Author: Frank Pasquale

The Second Machine Age & the System of Professions

Why do we have professions? Many economists give a public choice story: guilds of doctors, social workers, etc., monopolize a field by bribing legislators to keep everyone else out of the guild.* Some scholars of legal ethics buy into that story for our field, too.

But there is another, older explanation, based on the need for independent judgment and professional autonomy. Who knows whether a doctor employed by a drug company could resist the firm’s requirement that she prescribe its products off-label as often as possible. With independent doctors, there is at least some chance of pushback. Similarly, I’d be much more confident in the conclusions of a letter written by attorneys assessing the legality of a client’s course of action if that client generated, say, 1%, rather than 100%, of their business.

Andrew Abbott’s book The System of Professions makes those, and many other, critical points about the development of professions. Genuine expertise and independent judgment depend on certain economic arrangements. For Abbott, the professions exist, in part, to shield certain groups from the full force of economic demands that can be made by those with the most money or power. As inequality in the developed world skyrockets, and the superrich at the very top of the economy accumulate vastly more wealth than the vast majority of even the best-paid professionals, such protections become even more urgent.

I was reminded of Abbott’s views while reading Lilly Irani’s excellent review of Erik Brynjolffson & Andrew McAfee’s The Second Machine Age, and Simon Head’s Mindless. Irani, a former Googler, digs into the real conditions of work at leading firms of the digital economy. She observes that much of what we might consider “making” (pursuant to some professional standards) is a form of “managing:”
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Methodological Pluralism in Legal Scholarship

The place of the social science in law is constantly contested. Should more legal scholars retreat to pure doctrinalism, as Judge Harry Edwards suggests? Or is there a place for more engagement with other parts of the university? As we consider these questions, we might do well to take a bit more of a longue duree perspective–helpfully provided by David Bosworth in a recent essay in Raritan:

No society in history has more emphasized the social atom than ours. Yet the very authority we have invested in individualism is now being called into question by both the inner logic of our daily practices and by the recent findings of our social sciences. . . .

Such findings challenge the very core of our political economy’s self-conception. What, after all, do “self-reliance” and “enlightened self-interest” really mean if we are constantly being influenced on a subliminal level by the behavior of those around us? Can private property rights continue to seem right when an ecologically minded, post-modern science keeps discovering new ways in which our private acts transgress our deeded boundaries to harm or help our neighbors? Can our allegiance to the modern notions of ownership, authorship, and originality continue to make sense in an economy whose dominant technologies expose and enhance the collaborative nature of human creativity? And in an era of both idealized and vulgarized “transparency,” can privacy—-the social buffer that cultivates whatever potential for a robust individualism we may actually possess—-retain anything more than a nostalgic value?

These are provocative questions, and I don’t agree with all their implications. But I am very happy to be part of an institution capable of exploring them with the help of computer scientists, philosophers, physicians, social scientists, and humanists.

I suppose Judge Edwards would find it one more symptom of the decadence of the legal academy that I’ll be discussing my book this term at both the Institute for Advanced Studies of Culture at UVA and at MAGIC at the Rochester Institute of Technology. But when I think about who might be qualified to help lawyers bridge the gap between policy and engineering in the technology-intensive fields I work in, few might be better than the experts at MAGIC. The fellows and faculty at IASC have done fascinating work on markets and culture–work that would, ideally, inform a “law & economics” committed to methodological pluralism.
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The Black Box Society: Interviews

My book, The Black Box Society, is finally out! In addition to the interview Lawrence Joseph conducted in the fall, I’ve been fortunate to complete some radio and magazine interviews on the book. They include:

New Books in Law

Stanford Center for Internet & Society: Hearsay Culture

Canadian Broadcasting Corporation: The Spark

Texas Public Radio: The Source

WNYC: Brian Lehrer Show.

Fleishman-Hillard’s True.

I hope to be back to posting soon, on some of the constitutional and politico-economic themes in the book.

