Category: Behavioral Law and Economics


The Dignity of the Minimum Wage?

[A brief note of apology: it’s been a terrible blogging summer for me, though great on other fronts.  I promise I’ll do better in the coming academic year. In particular, I’d like to get back to my dark fantasy/law blogging series. If you’ve nominations for interviewees, email me.]

WorkDetroitThis is one I’ve been meaning to write for a while.

One of the major lessons of the cultural cognition project is that empirical arguments are a terrible way to resolve value conflicts. On issues as diverse as the relationship between gun ownership and homicide rates, the child-welfare effects of gay parenting, global warming, and consent in rape cases, participants in empirically-infused politics behave as if they are spectators at sporting events. New information is polarized through identity-protective lenses; we highlight those facts that are congenial to our way of life and discounts those that are not; we are subject to naive realism.  It’s sort of dispiriting, really.  Data can inflame our culture wars.

One example of this phenomenon is the empirical debate over minimum wage laws. As is well known, there is an evergreen debate in economics journals about the policy consequences which flow from a wage floor.  Many (most) economists argue that the minimum wage retards growth and ironically hurts the very low-wage workers it is supposed to hurt. Others argue that the minimum wage has the opposite effect. What’s interesting about this debate -to me, anyway- is that it seems to bear such an orthogonal relationship to how the politics of the minimum wage play out, and the kinds of arguments that persuade partisans on one side or another. Or to put it differently, academic liberals in favor of the minimum wage have relied on regression analyses, but I don’t think they’ve persuaded many folks who weren’t otherwise disposed to agree with them. Academic critics of the minimum wage too have failed to move the needle on public opinion, which (generally) is supportive of a much higher level of minimum wage than is currently the law.

How to explain this puzzle?  My colleague Brishen Rogers has a terrific draft article out on ssrn, Justice at Work: Minimum Wage Laws and Social Equality. The paper urges a new kind of defense of minimum wages, which elides the empirical debate about minimum wages’ effect on labor markets altogether. From the abstract:

“Accepting for the sake of argument that minimum wage laws cause inefficiency and unemployment, this article nevertheless defends them. It draws upon philosophical arguments that a just state will not simply redistribute resources, but will also enable citizens to relate to one another as equals. Minimum wage laws advance this ideal of “social equality” in two ways: they symbolize the society’s commitment to low-wage workers, and they help reduce work-based class and status distinctions. Comparable tax-and-transfer programs are less effective on both fronts. Indeed, the fact that minimum wage laws increase unemployment can be a good thing, as the jobs lost will not always be worth saving. The article thus stands to enrich current increasingly urgent debates over whether to increase the minimum wage. It also recasts some longstanding questions of minimum wage doctrine, including exclusions from coverage and ambiguities regarding which parties are liable for violations.”

I’m a huge fan of Brishen’s work, having been provoked and a bit convinced by his earlier work (here) on a productive way forward for the union movement. What seems valuable in this latest paper is that the minimum wage laws are explicitly defended with reference to a widely shared set of values (dignity, equality). Foregrounding such values I think would increase support for the minimum wage among members of the populace.  The lack of such dignitary discussions in the academic debate to date has level the minimum wage’s liberal defenders without a satisfying and coherent ground on which to stand. Worth thinking about in the waning hours of Labor’s day.




The Pervasive Effect of Priors: Part Four

A New York Times front page last week prominently featured a story, U.S. Opens Spigot After Farmers Claim Discrimination, that shows many people in a very bad light indeed.   A small, focused program intended to compensate a small number of people, true victims of discrimination in farm lending, has mushroomed for various reasons into a huge money pit, “compensating” those who may very well not have suffered discrimination.

Even those who generally think well of government would, I think, be hard pressed not to be distressed by this story.   Government responded to political pressures to include more and more people, and require less and less documentation, resulting in a multi-billion dollar giveaway. I want to focus here on views of those taking “advantage” of the compensation scheme to seek compensation when they were not injured.

Different people have different views as to how people respond to incentives in general and monetary incentives in particular.  Some think anyone would ‘do anything for a buck’ – including have children, get/not get married, get more healthcare, or file specious discrimination claims.   Some people might think some subset of people (‘greedy’? ‘rational’? more on that later) would do anything for a buck.  Some people might think that incentives matter ‘at the margin’ but that someone could not be persuaded to do something very much ‘against his nature.’

