0

Brian Bix Reviews Franke’s “Wedlocked: The Perils of Marriage Equality”

51UfSYDx0wL._SX336_BO1,204,203,200_Anyone interested in marriage equality will want to read Katherine Franke’s Wedlocked: The Perils of Marriage Equality (New York University Press, 2015).

Earlier this year we posted some commentaries as part of an online symposium on Wedlocked:

  Now to add to the conceptual mix, Professor Brian Bix has his own thoughtful review of Wedlocked. Those of us over at the Journal of Legal Education invited his review.

stairway-to-heaven-1319562-m-720x340
0

FAN 114 (First Amendment News) 2015 Term: What Happened to the Big Cases? — Equally Divided or Cert. Denied

The big First Amendment news of the 2015 Term was the cases the Court declined to hear. But even in the one case the Justices actually decided (4-4 cases don’t count), they were of two minds. The result: no blockbuster opinion like last Term’s Reed  Town of Gilbert (2015).

The Court’s Schizophrenic Moment 

The only First Amendment expression case the Justices actually decided was a government employee case, Heffernan v. City of Paterson (7-2). But even there, Justice Stephen Breyer’s majority opinion was (if I may) rather schizophrenic. One the one hand, the Court ruled that “when an employer demotes an employee out of a desire to prevent the employee from engaging in protected political activity, the employee is entitled to challenge that unlawful action under the First Amendment and §1983 even if, as here, the employer’s actions are based on a factual mistake about the employee’s behavior.” On the other hand, the Court “assumed that Heffernan’s employer demoted him out of an improper motive. However, the lower courts should decide in the first instance whether respondents may have acted under a neutral policy prohibiting police officers from overt involvement in any political campaign and whether such a policy, if it exists, complies with constitutional standards.”

Thus while Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006) remains the main law in the area of government-employee speech, a little wind has been taken from its sails.

  Abood Lives On 

The central issue in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association was whether Abood v. Detroit Board of Education should be overruled and public-sector “agency shop” arrangements invalidated under the First Amendment. After oral arguments, it looked like Abood was headed for the dead-precedents dumpster. Ever since Harris v. Quinn (2014), the conservative bloc of the Court seemed to be gunning for Abood.

Justice consider the rhetorical question Justice Antonin Scalia posed to Michael Carvin, counsel for Petitions: “Is ­­ is it okay to force somebody to contribute to a cause that he does believe in?” The drift of his other questions and comments moved along that conceptual track.

But Fate intervened, Justice Scalia died, and that left the Court divided 4-4, which affirmed the ruling of the Ninth Circuit in favor of the unions. Much as Heffernan saved Garretti, Friedrichs saved Abood. The rehearing petition was also denied. (See also Town of Mocksville v. Hunter, below.)

Some Important Cases — Cert. Denied 

Some big First Amendment issues came before the Court this Term, but alas, all were ducked and thus delegated to the dustbin of forgotten cases.  Just consider the following areas of the law:

  • Right of Publicity: “Whether the First Amendment protects a speaker against a state-law right-of-publicity claim that challenges the realistic portrayal of a person in an expressive work.” Despite the splits in the circuits and the confusion in the lower courts, the Justices denied the petition in Electronic Arts, Inc. v. Davis Paul M. Smith was lead counsel for the Petitioner.
  • Deceptive & Misleading Ads: “Whether a finding by the FTC that a truthful advertisement nonetheless implies a misleading message to a minority of consumers, and therefore receives no First Amendment protection, must be reviewed de novo.” POM Wonderful, LLC v. FTC Tom Goldstein was lead counsel for the Petitioner.
  • Student Speech: “Whether and to what extent public schools, consistent with the First Amendment, may discipline students for their off-campus speech.” Bell v. Itawamba County School Board Wilbur Colom was lead counsel for the Petitioner.
  • Government Employee Speech: “Whether the First Amendment protects police officers who report misconduct in their ranks to a law enforcement agency for investigation.” Town of Mocksville v. Hunter→ Philip M. Van Hoy was lead counsel for the Petitioners.
  • Occupational Speech: “Whether restrictions on occupational speech are subject to First Amendment scrutiny, or only rational-basis review.” Hines v. Alldredge. Jeffrey Rowes was lead counsel for the Petitioner.
  • Public Forum: “(1) Whether the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) created a public forum by accepting for display on its property a wide array of controversial political and public-issue ads, including ads that address the same controversial subject matter as petitioners’ pro-Israel ad, and thus violated the First Amendment by rejecting petitioners’ ad based on its content; and (2) regardless of the nature of the forum, whether the MBTA’s rejection of petitioners’ advertisement based on an advertising guideline that prohibits ads considered by MBTA officials to be “demeaning and disparaging” was a viewpoint-based restriction of speech in violation of the First Amendment.” American Freedom Defense Initiative v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority→ Robert J. Muise was lead counsel for the Petitioners.
  • Charitable Fund Solicitations: “Whether a state official’s demand for all significant donors to a nonprofit organization, as a precondition to engaging in constitutionally-protected speech, constitutes a First Amendment injury; and whether the “exacting scrutiny” standard applied in compelled disclosure cases permits state officials to demand donor information based upon generalized “law enforcement” interests, without making any specific showing of need.” Center for Competitive Politics v. Harris. → Allen Dickerson was lead counsel for the Petitioner.
  • 4 Campaign Finance Cases: [1] “Whether Mississippi can, consistent with the First Amendment, prohibit a small informal group of friends and neighbors from spending more than $200 on pure speech about a ballot measure unless they become a political committee, adopt the formal structure required of a political committee, register with the state, and subject themselves to the full panoply of ongoing record-keeping, reporting, and other obligations that attend status as a political committee.” Justice v. Houseman Paul Avelar was lead counsel for Petitioners.
  • [2] Disclosure Requirements: “Does a state’s interest in “increas[ing] . . . information concerning those who support the candidates,” Buckley v. Valeo, permit it to condition a charity’s publication of a nonpartisan voter education guide, which lists all candidates equally and makes no endorsements, upon the immediate and public disclosure of the names and addresses of individuals making unrelated donations over the previous four years?”  Delaware Strong Families v. Denn (Justice Thomas dissented from the denial of cert. and issued an opinion, and Justice Alito would have granted the petition.  Allen Dickerson was lead counsel for the Petitioner.
  • [3] Whether Hawaii’s registration, recordkeeping, and and ongoing reporting requirements violate the First Amendment as interpreted in Citizens United v. FEC. Yamada v. Snipes James Bopp, Jr., was lead counsel for the Petitioners.
  • [4] “Whether the ban on political contributions by federal contractors in 52 U.S.C. § 30119, as applied to individuals such as petitioner and the other plaintiffs, is sufficiently tailored to meet the requirements of the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment and the First Amendment to the Constitution.” Miller v. Federal Election Commission. Alan Morrison was lead counsel for the Petitioner.

Free Speech & College Campuses Read More

0

Roundup: Law and Humanities 06.28.16

 

Conferences

 

Call For Papers: 2016 Law & Society Association of Australia and New Zealand Conference

Disruption, Temporality, Law:
The Future of Law and Society Scholarship

2016 Conference of the Law & Society Association of Australia and New Zealand

30th November – 3rd December 2016

Call for Papers closes: 30th June 2016

The Call for Papers for the 2016 Law & Society Association of Australia and New Zealand Conference, hosted by the Law Futures Centre and Griffith Law School in conjunction with the Southern Cross University School of Law and Justice closes on the 30th June 2016. Details of the call for papers are attached.

We are also pleased to announce the following confirmed keynote speakers:

  • Professor William MacNeil, The Hon John Dowd Chair in Law, Dean and Head, School of Law and Social Justice, Southern Cross University
  • Professor Irene Watson, Research Professor of Law, School of Law, University of South Australia
  • More keynote announcements to come!