European Parliament Resolution on Google

The European Parliament voted 384 – 174 today in favor of a “resolution on Supporting Consumer Rights in the Digital Single Market.” The text of the resolution:

Stresses that all internet traffic should be treated equally, without discrimination, restriction or interference, independently of its sender, receiver, type, content, device, service or application;

Notes that the online search market is of particular importance in ensuring competitive conditions within the Digital Single Market, given the potential development of search engines into gatekeepers and their possibility of commercialising secondary exploitation of obtained information; therefore calls on the Commission to enforce EU competition rules decisively, based on input from all relevant stakeholders and taking into account the entire structure of the Digital Single Market in order to ensure remedies that truly benefit consumers, internet users and online businesses; furthermore calls on the Commission to consider proposals with the aim of unbundling search engines from other commercial services as one potential long-term solution to achieve the previously mentioned aims;

Stresses that when using search engines, the search process and results should be unbiased in order to keep internet search non-discriminatory, to ensure more competition and choice for users and consumers and to maintain the diversity of sources of information; therefore notes that indexation, evaluation, presentation and ranking by search engines must be unbiased and transparent, while for interlinked services, search engines must guarantee full transparency when showing search results; calls on Commission to prevent any abuse in the marketing of interlinked services by operators of search engines;

Some in the US tech press has played this up as an incipient effort to “break up” Google, with predictable derision at “technopanic.” (Few tend to reflect on whether the 173 former firms listed here really need to be part of one big company.) But the resolution’s linking of net and search neutrality suggests other regulatory approaches (prefigured in my 2008 paper Internet Nondiscrimination Principles: Commercial Ethics for Carriers and Search Engines). I’ve developed these ideas over the years, and I hope my recently released book‘s chapters on search and digital regulation will be of some use to policymakers. Without some regulatory oversight and supervision, our black box society will only get more opaque.

Reining in the Data Brokers

I’ve been alarmed by data brokers’ ever-expanding troves of personal information for some time. My book outlines the problem, explaining how misuse of data undermines equal opportunity. I think extant legal approaches–focusing on notice and consent–put too much of a burden on consumers. This NYT opinion piece sketches an alternate approach:

[D]ata miners, brokers and resellers have now taken creepy classification to a whole new level. They have created lists of victims of sexual assault, and lists of people with sexually transmitted diseases. Lists of people who have Alzheimer’s, dementia and AIDS. Lists of the impotent and the depressed.

***

Privacy protections in other areas of the law can and should be extended to cover consumer data. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, or Hipaa, obliges doctors and hospitals to give patients access to their records. The Fair Credit Reporting Act gives loan and job applicants, among others, a right to access, correct and annotate files maintained by credit reporting agencies.

It is time to modernize these laws by applying them to all companies that peddle sensitive personal information. If the laws cover only a narrow range of entities, they may as well be dead letters. For example, protections in Hipaa don’t govern the “health profiles” that are compiled and traded by data brokers, which can learn a great deal about our health even without access to medical records.

There’s more online, but given the space constraints, I couldn’t go into all the details that the book discloses. I hope everyone enjoys the opinion piece, and that it whets appetites for the book!

Improving Lawyers’ Efficiency, the Guantanamo Way

John Patrick Leary has a great series of posts called “Keywords for an Age of Austerity.” While he hasn’t yet taken on the term “efficiency,” it’s something we hear a lot from “Legal Rebels” nowadays. I found the following passage from an interview with philosopher Johanna Oksala very insightful on one intersection between law and efficiency:

In [my book Foucault, Politics, and Violence] I [discuss] new interrogation techniques – including waterboarding – that were introduced at Guantanamo Bay detainee camp in 2002. Philip Sand shows in his book Torture Team that what made these new, considerably more aggressive interrogation techniques possible was not the suspension of international law, but an interpretation of it that made it consistent with pregiven policy aims: the effective gathering of intelligence for national security. The law was respected by the state, but it was used strategically: the policy should have been drawn up around the law, but instead the legal advice was fitted around the policy. Legality was subsumed under efficiency and professionalism.

What’s said here of government as a client applies as well in many recent situations where firms’ corner-cutting policies were taken to lawyers, who appeared far more interested in “efficient” outcomes for their employers or clients than in bounding their actions by law. They also appeared willing to fit their ideal of “professionalism” to that overriding pursuit of efficiency. So we should be a bit cautious when we hear, bandied about, terms like “efficiency,” “innovation,” “putting the client first,” et al. in discussions of the future of the profession. Scratch the surface, and you’ll often find a definition of each that is partial, self-serving, or even Orwellian.