There’s also a role for self-deception here: a person who is motivated by a monetary incentive may not want to admit this, and therefore might convince herself that she was doing the incentivized act because it was right/what she really wanted to do, not because of the incentive.  Which view a person has depends in part on how she sees herself: what does she see herself as being willing to do for money? It may also depend on her broader view as to whether ‘being willing to do many things for money’ is a bad thing or a good (“rational”) thing.

With respect to what motivates somebody else, a person may think ‘this person is like me—one of ‘us.’  ‘If she is doing x, her motivation is probably what mine would be.’  Obviously, people are not monolithic, and equally obviously, there will be enormous differences in the monetary opportunities people have and how they experience and react to them.  There are many things nobody would do no matter how much money was being offered.      Read More


The Pervasive Effect of Priors: Part Three

Last week’s marathon bombings got me thinking about how people form narratives about bad events, both big and small.

My partner Eric and I were traveling in Portugal in a rented car.  The car only took diesel fuel, and we had difficulty figuring out whether particular pumps dispensed diesel.   Eric tried to use one pump, which didn’t seem to fit.  We asked an attendant, who seemed quite surly.  He shoved the ill-fitting pump into the car.  About 20 minutes later, on the highway, the car stopped working.   The repair people who came to help us told us that the car had been filled with regular fuel.

Eric and I decided that the attendant had disliked us, perhaps because we were American, and had done this on purpose.  My sister heard this story; her take was that surely the attendant just made a mistake. She asked ‘don’t you prefer to think of it that way’?  Eric and I didn’t, but she did.

One suggestion that’s been made about the marathon bombings is that they could have been stopped given what the FBI knew or had reason to know about the elder brother.    Is this comforting—or not?  Do we prefer to think somebody knew enough, but didn’t act on their knowledge? Or would we prefer to think that it could not have been stopped? Read More


The Pervasive Role of Priors: Part Two

Continuing the thread from my previous post, available here, on how prior beliefs and ways of viewing the world affect one’s conclusions:

One person who commented on my prior post noted that people have priors as to how much justification is needed for government action.  I completely agree with this.  I think that in many cases, that prior is importantly related to, and to some extent caused by, another prior, about what sort of people are in government.

I was brought up thinking that people who went into government were generally “good” – that they went into government to do what they thought of as the right thing, and that in many cases, what they thought was the right thing was pretty good.  I recall watching the Alan Alda movie The Seduction of Joe Tynan, which I remember as being about a “good” politician completely compromising his principles to retain power, and feeling both sad and startled.

In a sense, my prior has stayed with me, even though I know of many-probably thousands at this point- examples to the contrary.  I recall reading fairly recently (over at Marginal Revolution) about a government decision to keep the speeding limit on a stretch of highway too low.  The low speed limit causes accidents, but yields lots of revenue from speeding tickets, presumably the motivation for keeping the limit as it is.  My reaction was a bit of shock and dismay. Read More


The Pervasive Role of Priors: Part One

Thanks to Larry for inviting me to guest-blog. It’s every academic’s dream, I think, to have a built-in audience for her thoughts. And given the caliber of this blog and the readership it attracts, I could scarcely have a better one.

One subject I’ll be blogging on is my general view that people’s prior beliefs and other aspects of how they view and take in the world explain a huge amount, much more than is usually acknowledged. They (people’s priors) help explain why there are so many debates that never get anywhere.  Both sides might have terrific arguments, yet nobody is persuaded.

And people keep on making the same sorts of arguments, even knowing this. Sometimes they wonder why more people aren’t persuaded. It’s a bit like the old joke about the person who goes to a foreign country and doesn’t know the language, so he tries to communicate in his own language and, when he’s not understood, he just tries again, repeating what he said . . . but louder.

I recently went to a very interesting colloquium co-sponsored by the Federalist Society and the Liberty Fund on Behavioral Law and Economics.  One big issue discussed was the relationship between behavioral law and economics and law, including most importantly paternalistic justifications for law that behavioral l & e might provide.  Michael Bloomberg’s attempt to ban sales of large sizes of soda was much on people’s minds.

