Category: Articles and Books

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Anuj Desai on the Post Office and the First Amendment

Envelope 1a.jpgProfessor Anuj Desai (U. Wisconsin Law School) has posted his forthcoming article, The Transformation of Statutes into Constitutional Law: How Early Post Office Policy Shaped Modern First Amendment Doctrine, on SSRN. Anuj’s paper is a fascinating history of the early Post Office and how statutory protection of letters influenced constitutional law. From the abstract:

We typically think of constitutional law as the product of text, structure, constitutional history, ethical and moral philosophy, or common law doctrine. At times, though, constitutional law comes directly from societal institutions; those institutions in turn are often rooted in legislative, not judicial, choices. In this article, I tell an intriguing story of constitutional lawmaking in which policy choices about an institution developed into constitutional law. I look at two important areas of First Amendment doctrine: First Amendment constraints on government spending, i.e., “unconstitutional conditions”; and what is known in First Amendment jurisprudence as “the right to receive.” I argue that the genesis of both doctrines can be found in legislative choices made during the formation of one of the nation’s first “administrative agencies,” a communications network that was viewed as the internet of its day: the United States Post Office. When the twentieth century Supreme Court held that the First Amendment can constrain government spending and then later, in a separate line of cases, established “the right to receive,” the Court initially relied on specific attributes of the post office. Those attributes in turn had been established by choices made by policymakers during the late eighteenth century. In short, the Court incorporated aspects of the early postal statutes into First Amendment doctrine. Legislative choices in effect became constitutional law.

I really enjoyed reading this article — it’s a very interesting piece, especially for anybody interested in legal history and First Amendment law.

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The Law Reviews vs. the Courts

I’ve just posted to SSRN the near-final version of a short essay I wrote for “CONNtemplations,” the soon-to-debut online companion to the Connecticut Law Review, titled “The Law Reviews vs. the Courts: Two Views from the Ivory Tower.” The essay advances the (perhaps somewhat counterintuitive) claim that part of the reason why federal judges have found law reviews increasingly unhelpful is because their own discretion, both procedurally and substantively, has been substantially cabined in recent years…

I explain in somewhat more detail in the essay, which I (shamelessly) encourage you to check out — it’s a quick read, too. But I wanted to blog about it here to see if folks think there’s any possible connection. As Congress and the Supreme Court have narrowed the scope of review in all kinds of cases, as courts have relied that much more frequently on harmless error and the like, etc., is there something to be said for _that_ trend having an impact on the utility vel non of legal scholarship? Or, are we just, as Second Circuit Chief Judge Jacobs recently suggested, hopelessly out of touch?

Argument & Authority

One part of the intro to Kennedy & Fisher’s Canon of American Legal Thought really hit me today:

Law students struggle to understand the relationship between “the rules” and the vague arguments that lawyers call “policy.” Should “policy” begin only in the exception—when legal deduction runs out—or should it be a routine part of legal analysis? If the latter, how should lawyers reason about policy? What should go into reasoning about “policy”—how much ethics, how much empiricism, how much economics? Which of the arguments laypeople use count as professionally acceptable arguments of “policy” and which do not? Which mark one as naïve, an outsider to the professional consensus? What is it about policy argument that makes it seem more professional, more analytical, more persuasive, than talking about “mere politics”?

I think I might begin my administrative law class next term with those questions at the forefront. Administrative Law is occasionally derided as a Seinfeld class–a class about nothing–because the precedents seem so malleable and ad hoc. All seems to turn on an increasingly complicated jurisprudence of deference. But the agencies are often getting deference because they are presumed to have a better grasp on “empiricism and economics” than nonspecialist judges.

The problems raised by K&F go beyond law into flelds like economics itself. Consider EconJournalWatch’s recent issue examining the role of math in top-level publications. Sutter & Pejsky ask “Where Would Adam Smith Publish Today?,” and note a “near absence of math-free research in top journals.” A bit from their conclusion:

The emphasis on mathematical modeling and regression analysis imposes a toll on the profession. Adam Smith spent his early years studying literature, history, ethics, political and moral philosophy, and then teaching literature and rhetoric to college students. Today to succeed in the profession he would need to study model building and regression analysis well enough to publish in “good” journals, and he (and the rest of us) would have lost the value added from the studies displaced. The same would apply for many Nobel prize winners who published their work in an economics profession less tied down to model building and regression analysis.

Sutter & Pejsky, along with many other interesting authors in EJW, are arguing for a more pluralistic approach to economic authority. I hope to show my students in Admin the multiple sources of authority for agency decisions…and how that complexity, while occasionally frustrating and obfuscatory, can make the resulting decisions stronger, like a Peirce’s cable.

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Law Clerks and Book Proposals

There’s a fairly disturbing (at least to me) book proposal making its way around the e-mail universe, disturbing not because of the subject (the current debate over habeas and the war on terrorism), but because of the occupation of the authors/editors — two current D.C. Circuit law clerks. Indeed, the proposal itself harps on this fact, suggesting that the two clerks “are uniquely suited to moderate this debate,” having “spent a year in the legal trenches, as it were; each serving as law clerks on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit during a year that saw several landmark detention decisions likely to end up before the Supreme Court.”

