a letter to Postmaster General Frank Walker on this day, Attorney General Francis Biddle (1886-1968) proposed banning the magazine Social Justice from the mails. Social Justice was the publication of Father Charles Coughlin, a Catholic priest in the Detroit area, who in the late 1930s became a public, ultra-conservative critic of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.”

Unknown“When the U.S. entered World War II, Coughlin became a critic of the war effort, in part because he was anti-Semitic. Coughlin’s criticisms were the reasons for Biddle’s censorship proposal. In the end, the Post Office did bar Social Justice from the mails. It was one of the relatively rare instances of suppression of dissent during World War II . . . .” (See Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, April 15, 1942 story here.)

Biddle, of course, was the one who had been a secretary to Justice Holmes (1911-1912), assistant to the U.S. Attorney (E-Dist., PA), chairman of the NLRB (1934-35), Third Circuit Judge (1939-1940), U.S. Solicitor General (1940), U.S. Attorney General (1941-45), and later a judge on the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (1945-1946) (Herbert Wechsler served as his main assistant), among other things. Biddle also wrote a biography of Holmes — Mr. Justice Holmes (1942), among other books.

Francis Biddle

Francis Biddle

One more biographical note: he was a half second cousin four times removed of James Madison.

As recounted in a Wikipedia entry, “[d]uring World War II Biddle used the Espionage Act of 1917 to attempt to shut down ‘vermin publications.’ This included Father Coughlin’s publication entitled Social Justice. Biddle has also been ‘credited’ with the creation of what became known later as the ‘Attorney General’s List of Subversive Organizations.’ In fact, this list was originally known as ‘The Biddle List.'”

“In the Biddle List, eleven front groups originating in the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) were singled out as being ‘subversive’ and under the control of the Soviet Union. Unlike the later, more infamous Attorney General’s List of Subversive Organizations, which contained both left and right-wing organizations, the Biddle List contained only left-wing organizations as well as civil rights organizations tied to the CPUSA.”

Biddle List (1941): 

Contrast Francis Biddle, Remarks at the Dedication of the Thomas Jefferson Room, Library of Congress, December 15, 1941, on the occasion of the 150th Anniversary of the Bill of Rights. Here is an excerpt from those remarks:

War threatens all civil rights; and although we have fought wars before, and ourpersonal freedoms have survived, there have been periods of gross abuse, when hysteria and hate and fear ran high, and when minorities were unlawfully and cruelly abused. Every man who cares about freedom, about a government by law — ­and all freedom is based on fair administration of the law — must fight for it for the other man with whom he disagrees, for the right of the minority, for the chance for the underprivileged with the same passion of insistence as he claims for his own rights. If we care about democracy, we must care about it as a reality for others as well as for ourselves; yes, for aliens, for Germans, for Italians, for Japanese, for those who are vdth us as well as those who are against us: For the Bill of Rights protects not only American citizensbut all hunlan beings who live on our American soil, under our American flag. The rights of Anglo-Saxons, of Jews, of Catholics, of negroes, of Slavs, Indians — all are alike before the law. And this we must remember and sustain — ­ that is if we really love justice, and really hate the bayonet and the whip and the gun, and the whole Gestapo method as a way of handling human beings.

As far as I can tell, there has been no book-length biography of Francis Biddle, which strikes me as odd. Such a biography is long overdue and Biddle is certainly deserving of one.

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Mrs. Murphy’s Wedding Services

The recent discussion about the Indiana RFRA brings to mind the “Mrs. Murphy’s Boarding House” hypothetical that was debated when the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968 were enacted.  Mrs. Murphy was supposed to be an old lady who took boarders in her home.  The argument was that someone like that should not be required to take in boarders that she did not want in her home, even if her reason was racial bigotry.  Ultimately, the Fair Housing Act did exempt this sort of person and that  compromise that remains the law.

The argument is now being made that a provider of wedding services (a caterer, florist, photographer, or wedding planner) should not be required to work on a same-sex marriage if he or she objects on religious grounds.  Is this Mrs. Murphy comparable to the 1960s version?  I would say no.  The boarding house example includes a home and a business, and thus one might conclude that there is some privacy interest at stake.  The wedding scenario, by contrast, only involves a business and thus does not seem to warrant an exception from a non-discrimination provision based on sexual orientation.  (If there is no such provision, then the wedding planner is free to discriminate against same-sex weddings, I suppose.)

Nevertheless, I’m left wondering about the practical effect of this modern Mrs. Murphy.  Suppose a wedding provider says on its website, brochures, or in person that they think same-sex relationships are wrong but that they will comply with state law and work on same-sex weddings upon request.  How many same-sex couples are going to want their photos, flowers, cake, etc to come from someone who thinks that their marriage is sinful, unconstitutional, etc?  Not many, I would think.  So is there really a problem here?

6

FAN 51.1 (First Amendment News) Oklahoma ACLU Issues Separate Statements on Racist Chants

March 9, 2015 (ACLU of Oklahoma Press Release)

OKLAHOMA CITY – Following this weekend’s news of members of the University of Oklahoma’s Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternity chanting about lynching African Americans, and the investigative and disciplinary actions in progress, the American Civil Liberties Union of Oklahoma as released the following statements:

The following is attributable to Ryan Kiesel, ACLU of Oklahoma Executive Director:

Sixty-six years ago and after two trips to the United States Supreme Court, Ada Lois Sipuel Fisher became the first African American student to be admitted to the University of Oklahoma College of Law. Even after her admission, she was still segregated from her white peers. With a legal team that included Thurgood Marshall, her case played a critical role in the end of the separate but equal doctrine. As monumental as that victory may have been, the video showing SAE fraternity members at the University of Oklahoma singing a disgraceful racist chant serves as a stark reminder that racism is very much a present reality.

