The Yale Law Journal Online: Preventing Policy Default: Fallbacks and Fail-safes in the Modern Administrative State
The Yale Law Journal Online has published the third in a series of responses to Benjamin Ewing and Douglas A. Kysar’s recent article, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm, which appeared in the November issue of The Yale Law Journal. In their article, Ewing and Kysar argue that the traditional constitutional model of “checks and balances” could be improved by incorporating “prods and pleas,” through which different government branches incentivize action from other branches. To set forth their argument, Ewing and Kysar explore federal climate nuisance litigation as an example and analyze how prods and pleas function in that arena.
In Preventing Policy Default: Fallbacks and Fail-safes in the Modern Administrative State, Daniel A. Farber argues that Ewing and Kysar place too much focus on common law. He writes that, with respect to climate change, “[t]he common law is simply not where the action is in today’s world.” Instead, he suggests that public law litigation and state legislative activity are more useful mechanisms for “fill[ing] the gaps created by congressional or presidential policy defaults.”
Preferred Citation: Daniel A. Farber, Preventing Policy Default: Fallbacks and Fail-safes in the Modern Administrative State, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 499 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/02/21/farber.html.
Previous responses in this series:
Richard A. Epstein, Beware of Prods and Pleas: A Defense of the Conventional Views on Tort and Administrative Law in the Context of Global Warming, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 317 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/12/06/epstein.html.
Jonathan Zasloff, Courts in the Age of Dysfunction, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 479 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/02/14/zasloff/html.