My initial reaction is that this rubs me totally the wrong way. Wholly separate from the prospect of law clerks speaking to reporters about their jobs after their clerkships are over is clerks using their position as a ground for a book deal. If I remember right, the relevant provision of the Code of Conduct for Judicial Employees is Canon 3D, which provides:

A judicial employee should avoid making public comment on the merits of a pending or impending action and should require similar restraint by personnel subject to the judicial employee’s direction and control. . . . A judicial employee should never disclose any confidential information received in the course of official duties except as required in the performance of such duties, nor should a judicial employee employ such information for personal gain. A former judicial employee should observe the same restrictions on disclosure of confidential information that apply to a current judicial employee, except as modified by the appointing authority.

So I guess there are three questions here: First, is using your current position as a law clerk to promote a book deal in effect (if not actually) employing “confidential information received in the course of official duties . . . for personal gain”? Second, even if not, aren’t we opening a can of worms if clerks start using their position to hawk book deals? Third, although we’ll probably have no sense of the answer, does their judge know, and if not, shouldn’t s/he?

UPDATE: I should be clear, as some have noted in the comments, that the proposal is for a volume of essays from multiple contributors, and that the clerks do not appear to be planning to write anything themselves. There also does not appear to be an actual book deal; the e-mail referenced in the post is effectively gauging interest for possible contributors. I’m not sure that changes the issue, but wanted to clarify the original content.

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Self-Handicapping and Managers’ Duty of Care

I have recently posted my symposium essay Self-Handicapping and Managers’ Duty of Care on SSRN and Selected Works. You can read the abstract when you click through, so to convince you to download the essay, I’ll give you a taste of the introduction:

Authors commonly introduce their works in symposium issues with a few disclaiming words. They identify their scholarship as a “symposium essay,” not an “Article”; a “sketch” of an answer, not a fully-fleshed out argument. Casual readers might conclude that law professors are unusually humble and resist trumpeting the novelty and sophistication of their scholarship.

Social psychologists might instead believe that symposium authors seek to avoid reputational sanctions for publicizing arguments they have not fully dressed. Scholars try to signal an excuse for underdeveloped pieces: “I haven’t worked as hard on this paper as I would have if it were a ‘real’ article.” The goal of this excuse-making is simple: disappointed readers will attribute blame away from the author’s perceived acuity and professional reputation.

This is a symposium essay about the psychology of creating such pre-excuses for failure. Rather than focus on academics, I will examine the failings of overconfident corporate managers . . .

The piece grew out of a post I wrote here over a year ago, and will appear in the Wake Forest Law Review’s Business Law Symposium Issue.

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Can the First Amendment Serve as a Source of Criminal Procedure?

first-am-as-crim-pro.jpgTypically, when we think of the constitutional criminal procedure that regulates government information gathering, we think of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. But many government investigations involve collecting information about speech, association, religion, and the consumption of ideas. The NSA surveillance of telephone calls, for example, involves speech. National Security Letters can be used to obtain information about association and the consumption of ideas. And so on.

Does the First Amendment apply? Should it? If the First Amendment serves as a source of criminal procedure, what procedures does it require? For example, could the First Amendment require a warrant? An exclusionary rule?

For the answers, please check out my new article, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 112 (2007).

I’ve posted the final published version of the article on SSRN.

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Orin Kerr on the Fourth Amendment

Anybody familiar with Fourth Amendment law knows that it is utterly incoherent. In his new paper, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, my colleague, Orin Kerr (GW Law School) argues that this incoherence is actually a good thing. He attempts to sort out the muddle that currently exists in Fourth Amendment law into four models. From the abstract:

The Fourth Amendment protects reasonable expectations of privacy, but the Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to provide a consistent explanation for what makes an expectation of privacy reasonable. The Court’s refusal has disappointed scholars and frustrated students for four decades. This article explains why the Supreme Court cannot provide an answer. It shows that there are four different tests for what makes an expectation of privacy reasonable, not one, and it argues that the Supreme Court has declined to give a single answer because the reasonable expectation of privacy framework is a bottom-up rather than top-down regulatory system. The exclusionary rule requires hundreds and even thousands of narrow rules explaining when an expectation of privacy is reasonable, and the Supreme Court hears too few cases to generate them. The Supreme Court must delegate the process of rule-creation to decentralized lower courts, and the lower courts must announce rules case-by-case. No one top-down approach can regulate this decentralized, bottom-up system, which means that the Supreme Court cannot provide a single answer to what makes an expectation of privacy reasonable. On the other hand, the existing four models reflect the needs of the bottom-up system far better than any single test. The four models provide the tools lower courts need to create localized Fourth Amendment rules that accurately identify reasonable police practices.

For anybody interested in Fourth Amendment law, Orin’s article is a must read.