We offer our sincere appreciation to the students, faculty and staff who have joined together in solidarity against hate and racism. They remind us that the spark in Ada Lois Sipuel Fisher still persists in the minds of those who benefitted from her work. Let history say the same of us. At the very least, this awful incident must prompt a robust conversation and a review of every aspect of campus life so that we can combat persistent discrimination and realize racial justice. And as the fates of the students at the center of this controversy unfold, we encourage the administration to demonstrate their commitment to due process; for it is often in protecting the rights of the very worst, we are able to demonstrate our fullest commitment to justice. (emphasis added)

The following is attributable to Brady Henderson, ACLU of Oklahoma Legal Director:

We join with OU President David Boren, as well as the majority of OU students, faculty, and alumni, and with an overwhelming number of Oklahomans in their disgust at SAE’s conduct this past Saturday night. While many Americans paused this weekend to reflect on the 50th Anniversary of Martin Luther King’s famous march in Selma, Alabama, these students marked the occasion by mocking one of the saddest chapters of American history, the mob-fueled, government-sanctioned murder of African Americans. These students remind us that despite King’s victory in Selma, and other battles won by countless citizens with the courage to face hate head-on, racism is not dead or even dormant in modern America, even on our college campuses.

We applaud President Boren’s aggressive response to the SAE’s actions, and we encourage the OU administration to be equally aggressive in ensuring that the due process rights of students remain protected throughout any disciplinary processes against Fraternity members. The deep-rooted problem of racism will not be solved by discipline alone, but by open and honest dialogue and an accounting of where we are and where we need to go not just in our universities, but in the communities university students will one day lead.(emphasis added)

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UCLA Law Review Vol. 62, Issue 2

Volume 62, Issue 2 (February 2015)
Articles

Judging Opportunity Lost: Assessing the Viability of Race-Based Affirmative Action After Fisher v. University of Texas Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Angela Onwuachi-Willig 272
Enforcing Rights Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer 306
Milliken, Meredith, and Metropolitan Segregation Myron Orfield 364

 

Comments

David’s Sling: How to Give Copyright Owners a Practical Way to Pursue Small Claims Jeffrey Bils 464
Nonserious Marijuana Offenses and Noncitizens: Uncounseled Pleas and Disproportionate Consequences Jordan Cunnings 510
26

Jonathan Chait, Don’t be an Asshole

In today’s New York Magazine, Jonathan Chait has published a tone-deaf article against liberal efforts to call people out for saying or writing offensive things. Chait uses every empty, meaningless phrase it takes to write such an article: “political correctness,” “language police,” “censorship,” and “thought-criminal.” Of course he discusses Charlie Hebdo because you have to talk about Charlie Hebdo and surrendering to terrorists if you want to talk about “political correctness” these days.

After learning from discussions with many people holding views similar to Chait, I have had some success in distilling the problems of offensive speech to simpler terms. I call it the “don’t be an asshole” rule. It lacks nuance, I admit.

The applications of “don’t be an asshole” are many. Here are just a few:

Don’t yell “fuck” in the middle of a wedding ceremony or funeral.
Don’t fart in someone’s face.
Don’t post your ex-girlfriend’s nude pictures online.
Don’t name your sports team an offensive ethnic slur.
Don’t call women “sluts” even if you believe in your heart-of-hearts that you also call promiscuous men “sluts.”
Don’t use ethnic, religious, homophobic, racial, sexist slurs.
Recognize that you might be racist, sexist, homophobic, or otherwise bigoted and not know it.
Listen charitably.

And if someone calls you are a racist, sexist, bigot, etc., the “don’t be an asshole” rule even has a course of action to take:

Step one: Apologize.
Step two (optional): Thank the person for letting you know (assuming you don’t want to be an asshole in the future).
Step three: Don’t be an asshole again.

It’s really not that hard. If you follow these basic, limited steps, you don’t have to worry about the “politically correct” “thought police” “censoring” your thoughts and letting the terrorists win.

For an exhibit of what to do when you say something offensive, see Benedict Cumberbatch yesterday. Cumberbatch recently used the outdated phrase “colored people” in an interview. For Brits like Cumberbatch, the phrase doesn’t carry, from my understanding, the same baggage that it does in the states. Did Cumberbatch, thus, fight back and say that listeners had it all wrong because they didn’t understand his intent and/or cultural background? No. Did the “thought police” do horrible, horrible things to him? No. This is what Cumberbatch said after being called out for his language: “I’m devastated to have caused offense by using this outmoded terminology. I offer my sincere apologies. I make no excuse for my being an idiot and know the damage is done.” That’s it. Problem solved. Benedict Cumberbatch is not an asshole. Jonathan Chait, don’t be an asshole.

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UCLA Law Review Vol. 62, Issue 1

Volume 62, Issue 1 (January 2015)
Articles

Intellectual Property Law Solutions to Tax Avoidance Andrew Blair-Stanek 2
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation Erwin Chemerinsky, Jolene Forman, Allen Hopper & Sam Kamin 74
Offshoring the Army: Migrant Workers and the U.S. Military Darryl Li 124

 

Comments

Inmates’ Need for Federally Funded Lawyers: How the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Casey, and Iqbal Combine With Implicit Bias to Eviscerate Inmate Civil Rights Tasha Hill 176
Proportional Voting Through the Elections Clause: Protecting Voting Rights Post-Shelby County Conner Johnston 236