One thing I very much wanted to get out of the discussion was an understanding of the other participants’ priors as well as my own. Here are some initial thoughts.

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The Disclosure Crisis

Thank you to Danielle for the lovely (re)introduction and to Concurring Opinions for inviting me to blog this month.

The Washington Law Review hosted a symposium Thursday entitled “The Disclosure Crisis,” which covered everything from privacy policies to restaurant hygiene grades. The gist of the conference, on my view, was that the only thing piling up faster than examples of mandated disclosure as a regulatory strategy is the evidence it does not work. Time and time again, officials choose to intervene in a given area by requiring companies and others to reveal information so that individuals can protect themselves and police the market. And time and time again, disclosure ends up helping few if any consumers or citizens actually make better decisions.

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Shoves, Nudges, and Freedom

Cass Sunstein reviews a book by Sarah Conly on coercive paternalism in the NYRB this month:

A natural objection [to paternalism] is that autonomy is an end in itself and not merely a means. On this view, people should be entitled to choose as they like, even if they end up choosing poorly. . . . Conly responds that when government makes (some) decisions for us, we gain not only in personal welfare but also in autonomy, if only because our time is freed up to deal with what most concerns us. . . .

Conly’s most controversial claim is that because the health risks of smoking are so serious, the government should ban it. She is aware that many people like to smoke, that a ban could create black markets, and that both of these points count against a ban. But she concludes that education, warnings, and other nudges are insufficiently effective, and that a flat prohibition is likely to be justified by careful consideration of both benefits and costs, including the costs to the public of treating lung cancer and other consequences of smoking.

As Big Beverage’s tactics come closer and closer to those of big tobacco, might it be the next target?

For those who’d like government to influence decisions in subtler ways, check out Kate Greenwood’s review of recent health care proposals from Richard Frank and Christopher Robertson. Very interesting ideas there.


BRIGHT IDEAS: Werbach and Hunter on For the Win: How Game Thinking Can Revolutionize Your Business

This Bright Ideas post looks at Kevin Werbach and Dan Hunter’s new book, For the Win: How Game Thinking Can Revolutionize Your Business. I have posted about it, but Kevin and Dan were gracious enough to answer some questions. We go into what is gamification, the differences between internal and external uses of the technique, how it relates to super-crunching, and the ethical and legal implications of the technique.

Kevin and Dan, you have drilled into an area, gamification, that seems almost arcane, a technique known to initiates. Why do it?

[KW] We actually think gamification is quite relevant for a broad range of audiences. First of all, video games have a huge impact on our culture. The games industry generates more revenue annually than Hollywood does at the box office. According to a Pew survey, 97% of American teeagers play video games, and it’s not just young people: the Entertainment Software Association reports that the average age of a gamer is 30, with almost half of them women. We can dismiss video games the way we used to dismiss social networking… and e-commerce before that… and the Internet before that… or we can look at why they are so powerful and apply those lessons in other contexts.

Second, the core goal of gamification is motivation. Think about all the situations where motivation matters: at work, at home, as consumers, in legal compliance, in social activism, and in collective action, to name a few. In all these cases, greater engagement drives material results. If there were motivational techniques that were proven in real-world businesses, consistent with decades of psychological research, and synergistic with big data and other leading-edge technology trends, wouldn’t you want to understand them?

And third, gamification is happening. It’s a rapidly growing business trend among startups, Fortune 500 companies, non-profits, and even government agencies. It raises a host of significant legal, operational, and ethical issues, as well as a variety of practical business concerns. We felt that my work on emerging technology and policy trends through the Supernova conference, and Dan’s scholarship on virtual worlds and background in cognitive psychology, gave us a unique ability to tackle these questions in a serious way. That’s why we put together the first gamification course at Wharton, and wrote For the Win as business guide to this emerging field.

OK, so what is gamification?

[KW] Gamification means applying design techniques from video games to business and other problems. In other words, it’s the process of motivating customers, employees, and communities by thinking like a game designer. It doesn’t mean turning everything into a game. Quite the contrary! Gamification involves incorporating elements of games into existing activities, the way Nike weaves levels and awards into its Nike+ system, or Microsoft motivated employees to review half a million Windows 7 dialogue boxes for localization errors with a competition among offices.