The conference will open on the evening of Wednesday 30th November with a public debate on “The Future of Legal Education”. Confirmed debate participants include:

  • Professor Margaret Thornton, ANU College of Law, Australian National University
  • Bill Potts, President, Queensland Law Society & Founding Director, Potts Lawyers
  • John Briton, Former Legal Services Commissioner, Queensland
  • Professor Reid Mortensen, Head of School, School of Law and Justice, University of Southern Queensland
  • Magistrate Jacqui Payne, Queensland Courts
  • Professor Charles Sampford, Director of the Institute for Ethics, Governance and Law, Griffith University

Submission of Proposals:

Please submit proposals for papers, panels or streams to LSAANZ2016@griffith.edu.au. Proposals should consist of a short abstract (max. 250 words), 3 keywords and a short biography (100 words). Panel proposals should include a title/theme for the panel, and abstracts, keywords and biographies for each presenter.

We looking forward to welcoming you to Brisbane.

The 2016 Conference Organising Committee.

Professor John Flood, Dr Timothy Peters, Dr Edwin Bikundo, Mr Shahram Dana, Dr Roshan de Silva Wijeyeratne, Associate Professor Susan Harris-Rimmer, Ms Heron Loban, Dr Jennifer Nielsen, Professor Charles Sampford and Ms Kandice Cherrie.

For Conference enquiries email: LSAANZ2016@griffith.edu.au

 

Read More

7

The Death of Popular Constitutionalism

“Popular constitutionalism” exerts significant influence in legal scholarship, including my own. There are two aspects to this approach: one descriptive and one normative. The descriptive part looks at how social movements and institutions outside of the courts interpret the Constitution and bring about change. The normative part celebrates these activities. Isn’t it wonderful when the people or elected officials take these important matters into their own hands? Courts, after all, are unelected havens for elites. My work often points out that popular constitutionalism does not always work out so well (as in Jacksonian Democracy of the rise of Jim Crow), but I think it’s fair to say that the rosy view has been the dominant one.

I think that is about to end.  Donald Trump will probably kill normative popular constitutionalism for a generation, much as jury nullification by racist Southerners killed that idea. (The Brexit referendum may also be cited as a kind of anti-precedent for popular constitutionalism, though it’s too early to say).  This social movement is going to crowd out memories of the beloved moments of popular constitutionalism, such as the Civil Rights Movement.

Indeed, I’ll go one step one further.  I think we will soon see a revival of interest in H.L. Mencken, who made his name by criticizing democracy as expressed by what he called the “booboisie.” Mencken had his own problems (like being an Anti-Semite), but his disdain for Middle America is probably going to get a more sympathetic hearing in certain quarters.

1

The House of Commons Is Now The House of Lords

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there was a healthy debate in Britain about when the unelected House of Lords could legitimately oppose the elected House of Commons.  The answer from 1832 to 1911 was that this could be done on important issues not involving the budget unless the House of Commons had a mandate from the voters, which was defined as a victory in a general election where the issue was squarely presented to the voters. In 1911, this consensus broke down when the Lords did not relent in the face of such a mandate, and a second general election and the threat of “Lords-packing” from the King was required to get the Upper House to back down and approve a statue stripping them of their absolute veto power over future legislation.

Brexit poses a related problem.  When should the elected House of Commons oppose the will of the electorate as expressed in  a referendum?  Formally, of course, the referendum was only advisory.  In practice, the current assumption is that Parliament will bow to the “Leave” vote.  Suppose, though, that in a year or two a majority of MPs conclude that Brexit would be a disaster and refuse.  In that scenario, the House of Commons would effectively be demanding that the result of the referendum be confirmed by a general election fought on that issue.

I think this would be a perfectly legitimate “sober second look” for such an important question.  If people really want to leave the EU, then the MPs who vote no on leaving would fare poorly.  Now do I think that a majority of MPs will actually resist the result of the referendum?  Right now, I’d say no.  Things might look different in 2017 though.

3

Dads Change Diapers Too

This is my third and final post about fathers as caregivers, drawing from some of my own experiences as a dad. (Earlier posts are available here and here.)

Father’s Day this year was really special because my husband, two-year-old daughter, and I celebrated on vacation in New York. We had a really lovely time overall. The trip was, however, also memorable because of this—have a look at this photo.