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Olde Fields, New Corn, and an Inscription

hlscrest.pngI have always been facinated by the confrontation between James I and Chief Justice Edward Coke over the nature of the common law. The king asserted the right to dictate the law because, he reasoned, law was simply the expression of natural reason and the king’s reason was as good as the judges. Coke responded by conceding that the law was reason, but insisted that it was an “artificial reason” that could only be gained by deep study and long experience. Coke’s response is cryptic, and historians of greater learning than I have lavished a great deal of attention on what precisely he meant in context. I take it, however, that Coke is claiming that rules built up in the law over the centuries represent a well of experience and wisdom that exceeds what we might acquire by rational construction on a tabula rasa. As it happens I am a big fan of the common law, and I tend to have more faith in judicial caususitry than in a priori philosophical speculations. In some sense, I believe in the artificial reason of the law.

Hence, I was fancinated when I ran across Felix Frankfurter’s dedication in his 1930 book The Labor Injunction. He wrote, “To Mr. Justice Brandeis, for whom law is not a system of artificial reason, but the application of ethical ideals, with freedom at the core.” The shifts in jurisprudential world views crammed into that inscription is really quite impressive. There is also a wonderful irony in the fact that Frankfurter no doubt penned these words at the Harvard Law School, which is of course covered with the law school’s crest on which are prominently displayed sheaves of wheat. The sheaves are an allusion to Coke and another of his maxims on the law: “From olde fields, springs forth new corn.” The dirt of experience and history imagined by Coke, however, strike me as quite different — less ethereal and celestial — than the “ethical ideals” for which Frankfurter praised Brandeis.

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Privacy’s Other Path

confidential5a.jpgProfessor Neil Richards (Washington University School of Law) and I have posted on SSRN our new article, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 Georgetown Law Journal __ (forthcoming 2007). The article engages in an historical and comparative discussion of American and English privacy law, a topic that has been relatively unexplored in America.

Although the tort law of privacy in America and England arose from the very same common law cases, the law has developed on very different paths in each country. For example, in England, a friend, spouse, lover, or nearly anybody else who violates a confidence can be liable. In America, people are said to assume the risk of betrayal for many breaches of confidence; the law, however, protects against the invasion of privacy by strangers. How and why did the law develop so differently in America and England? Our new article explores the answers to these questions and debunks many myths in the conventional wisdom about privacy law.

You can download and read the article for free on SSRN. If you don’t like it, we provide a full money-back guarantee. With a deal like this, how can you lose?

Here’s the abstract:

The familiar legend of privacy law holds that Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis “invented” the right to privacy in 1890, and that William Prosser aided its development by recognizing four privacy torts in 1960. In this article, Professors Richards and Solove contend that Warren, Brandeis, and Prosser did not invent privacy law, but took it down a new path. Well before 1890, a considerable body of Anglo-American law protected confidentiality, which safeguards the information people share with others. Warren, Brandeis, and later Prosser turned away from the law of confidentiality to create a new conception of privacy based on the individual’s “inviolate personality.” English law, however, rejected Warren and Brandeis’s conception of privacy and developed a conception of privacy as confidentiality from the same sources used by Warren and Brandeis. Today, in contrast to the individualistic conception of privacy in American law, the English law of confidence recognizes and enforces expectations of trust within relationships. Richards and Solove explore how and why privacy law developed so differently in America and England. Understanding the origins and developments of privacy law’s divergent paths reveals that each body of law’s conception of privacy has much to teach the other.

We welcome any comments and suggestions for the article.

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The Myth of the Superuser

superuser.jpg

Everybody knows that the Internet is teeming with super-powerful and nefarious miscreants who are almost impossible to stop and who can cause catastrophic harms. If you need proof, simply pick up any newspaper or watch any “hacker” movie. The problem is, what everybody knows is wrong. Or, at least so I argue in my most recent article, The Myth of the Superuser: Fear, Risk, and Harm Online, which I have posted to SSRN and submitted to a law review intake inbox near you. Here’s the abstract:

Fear of the powerful computer user, “the Superuser,” dominates debates about online conflict. This mythic figure is difficult to find, immune to technological constraints, and aware of legal loopholes. Policymakers, fearful of his power, too often overreact, passing overbroad, ambiguous laws intended to ensnare the Superuser, but which are used instead against inculpable, ordinary users. This response is unwarranted because the Superuser is often a marginal figure whose power has been greatly exaggerated.

The exaggerated attention to the Superuser reveals a pathological characteristic of the study of power, crime, and security online, which springs from a widely-held fear of the Internet. Building on the social science fear literature, this Article challenges the conventional wisdom and standard assumptions about the role of experts. Unlike dispassionate experts in other fields, computer experts are as susceptible as lay-people to exaggerate the power of the Superuser, in part because they have misapplied Larry Lessig’s ideas about code.

The experts in computer security and Internet law have failed to deliver us from fear, resulting in overbroad prohibitions, harms to civil liberties, wasted law enforcement resources, and misallocated economic investment. This Article urges policymakers and partisans to stop using tropes of fear; calls for better empirical work on the probability of online harm; and proposes an anti-Precautionary Principle, a presumption against new laws designed to stop the Superuser.