Uses of Legislative History: Scalia v. Alito
Today the Supreme Court held unanimously in Zedner v. United States that a defendant may not prospectively waive the application of the Speedy Trial Act and, therefore, a defendant’s agreement to waive the Act’s protections “for all time” in his pending criminal case was ineffective. Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion in which he reasoned that the language and purposes of the Speedy Trial Act led to the conclusion that the Act did not permit prospective waivers and that this conclusion was supported by the Act’s legislative history. Justice Scalia wrote the single concurring opinion, joining the majority opinion except for it’s use of legislative history.
Sharply criticizing Alito’s reliance on legislative history, Scalia wrote:
I believe that the only language that constitutes “a Law” within the meaning of the Bicameralism and Presentment Clause of Article I, §7, and hence the only language adopted in a fashion that entitles it to our attention, is the text of the enacted statute. . . .
It may seem that there is no harm in using committee reports and other such sources when they are merely in accord with the plain meaning of the Act. But this sort of intellectual piling-on has addictive consequences. To begin with, it accustoms us to believing that what is said by a single person in a floor debate or by a committee report represents the view of Congress as a whole—so that we sometimes even will say (when referring to a floor statement and committee report) that “Congress has expressed” thus-and-so. . . . There is no basis either in law or in reality for this naive belief. Moreover, if legislative history is relevant when it confirms the plain meaning of the statutory text, it should also be relevant when it contradicts the plain meaning, thus rendering what is plain ambiguous. Because the use of legislative history is illegitimate and ill advised in the interpretation of any statute—and especially a statute that is clear on its face—I do not join this portion of the Court’s opinion.
Given that the decision is 9-0, it’s hard to read it as early evidence of a large difference between Scalia and Alito. For that, we’d need a case in which Alito uses legislative history to buttress a statutory interpreptation with which Scalia does not otherwise agree.