When you look at it that way, the basic concept of gamification is pretty simple, but doing it well is hard. Even experienced game designers often create games that aren’t much fun. Executing gamification effectively requires a combination of skills and knowledge, which we describe in For the Win.

Right. I see games are important in that they are big business and a big part of many folks’ lives. Let’s talk a little more about motivation. Is this approach a sort of applied behavioral economic one? Someone identifies levers and then builds systems to nudge or indeed shift the way others engage and behave?

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CELS VII: Low Variance, High Significance

[CELS VII, held November 9-10, 2012 at Stanford, was a smashing success due in no small part to the work of chief organizer Dan Ho, as well as Dawn Chutkow (of SELS and Cornell) and Stanford’s organizing committee.  For previous installments in the CELS recap series, see CELS III, IV, V, and VI. For those few readers of this post who are data-skeptics and don’t want to read a play-by-play, resistance is obviously futile and you might as well give up. I hear that TV execs were at CELS scouting for a statistic geek reality show, so think of this as a taste of what’s coming.]

Survey Research isn't just for the 1%!

Unlike last year, I got to the conference early and even went to a methods panel. Skipping the intimidating “Spatial Statistics and the GIS” and the ominous “Bureau of Justice Statistics” panels, I sat in on “Internet Surveys” with Douglas Rivers, of Stanford/Hoover and YouGuv. To give you a sense of the stakes, half of the people in the room regularly use mTurk to run cheap e-surveys. The other half regularly write nasty comments in JELS reviewer forms about using mTurk.  (Oddly, I’m in both categories, which would’ve created a funny weighting problem if I were asked my views.) The panel was devoted to the proposition “Internet surveys are much, much more accurate than you thought, and if you don’t believe me, check out some algebraic proof.  And the election.”  Two contrasting data points. First, as Rivers pointed out, all survey subjects are volunteers, and thus it’s a bit tough to distinguish internet convenience samples from some oddball scooped up by Gallup’s 9% survey response rate.  Second, and less comfortingly, 10-15% of the adult population has a reading disability that makes self-administration of a survey prompt online more than a bit dicey.  I say: as long as the disability isn’t biasing with respect to contract psychology or cultural cognition, let’s survey on the cheap!

Lunch next. Good note for presenters: avoid small pieces of spinach/swiss chard if you are about to present. No one will tell you that you’ve spinach on a front tooth.  Not even people who are otherwise willing to inform you that your slides are too brightly colored. Speaking of which, the next panel I attended was Civil Justice I. Christy and I presented Clusters are AmazingWe tag-teamed, with me taking 9 minutes to present 5 slides and her taking 9 minutes to present the remaining 16 or so.  That was just as well: no one really wanted to know how our work might apply more broadly anyway. We got through it just fine, although I still can’t figure out an intuitive way to describe spectral clustering. What about “magic black box” isn’t working for you?

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The Price of Bankruptcy

Credit Slips highlights a very cool new paper, Bankruptcy Spillovers: Distance, Public Disclosure, and Opaque Information.  In the paper, Barry Scholnick examines bankruptcy filings in Canada at a micro level.  Looking at the postal code of every filer – which code is a much more precise geographic identifier than our zip codes – Scholnick concludes:

“The punch line of my study is that there is indeed a significant impact from the past bankruptcies of neighbors (as defined by the very small Canadian Post Codes) to the probability that an individual in the neighborhood will file . . . I propose, and provide evidence for, the hypothesis that if a defaulter lives in a neighborhood with a large number of previous bankruptcies among the neighbors, then that individual will choose to default via bankruptcy rather than charge-off. This is because more neighborhood bankruptcies will lower stigma or provide more information about the process of bankruptcy.

On the other hand, I show that defaulters who live in low bankruptcy neighborhoods choose to default via charge-off rather than bankruptcy. This is consistent with the argument that low bankruptcy neighborhoods have higher levels of bankruptcy stigma, thus individual defaulters choose to default via charge-off in order to maintain more privacy about their default.”

This paper not only fits within a literature on bankruptcy, but also is a nice match to work by my co-author Tess Wilkinson-Ryan on how mortgage foreclosure and other forms of breach are socially mediated events.  Abiding by onerous contracts is unpleasant, but we do it so long as it is socially validated. When it stops being socially normal to stick with terrible deals, we exit them.