The link is here. Here is the Abstract of the conference, to be held on June 9th in Istanbul:
Modern constitutions today commonly entrench at least one unamendable constitutional provision. An unamendable provision is impervious to the formal amendment rules that authorize alterations to the constitutional text. The Afghan Constitution (2004), for example, makes Islamic Republicanism unamendable, as does the Tunisian Constitution (2014). The Brazilian Constitution (1988) and German Basic Law (1949) both make federalism unamendable. Under the Portuguese Constitution (1976), political pluralism is unamendable, and the same is true of secularism in the Turkish Constitution (1982).
Are unamendable constitutional provisions undemocratic or do they reflect a deep respect for the true democratic foundations of constitutionalism? What are the functions, limits, uses and abuses of such provisions in modern constitutions? What are the optimal conditions under which they achieve the intent of their designers? What circumstances frustrate their intended purposes? This workshop invites abstracts for papers examining any issue related to unamendability, including both formal and informal forms.