I recently posted on SSRN a book chapter I co-authored with Professor Michael Sullivan (Emory, Philosophy). The chapter is called Radical Pragmatism and it is in The Cambridge Companion to Pragmatism pp. 324-344 (Alan Malachowski, ed. 2013). This is a much shortened version of an earlier essay we wrote critiquing Judge Richard Posner’s conception of pragmatism. We have tightened the argument, and this piece makes our key points much more succinctly. Here’s the abstract:
“[P]ragmatist theory of law is, like much pragmatist theory, essentially banal.” So wrote Thomas Grey at the dawn of pragmatism’s renaissance in legal theory. Several contemporary pragmatists, as well as a number of critics of pragmatism, view pragmatism as a thin theory, more of a method than a philosophy with substantive commitments. For example, Richard Posner, one of the leading contemporary pragmatists, asserts that “pragmatism is more a tradition, attitude, and outlook than a body of doctrine” and that it has “no inherent political valence.” Likewise, Richard Rorty contends that pragmatism “is neutral between alternative prophecies, and thus neutral between democrats and fascists.”
Under this view, pragmatism generally leads to cautious common-sense policies. It is far from radical and unsettling, for it is too lacking in substantive value commitments to be otherwise. In this book chapter, we contest this account of pragmatism and offer a thicker account. Pragmatism does indeed have a political valence. It has substantive values. And, far from being banal, it is radical at its core.
You can download the chapter on SSRN.