LaGuardia Airport, Terminal B, Concourse C

LaGuardia Airport, Terminal B, Concourse C

This is the United Airlines counter at LaGuardia Airport, Terminal B, Concourse C. I warily crouched down in the narrow space behind this counter to change my daughter’s diaper on the floor. I did it as fast as I could, feeling awkward about being there. I tried not to get in the way of the airline agents who were working behind the counter, and I shuddered at the thought of how dirty the floor might be.

My daughter and I were traveling home alone because my husband returned earlier for work. The agents at the ticket counter confirmed that there were no diaper changing facilities for fathers—no changing table in the men’s restroom, and no family restroom. The only diaper changing table was in the women’s room.

I suggested that I place my daughter’s changing pad on the table behind the ticket counter and change her there, but the airline agents said, understandably, that I needed to find someplace more discreet. The airport was bustling with people at every corner. After looking around, the agents offered to let me squeeze behind their ticket counter and use the cramped floor space there.

That was the best option we could think of. I didn’t want to subject my fellow travelers to the sight (and possible smell) of a diaper change, especially the folks who were enjoying their meals nearby. I also didn’t want my daughter and me to have to deal with the glare of onlookers. So, behind the counter we retreated.

Lack of men’s access to diaper changing facilities always makes me wonder what year we’re living in. Isn’t it about time we got behind the idea that men change diapers too?

Placing diaper changing tables exclusively in women’s restrooms is a problem because, as I discussed earlier, men’s access to diaper changing facilities is important to the health and well-being of the children we love and care for. Excluding men from diaper changing facilities also troubles me because it reflects and reinforces the outdated cultural assumption that taking care of young children is strictly a woman’s role.

Access to diaper changing facilities is particularly important at airports because waiting to change the diaper on the plane presents challenges. Not all airplanes have diaper changing tables. Moreover, parents are not permitted to get out of their seats to change a diaper during take-off, landing, and periods of turbulence in between.

Cities like Honolulu, Miami, and San Francisco have laws that give men and women a right of equal access to diaper changing facilities. State Senator Brad Hoylman has proposed legislation that would make New York the first state to require new and newly renovated buildings to give men and women equal access to diaper changing stations. I hope his bill will become law. Unfortunately, Governor Brown of California vetoed similar measures in 2014.

At the federal level, Congresswoman Tammy Duckworth of Illinois has introduced the Friendly Airports for Mothers Act, which would require airports to provide lactation rooms. I think it would be great to pass an even broader law that addresses diaper changing facilities in addition to lactation rooms. This could make airports friendlier not only to mothers, but also to fathers. In the meantime, I have contacted LaGuardia Airport to request that they install changing tables in all of their men’s rooms.

To be clear, the agents at the ticket counter were really kind to my daughter and me. The main woman whom I spoke with expressed her own disappointment with what she called the airport’s “double standard.” Let’s fix this double standard.

The good news for the immediate future is that my daughter has made great strides with potty training. I’m so proud of her! Our days of having to hide behind an airline ticket counter are numbered. Still, this is a bigger issue that needs to be addressed.

For more of my writing about fatherhood, please check out my forthcoming law review essay entitled “Shaping Expectations about Dads as Caregivers: Toward an Ecological Approach.”

1

The Internal Dynamics of the Court

The result in Fisher was surprising, but the case illustrates an important point about how appellate courts work.  In Fisher I, the scuttlebutt is that a majority opinion was drafted (possibly by Justice Kennedy) to strike down the UT admissions plan and place new obstacles in the way of racial preferences in higher education. Justice Sotomayor then circulated a draft dissent that was, by all accounts, very fierce (some of which made its way into her subsequent dissent in the University of Michigan case).  This dissent caused the majority to back down and the compromise remand to the Fifth Circuit.  In the interim, something caused Justice Kennedy to change his mind (though we won’t know what for a long time.)

The point is that dissents are not just expressions of discontent or appeals to the future.  Sometimes they actually change the outcome of a case. This is why knowing who the influential Justices are is impossible until long after decisions are made, because we usually don’t know how those internal conversations go.