Legal Scholarship & the University

Just a quick note to make explicit something implicit in my last post: I not only agree with Dave Hoffman’s point about the enduring value of many modes of law teaching, but also think that we could do with a lot less defensiveness about the value of legal scholarship. It is not only the case that legal theories “have fundamentally changed our thinking about the law,” as Robin West and Danielle Citron argue. There are areas of social science presently adrift either because they have not adequately incorporated key legal insights, or because attorneys and legal scholars have failed to fully engage with key controversies and ideas. And there are fields–like political economy and finance theory–now being revitalized thanks to the efforts of legal academics. Legal scholarship exists not only to help the bench and bar, but to enrich the social sciences and humanities generally.

From Piketty to Law and Political Economy

Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the 21st Century continues to spur debate among economists. It has many lessons for attorneys, as well. But does law have something to offer in return? I make that case in my review of Capital, focusing on Piketty’s call for a renewal of the social science of political economy. My review underscores the complexity of the relationship between law and social science. Legal academics import ideas from other fields, but also return the favor by informing those fields. Ideally, the process is dialectic, with lawyers and social scientists in dialogue.

At the conference Critiquing Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation, I saw that process first hand in May. We at the Association of Professors of Political Economy and the Law (APPEAL) are planning further events and projects to continue that dialogue.

I also saw a renewed synergy between law and social sciences at the Rethinking Economics conference last month. Economists inquired about bankruptcy law to better understand the roots of the financial crisis, and identified the limits that pension law places on certain types of investment strategies.

Some of the organizers of the conference recently took the argument in a new direction, focusing on the interaction between Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) and campaign finance reform. “Leveling up” modes of campaign finance reform have often stalled because taxpayers balk at funding political campaigns. Given that private campaign funders’ return on investment has been estimated at 22,000%, that seems an unwise concession to crony capitalism. So how do we get movement on the issue?
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Announcing the We Robot 2015 Call for Papers

CommonsRobotHere is the We Robot call for papers, via Ryan Calo:

We Robot invites submissions for the fourth annual robotics law and policy conference—We Robot 2015—to be held in Seattle, Washington on April 10-11, 2015 at the University of Washington School of Law. We Robot has been hosted twice at the University of Miami School of Law and once at Stanford Law School. The conference web site is at http://werobot2015.org.

We Robot 2015 seeks contributions by academics, practitioners, and others in the form of scholarly papers or demonstrations of technology or other projects. We Robot fosters conversations between the people designing, building, and deploying robots, and the people who design or influence the legal and social structures in which robots will operate. We particularly encourage contributions resulting from interdisciplinary collaborations, such as those between legal, ethical, or policy scholars and roboticists.

This conference will build on existing scholarship that explores how the increasing sophistication and autonomous decision-making capabilities of robots and their widespread deployment everywhere from the home, to hospitals, to public spaces, to the battlefield disrupts existing legal regimes or requires rethinking of various policy issues. We are particularly interested this year in “solutions,” i.e., projects with a normative or practical thesis aimed at helping to resolve issues around contemporary and anticipated robotic applications.
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The Right to be Forgotten: Not an Easy Question

I’ve previously written on regulation of European data processing here. I’ll be presenting on the “right to be forgotten” (RtbF) in Chicago this Spring. I’ll be writing a series of posts here to prepare for that lecture.

Julia Powles offers an excellent summary of the right in question. As she explains, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has ruled that, “in some circumstances—notably, where personal information online is inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive in relation to data-processing purposes—links should be removed from Google’s search index.” The Costeja case which led to this ruling involved Google’s prominent display of results relating to the plaintiff’s financial history.

Unfortunately, some US commentators’ views are rapidly congealing toward a reflexively rejectionist position when it comes to such regulation of search engine results–despite the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s extensive regulation of consumer reporting agencies in very similar situations. Jeffrey Toobin’s recent article mentions some of these positions. For example, Jules Polonetsky says, “The decision will go down in history as one of the most significant mistakes that Court has ever made.” I disagree, and I think the opposite result would itself have been far more troubling.

Internet regulation must recognize the power of certain dominant firms to shape impressions of individuals. Their reputational impact can be extraordinarily misleading and malicious, and the potential for harm is only growing as hacking becomes more widespread. Consider the following possibility: What if a massive theft of medical records occurs, the records are made public, and then shared virally among different websites? Are the critics of the RtbF really willing to just shrug and say, “Well, they’re true facts and the later-publishing websites weren’t in on the hack, so leave them up”? And in the case of future intimate photo hacks, do we simply let firms keep the photos available in perpetuity?
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