14

The New House Filibuster

I would bet that the sit-in tactic used yesterday by the House Democrats will become more common over time.  It’s pretty easy to find 50 House members who feel strongly about something and would be willing to tie up the chamber and rotate in protest.  The Speaker in these situations would be loathe to use the Sergeant-At-Arms to arrest these members or bar them from the chamber–that would look awful. And if social media can broadcast the protest even when the House is in recess, then there is no disincentive to do this other than the physical discomfort. (Sure, those broadcasts violated the House rules, but again, I doubt that the majority will do anything about that.)

Granted, this was not a true filibuster in that the Speaker was able (by ignoring the shouts of protest) to conduct business, but of course only very limited business can be conducted if the well of the House is occupied and speakers cannot be heard.

0

FAN 113 (First Amendment News) “Abrams Court” Breaks with Tradition & Allows Cameras in Courtroom

 

June 15, 2016, Washington, D.C. It was a remarkable moment when the Abrams Court sat to hear the case of Pear v. United States. The two issues before the eight-member Court were:

1.) Does the All Writs Act empower a court to compel a third-party to design new software to provide the “reasonable technical assistance” contemplated by the Supreme Court in United States v. New York Telephone Company, 434 U.S. 159 (1977)?

2.) Does a court order requiring a technology company to develop software to overcome security measures and to authenticate the software to obtain access to private information violate the First Amendment?

Chief Justice Floyd Abrams

Chief Justice Floyd Abrams

Before oral arguments in the novel case began, however, Chief Justice Floyd Abrams (suited in his specially-designed robe) made the following announcement:

At the outset, I have an  announcement. As may be evident, this proceeding of this Court will be televised. This Court has long barred cameras from our courtroom  for publicly unstated and perhaps difficult to defend reasons.

At that point the Chief Justice paused and smiled, and then continued:

Whatever the wisdom of that decision in the past, we see no reason to do so today and a powerful basis to allow cameras today. This is an important case, one in which there is great and deserved public interest. Allowing the public to see this branch of government in this public phase of its work is undoubtedly in the public interest and we serve that interest by opening this Court to far greater public scrutiny.

The Chief Justice next turned to counsel and admonished them:

I am confident that counsel will comport themselves appropriately and have no doubt that members of this Court will do so. 

With that the video-recorded moot court event hosted by the Newseum Institute began. Noted First Amendment lawyers Robert Corn-Revere and Ronald G. London represented Pear, and argued that the United States was asking the fictional company to create an entirely new function in providing access to an iPhone, thus creating new literary work — which would be protected by the First Amendment. (See Petitioners’ brief here)

Former assistant U.S. Attorney Joseph DeMarco, and co-counsel Jeffrey Barnum, a legal scholar and lawyer specializing in criminal and First Amendment law, argued the government does have the authority to compel companies to assist in a criminal investigation, and that there was no First Amendment protection for the kind of work the government was seeking — providing access only to a phone, not to the data it contained — for this single phone only.  (See Respondent’s’ brief here)

R.I. Governor Veteos “Revenge Porn” Bill

First Amendment lawyers and advocates have expressed concerns that htis particular bill is overbroad and vague, and, if enacted, will turn Rhode Island into an outlier on the protection of free speech. — Gov. Gina Raimondo

Gov. Gina Raimondo

Gov. Gina Raimondo

According to WPRI-12 News, “Gov. Gina Raimondo has issued the first veto of her tenure, rejecting a proposed ban on so-called ‘revenge porn’ as unconstitutional due to First Amendment concerns, her office announced Tuesday.”

“The bill, which cleared the General Assembly last week, was backed by Attorney General Peter Kilmartin. Supporters said it was designed to punish individuals who distribute sexually explicit material without the consent of everyone involved.”

“But watchdog groups including the American Civil Liberties Union and the New England First Amendment Coalition had urged Raimondo to veto the bill, describing it as unconstitutional, and in the end the governor agreed.”

We do not have to choose between protecting privacy rights and respecting the principles of free speech. The right course of action is . . . [to] craft a more carefully worded law that specifically addresses the problem of revenge porn, without implicating other types of constitutionally protected speech. — Gov. Gina Raimondo

Full Text of Governor Raymond’s veto message here.

8th Circuit Orders New Trial in Jesse Ventura Defamation Case

Here are the key facts as described in Chief Judge William Riely’s majority opinion in Ventura v. Kyle (8th Cir., June 13, 2016):

Jesse Ventura

Jesse Ventura

“Before his death, Chris Kyle was a sniper for a United States Navy Sea, Air and Land (SEAL) team. He authored the book American Sniper: The Autobiography of the Most Lethal Sniper in U.S. Military History (American Sniper). In the book, Kyle described punching a ‘celebrity’ referred to as ‘Scruff Face’ who was making offensive remarks about the SEALs at a gathering following the funeral of a SEAL killed in combat. In interviews about the book, Kyle revealed ‘Scruff Face’ was James Janos, better known as Jesse Ventura. Ventura, who was at the bar but denied a fight occurred, sued Kyle in this diversity action under Minnesota law for defamation, misappropriation, and unjust enrichment, alleging Kyle fabricated the incident. The jury found in favor of Ventura on the defamation claim, awarding $500,000 in damages, and found in Kyle’s favor on the misappropriation claim. Serving in its advisory role as to the equitable unjust-enrichment claim, the jury recommended an award of approximately $1.35 million, which the district court adopted. Kyle appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.”

The majority opinion (joined by Judge Bobby Shepherd) reversed the unjust-enrichment judgment and vacated and remanded the defamation judgment for a new trial.

Judge Lavenski Smith concurred in part and dissented in part: “I concur in the majority’s reversal of the unjust-enrichment judgment. However, I disagree with majority’s decision to vacate and remand the defamation judgment for a new trial because of references to insurance in trial testimony and closing argument.”

→ Floyd Abrams joined by Susan Buckley and Merriam Mikhail filed an amicus brief on behalf of 33 media companies and organizations contesting the award. In it, the trio of lawyers advanced two main arguments:

  1. The Common Law Does Not Recognize and the Constitution Does Not Permit an Award of a Book’s Profits as a Remedy for Defamation, and
  2. The Award of Profits from American Sniper is Tantamount to an Award of Punitive Damages, Damages that Are Not Permitted Against the Estate

Court Dismisses Challenge to Met Depictions of Paintings of Jesus Read More

0

Roundup: Law and Humanities 06.20.16

So much going on in law and humanities these days that it’s hard to pick and choose what to bring you. Here’s a sampling.

Conferences

There will be a Conference on Law and Ritual September 22-23, 2016 Leeuwarden, The Netherlands, sponsored by Voices of Law.

Here is a link to the conference website.

Follow news of the conference on Twitter:  #LawAndRitual @VoicesofLaw

_____

The organizers of the LSU Conference on Law, Authorship, and Appropriation are still accepting paper proposals for the Conference, which will take place at LSU A&M, Baton Rouge, on October 28 and 29, 2016. The original call (with updated dates) is reproduced below.

Call for Papers

By Any Other’s Name: A Conference on Law, Authorship, and Appropriation

Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, October 28-29, 2016

On October 28-29, 2016, the LSU College of Music and Dramatic Arts, LSU School of Theatre, the LSU Law Center, LSU’s ORED (Office of Research and Economic Development) and the Law and Humanities Institute will co-sponsor a conference on law, authorship, and appropriation on the LSU A and M campus in Baton Rouge, LA. This conference will bring together scholars, performers, and students to discuss law and authorship in the face of challenges issued by artists who engage in appropriation—the practice of taking the works of others to rethink or recreate new works.

Some artists who engage in appropriation may describe their activities as parody, sampling, or remixing. Some artists whose work is appropriated may describe the result as misappropriation. Writers might describe the use or reuse of words variously as hommage or plagiarism. Lawyers weigh in both sides of the issue, interpreting such reuse as fair use or infringement, depending on the circumstances.

Digital technology creates a host of new considerations, from the opportunity for a creator to license rights up-front (or not at all) to opportunities for users to create content cooperatively, either on the Web or in face-to-face settings.

What do such changes, in law and in aesthetics and art, mean for our understandings of authorship and the relationship between creator and audience? Do words like “author” and “creator” even continue to have meaning?

Read More